Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (32 page)

4 The advent of war

‘Welcome to hell on earth’

Hitler's War
Directive 21 stated that preparations for the campaign against the Soviet Union were to be concluded by 15 May 1941.
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While
planning for the eastern campaign went ahead, the wider war was developing in its own direction, rapidly engulfing the nations of south-eastern Europe, until events finally came to a head in the spring of 1941, compelling Hitler to intervene.
The Balkan campaign is sometimes narrowly portrayed as Hitler's response to the successful Yugoslav coup against the regent
Prince Paul, who was deposed after finally acceding to the
Tripartite Pact, following months of German pressure. In truth, however, Hitler's rationale for the new campaign ultimately aimed at restoring the Axis position in the south and ensuring Germany's flank for the invasion of the Soviet Union.

Since October 1940
Mussolini had been embroiled in a disastrous attempt to invade
Greece, which soon saw his beleaguered army thrown back into
Albania and forced to defend itself against further Greek counter-attacks.
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The following months saw increasingly bold
British action in the eastern Mediterranean and North
Africa, leading to heavy Italian losses and the eventual Greek consent to the landing of four British divisions. The Greek hesitation in accepting direct British assistance was closely tied to their well-founded concerns about provoking Hitler,
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who feared the British were seeking to recreate a ‘Salonika front’ like the one that had proved such a thorn in Germany's side in 1916–1918. Of even greater concern to Hitler was the prospect that British bombers might be committed to new RAF airfields and used to strike the vital oil fields
in Romania
. In
addition, Hitler was undoubtedly aware of the economic implications control over south-eastern Europe held for Germany. Half of
Germany's cereal and livestock came from the region, 45 per cent of its bauxite (aluminium ore), 90 per cent of its tin, 40 per cent of its lead and 10 per cent of its copper.
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Finally, a major operation to occupy Yugoslavia and Greece would provide a somewhat more convincing explanation for the growing German military build-up in the east, helping to allay any Soviet fears of an impending attack.

Planning for what later became known as Operation
Marita began in early November 1940,
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although Hitler made it clear to Mussolini
and the Italian foreign minister, Galeazzo
Ciano, that German intervention could not be expected before the following spring.
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In
spite of the continuing turmoil in the south, the army's deployment and timing for Barbarossa remained almost unaltered until the Yugoslav coup. The heavy commitment of first-rate German combat formations to Operation Barbarossa required the immediate dispatch of nine divisions and two corps headquarters to new assembly areas in the south,
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inducing a delay in the launch of the eastern campaign, which Halder estimated at being around four weeks.
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Some have questioned the wisdom of this postponement,
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but a delay was almost certainly inevitable given that the late spring thaw had swelled and in some cases flooded the major waterways, impeding mobile operations over the sodden ground.
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Even though the time lost was unavoidable owing to the unseasonable weather, the Balkan campaign still exacted a military price. From the divisions committed to action in Yugoslavia, two-thirds were simply replaced in the line by OKH reserves and all combat divisions were en route back to the eastern border by the end of May. The forces committed to Greece, however, were a different matter. Combat losses were slight yet, as would soon be the case in Operation Barbarossa, the long distances and inhospitable terrain took a much greater toll on the German panzers and motorised transports.
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As a result, these divisions had to make the long journey back to Germany to receive thorough overhauls and partial
re-equipping. It proved a time-consuming process and meant that the
2nd and
5th Panzer Divisions, as well as the
60th Motorised Infantry Division, only arrived on the eastern front well after the initial attack.
¹²
The two panzer divisions were then held in the OKH reserve and did not see action until October 1941. The delay in returning motorised units to service proved an important setback given the brief window of opportunity for the success of Barbarossa. Compounding this was the loss of the entire
12th Army, which was needed to provide occupation forces and coastal defence in south-eastern Europe. This complicated the already difficult task of
Army Group South, which made the slowest progress of the three army groups in the opening weeks of Operation Barbarossa.
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In the longer term, partly because of the brutally repressive measures enacted against the Serb and later Greek populations, the Balkans rapidly became the centre of an intense guerrilla war, harming Germany's economic exploitation and demanding increasingly large security
forces.
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Finally, one must consider the resultant military cost of seizing
Crete in May 1941, where some 220 transport aircraft were lost and 4,000 German soldiers killed, devastating the elite
7th Parachute Division and ending Hitler's enthusiasm for further airborne
operations.
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The Balkan campaign placed yet another drain on Germany's eroding military resources and contributed in no small measure to the mounting over-extension of the Wehrmacht. Alone these burdens could be borne, at least in the short term. The added risk posed by invading the Soviet Union presented an entirely different proposition and one which entailed very real dangers for the Reich. Operation Barbarossa was always going to be a great gamble and in many regards the odds were stacked against Germany. Still, Hitler chose this course and, resolutely backed by his generals, there was no dispute about the wisdom of war, or the prospect of victory. If Hitler bears the guilt of being an obsessive megalomaniac, driven by a fanatical and irrepressible will, the generals too must be accorded their share of blame for blindly following and even encouraging
him.
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On the last day of April 1941 Hitler settled on 22 June as the new date for the start of Operation
Barbarossa.
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Despite the months of planning
and the fact that the postponement of the operation was a relatively recent occurrence, the generals were still undecided on basic questions concerning the deployment of panzers and infantry in the initial attack. This had been debated since
Paulus's December 1940 war game, where the old issue of the panzer groups operating as independent entities was again a subject of contention.
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A further war game conducted in February 1941 under
Guderian's direction raised the issue once more. In this instance Hoth, commander of
Panzer Group 3, was worried that the presence of infantry divisions would congest the roads and slow the advance of his own forces. Neither
Bock nor Guderian agreed, although Hoth was somewhat placated by assurances that these forward infantry divisions would be subordinated to him, allowing him to ensure that their movement did not impede his panzers. Explaining the decision, Bock, as Army Group Centre's commander, was clearly concerned at the speed with which a gap could open up between his infantry divisions and those of the motorised and panzer divisions. ‘If I gave into Hoth's demand’, Bock wrote, ‘the leading infantry might not cross the border until four or five days after the tanks in Panzer Group 3's attack area, meaning the entire northern sector of the
9th Army.’
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For Hoth's part, he insisted upon the promised control of the infantry divisions, pursuing the matter all the way to Halder to ensure his authority.
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By the middle of May, the suggestion that Guderian's
Panzer Group 2 should likewise accommodate infantry divisions in its forward area provoked an apparent change of heart in the general. According to Bock, Guderian now spoke out harshly against the proposals, claiming they would split up his panzer units in the first attack. Bock also now expressed reservations. The additional infantry was to be provided by the strategic reserve, causing Bock to complain: ‘[A]rtillery and combat engineers of the reserve are already being committed in the first attack; if they are now joined by the infantry, there will be practically nothing left of the reserves.’
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The impatient desire to move the infantry closer to the border was
Brauchitsch's initiative and not only the panzer units were affected; he also wanted the reserves packed more tightly together on the army group's right wing. Bock feared this would produce mass confusion and obstruct movement throughout the entire army group. Summing up his view, Bock wrote:

