Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation (9 page)

A second internal factor which may ensure that the entropy that allowed the events of 1988 to occur is not repeated, is the necessity for economic development. This may drive the army not only to insist on more rational and business-sensitive economic policies, but also to provide an opportunity for civilians to begin to share power with the military. Alfred Stephan, in his book
Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone,
³³
described how, because of the desire by politicized conventional armies to have new and expensive equipment, such groups seek overall economic growth in order to increase government revenues. This tends to turn the infantry against the intelligence corps, which, with its much-less-mechanized operations, is primarily concerned with political control rather than with economic growth. Aware as it is of its own strategic vulnerability, and more aware of the advanced economies and weapons systems of the country’s neighbours than it was in the days when General Ne Win determined security policy, the army may insist on putting economic growth higher up the policy agenda than has previously been the case.

It may not be insignificant that the first public meeting at which the new Prime Minister spoke included not only senior government officials but also what were described as indigenous entrepreneurs from the Chamber of Commerce and other business organizations. By including what the
New Light of Myanmar
quoted him as describing as “the very well to do” in the meeting, he implied that they too had a role in the future of the country as seen from the perspective of the new order.
³⁴
It is, perhaps, not insignificant that also present on this occasion and speaking about the business climate was General Thura Shwe Mann, third in the new hierarchy of the regime and Joint Chief of Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force.
³⁵
This meeting stands in contrast to the last large address to senior members of the government given by General Khin Nyunt in August 2003, when he announced the constitutional roadmap. Apparently no members of the private sector were invited to attend.

The major external factor which makes a repeat of the scenario of 1983–88 unlikely is the marked change in Myanmar’s international position. This has come about as a result of the end of the Cold War, the increasing economic integration among the economies of Asia, and the SPDC’s own more vigorous diplomacy as it has sought to defend itself from the effects of criticisms and economic and political sanctions applied by the United States and the European Union. Myanmar’s membership of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is one element of this diplomatic effort. Only minor aspects of the changed situation in which Myanmar found itself in 2004 are reversible. Moreover, although there are, no doubt, members of the top levels of the army and government who hold what the rest of the world has to offer in the kind of disdain which demonstrates that they are the true sons of General Ne Win, even the most die-hard among the military know that the technology and economic modernization they seek in order to enhance the national defence capabilities (let alone their own personal interests) is only available through the ever-increasing integration of Myanmar into the larger Eurasian economy.

This realisation came simultaneously with the creation of the SLORC. Ministers at that time proudly announced how many international organizations their respective ministries had joined or rejoined. Invitations for foreign capital to invest in Myanmar were issued almost immediately after the military resumed sole control of the regime. “Socialism is dead; long live the Myanmar road to capitalism, with the help of our foreign friends” might well have been the slogan of the early SLORC. Changes in China were fundamental to this, not least the withdrawal of support by the Chinese Communist Party for the Burmese Communist Party nearly a decade earlier and China’s turn to the capitalist road. Not only did this pave the way for the ceasefire agreements with the Kachin, Wa, and Kokang on the Chinese border, but it also meant that China came to be seen both as a market for Myanmar and as a source of capital and technology as well as military equipment. The arms embargoes that most
North American and Western European countries applied following the army’s suppression of the “pro-democracy” demonstrators in 1988 were, consequently, little noticed except by Western arms exporters.

The economic sanctions that have been applied increasingly stringently by the United States and the European Union since the United States Congress in 1996 passed legislation banning all new investments by American companies have politically had an equally negligible effect on the regime. The ever-tightening sanctions policy has limited the overall degree of economic growth in Myanmar, but has also had the effect of making the regime both more self-reliant and more indebted to its Asian neighbours, while increasing its defensiveness in dealing with Western governments. Sanctions have merely confirmed in the minds of the generals the soundness of their policies and the traitorous behaviour of those Myanmar citizens inside and outside the country who advocate the maintenance of existing sanctions and organize boycotts of Myanmar goods and the Myanmar tourist industry.
³⁶

While the sanctions that the United States has applied have received most international attention because of their implications for foreign investment and, since mid-2003, for US-dollar-denominated transactions in Myanmar,
³⁷
European Union sanctions have also been in place for some years. Having agreed amongst themselves to withdraw all military attaches from Myanmar and to insist that Myanmar station no official military attaches in European capitals, European governments have thus denied themselves one form of access to the military and, therefore, to the current government. Bans have also been placed on the issuance of visas to senior military figures and their families. Grandchildren as young as toddlers are thus unable to avail themselves of European health and educational services. Assets held by senior Myanmar officials have also been frozen. The elaborate financial trawl necessary for such an asset freeze revealed an extraordinarily small amount of money, almost certainly much less than the cost of the accountants who did the work. In October 2004 the visa ban was extended to include all military officers down to brigadiergeneral rank and their families unto the third generation.
³⁸

As American and European interests in human rights in Myanmar are insufficient to threaten, let alone implement, more drastic measures toward the regime, the government has largely dismissed Western pressure from their calculations.
³⁹
In view of the success of the government
and some ceasefire groups, with United Nations assistance, in further reducing the production of opium, corroborated independently by joint U.S.-Myanmar survey teams, officials in Yangon must wonder what it takes to get cooperation on specific issues of significance to the international community. The deepening engagement with Asia as both a counter-weight to the minimal consequences of Western sanctions and as a way of gaining access to development resources will ensure that Myanmar remains internationally active. The acceptance of Myanmar at the Asia-Europe summit in Hanoi in October 2004 underscored this reality for the regime.

