Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation (5 page)

Together, ASEAN and Myanmar’s Asian neighbours enjoy more influence in Yangon than Western countries do, but precisely how they will use this influence remains to be seen. India, China, and Japan seem likely to continue to compete for strategic influence in a rather empty contest, and each will be less than satisfied with the highly nationalistic and nonrational policy responses of the SPDC. But whether India, China or Japan would ever be prepared to play a more direct role to encourage political change remains to be seen. So far each of these countries has
been at pains to avoid taking on such a thankless role. Whether anything might come out of any Indonesian messages that convey quietly but directly to the regime their concerns about its lack of forward movement is also still unclear.

A stronger anti-UN sentiment seems to be emerging amongst the new SPDC leadership, and this could lead to even greater difficulties for UN Special Envoy Razali, for the ILO presence in Yangon, and perhaps even for other more established UN activities in Myanmar. Whether any hiccups are just short-term, and can be overcome with patience and persistence, or whether they will translate into longer-term problems, remains to be seen. If such setbacks to the broader role played by the United Nations were to eventuate, it could take some time for this ground to be recovered.

At the same time, while the intensity of the limited Western sanctions against the regime has increased over the past three years, the political impact of sanctions is negligible, and will remain so as long as Myanmar’s powerful neighbours, China and India, continue to underpin the country, as seems most likely. Indeed, the use of non-UN sanctions has probably, if anything, hardened regime attitudes on whether or not to concede to demands for change from the international community. The judgments on this question by Robert Taylor and by
Morten Pedersen
in their chapters are difficult to gainsay. They reinforce the carefully-balanced assessment made two years earlier in the conference on “Reconciliation in Myanmar and the Crises of Change” at Johns Hopkins University that “there is little evidence to support the idea that sanctions alone have played a significant role in causing the changes in Burma/Myanmar since 2000”.
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Morten Pedersen makes the case for a more intelligent, comprehensive approach to providing assistance that does not exclude working with decision-makers but rather seeks to influence them.

Whereas in some other conflict-torn states, returning expatriates have made a significant contribution both to national reconstruction and national reconciliation, there is little sign yet of this occurring in any significant way in Myanmar.
Zaw Oo
presents a comprehensive description of the successful move to internet campaigning by the Burma opposition groups overseas. Yet he, too, acknowledges their difficulties in achieving the primary goal of regime change.

In the context of the debate in recent years over sanctions versus “engagement”, several speakers were asked to focus on the nature of international assistance inside Myanmar, and to provide real life “case
studies” in various sectors. Little coverage of such experiences can be found in conferences on Burma or in published literature until now, because such activities are clearly not regarded as “politically correct” by the most vocal activists and by some foreign governments. The relatively positive outcomes from much of this sort of assistance also remain less well known, and it is not sufficiently recognized for its contributions, but equally have yet to demonstrate that its undoubted improvements can be sustained.

Viewing the situation from a Myanmar perspective,
U Myint
demonstrates that there is considerable scope for international assistance to influence policy development and implementation in a much more “hands on” way.

One of the underlying reasons why change in Myanmar has not been propelled by pressures from within the country is the extremely debilitated state of civil society structures. Anyone visiting or working in the country, even briefly, cannot but be surprised by the present sorry state of affairs. So it was reasonable for the 2004 Update Conference to examine once again the role, if any, of civil society in promoting change.

As
David Steinberg
reports in his chapter, domestic civil society has been so comprehensively suppressed, not only under the SLORC/SPDC regime but also during the Ne Win period, that it will remain weak and in an embryonic state for the foreseeable future. In most countries civil society forms the strong and essential underpinning for the creation of democratic forces, but in Myanmar it has been drastically weakened by decades of active official restriction and is unlikely to play a determining role in achieving national reconciliation at this stage. But the momentum towards adopting the new Constitution has increased, however slightly, and it will be hard for the SPDC to turn back increasing grass-roots interest in greater community participation in development and empowerment. As Steinberg cogently demonstrates, the military regime’s lack of legitimacy and the absence of broad-based civil society structures are closely linked.

David Tegenfeldt
and
Karl Dorning
provide unique first-hand insights in asking how international non-government organizations can contribute through strengthening civil society structures and encouraging positive change. Taking examples of how civil society roles in some other key
internal conflicts were an essential ingredient in the major transformations that occurred, and with the insights that come from their many years of immersion in Myanmar society and culture, both are optimistic about the capacity of Myanmar people to respond although they recognize the enormity of the residual problems.

David Tegenfeldt calls for more strategic and more conscious efforts to promote change in Myanmar than have been applied in the past. His suggestion of drawing lessons from other historically significant internal conflicts is neither far-fetched nor theoretical. Karl Dorning details how international NGOs are already playing a significant role in re-building civil society, but also argues that this is nowhere near enough, given the manifest needs in Myanmar.

So far there has been little spill-over from the very limited presence of foreign investors in Myanmar. The main reason for this, apart from the general imperviousness of the country to outside influences under the military regime, is the reality that most foreign investors are obliged to operate through joint ventures with government-run or government-directed organizations.

