Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation (12 page)

Over the past few years it has been clear that there has been a growing division within Burma’s military leadership on how to maintain the army’s political role in the future and develop the country. Than Shwe’s approach in recent years has been to revitalize the army and strengthen the military. Than Shwe has a clear vision of the future of the military — and it is not one in which the army plays second fiddle to a civilian administration. General Than Shwe has made no secret of the fact that he expects to rule the country for at least another decade, according to a senior military source close to the top general. This has been institutionalized in the draft constitution, in that the president must be a military man, while the defence minister must also be an army commander.

But Than Shwe understands that for the army to remain in a position of control it needs to be strengthened and reformed. With more than 400,000 armed soldiers and officers, it is already the largest standing army in the world apart from that of China. In the two years 2003–04 the army has been making major purchases of hardware, including significant purchases from the Ukraine.

General Than Shwe is renowned for being cautious and xenophobic, as well as authoritarian. He does not trust his subordinates. Several years ago he told a senior army commander that he mistrusted both his immediate subordinates, Maung Aye and Khin Nyunt, because he felt they were “hot-heads” who had a tendency to make snap decisions. In the past few years he has led something of a hermit’s life — seeing few people and
confiding in even fewer. “He sits in a cocoon — his own padded room — meets few people and listens to none,” according to a Western diplomat in Rangoon. But he does spend time surfing the Internet on his computer and understands that this is the future — and one which Burma must encompass, according to a military official in the Senior General’s office. (It should be noted that here that many analysts believe Than Shwe does not have a good grasp of English. This is not true. He speaks and understands English extremely well. Both the UN envoy, Razali Ismail, and the former Indonesia foreign minister, Ali Alatas, have told me that they had long conversations with the General in English.)

In 2004 Than Shwe ordered all senior commanders in the army to learn how to use computers and access the Internet. Army officers of the rank of colonel and above were recently told to buy their own personal computers, according to military sources. Several hundred junior military officers have been sent to Russia and India for computer training. Senior officers in the army now have to pass examinations in English to get promotion. This is all part of Than Shwe’s vision to revitalize the army and ensuring that it has an enduring role in Burma’s political future.

The power-struggle within the military has thrown the future of Burma’s national reconciliation process into serious doubt. The National Convention resumed drafting a new constitution in May 2004 and is continuing to prepare for a referendum on the constitution in the future.

The former prime minister Khin Nyunt was often seen as the driving force behind the national reconciliation process, but immediately after his arrest the regime’s leaders were at pains to assure the international community that the State Peace and Development Council was committed to the roadmap. Days after Khin Nyunt was ousted, the new Burmese Foreign Minister, Nyan Win, told diplomats in Rangoon that it was “business as usual,” according to a Western-based diplomat in Rangoon who attended the Foreign Minister’s briefing. Later, the Chairman of the National Convention Convening Commission, Lieutenant-General Thein Sein, said, “[W]ith a view to seeing the emergence of a peaceful, developed and discipline-flourishing democratic state, the State Peace and Development Council will continue to implement the [roadmap] agenda step by step, without changes.”
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This seems to remain the military rulers’ political strategy, the key being the National Convention. Although the main political parties, including opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, were not able to participate in 2004, the various ethnic rebel
groups who have signed ceasefire agreements with Rangoon have been attending. But the continued participation of some of these groups must be in serious doubt. For them, Khin Nyunt’s role in the government was crucial, for he was their main point of contact and they believed that he, at least, understood their demands for ethnic rights. Many ethnic leaders were personally loyal to Khin Nyunt and still do not trust Than Shwe or Maung Aye. The Wa and Kachin ethnic leaders remain anxious and uneasy, according to sources close to both groups, despite repeated meetings with the new prime minister, Soe Win, and Secretary One, Thein Sein.

Originally many of the ethnic leaders contemplated withdrawing from the process. “We may now have no alternative but to pull out of the National Convention,” said a senior ethnic leader inside Burma, a week after Khin Nyunt’s removal. But most of them later believed they had no alternative but to remain at the National Convention. “We need to be there to put our point of view. This may be the last chance we get to influence the content of the constitution,” a Kachin leader told this author.
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But for the Burmese government and the ethnic groups, the national reconciliation process involves more than simply drawing up a new constitution in which ethnic rights are guaranteed. Although these ethnic groups have ceasefire agreements with the government, most of them have retained their arms. In the months before the National Convention started in May 2004, Khin Nyunt and his intelligence operatives had been telling the ethnic leaders that once the new constitution was drafted, they would have to surrender their weapons. This is something many of them were already reluctant to contemplate; with the purge of Khin Nyunt, they will be even more hesitant to disarm.

