"Non-Germans" Under the Third Reich (227 page)

38.
Monthly report, Warsaw District chief for January 1941; monthly report,
Kreishauptmann
Jasło (Kraków District) for June 1941 (ZS, Polen 347, 260 ff.).

39.
Monthly report,
Kreishauptmann
Jasło (Kraków District) for June 1941, ibid.

40.
Concerning the excessive demands of the Reich for harvest contingents and the resulting cancelation or reduction of food rations for Poles, cf. cabinet meeting of August 24, 1942 (“Diensttagebuch”), and Frank’s remarks at the cabinet meeting of December 14, 1942 (“Diensttagebuch”). On the role of the General Government as a “food basket” of the Reich (second only to France) and the merciless plundering thereof, see the final report of the plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, containing detailed tables and statistics (no date [probably end of 1943 or 1944], BA R 26 IV/Vorl. 12, Bl. 2 ff.), as well as a secret directive of the plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan of June 28, 1944, on fulfillment of supply targets for 1944 and catching up on the backlog (Vorl. 13); cf. also secret memorandum of the Food Agency (
Geschäftsgruppe Ernährung
) about a meeting with representatives of the OKW and the Reich Food Ministry held on June 29, 1944 (BA R 26 IV/Vorl. 13).

For a detailed account of food supplies for Poles up to 1941, cf. the official report of the
Stadthauptmann
Kraków (Kraków, October 26, 1939–41 [IfZ, Dd 56.09]), and Schulte-Wissermann, in Bühler,
Das Generalgouvernement, seine Verwaltung und seine Wirtschaft
(1943), 218 ff.; see also remarks by Governor General Frank at the cabinet meeting of December 14, 1942 (“absolute starvation level”), “Diensttagebuch.” The monthly report by the
Stadthauptmann
Lublin for January 1941 has a detailed list of food rations for Germans, Poles, and Jews (ZS, Polen 347, 308 ff.); see also monthly report,
Kreishauptmann
Czenstochau for December 1940–January 1941 (317 ff.): Poles received only 100 g of bread a day and nothing else; monthly report,
Kreishauptmann
Tomaschow (Tomaszów Mazowiecki) for March 1942 (Polen, film 5, Bl. 468): Germans had adequate provisions, those for Poles were poor; the Jews were starving. Situation report,
Kreishauptmann
Petrikau for May 1940 (Polen 347, Bl. 607): “intolerable conditions.” Monthly report,
Kreishauptmann
Cholm for June 1940 (Bl. 578 ff.): “extortionate price inflation.” Cf. also
News from the Reich
, June 20, 1940 (BA R 58/151), with precise details on daily rations for Germans, Poles, and Ukrainians. A comprehensive summary is given in the confidential report of the head of the
Hauptgruppe gewerbliche Wirtschaft
(lit. main group trade and industry), November 14, 1941 (ZS, Polen 347), with numerous statistics and calorie tables for Poles (usual allocation, 515; with “A” supplements [for the heaviest manual work], 906; with “B” supplements [for heavy work], 747 calories); however, the minimum daily requirement was said to be 800 calories, for manual work 3,000 calories, and for heavy work 3,500 calories. The agricultural workforce frequently received no food at all (ZS, Polen 359). Cf. also report of the Polish Aid Committee for the City of Warsaw for 1942–43 (daily ration for adults in May 1942, 382.9 calories; for children, 321.3; in March 1943, 447 and 390 calories, respectively; BA R 52 III/8.9). Cf. also report, F. Siebert “Hauptabteilung Innere Verwaltung,” November 11, 1959 (BA Ostdok. 13 GG Nr. 1 b/5).

41.
In the General Government, therefore, the ration card system was not introduced; a “simpler system” was used. Entitled to provisions were above all the population of the main cities and those working for German interests or where there was some other form of “public interest” (Gollert,
Warschau unter deutscher Herrschaft
[1942], 202 f.). Those not entitled to receive rations included workers from the countryside who were expected to be self-reliant; these were close to starvation because farmers had been reduced to subsistence level by quota requirements.

