Open Secrets: The Explosive Memoirs of an Indian Intelligence Officer (49 page)

Narayanan believed, like his political master, to run the affairs of the organisation with the help of a carefully selected coterie. There were, under his dispensation, three categories of middle and upper level operatives: the kitchen helpers, the utility personages and the hanging-peg passengers. While he depended heavily on the immediate coterie, he did not succeed in earning true admiration of the two categories. I felt that Narayanan had distanced himself from the grassroots.

I did never belong to any coterie in the IB. Perhaps I missed out the benign smiles of the coterie catalysts because of my prolonged field assignments and my propensities of asking inconvenient questions, maintaining my ‘operational independence’ and refusal to mimic the ambience of abject submission to the power wielders. I believed in controlled functional autonomy, operational flexibility within the given briefs and personal detachment from the ‘consumers’. I was prone to support a cause with an ideological approach and not any persona, never sheepishly.

I had always appreciated the intellectual sharpness of Narayanan. But I failed to ingratiate myself with the coterie around him and approve of his incautious support to the ‘reign of error’ of Rajiv Gandhi. As a subordinate ‘Bureau’ of the Ministry of Home Affairs the IB had no functional independence and we, the operational functionaries of the agency, had to carry out illegal orders of the ‘consumers.’ But, even at the height of Indira Gandhi’s power some of the leaders of the organisation had zealously guarded certain niches of the IB. Sanjay had trampled these down. But this time around these niches were voluntarily surrendered to the coterie around Rajiv.

Most coterie members hated me. They hated me for my independent views and non-conformity with the corporate ambience in the organisation. They distrusted me because I was supposed to be still ‘loyal’ to the old Indira-time elements. They were yet to be aware of my deep liking for the RSS.

However, developments in the political and national lives and the changes inside the agency did not deter me from devoting my loyalty and professional skill to the task I was assigned. But I started with a big handicap. A competent team headed by Kalyan Rudra headed the Punjab Operations Cell. They belonged to the inner coterie of Narayanan. The team was oriented to obey and follow the existing leadership. My arrival was not liked either by the leaders or the workforce of the cell. A gadfly isn’t tolerated on the toast. I felt the heat and suspicion and the hostile ambience temperature. Gradually the Operations Cell was bifurcated and I was left to fend for myself with inexperienced manpower and nothing else. It was an unfair deal and I smarted under professional humiliation. How could two different personalities with different work-ethos and styles work in the same problem area? The puzzle baffled me.

I did not, at that point of time, understand the strategic move of the Director Intelligence Bureau. Very often the two cells crossed each other’s undefined territory and jeopardised asset generation and manipulation. For a period of time the ambience heat infected the lower functionaries, who were forced to observe the ‘Laxman rekha’ (restraining line) drawn by their controlling officers. We often functioned in isolation and almost crashed against each other, rather with not too sublime thuds and catastrophic consequences.

But there I was, thrown on the gaping national fault line of Punjab. My partner in the Operations cell and a couple of others sincerely believed that such fault lines, either inherited or created by the thirsty and hungry politicians, could jolly well be filled up by dead bodies, bodies of innocent citizens and citizens turned terrorists. I did not subscribe essentially in the state policy of filling up the follies of fault lines by dead bodies, in the name of restoring law and order and the rule of law. My experiences in the North East and in Naksalbari had convinced me that fault lines can only be filled up by prudent fusion of political, administrative and economic measures. Smoothening of the roughed up frills of cultural linkages often helped in less counting of body bags.

To some of my colleagues ‘operation’ meant generating actionable information and associate with the police to physically eliminate the terrorists. On a number of occasions innocent youths were picked up in police style and mercilessly interrogated. They often disappeared; killed and dumped in isolated and mass graves. I was vehemently opposed to such fusion operations in connivance with the police forces. I felt that the IB should work on two plains: generating tactical intelligence to be used by the police and devising strategic approaches that could lead to lasting solution of the human problem and healing of the fault line. These differences continued from day one.

In any case, I was there, caught between the gaping gorge of the Punjab fault line. I was supposed to churn out positive results though the pulling ends of the ropes were beyond my control. But I was not in the habit of saying die, before I exactly died. The old buccaneer of the North East peeped out of its slumber once again.