The same dictate as the year before at
Wesel, where they forced me to move them [the reserves] closer! That led to dangerous traffic jams, which were overcome only with great difficulty. It will be exactly the same here, for days will pass before Panzer Group 2 departs and before the
XII Corps is across the
Bug, in which the reserves can close ranks calmly.
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In the end, Guderian was appeased in much the same manner as Hoth, which may well have formed the impetus for his change of heart. At his own request, Guderian
was temporarily given command of XII Corps to assault the defences at
Brest Litovsk.
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The resolution was only agreed as late as 12 June 1941, which may explain why Brauchitsch
, in spite of his aversion to the plan, grudgingly accepted it. Bock was also disturbed, writing: ‘I too can see no advantage to this solution…And up front is a huge mass of infantry, which can easily lead to large and unnecessary losses.’ Bock then added: ‘Behind it all is the failure of those in charge to clearly and in good time order what they wanted; that would have eliminated all discussions and compromises.’
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Bock's insightful comment forms a rare instance of general criticism which, although unknown to Bock
at the time, deserves to be seen in the wider context of Halder's and Brauchitsch's deception over Moscow.

As
the date of attack drew nearer, the final intelligence reports from the deputy military attaché in Moscow, Colonel Hans
Krebs, and the chief of Foreign Armies East, Colonel
Kinzel, reaffirmed the general tone of confidence within the German High Command. Towards the end of April, Kinzel noted that estimates of the Red Army had grown to a peacetime strength of 170 divisions, but that many divisions were short of equipment, especially artillery. Officers were also said to be in short supply with regiments being commanded by young majors and divisions by colonels.
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Krebs gave his report to Halder upon returning from Moscow on 5 May. The Soviets, he said, would do anything to avoid war and yield on every issue short of making territorial concessions. The officers’ corps was decidedly bad and, compared with 1933, the overall picture was strikingly negative. Indeed, despite Soviet rearmament, Krebs maintained it would take the Red Army twenty years to reach their former position.
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The reports only confirmed the impression, shared throughout the upper circles of the Wehrmacht, that the Soviet Union was still a backward land with a large but clumsy army, lacking modern equipment, training and above all leadership. In early May, as the
commander of Army Group South, Field Marshal Gerd von
Rundstedt, bid goodbye to his counterpart at Army Group North, Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von
Leeb, he made the laconic remark: ‘Well then, see you in
Siberia.’
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In a further dose of sober realism, Ulrich von
Hassell commented a week before the campaign on 15 June 1941: ‘The prospects of a swift victory against Russia are still judged by the soldiers as stirringly bright.’
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While
the accuracy of German intelligence amounted to little more than an accumulation of fanciful misinformation, a glaring failure of Halder's General Staff was its blatant unwillingness to consider the other side to the Soviet empire. The remarkable increases in industrialisation, the vast manpower reserves, the adaptability of a centralised economy to wartime mobilisation and the absolute authority of the state administration headed by
Stalin, all merited closer attention. The prospect of the Soviet Union as an emerging great power with modern military concepts and technical sophistication was not an entirely new idea, nor one unknown to the German military. Describing the Soviet state in 1937
Guderian wrote:

Russia possesses the strongest army in the world, numerically and in terms of the modernity of its weapons and equipment. The Russians have the world's largest air force as well, and they are striving to bring their navy up to the same level. The transport system is still inadequate, but they are working hard in that direction also. Russia has ample raw materials, and a mighty armaments industry has been set up in the depths of that vast empire. The time has passed when the Russians had no instinct for technology; we will have to reckon on the Russians being able to master and build their own machines, and with the fact that such a transformation in the Russians’ fundamental mentality confronts us with the Eastern Question in a form more serious than ever before in history.
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