42.
Meeting on April 23, 1940: “The second category comprises the Poles, insofar as I have no use for them. I will feed these Poles by giving them whatever is left over. Otherwise I can only exort them to help themselves and say to them: we are not to blame for the war” (“Diensttagebuch”). “Whether the Jews … have food or not is the least of my concerns” (“Diensttagebuch,” 1940). The prevailing view was that it would be best to give no food at all to the Jews, though initially a minimum had to be provided to maintain their work potential; cf., e.g.,
News from the Reich
, June 20, 1940 (BA R 58/151, Radom District; Jews receive half the rations provided for Poles, but “only when food is left over”). An overview of food rations provided in 1941 is given in Nuremberg doc., NG-618. As the supply situation worsened (at the latest from 1942 on), the German authorities stopped food rations for Jews altogether—with the exception of 300,000 armament workers (Frank at a cabinet meeting on April 24, 1942: “The fact that ‘we thereby’—i.e., by fulfilling the quotas for the Reich at any price—condemn 1.2 million Jews to death, is only mentioned in passing”; “Diensttagebuch”). Cf. also situation report,
Kreishauptmann
Tomaschow for March 1942 (ZS, Polen, film 5, Bl. 468; according to this, starving Jews tried to live outside the ghetto but were shot by the police as soon as they were apprehended). For more on the situation of the Jews, cf.
Die jüdische Nährmittellage
(London, 1942) (Nuremberg doc., L-165; also IfZ).

43.
Cf. monthly report,
Kreishauptmann
Cholm for June 1940 (ZS, Polen 347, Bl. 578 ff.): “extortionate price inflation.” In propaganda material, the black market was blamed on the Jews (cf. report of
Schutzpolizei
lieutenant Alfred Finke, “Die Unverbesserlichen” [The incorrigibles],
Pressedienst des GG
, May 22, 1942, Folge 169; the black market was “of course the work of Jewish elements—diseased, slimy elements”; quoted from ZS, Versch. 108, 402 ff.). However, it was clear to the German administration that supplies could be maintained only through the black market, so the authorities turned a blind eye or even welcomed it. Cf. report,
Stadthauptmann
Kraków, September 12, 1940, IfZ, Ma 158/1–3. Instructions on vigorous action against black marketeers (cf., e.g., decree, government of the General Government, July 10, 1943, ZS, Polen 349, 166 ff.) existed on paper only; for a description of the black market and inflation, cf. the following monthly reports:
Kreishauptmann
Tomaschow (Radom District) for July 1941 (Polen 347, Bl. 448 ff.);
Kreishauptmann
Kraków District for August 1940 (IfZ, Ma-158/2, Bl. 15);
Stadthaptmann
Kraków for September 12, 1940 (IfZ, Ma-158/2, Bl. 15; also ZS, Polen 347, 104 ff.).
Kreishauptmann
Siedlce (Warsaw District) for January 1942 (ZS, Polen 348, 796 ff.);
Kreishauptmann
Tomaschow for March 1942 (826 ff.);
Kreishauptmann
Sochaczew (Warsaw District) (Polen 347, 356 ff.). Regarding the price system (highest prices and price controls), cf. report by the head of the Price Control Office given on July 1942 to the Civil Service Academy of the General Government (quoted from
Krakauer Zeitung
, July 9, 1943). The situation was worsened by the fact that, from mid-1941, the goal of price policy was to ensure supplies to the Wehrmacht and the needs of other Germans became secondary (Gollert,
Warschau unter deutscher Herrschaft
, 180 ff.). The governor general had issued numerous decrees to combat profiteering, which proved totally ineffective; cf. Decree on Measures against Profiteering of January 21, 1940 (
VBl.GG
1 [1940]: 8 f.), replaced by the Decree on Pricing of April 12, 1940 (131 ff.); final draft, July 1, 1944 (
VBl.GG
[1944]: 211 ff.).

According to the confidential report by the head of the Central Group for Commercial Economy in the Central Chamber for the Whole Economy in the General Government of November 14, 1941 (Institute for Western Studies, Pozna
, doc. I-6; reproduced in
Doc. Occ.
6:356 ff.), some wages remained at prewar levels; some were raised slightly; at best (in the steel and engineering industries), they were brought into line with rates of pay for Germans. In contrast, by November 1941 prices on the black market (Radom District)—which was the one and only means of procuring food—had risen in comparison with prewar levels by about 2,500% for bread, 940% for milk, 1,100% for butter, 2,600% for bacon, 1,200% for potatoes, 1,200% for beef. On increasing food rations to industry, cf. report by the head of the Central Group for Commercial Economy (Institute for Western Studies, Pozna
, doc. I-6; reproduced in
Doc. Occ.
6:359).

