Nelson: Britannia's God of War (51 page)

Between April and October 1805, Britain and France played out a complex strategic game on a vast scale. While it cost relatively few lives, the outcome would be crucial. Bonaparte was playing for the ultimate prize, the defeat of Britain by invasion; Britain tried to create a new Continental coalition to overwhelm the upstart Emperor. Both would be disappointed.

Bonaparte’s invasion plans have exercised a grim fascination for the past two hundred years. For some they were the gravest threat to Britain between the Spanish Armada and 1940; for others a bluff. The latter seems more likely with the benefit of hindsight: when the French general staff investigated the issue very carefully at the end of the nineteenth century they concluded that the plans were never fully staffed, and showed little grasp of the realities of maritime warfare.
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There were never enough troops at the Channel ports, or enough invasion craft to carry them, while the harbours were too shallow, the embarkation too slow and the prospect of getting across without a major battle too unlikely for the plans to have been real. This did not mean, however, that the threat was not perceived as serious at the time; its very existence had a fundamental effect on British policy.

Since his return to office in May 1804, Pitt had taken a more active approach to pursuing diplomatic links than the Addington Ministry –
principally with Russia, but also Austria. He saw the solution to the problem of radicalised France in European terms. Only the combined efforts of the great powers could force France back into the state system, with a form of government that recognised the legitimacy of existing regimes, the sanctity of borders and of treaties. Without such a change the war would go on for ever. Addington had been content to wait for Europeans to see this for themselves. While he waited, he built up the defensive arm of British power, making the prospect of a successful French invasion less likely by the day. He increased the standing army, reformed the militia and used volunteer meetings to bring the total bearing arms to half a million. As the local forces improved, they would release the army for overseas operations.

After a year of sustained improvement, the defences of Britain were strong, and still Bonaparte had not moved. The key difference between Pitt and his predecessor lay in their offensive measures. Under the cover of the main fleets, Addington had begun to sweep up French islands and overseas bases, annihilated her trade and shipping, and denied her the chance to move outside Europe. It was economic war, and could be waged over the long term: sound money and economic stability would keep Britain going while the French economy collapsed. Pitt’s focus, by contrast, was political: new alignments with St Petersburg and Vienna were his principal aim.

The key to the situation remained Bonaparte. His unlimited ambition and disregard for any form of international agreement not based on force made peace highly unlikely. Since the outbreak of war he had used the threat of invasion to keep the British pinned to their own shores, while reducing various clients and satellites on his borders to the status of French provinces. His long-term aims, which he took no pains to disguise, included southern Italy, Greece, European Turkey and Egypt. Ultimately, he wanted to throw the British out of India.While France held the Low Countries Britain would never make peace; while Bonaparte ruled without honour, disregarding the law of nations, any peace would be a delusion.

The Tsar was also concerned by French ambition, and favoured a European league of major powers, with British support, to block Bonaparte’s schemes. By mid-1804 he had issued his demands, and recalled his ambassador from Paris. The obvious point of contact between Russia and Britain was the eastern Mediterranean, where mutual concern for Naples, the Greek islands and Turkey offered the
potential for an alliance-building combined effort. British policy also favoured the restoration of the Kingdom of Sardinia, to block French hegemony in Northern Italy. To cement the new partnership Pitt agreed to send an army to join the Russians in Italy, but rejected the Tsar’s demand that Britain return Malta to the Knights. Pitt was confident enough to threaten to fall back on a purely maritime war, leaving Russia to settle Europe on her own. Even so he continued preparations for a Mediterranean expeditionary corps to join the Russians in Italy.

