Myanmar's Long Road to National Reconciliation (54 page)

Western governments are also guilty of greatly underestimating the strength of the military regime and overestimating the strength of the opposition. The conventional wisdom that the regime is brittle and close to collapsing under intense popular pressure for democracy is wishful thinking, and has created highly unrealistic expectations about how change is going to come about. The military apparatus controls almost every lever of power in the country and is therefore virtually undefeatable unless segments of the armed forces turn against each other, something which has not happened since the earliest days of independence and is highly unlikely today. The political opposition looked strong in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but it has never really succeeded in mobilizing popular dissatisfaction with the military government into sustained political action, and its leverage today is minimal. The decision by the National League for Democracy (NLD) in May 2004 to boycott the National Convention has further marginalized the party which looks increasingly unlikely to assume a future leadership role in government, at least in its current configuration.

Economic sanctions, by limiting the regime’s access to foreign exchange, may have curtailed its arms purchases, but this curtailment has primarily affected Burma/Myanmar’s conventional defence capabilities. It has had little effect on the regime’s ability to suppress internal dissent, which relies largely on political and social controls backed by a proven commitment to use violence to suppress dissent, not
on high-tech weapon systems or even on large numbers of troops. Instead, the military has responded to the resulting resource constraints by cutting back government expenditure on health and education, thus passing the burden of sanctions on to the poor. International attention may have helped protect Aung San Suu Kyi and her party from elimination, but the lack of economic reform and development, to which sanctions contribute, works against any processes of social change that over time could facilitate genuine political change.

In theory, the lack of progress toward democracy and human rights could be due to the failure by the international community to agree on comprehensive sanctions that would raise the costs for the regime to a level high enough to force change. In reality, effective global sanctions are not — and never were — a realistic option, given the positions and interests of Burma/Myanmar’s regional neighbours. Instead, by seeking to force regional countries to adopt a Western strategy that runs counter to their own interests, the US and the EU have undermined any chance of developing a common platform and influencing all-important regional dynamics in a positive direction. This has also significantly weakened the capacity of the United Nations to play an effective mediating role.

The push for regime change not only disregards realistic scenarios for change, but also ignores the many inter-linked and highly complex challenges Burma/Myanmar must overcome in order to break its present, self-reinforcing pattern of conflict, repression and poverty. The installation of an elected government would be an important step forward, but such a government could not function properly in the absence of supportive socio-political structures, nor would it provide a panacea for the country’s deep-seated development problems. The central state has neither the authority nor the institutional capacity nor the financial strength to implement policies across its realm effectively. The expansion of stable, modern governance structures and of the rule of law into areas currently under control of local army commanders or former insurgent groups will be a particularly difficult and extended process. Meanwhile, the low level
of development and the deepening humanitarian crisis leave the general population disempowered and unable to play a meaningful political role, even if the political system were freer. Unless more is done to prepare the ground for political change, democracy is likely ultimately to disappoint, and could all too easily fail.

Many proponents of sanctions, while admitting their limitations, nonetheless maintain that the benefits outweigh the costs, and that the harm done is insignificant. This is a serious misreading of the situation. While it is certainly true that the macro-economic effects of the sanctions are overshadowed by the regime’s own economic mismanagement, the sanctions have increased the sense of threat within the government, and have thus directly contributed to the increased allocation of scarce resources for improved armaments and other security capabilities. By reinforcing the political deadlock and making the search for domestic compromises more difficult, sanctions also contribute to maintaining the current zero-sum struggle for power, which diverts attention away from vital governance and development issues. More direct negative social effects arise from the denial of foreign aid, investments and trade, which limits job opportunities, contributes to inflation, and reduces the provision of social services as well as broader community development activities, thus significantly diminishing opportunities for the general population to improve their livelihood.

Any effective international approach must recognize that the challenges of transition in Burma/Myanmar — one of the poorest, most heterogeneous and conflict-prone societies in Asia — are more difficult than in most of the countries that over the past few decades have made the transition to some form of democratic rule. The path to the creation of a government and society capable of realizing Burma/Myanmar’s great potential will necessarily be long and tortuous — and those who genuinely wish to help the general population need to match commitment to principle with a more pragmatic search for solutions. For any policy to
be effective, it must take into account the huge power imbalance between the military and the pro-democracy forces, as well as the broader structural obstacles to political and economic development, including armed conflict, deep-rooted poverty, and low levels of education. This requires a long-term perspective, measured over perhaps decades rather than years, and more humility regarding the prospects for reform and the influence of external interventions.

However laudable, the West’s singular pursuit of democracy does not provide an effective strategy for promoting freedom, security, and welfare for the general population of Burma/Myanmar. First, the probability for a transition from military to genuine civilian rule in the foreseeable future is close to zero. The military will remain in power in the foreseeable future; any transition, including important governance and economic reforms, will have to be negotiated and implemented in cooperation with the military leadership. Second, democratization is a long and difficult process, not a one-off event. The establishment and maturation of genuinely democratic institutions in any country, not least one as poor and inexperienced with democratic practices as Burma/Myanmar, requires fundamental changes in attitudes and behaviour at all levels of society, which take decades, if not generations, to occur. Finally, the association between democratic governance and welfare is imperfect and not necessarily positive, at least in the short to medium term. To push for a revolutionary transformation of the formal political system without paying attention to important underlying or complementary development processes is short-sighted, unlikely to succeed, and could do more harm than good.