Richard Jones
explains how foreign investors inevitably encounter certain compromising situations in their relationship with the authorities, but outlines how these can be dealt with effectively by suitable preparations and sensitivity. In carrying out its social programmes in Myanmar, Premier Oil systematically sought input from a range of experts in order to ensure — to the extent this was possible — that its commercial activities and related social programmes were carried out in a way that was sensitive to community concerns. These experts — mainly from universities — advised Premier Oil on social and humanitarian aspects of their operations (Warwick, Essex Universities in the UK, Monash and Western Sydney Universities in Australia) as well as on the particular cultural and political contexts in which Premier Oil was functioning in Myanmar. Given that interaction between foreign investors and the government authorities is a fact of life in a country like Myanmar, it behoves foreign investors to be extremely sensitive to local conditions and to assume a measure of ethical responsibility for their activities in a systematic way. There is no evidence
to date of foreign investors being punished by the authorities for taking principled positions on workplace issues and on the social and economic context in which they are operating. But there is also not much evidence yet of improved working conditions and labour practices arising from the presence of foreign investors. This could easily change if foreign direct investment were to grow more rapidly in the future, but this seems unlikely for the moment, given the recent extension of sanctions by certain Western countries.

Sean Turnell’s
incisive snapshot of the SPDC’s mismanagement of the financial and banking problems during 2003–04 demonstrate both the compound impact of inept military controls of the economy and the resilience of the subsistence economy. One key point in his analysis is the absence so far of any measurable macro-economic impact from sanctions.

As Turnell notes at the end of his assessment of the economy, while the broad economic impact of sanctions is still difficult to measure, there have been undeniable short-term adverse effects on employment, business activity and (indirectly) on overall living standards. But this does not foreshadow the economic collapse of the regime. In all probability, any impacts from sanctions will continue to be mitigated in various ways, with flows of assistance from China, India, and Japan picking up in recent years. Without a move to more universal sanctions, a collapse arising from sanctions can be ruled out. Any move to wider, UN-based sanctions clearly remains out of the question, however.

Agriculture was given considerable attention at this 2004 conference, as health had been on previous occasions. Arguably, agriculture can also be the source of powerful humanitarian welfare improvements, and certainly in Myanmar it occupies a leading place in economic development. Interestingly, when in 2002 the SPDC sought to show Aung San Suu Kyi examples of progress under their administration, it was agricultural infrastructure and power generation projects that they took her to see. From her point of view, Aung San Suu Kyi did not dispute this choice, and subsequently told observers in Yangon that she was impressed by some of the government projects and respected the dedication and skills of government technicians.

Clearly, the main requirement for greater progress in agricultural development is to allow market forces to function without intervention from the government, while ensuring that the government provides an
overall strategic policy that takes account of food security needs, and of Myanmar’s domestic diversity of climates and natural endowments, at the same time as ensuring consistency and predictability of policy.

Graeme Batten
and
Myo Win
argue that improvements in infrastructure are an essential pre-requisite for achieving progress in efficient and sustainable agricultural development. They provide a wealth of information about the agricultural sector, while identifying shortcomings and areas for future international assistance aimed at improving food security and thereby alleviating poverty, which they argue should be accorded the same priority as health by the international community. Theirs is a more optimistic perspective than that of Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung in the 2002 Myanmar Update.
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They also acknowledge the underlying constraints arising from the absence of a fully-developed, market-driven macro-agricultural policy. But modest changes have been occurring in agricultural policy, and the Rector of the Yezin Agriculture University,
Dr Kyaw Than,
in his introductory commentary openly recognizes many shortcomings and the need for international assistance to help overcome various obstacles.

John Copland
provides an experienced and balanced view of Myanmar’s agricultural needs, based on his extensive experience of working in the developing agricultural economies of Southeast Asia. He also offers publicly, for the first time, case studies of two projects currently under way in Myanmar with financial support from the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR). Aung San Suu Kyi, who was consulted about these projects before they began, was impressed by the way in which they were designed to ensure that direct benefits would go to the people.

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Despite Western and Asian expressions of concern about the excessively “leisurely” pace of change, realistically the maximum one might expect might be the completion of a referendum and establishment of a transitional government under the military by mid-2006. National reconciliation is likely to be a drawn-out gradual process, rather than a single event or agreement.

The new leadership will probably remain highly risk-averse for the immediate future, and there is little sign so far of the major change in attitude necessary if they are to accomplish their own agenda in any
reasonable time-frame. A move into a period of isolationism cannot be ruled out, but this is likely to be short-term, because Myanmar’s integration with the region is too great to be ignored or reversed, and because the SPDC depends on assistance from China and India in particular.

Severe cleavages in society need to be mediated. While it is not clear how this might be achieved, given the lack of organizations with a track record of success in dealing with the military authorities, perseverance with any practical form of engagement helps. In the meantime, the SPDC’s essential lack of legitimacy — and their basic inability to overcome this through their current approaches — will remain a major obstacle to a long-term political solution. While it is increasingly hard to identify what might prove to be the catalyst for change, it is nevertheless important to keep trying to find solutions that can break the deadlock between the two opposing sides. A more pro-active — but mutually acceptable — political role by the United Nations could still be a long way off, but this would only be possible if key UN member states such as China, the United States, and Myanmar itself, could agree on it.