Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation (55 page)

The West also needs to reconsider its strategic objectives. Rather than helping Burma/Myanmar move forward, past efforts to weaken the military regime have simply deepened the siege mentality of the top leadership and caused the divisions in society to widen, provoking further reactionary measures by an institution whose knee-jerk response to any perceived threat has always been to strengthen its control over the state and society. Further isolation that undermines whatever limited government capacity and economic activity still exists, will simply reinforce current repressive, predatory, and corrupt practices, and make it more difficult for any future government to reform the existing system.

To avoid such a scenario and to support the three overarching processes of change outlined above, the international community should work instead to establish the conditions for a gradual transfer of power to a stable and competent civilian government. This requires less focus on weakening the military regime and more on encouraging new thinking within the officer corps, building capacity across the state and society to
deal with the country’s development needs, and strengthening the nascent democratic infrastructure.

Considering the immense power imbalance between the military and civilian forces and the proven commitment of the generals to quell any challenge to their rule, progress is all but inconceivable without the cooperation of reform-minded officers. The current leadership, however, is locked into traditional ways of thinking that are rooted in the country’s troublesome past, and is so fearful of instability that any criticism or sign of popular mobilization is seen to threaten the survival of the state. One of the first steps in any strategy for promoting freedom, security, and welfare must therefore be to open the minds of the officer corps to more participatory and responsive governance. It is imperative that the next generation of military leaders comes to perceive alternative ways of governing that, while protecting vital “military” interests, including Burma’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, also support broader development objectives.

In order to ensure that the military regime derives minimal legitimacy and financial benefits from international assistance, most Western donors stipulate that contacts with the government should be minimized and that aid should be provided outside state structures either directly to the beneficiaries or through civil society organizations. Such limitations not only fly in the face of “best practice” and limit the impact and sustainability of aid programmes; they also ignore the requirements of gradual, evolutionary change throughout government structures, which provides certainly the most likely and, arguably, the preferable path towards transition. Realistically, state power will only gradually move from the military to civilian institutions, and only in response to successful development and growing confidence on part of the military that civilian government will not threaten national security. This will require cooperation between military officers and civilian politicians and bureaucrats within a
governance framework that engenders the trust and cooperation of a skilled and well-educated population. Donors and aid agencies should therefore work to improve the capacity of the existing state to formulate and implement pro-poor policies, as well as the capacity to raise revenue legitimately for public investments in physical and social infrastructure that support these policies. Much more also needs to be done to develop the capacity of the general population through improved education, health and welfare to support and complement the state. Most importantly perhaps, bridges must be built between the state and society — connections that will extend beyond what is necessary for the development of a future electoral system to establish a widespread network of two-way communication structures through which the state may inform its citizenry and elicit information and ideas. Such efforts may reinforce the military regime in the short term, but over time will strengthen the basis for a successful transition to meaningful democracy by challenging current notions of military supremacy within the officer corps and building a credible civilian alternative to military rule that will be able to deliver on the population’s high hopes for peace and prosperity.

While conservative leadership and weak capacity for good governance present immediate barriers to progress, the biggest challenge for promoters of democracy may be to build the infrastructure necessary to make a future democratic system truly representative and participatory. Burma/Myanmar’s experience with democracy in the early post-independence period was extremely short and ended more than forty years ago; in the country today no one under sixty years of age has any experience of participation in democratic politics. There are no longstanding political parties, no politically significant civil society, and no widespread commitment to democratic values and behaviour among the population at large. Indeed, the strong hierarchy, top-down approach to governance, and inability to deal with dissent associated with military rule are replicated within most civilian organizations, including the NLD and most exile groups. Although present conditions do not determine future outcomes, this democratic “deficit” is likely to persist long after the establishment of electoral democracy, and should be actively
addressed, even if, at the present stage, this will have to be done indirectly within a broader capacity-building agenda.

The framework set out here does not rule out the use of coercive or punitive measures
per se,
but the policy implications of taking a longerterm, evolutionary approach to reform are clear. In order to contribute to social change processes, international actors need to be engaged on the ground in close proximity with the people and institutions they are trying to influence. This requires a shift away from censure and sanctions toward “critical engagement’. There is a need to downplay public condemnation and overt pressure in favour of more constructive efforts to foster policy dialogue and capacity-building.

Although coercive diplomacy may exert some pressure on the military rulers to improve their human rights record for purely instrumental reasons, it has the unfortunate effect of closing minds and freezing social developments, something which contradicts the overriding need to build a stronger grassroots support and capacity for participatory government and the rule of law. Essentially, coercive diplomacy encourages only defensive measures by the regime, not far-reaching genuine reforms, which depend on fundamental shifts in the perceptions of top military leaders, as well as empowerment of civilian institutions.