INSIDE BLAZING PUNJAB

The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding.

Justice Louis D. Brandeis.

It is necessary to briefly recount the lay of the ground after Operation Blue Star, assassination of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Longwal Accord. Punjab is a classic example of political misperception that national fault line can be repaired by the use of force alone. Blue Star had succeeded in killing Bhindranwale and his close associates but it did not quell the singed psyche of the Sikhs. The Bhindranwale followers had dispersed inside Punjab and elsewhere in India. Those who had gone over to Pakistan were picked up by the ISI and psychologically and logistically armed to continue the acts of terrorism. It was a low cost and low intensity proxy war. The Indian system had offered Pakistan with a unique opportunity to shift its theatre of proxy war from Indian North East to North West.

Soon after Surjit Singh Barnala was handed over the reins of Punjab the Bhindranwale followers started reappearing in small groups. The Army and the paramilitary forces launched operation ‘Munda’ to mop up the ‘militant’ youths. But the exercise turned out to be counterproductive. It forced a number of youths to escape to the safe ISI niches in Pakistan. Barnala had miserably failed to contain the stem. By early 1986 Rajiv Gandhi faced a phalanx of militant organisations with the Dam Dami Taksal as the top cone of a tectonically instable pyramid.

While the faction ridden AISSF continued to be the fertile breeding ground, the other prominent groups included: the Babbar Khalsa (Pakistan based Sukhdev Singh Dassowal and Sukhdev Singh Sakhira and Talvinder Singh Parmar groups), Khalistan Commando Force (Cheheru), Khalistan Liberation Army (Tarsem Singh Kohar), Jarnail Singh-Babla gang (killer group of Sant H.S. Longwal), Mathura Singh gang (killer of Lalit Maken, General Vaidya etc), Roshan Lal Bairagi gang, Khalistan Armed Police, Khalistan Liberation Force (Tat Khalsa-Avtar Singh Brahma), Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (Manochahal), Mai Bhago Regiment (Bibi Bhag Kaur) and Mata Sahib Singh Commando Force (Harsharan Kaur) etc. The list is fairly long and Sikh propensity for spontaneous splitting like nuclear particles had given rise to several factions in the KCF, BTFK and KLF etc organisations.

The need for formation of a common political umbrella for the militant groups was emphasised by the foreign-based militant organisations like the WSO, ISYF, International Babbar Khalsa and their mentor, the Inter Services Intelligence of Pakistan. This was made possible by a strategic move by the Dam Dami Taksal. The meeting on 5-6 January at Gurdwara Gurdarshan Prakash at Chowk Mehta of the top terrorist leaders was presided over by Baba Thakur Singh, acting
jathedar
of the Taksal. It was decided to appoint a five-member Panthic Committee (Committee of the Faithful) to guide the ‘Sikh Panth’ and to act as political umbrella of the terrorist groups. This momentous decision was sanctified in a ‘
sarbat khalsa
’ (general congregation) meeting held inside the Golden Temple, for which Major General Narinder Singh (Retired Indian Army) was made security chief and Dalbir Singh, a retired journalist was entrusted with the task of drafting the resolutions. The Panthic Committee was reconstituted at this meeting and Bhai Jasbir Singh Rode, a nephew of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale was appointed the
Jathedar
of the
Akal Takht
in place of Kripal Singh.

The Panthic Committee was a motley collection of militant leaders who had very little knowledge about the complicated aspects of statecraft, geopolitical peculiarities and the arts and science of guerrilla warfare. Around this time Gurjit Singh, the AISSF leader, returned from Pakistan with messages that Pakistan was unhappy with the progress made by the militant groups. The Panthic Committee was also pressurised by the foreign-based demagogues to declare ‘Khalistan’ as the independent home state of the Sikhs. That vital decision was finally taken at a meeting at the Golden Temple on April 28, 1986, which was attended by amongst others by Dr. Sohan Singh, a former director, health services and a relation of Sardar Swaran Singh, one time minister in Indira government. The formal announcement was made on April 29. The developments in early 1986 had given opportunity to the Sikh terrorists to reoccupy the Golden Temple and adjacent buildings. The Barnala government failed to stem the rot and the holy precincts was turned into torture and killing chambers. The terrorised people of Punjab were forced to turn to the terrorist outfits for adjudication and for mere permission to breathe and live. They were subjected to double jeopardy: indiscriminate killing by police and paramilitary forces, and, harassment and torture and ransom demands by terrorist outfits.