Since the fall of Khin Nyunt, Than Shwe and Maung Aye have been taking a very tough line with the ethic groups, according to military sources in Rangoon. This approach has been highlighted by a more combative position towards the main rebel group that has not yet signed a ceasefire agreement, the Karen National Union (KNU), and there were several major skirmishes in December 2004 and January 2005. The KNU and the government had been holding peace talks during the course of 2004.
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The Karenni, who broke their ceasefire agreement with the SPDC, have also come under intense military fire in the first two months of 2005.

For their part, several ethnic leaders have hinted that returning to armed struggle against the Burmese army is a serious option that will have to be considered. The whole question of demobilizing the ethnic armies remains one of the pivotal issues in the national reconciliation
process. It was the key issue that was being discussed between Khin Nyunt and the ethnic leaders in the months after the National Convention went into recess in July 2004. At the time, the two sides seemed to have made significant progress towards a solution that would have seen the ethnic soldiers absorbed into a armed militia, but under the control of the Burmese regional commanders.
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Disarming the ethnic armies as quickly as possible is now at the top of the military’s agenda, while the ethnic leaders’ suspicions of the intentions of the top military men means they will resist this move as long as possible.

Although Burma’s top leaders continue to insist that nothing has really changed as a result of Khin Nyunt’s fall, the reality in Rangoon at the moment is that there is significant sense of uncertainty. There is no doubt that Khin Nyunt is now a totally spent force and has been effectively removed from the scene, but the power struggle at the top has not yet been completely resolved. The struggle now is between Maung Aye and Than Shwe.

At the centre of the continuing tension within the military leadership is the issue of transferring power to the next generation of officers. This is a problem that besets all military dictatorships, and in some countries has led to a period of acute uncertainty that has in turn ended with the eventual transfer of power to a civilian government.
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When the Foreign Minister, Nyan Win, briefed diplomats on Khin Nyunt’s retirement on health grounds, he also pointed out that the regime was beginning to hand over the reins of power to the next generation. There have been clear signs for some time that a new, younger officer class was being groomed to succeed the old men currently in charge.

The transfer of power is far from over. The purge of Khin Nyunt and his supporters is likely to be the start of the process rather than the end. General Thura Shwe Mann has been appointed to the important position of Joint Chief of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, is thus already number three in the SPDC, and is obviously destined for one of the top jobs. But it is unclear at present who else will emerge to replace Than Shwe and Maung Aye in due course. Little is known about the next generation of army officers. Even Shwe Mann is an unknown quantity. He and many others coming through the ranks are believed to favour a more professional and clean army. A few years ago a senior military officer said he believed eighty per cent of colonels in the army believed in the need for political change, and many even privately supported Aung San Suu Kyi, but dared
not reveal their feelings to anyone in the army for fear that it would be used against them in the future.

The latest military changes in Burma certainly herald a significant and extensive overhaul of the country’s power structure. However, it is by no means clear where that leaves the national reconciliation process. In recent months there have been strong hints that the military government intends to wrap up the National Convention by the end of 2005 to hold a referendum on the constitution before the end of 2006. The regime’s leaders are concerned about their ASEAN neighbours who are anxious to see political reform in Burma before Rangoon is considered for the presidency of ASEAN in the next few years.
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The ease with which Burma’s third-most powerful general was swept from power has revealed how fragile Burma’s military control really is. In the midst of this uncertainty and change it is just possible that the emerging generals will opt to try to involve Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy in the national reconciliation process.

If so, Khin Nyunt’s legacy may still be instrumental in forcing the regime to start a genuine process of handing over power to a civilian government. But Khin Nyunt’s vision was always that this would take up to another thirty years. The former prime minister also told the pro-democracy leader that the army never negotiated. If that is the pragmatist’s view, political change in Burma is still a very long way off.

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   Exclusive interview with the author.

²
   Personal exclusive interviews with several participants in the meetings.

³
   From a statement by Lieutenant-General Thein Sein, “Complete Explanation on the Developments in the Country”,
New Light of Myanmar,
23 October 2004.

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   Exclusive interview with KIO leader, Dr Tu Ja, in Rangoon.

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   Talks sponsored by Khin Nyunt and usually conducted by senior military intelligence officers. Ironically, a KNU delegation was in Rangoon at the exact time Khin Nyunt was arrested.

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   Interview with military spokesman Colonel Hla Min.

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   In Asia, Bangladesh and the Philippines are cases in point.

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   Burma unexpectedly stood down as the next president of the ASEAN bloc at the 2005 regional summit of foreign ministers in the Lao capital of Vientiane in July. For further details, see Larry Jagan, “Rangoon lets ASEAN off the hook”,
Bangkok Post,
29 July 2005.