Instead of pushing for regime change at this stage, the international community should work to promote three longer-term processes of change — political liberalization, peace-building, and socio-economic development — which would not only produce immediate benefits for the general population, but could also begin to lay the ground for an internally-driven and thus more meaningful and sustainable reform process. This approach would also create wider space for working with domestic actors, who, with the exception of the NLD and a relatively small number of political
activists, do not see democracy as the immediate, or even the primary, goal for society, but are working towards other goals — for example, to strengthen national unity, to promote local autonomy and ethnic rights, or simply to re-establish their fields or businesses after decades of armed conflict. The three processes of change, of course, are closely inter-related and mutually reinforcing, which is another reason why they need to be pursued in tandem.

The overwhelming power imbalance between the military regime and the opposition, as noted, virtually rules out any democratic break-through at this time, whether through a power-sharing compromise with the political parties or a revolutionary social challenge from the grassroots. Since 1988, however, the military junta has allowed a number of political openings, including the formation of political parties and the convening of the National Convention, as well as a limited expansion in popular access to information and in space for public debate and civil society organizations. Although these steps are primarily aimed at shoring up the regime’s power rather than facilitating increased popular participation in politics, they have begun to transform public life and may over time fuel a process of “creeping democratization”.

We know from countries such as Singapore that limited political liberalization, even when reinforced by comprehensive economic liberalization measures, does not necessarily lead to liberal democracy, even in the longer term. It does, however, inevitably strengthen civilian institutions by giving them space to form and exercise at least certain basic political functions, thus improving the prospects for an effective challenge to authoritarian rule and the consolidation of a meaningful democracy. This is particularly the case if the expansion of political freedom and activity combines with peace-building and socio-economic development that spread the possibilities and resources for civilian political activity to a wider section of the population.

Burma/Myanmar’s long-running, internal armed conflicts were a root cause of the military’s rise to power in the 1950s, and continue to present
a serious obstacle to any future military disengagement from politics. The spread of ceasefires since the late 1980s has brought within reach a nationwide stop to fighting. However, continued political tensions, serious human rights abuses by the army in newly-occupied areas, and the lack of development of former war zones means that peace is still far off. While the leaders of the ethnic armed groups, including those still fighting the government, appear to be committed to stopping the fighting, frustrations among the younger generation, who have little prospect for a meaningful future and do not remember the suffering caused by the war, are mounting. Resistance on the part of many army officers to cooperating with their former enemies means that even minor flare-ups could quickly escalate into renewed fighting on a significant scale. This, in turn, would reinforce the military’s reasons for maintaining a stranglehold on government and would justify even larger budget allocations to the armed forces.

The absence of peace also presents a major threat to a future democracy. Although supporters of the NLD argue that democratic governance would resolve the ethnic conflicts, it is equally likely that its introduction would bring new tensions to Burma/Myanmar’s pluralist society where ethnic and religious identities are extremely strong. To be successful, democratic government requires political activity to be moderate rather than extreme in nature, with a strong emphasis on mutual trust and accommodation among contending groups. It is vulnerable to extremist politicians who use ethnic and other cleavages as a basis for generating support for confrontational positions. While the democratic process might facilitate inclusion of excluded groups and interests and allow the healing process to begin, it could also open the way for demagoguery and agitation based on ethnic and religious identity that would fuel latent conflicts. The search for peace, therefore, is not subsidiary to the quest for democracy, but is central to any meaningful political reform process.

A truly inclusive and democratic political system that gives all groups a voice in the governance of their areas and protects both individual and group rights does not result simply from reform of the formal structures of government, but depends on the empowerment of ordinary people. Failing this, the “democratic” political system will remain elitist and will do little to overcome the root causes of conflict and inequality. Yet the large majority
of the population in Burma/Myanmar is subsistence farmers, often semi-illiterate, who have little or no experience of the world beyond their village. Many people have had little contact with the central state and thus can hardly be expected to show commitment to its political arrangements, whether democratic or not. Moreover, local power structures in many areas are basically feudal, with little space for popular participation.

In these circumstances, even if democracy were introduced, the poor majority would remain voiceless and subject to the powers that be. Political and socio-economic development therefore cannot be separated. Before a future democracy can take root and be meaningful for many people and communities, those people and communities will have to transcend the barriers created by the daily struggle for survival on the one hand, and the cultural and structural legacy of militarization of society and repressive, autocratic rule on the other. This will require improved economic conditions, broader access to education and information, and stronger local organizations as the foundation for a vibrant (but moderate), pluralistic civil society.