The state government, though demoralised and haunted by the secessionist activities of the rival Akali factions and low moral of the police and the administration, did respond well to the terror wave. Rajiv Gandhi too responded fast by ordering NSG action inside the Golden Temple premises after the Panthic Committee had proclaimed “Khalistan’. He had again ordered the launching of ‘Operation Mand’ to flush out the terrorists from the Mand (riverine) wetland area.

He had already played the peace card through Ragi Darshan Singh and a Jain preacher Sushil Muni. These efforts yielded more sounds than results.

However, another Sikh leader, Buta Singh, the Union Home Minister, further compounded Rajiv’s predicament. Buta Singh, like his illustrious predecessor Giani Zail Singh nursed the ambition of adorning the cape of power in Punjab. A ‘
low caste
’ Sikh he was despised by the upper caste
Jats
and
khatris
(warriors). The upper caste Sikhs were ready to accept any Indian but, in their language, a ‘
chuda
’ (night soil carrier) as their leader. Rajiv Gandhi, rightly or wrongly, had failed to appreciate the caste realities in Punjab.

Though the administrative and police forces in Punjab were highly subverted and the judiciary almost stopped functioning, the new police leader J. F. Ribeiro did a commendable job. In 1986, about 80 top terrorists were engaged in action and 1525 terrorists were apprehended. The daunting old young police officer escaped an assassination bid but refused to give up. Rebeiro had finely blended the ingredients of tough policing and political approach.

The political forces were in disarray and most of the Indira Congress, Shiromani Akali Dal and Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) leaders were aligned to one or the other terrorist groups. Fathoming of loyalty had become an impossible task.

I was, as a rookie operator, assigned the task of grappling with the dual process of making peace sans the bullet and tracking down and neutralising the terrorist leaders. The other important tasks involved exposing the involvement of Pakistan, terrorist safe havens in Nepal and terrorist cells in other parts of India.

Intelligence operative’s performance details in an insurgency and terrorist infested terrain is often replete with nuggets of bravery. Such acts of bravery and achievement are often accompanied by body bags, bodies of the slain terrorists and those of the frontline soldiers.

I would like to skip the macabre details of the killings, which have been better portrayed by other chroniclers. But I must share with my readers that ‘operations’ conducted by me did not involve mindless killing of innocent village folks, youths and mass burial of suspected terrorists. I would rather like to refrain from commenting on the ‘heroic’ performances of my colleagues and that of a section of police force. I did not endorse their policy of killing own countrymen in the name of fighting terrorism, when other options were not totally exhausted. I firmly believe in curing the internal national ills through constitutional means and not through military might. We have been blatantly wrong in stamping social unrest as mere law and order problems.

I preferred the peace route to the ‘elimination route’, as I firmly believed that terrorism in Punjab did not grow overnight. It resulted from political intransigence and indulgence in competitive fundamentalism by two historically inimical political forces: the Congress and the Akali Dal. Indira Congress stalwarts like Zail Singh, Buta Singh and Sanjay Gandhi were responsible for bringing Jarnail Singh to the centre stage. They played with fireballs at a crucial point in history when the western Cold War partners and Pakistan were engaged in a last ditch battle against the ailing Red Bear. Zia, painted in the blackest brush by the western powers for human rights violation, was given a hurried white coat of paint and used as the frontline partner in the war against the USSR. A couple of petty political operators had failed to analyse the depth and extent of socio-economic paradoxes haunting the Punjab peasantry and the unemployed youth. They refused to recognise the fact that General Zia-ul-Rahman, a Jullandhari Punjabi, was just readying his arsenal to exploit the new Indian fault line. He was keen to get back to Jullandhar, the supposed industrial capital of an independent Punjab. Why not? Had he not succeeded in humiliating the USSR, a much bigger power?