As a result of the veto which the United States and some other major states have placed on the granting of major structural adjustment and development assistance loans and grants by international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Asian Development Bank, Myanmar is not integrated into the world financial system. There is no possibility of an IMF president standing over Senior General Than Shwe as he signs a humiliating loan agreement as happened to President Suharto of Indonesia near the end of his reign.

While Western-dominated institutions have no capacity to pressure the regime in Yangon, the same is not true of Myanmar’s Asian neighbours. China has extended major loans to Myanmar, including US$400 million in 2004 while writing off US$73 million at the same time. India has also become a major funder of the Myanmar state. Although non-payment of outstanding debt presumably would have little impact on these relationships, if Myanmar seeks additional funding for development assistance or, if the economy does not improve, for recurrent expenditures such as the purchase of petroleum products, good relations with the country’s giant neighbours will be essential. Since India and China are likely sources of foreign investment and economic assistance, as are the major ASEAN states and Japan, Asian states will in time develop even more influence in Myanmar.

More immediately, another factor limits the ability of the Myanmar government to ignore its Asian neighbours. This is its membership of ASEAN. Myanmar was scheduled to assume the chairmanship of the association in mid-2006 and host a summit of ASEAN and ASEAN-dialogue partner states in 2007. While it seemed unlikely that the United States and
perhaps the European Union would send representatives to such a meeting, it would have been hugely embarrassing to the other members of ASEAN as well as to the government of Myanmar if countries such as Japan and South Korea were to boycott the summit, which seemed highly unlikely. If Japan and South Korea do attend, this would undermine the effect of a Western boycott. The minimum that would be expected before the United States or the Europeans would consider attending a summit hosted by Yangon would be significant progress toward the achievement of a constitutional government in Myanmar.

If measurable progress on the political roadmap laid out by General Khin Nyunt in August 2003 is not achieved by the end of 2005, the competence of the government of Myanmar to fulfil its promises will be sorely undermined. Just as the declaration by the United Nations in 1987 that Myanmar had joined a number of African states as one of the “least developed countries” undermined the tattered legitimacy of the BSPP regime, so a decision by ASEAN to skip the turn of Myanmar to chair the Association would be seen by large parts of the politically-aware public in Myanmar, including within the armed forces, as a demonstration of the incompetence of the SPDC. The possibility of this happening, however, seems extremely unlikely.

The resumption of the constitutional convention, previously expected to take place in mid-November but later postponed until 17 February 2005, is the crucial next step in proceeding down the route of constitutional government. After the convention concludes, possibly in April or following a final session in June-July 2005, a draft constitution will have to be prepared and readied for a referendum. The organization of the latter, if done in the deliberative manner of the referendum held for the adoption of the 1974 constitution, would take several years. It would seem that to satisfy the concerns of the ASEAN countries (unspoken as yet in public, although they may have been voiced in private), such a leisurely schedule would be unacceptable.
⁴⁰
While it would probably be impossible by mid-2006 to move further along the path set out by the roadmap than successful completion of the referendum and the establishment of a transitional government under the military, that is the minimum that one might expect.

While this puts pressure on the government to move forward on the constitutional process, this situation does not necessarily bode well for the political future of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. Asian states have already discounted and grown weary of the double standards that the West applies to Myanmar, in contrast to their relations with, say, some states in the Middle East or elsewhere with even more egregious human rights records. In some ways, the self-isolation of the United States, and possibly of the European Union, from Asian international politics plays to the interests of some major Asian states. So continued exclusion of the NLD from the convention and permanent detention of Daw Aung San Kyi is probably inevitable, without a major change in their political strategy, if not their complete capitulation to the army.

The period between March 2005 and the middle of the year will be crucial for the success of the constitutional process and for the government. The new prime minister probably has significantly less latitude for initiative than his experienced predecessor had (until the final months of his tenure). For the reasons outlined above, the possibility also exists that the entire state machine will become more risk-adverse and conservative than it has been recently. But the government is going to have to deal with issues which are raised by the constitutional convention, not least the desire of the ceasefire groups and other representatives of the ethnic minorities for a viable degree of autonomy as well as a reasonable degree of development assistance. This will not only add to the political pressure on the army but will also highlight the need to develop more rational and consistent market-oriented economic policies.

Given the new political situation that follows from the dismissal of General Khin Nyunt as the third pillar of the SPDC, more now rests on the sagacity and farsightedness of one man than at any time since the fall of Chairman Ne Win. The capacity of Senior General Than Shwe to maintain the support of his military subordinates, to allow rational economic policies to be implemented, to maintain positive relations with China, India, and the major ASEAN member states, particularly Thailand, and to see the successful implementation of the next steps of the roadmap to constitutional government, is a huge challenge. Many variables will be outside his control and events may override intentions. Until now, the Senior General has been remarkable for revealing little of himself and his capacities. That is about to change.