When Pitt and the Tsar began to challenge French policy Bonaparte’s bluff was called, and rather than attempt an invasion he abandoned the scheme, paid off his barges and looked elsewhere for a weapon. Spain, already paying heavy subsidies to avoid a worse fate, was drawn into the war, but Pitt struck first, intercepting treasure ships and crippling overseas trade in October 1804, before Spain was ready. The Spanish fleet would not be effective until the middle of 1805, so the only move that could challenge Britain was an attack on her trade and overseas possessions. In January 1805 Bonaparte ordered the Rochefort and Toulon squadrons to sea: they were to rendezvous in the West Indies, release the French ships at Ferrol and return united to a suitable French port. He also issued orders for the Brest fleet to land troops in Ireland, sail round Scotland and link up with the fleet in the Ferrol and the army in Holland. The latter disconnected scheme appears to have been a smokescreen, leaked for effect. The breathing space these moves would win could be used to drive Austria out of any Russo-British combination. The invasion plans and preparations were now explained away as a smokescreen for the creation of the Grand Army that would dominate Europe for the next decade. Yet when Austria backed gracefully out of a confrontation, and Britain rejected Napoleon’s overtures for peace, he was left with no recourse but to revive the invasion plans.

Would Bonaparte take the initiative with his fleet, the only lever he could use to coerce Britain, before the new coalition could form and threaten his frontiers? He faced three powers: Britain was safe behind the Channel and Russia too far to the east to be attacked, but Austria was vulnerable, and hardly recovered from the Revolutionary wars. The threat from all three would be serious. He had to break up the combination before it could act. If he did nothing Britain could dispatch some of her tiny army overseas, link up
with Russia and prompt Austria. For obvious political reasons, Bonaparte could not wait on the defensive like the legitimate monarchies he faced. His rule was based on military success and glory, not peace and stability.

After toying with an attack on India, Bonaparte developed a new plan to concentrate his fleets in the West Indies and swing back to Europe for an invasion. This grand plan has perhaps been taken more-seriously than it deserved. Bonaparte never assembled more than ninety thousand troops on the Channel coast, and did not have sufficient harbour capacity or craft to embark them in fewer than four tides. His fleets from Brest, Ferrol, Cadiz and Toulon were to assemble at a distance, after escaping the British blockades, and cover an understaffed and unprepared ‘surprise’ invasion against an enemy who had been on full alert for twelve months. All this was to be achieved without a battle. The best that can be said for these schemes is that they occupied the attention of the British for several months, made use of a hugely expensive and otherwise unnecessary resource, and distracted everyone from his military designs. But the plan did not deal with the basic problem, one that his admirals understood only too well. If the French fleets managed to get to sea the British would concentrate on the Western Approaches off Brest, to cover the Channel, and the incoming trade. Furthermore, they would fight whenever the opportunity allowed, and any battle, whatever the result, would destroy the Imperial scheme.

The contemporaneous British plan to send General Craig with five to six thousand troops linked the British with Russia, met Nelson’s long standing strategic concerns and opened a new front against the French. The troops would secure Sicily, cooperate with the Russians in Naples, and occupy Sardinia or hold Alexandria. However, Nelson had not heard anything from London since November; the last two despatch vessels had been lost – one wrecked, the other taken by Villeneuve in January. His own ideas were clear. Off Toulon on 10 March, he was certain the French were once more embarking troops. He worked through the options, decided that the French occupation of Sardinia, Sicily or Egypt would be an irreversible disaster, and developed a plan to catch Villeneuve, whichever direction he was heading – east or west. He would cover the former course; the latter would be blocked by a ruse, forcing Villeneuve into his chosen position. After running across to Barcelona, to be seen and reported, he
would hold the fleet at Palmas on the Sardinian coast. The ruse would force the French to steer east, into the trap.

Villeneuve sailed on 30 March, well aware that Nelson was off Barcelona, heading south. The following day a neutral merchant ship betrayed Nelson’s true position; Villeneuve immediately swung east of the Balearics, heading for Cartagena to pick up a Spanish squadron. Four days later Nelson, still unaware that the enemy was out, wrote to tell Emma that ‘unless the French fleet should be at sea, or a certainty of its putting to sea, I shall move to the
Superb
on the day I have before told you’.
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Later that day he learnt they were out, and had missed his trap. Deprived of his prize, Nelson had to satisfy himself that the enemy had not passed to the east before he could look to the west. He did not repeat his sortie to Egypt: instead the fleet was spread to cover the area between Sardinia and the Tunisian coast. He also had to ensure they had not doubled back and passed to the east of Sardinia, a threat that kept him pinned in place for days: ‘I must not make more haste than good speed and leave Sardinia, Sicily, or Naples for them to take should I go either to the Eastward or the Westward, without knowing something more about them.’
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He desperately needed unambiguous intelligence to guide his actions; without it he would not risk the key positions.