The immature political kids and bandits in Delhi, who played with the Punjab fireballs during Indira Gandhi’s second tenure as well as Rajiv Gandhi and his corporate whiz kids, had failed to fathom the Punjab obsession of the
muhajir
Military President of Pakistan. Zia’s family were Arains from Jullandhar. He reposed greater trust on fellow
majha
(central) Punjab
muhajir
(refugee) Muslims of Jat stock. General Arif was his Vice-chief of Staff and General Akhtar Rahman, a fellow Jullandhari headed the Inter Services Intelligence. Another Jullandhari Arian, Lt. General Faiz Ali Chisti, headed Zia’s Opeartion Fairpaly that ended the capricious but democratically elected government of Zufiqar Ali Bhutto. It was no wonder that the majha area of Punjab received greater attention from Pakistan during the height of the movement, though the high priest of violence hailed from the
malwa
(lower) region.

Way back in 1982 I had reported on a meeting between Zia and some of the Sikh pilgrims to Nankana Sahib from India and England. The Joint Director overseeing Punjab desk had killed that ‘sensational’ report in his famous cooling chambers. This time around too, I had drawn attention of my bosses to the queer Jullandhar factor that loomed so large on the deteriorating Punjab situation. I had the right to inform my bosses but I did not have the right to be informed about the policy decisions framed by them, and also, I did not have the right to ask if such policy decisions had taken into account all available data. In the new dispensation such questions were treated as sacrilegious audacity. Things have not vastly changed since than. Small Hitlers very often rule the IB.

*

Though he was a fickle minded person, I believed Rajiv Gandhi was keen on simultaneous pushing of the peace and war process. I was summoned to his residence sometime in early November 1987, just four months after my induction to the operations cell and was grilled about my acquaintance with the Punjab problem. My face was not unknown to the Prime Minister. He placed me at the correct slot and asked me if I knew Sushil Muni. I feigned ignorance. I had known the so called
muni
(saint) at a different point of time in a rather unsavoury context, when I was asked by the PMO way back in 1981 to investigate a charge of molestation of a politician’s wife by a person aspiring for sainthood.

The new PM directed me to see him.

I met the Muni at his illegally constructed ashram on government land at Shankar Road (status as of 1996). In cahoots with Buta Singh, the Union Home Minister, the Muni had roped in Tarlochan Singh Riyasti, a veteran politician, for influencing a section of the terrorists. I gathered a clear perception that Muni Sushil was not loyal either to the PM or to the HM. He was loyal to himself and was angling for three steps towards nirvana: money, membership of the Upper House of the Parliament and a Padma award.

I had known Riyasti, a freedom fighter and a politician of good repute, from my earlier dalliance with the Punjab imbroglio at its formative stage. He had used my facilitation to get closer to Indira Gandhi and her private secretary R.K. Dhawan. He had elaborately briefed me about the machinations of Zail Singh and his open hostility with other senior Indira Congress leaders in Punjab. In fact, way back in 1982 he helped me to enter the precincts of Gurdwara Gurdarshan Prakash at Chowk Mehta, the dreaded abode of the militants.

Sushil Muni again introduced Riyasti to me and I was briefed about a new peace initiative, which was exclusively initiated by the veteran freedom fighter. In our private discussions Riyasti gave me to understand that he was in touch with a young group of Khalistanis and they were ready to meet the Prime Minister. To my horror I discovered that Riyasti had not even discussed the ‘operation’ with the Prime Minister. In fact, he was not allowed by Buta Singh to meet Rajiv Gandhi and insisted that he should only operate through Sushil Muni. The die was cast and I could not breach the barriers imposed on me by service restrictions. I did not have that kind of informal relationship with Rajiv Gandhi that I enjoyed with Indira Gandhi and Dhawan. But I knew something sinister was cooking up at the PM’s back. I wondered as to how the DIB could agree to launch Riyasti operation! It appeared that my boss too had succumbed to the hierarchical pressure and I was directed to bring the militant leaders to Delhi for a meeting with the PM. In plain language the operation was thrown on my lap at the last moment as my other colleague in the Punjab operation cell backed out for reasons known only to him.