44.
Frauendorfer, “Arbeits- und Sozialpolitik im GG” (1941); for further details, see Stamm, “Sozialversicherung im General Government und ihre Einordnung in die Arbeits- und Gesundheitsverwaltung” (1942). Cf. report by retired state secretary D. J. Krohn, August 24, 1960, on the beginnings of the Labor Administration in the General Government (BA Ostdok. 13 GG IV b/1).

45.
Decree on the Provisional Regulation of Benefit Payments to Pensioners of the Former Polish State, December 9, 1939 (
VBl.GG
[1939]: 206 ff.); reduction of pensions by 50 to 100% by means of the Second Decree of March 20, 1942 (
VBl.GG
[1942]: 142); and First, Second, and Third Implementing Orders (
VBl.GG
2 [1940]: 209; 510; 1942, 210); so-called War Victims Decree of December 20, 1939 (
VBl.GG
1 [1940]: 1 ff.).

46.
Decree, December 16, 1939 (
VBl.GG
[1939]: 226 f.: the highest rate of weekly unemployment benefit was 9 złoty, the family supplement for the first dependent 4.20 złoty, for each further dependent a maximum of 2.40 złoty), superseded by the decree of November 9, 1940 (
VBl.GG
1 [1940]: 329 ff.). Details in comments by
Oberregierungsrat
Leutert at a discussion with the governor general on September 30, 1939 (“Diensttagebuch”). The Labor Department in the office of the governor general explained in a letter to the district chiefs, Labor Department, on January 4, 1940 (BA R 2/5066, 27 ff.), that assistance would not be given in the spirit of the law in force but only to maintain their capacity to work in the interests of the Reich—and only in cases where self-help was not possible. As a rule, 7 złoty per week should be sufficient. Cf. also report, Dr. J. Krohn, August 24, 1960 [Krohn was state secretary prior to 1939 and was delegated to the General Government in September 1939, though he quit as early as November 1939 because of differences with Frank—Author].

47.
Decree of the governor general, February 7, 1940, quoted from “Report on the Development of the General Government” (BA R 52 II/247, 196 ff.).

48.
Ibid., 193.

49.
Cf. ibid., 192; decree issued by the government of the General Government, December 17, 1940 (ZS, Polen 257, Bl. 41 f.; directive about stricter supervision of the committees); annual report of the Central Polish Aid Committee 1941–42 (BA R 52 III/7 and 7a); and progress report for March 1943 (7b), as well as report by its chairman on the occasion of a meeting with the governor general on June 19, 1942, and discussions between the chairman and the governor general on July 23 and October 23, 1943 (dissolution and reconstitution of the committee) (“Diensttagebuch”). A detailed account of the viewpoint of the administration is given in the report of Dr. Heinrich, former
Referent
(expert) in charge of the Non-German Free Welfare desk in the Department of Population Affairs and Welfare in the office of the governor general, on August 27, 1958 (BA Ostdok. 13 GG I k/1); overview of the work of the committee, compiled by the Department of Population Affairs and Welfare, September 15, 1943 (k/3).

50.
Cf. “Report on the Development of the General Government” (BA R 52 II/247) (with detailed statistical material); progress report of the Jewish Social Self-Help for August 1942 (ZS, Ordner 62, 7–9) (financial hardship suffered by the Self-Help committee due to “incalculable loss of assets”). Letter from the Jewish Social Self-Help, Warsaw, to the commissar for the Jewish quarter, September 6, 1942 (ZS, Polen 349, 205 ff.) (financial resources are exhausted, 94% of the applicants sent away). The Jewish Social Self-Help was dissolved in October 1942 at the behest of the Security Police; it was replaced by the Jewish Aid Office for the General Government, which came under the Central Department of Internal Administration (Department of Population Affairs and Welfare); this body oversaw the remaining aid committees, carried out provisioning measures, and distributed charitable donations (Berenstein, Eisenbach, and Rutkowski,
Eksterminacja
ydów
[1957], 317 f.); however, its dissolution was ordered by the police as early as December 1942, on the grounds that “all Jews would soon have disappeared from the General Government” (letter from commander of the Security Police, Kraków, to the government of the General Government, November 18, 1942, ZS, Versch. 104, Bl. 475 f.); letter, government of the General Government, Department of Population Affairs and Welfare, to the commissioner of the Foreign Office in Kraków, December 5, 1942 (Bl. 485).