Villeneuve ran down to Cartagena, but would not wait for the Spanish ships to come out, heading for the Straits to release Admiral Gravina’s force at Cadiz. On 8 April he was seen passing Gibraltar by Captain Richard Strachan in the seventy-four
Renown
; Strachan turned back and signalled Orde’s squadron of five sail that the enemy was coming. Orde formed a line, but Villeneuve hurried past for Cadiz. Once Orde realised Nelson was not in hot pursuit, he sent a frigate to warn the Grand Fleet off Ushant of the possible concentration of enemy forces. He would follow the next day, if nothing changed overnight. This was sound doctrine, and good practice. If the Grand Fleet was overpowered Britain would lose the war: invasion or not, the loss of vital trade alone would be decisive. Orde took his battleships north, but left his cruisers to watch Villeneuve, sent warnings to Nelson, the West Indies and the homebound East India convoy. It was a solid performance, but too slow.

Villeneuve reached Cadiz on 9 April and signalled to Admiral Gravina to join him. Gravina hurried out with nine battleships, a solitary French ship and the eight Spanish ships then ready for sea. The
course remained westward. They went away into the night, the Spaniards straggling after the French, and were lost to the British before Orde’s cruisers could reach Cadiz.

These events coincided with the resignation of Henry Dundas, First Lord of the Admiralty, after charges relating to the improper use of public money were brought against him in Parliament. After some delay, he was replaced by his elderly cousin, Admiral Sir Charles Middleton, one-time Controller of the Navy with whom Nelson had corresponded back in the 1780s. Middleton was ennobled as Lord Barham to bring him into Parliament, but he was kept out of the Cabinet and the day-to-day running of the Navy. Instead he focused on the strategic issues, a subject on which Melville had been consulting him for some time. His central control, informed by the initiative and resource of numerous capable, confident frigate captains, and the consistent response of his fleet commanders to almost all the problems they faced enabled him to counter every move the French made, and often to anticipate them. It was a masterclass in pre-industrial strategy.
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Once the enemy put to sea, every officer used his best endeavour to keep the main fleets informed, and to pass messages back to London where other intelligence sources – some accurate, others generated by Bonaparte’s spies – were sifted and assessed. With Cornwallis or Gardner off Ushant, Calder off Ferrol, a squadron off Rochefort and Nelson in the Mediterranean, the cruisers knew where to look.

Suitably informed, Barham covered every eventuality. Although he was often too far behind events to pre-empt the enemy, his penetration varied from the acute to the sublime.
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A detachment from the Grand Fleet, commanded by Collingwood, was put in hand, and the various options open to the French were considered. Craig’s army heading for Italy was at risk, but smart cruiser work saw it put into Lisbon and, once Villeneuve had passed, rendezvous with Nelson at the Straits. Above all Barham ensured the Western Approaches to the Channel were secured by a force capable of defeating anything the French and Spanish could assemble. This simple strategic principle, based on long years of practical experience, and executed by competent and tested officers, would always defeat Bonaparte’s elaborate combinations.

All this occurred without Nelson’s knowledge. In position off Sicily on 10 April, he heard a rumour of the military expedition, and immediately set course for the Straits, to save it from Villeneuve. Instead he spent the next five days beating into a head wind to get round
Sardinia. Reliable news of the military expedition arrived just as he heard that the French were headed for the Straits. His first concern was the military force. On 18 April William Parker in the frigate
Amazon
confirmed the French had passed the Straits eight days earlier. Nelson had been outmanoeuvred, and hastened off to Gibraltar for more news. Not knowing where had they gone he left almost the entire cruiser force to cover Sicily, Sardinia and Egypt. Wherever the French were they would not profit from Nelson’s decision to pursue them. Unless he could find more positive intelligence of the French destination he would retreat on the Grand Fleet, as Orde had done. News of the link-up with the Spanish persuaded him the enemy was heading for the Channel, and he responded accordingly, sending his route and rendezvous ahead so the Admiralty could redirect him if they possessed better intelligence.