The aim of a “new” diplomacy should be to improve communication with the military regime in order to allay its fears and establish the basis for critical dialogue about core international concerns. It is crucially important to draw the generals out of their shell, lessen their suspicions about the ultimate intentions of Western governments, and help them embrace international cooperation and interaction. Although this will be a long-term process, it is the only way to make them see the value in, and the prudence of, complying with contemporary international norms of behaviour.

A “new” diplomacy should also encourage the establishment of institutions that over time can become independent agents of change,
especially through reform of laws and official processes. The ongoing process of drawing up a new constitution, for example, however flawed, is preferable to the alternative, which would see the military continue to govern essentially unconstrained by legal institutions. The formation of a parliamentary system, even if initially constrained and largely
pro forma,
would establish a platform for policy discussions which so far have been ignored by all sides in the ongoing power struggle. It would also provide more space for political party activities and thus over time help to build a more credible alternative to military rule. Similarly, the government’s establishment of a Human Rights Committee and the ratification of core human rights instruments such as the Geneva Conventions has provided new access points for dialogue and capacity-building. Even if such instruments are weak at first, the mere fact of their existence helps to build a constituency for change within the military state that is currently lacking. Conversely, rejecting them as irrelevant easily becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy as the new structures are left inactive and their domestic supporters abandoned and isolated.

Sanctions will, no doubt, remain part of Western policy for the foreseeable future, but there is a need for much clearer, more realistic benchmarks for progress towards agreed international objectives, together with a firm commitment by Western governments and international organizations to reciprocate with concrete, valuable gestures when positive steps are taken. In order to avoid disagreements in one area becoming an obstacle to progress in all other areas, there should be distinct “roadmaps” for progress towards political liberalization, basic human rights, and economic reform. The incentives associated with each of these roadmaps should be relevant to the particular issue in question, as this would facilitate dialogue also at the working level of the government, where officials may not always see the bigger picture. For example, since the worst human rights abuses are committed by local army units, reciprocal gestures for improvements should incorporate benefits for active army commanders and could, for example, focus on military exchanges and training. Similarly, concrete improvements in the access given to international aid agencies to remote or conflict-affected areas could be acknowledged by releasing assistance for road or other infrastructure-building, which may not take priority from a developmental point of view but would serve the national development
agenda. Any such assistance should be additional to existing aid programmes, which should be provided according to technical criteria alone.

Apart from refocusing their diplomacy, Western governments need to significantly strengthen their engagement with the state and society on more technical issues using foreign aid. The efficacy of international assistance depends on a comprehensive and coherent package of policy dialogue, selective capacity-building, and financial support. The current political limitations on assistance to Burma/Myanmar constrain efforts in each of these areas and are not conducive to promoting sustainable development. Although aid agencies are making a significant difference in the lives of many poor families through community development and livelihood activities, most of these activities leave the policy environment for development untouched and therefore are of questionable sustainability.

While opponents of development aid are correct in arguing that the security priorities and economic policies of the military regime currently limit the sustainability of aid, the true potential of assistance has never been tested. It is hardly surprising that the military government has flatly refused sweeping calls for structural adjustment reforms when they are denied support from the international financial institutions which usually provide the necessary technical and financial assistance and encouragement for such reforms in low income countries. It is no wonder, either, that the current leadership is generally suspicious of the activities of aid agencies when the rhetoric and conditionalities of major donors are so blatantly partisan and show little concern for the overall development needs of the country.

There is no doubt that the military is hostile to economic and administrative reforms that would directly weaken its hold on power, and less than enthusiastic about community development and other programmes that contravene its own notions of development which lag several decades behind current international development thinking. There is no doubt either that the state and society both lack the capacity to absorb and effectively apply large amounts of assistance, and that this capacity will have to be built up gradually, ahead of any major new
financial commitments. However, the international aid community is hardly unfamiliar with such obstacles. On the contrary, it has a range of strategies and tools available that have proven effective in other countries with arguably less government commitment to development and certainly less potential for long-term progress.

Importantly, the future is not without prospects. The next generation of military leaders, which is likely to take over within the next few years, has quite different educational and military career backgrounds from the current leadership, and has experienced at close hand the economic progress made by their neighbours. Once in charge, like all new governments, they will want to make their mark and improve on the performance of their predecessors. Thus there will be an important window of opportunity for reviving the reform drive — at least, if the international community is prepared to offer the necessary technical and financial assistance.

While the international community should defer the goal of democracy for now, this does not mean giving in to authoritarianism or accepting the continuance of human rights abuses. Rather, it would be a rational reorientation of international efforts to facilitate political and economic reform in a country where little progress has been made during the past sixteen years, nor seems likely in the foreseeable future if the current international policies are maintained. A broader, more process-oriented approach is both necessary for overcoming military resistance to reform and prudent, given the difficulty of instituting a genuine democracy, particularly if it is born out of major political or socio-economic upheavals rather than through a incremental, negotiated transition. By supporting national reconciliation and development, the strategy outlined here would help pave the way for meaningful and sustainable political change.