Operation Solo (33 page)

Morris also lodged a new complaint. Hall watched the money supplied by the Soviets like a miser and acted as if they were his personal funds. If he or Jack dipped into the money too often or too deeply for operational purposes, Hall might remove it from their custody and thereby reduce their power over him. Thus, he and Jack often had to defray operational expenses out of their own pockets. Neither was a pauper, but it did not seem quite right that they should have to subsidize the U.S. government as well as Hall.

The impromptu response by Wannall was worthy of Morris himself. Because of the trust the FBI reposed in Morris and Jack, he wanted to confide some in-house matters so they could understand the FBI rationale that now governed SOLO. Director Kelley had implemented a new concept of “participatory management.” Henceforth, each assistant director would be directly responsible for operations and policies within his division. Although the director was to be informed of any major developments and consulted about any basic policy decisions, from now on Wannall was free to make most decisions regarding SOLO without approval from anyone.

The conspicuous rapport prevailing among Morris, Jack, Al, Walt, and John impressed Wannall. If in the future Morris or Jack had any complaints, problems or advice, they should tell Al, Walt, or John as if speaking directly to Wannall.

The security measures safeguarding SOLO were extraordinary, and with the exception of the Chuchukin matter there had been no leaks in a long time. The reference in the book to Chuchukin as a disinformation officer was “old information” that did not emanate from the FBI—it could have come from anywhere—and the FBI did not know it was going to be published (implicitly, this was a Soviet rather than an American security breach). Nevertheless, the Soviet reaction in jerking Chuchukin out of the operation was normal and understandable to everyone. The FBI was doing
everything conceivable to protect them; still, the invaluable intelligence they gathered had to be disseminated to senior policymakers if it was to have value.

Brannigan spoke up. SOLO intelligence bore the highest U.S. security classification. Reports could not be copied or passed from one recipient to another. They could not be read outside the continental United States. The reports were hand-carried to the highest policymakers of the U.S. government, read, then returned to the FBI. Brannigan paused, then probably out of a lifetime of conditioning rather than any clever artifice, blurted out raw truth: “Despite all we are doing, despite unheard of safeguards, we cannot guarantee absolute security.”

Morris and Jack nodded. They knew there could be no absolute guarantee, and that is why they were afraid. What they craved was the belief that their services were valued and headquarters was doing all it could to sustain them.

Concerning expenses, Wannall said that as a matter of principle he did not want either Jack or Morris to spend a cent of their own on SOLO. Here again he flattered them with honesty. There were bureaucratic procedures of accounting for peculiar expenditures, and sometimes they clashed with even more stringent rules enforced to keep virtually everyone ignorant of SOLO. Occasionally it might be difficult to reimburse a few expenses (how do you justify buying a $600 suit for the general secretary of the American Communist Party without telling accountants something about SOLO?). But if ever money was needed on the spot, Wannall would make sure it was forthcoming.

Morris and Jack should not misconstrue the many questions often asked for weeks after a mission as pressure to produce intelligence. Sometimes reports contained slivers of information which, when combined with many other slivers, yielded important intelligence. The questions, rather than manifesting any pressure, testified to the immense value of the reports.

Wannall's willingness to discuss in-house matters, his treatment of Morris and Jack as fellow agents, his candid and intelligent explanations, and his statement that they could speak to him at any time through Al, John, or Walt completely won over Morris
and Jack. They left the meeting restored in spirit and ready to rejoin the battle.

Though he needed to get back to Washington quickly, Wannall asked the others to stay for a brief conference. It was not a conference at all; Wannall simply issued some policy directives. From now on, if Al, Walt, or John discerned in 58 or 69 any dissatisfaction or disillusionment, they were to alert him so the problem could be confronted before it worsened. Al, Walt, and John, in dealings with 58 and 69, were to emphasize that, as far as SOLO was concerned, Wannall was the “director”; when they heard from him, they were hearing from the director of the FBI. Finally, he ordered Boyle after each mission to draft for his signature congratulatory letters to be shown to 58 and 69.

In Kelley and Wannall, the SOLO team had two new champions at headquarters, the most powerful possible. Before long, the team very much would need them.

 

 

ON AUGUST 9, 1974, Richard Nixon resigned from office, the first American president ever to do so. In the aftermath of his resignation, Kelley and Wannall made a difficult decision—to violate a fundamental rule that had helped keep SOLO, Morris, Jack, Eva, and Roz alive for an improbably long time. The rule decreed that no one outside the FBI ever could know how SOLO worked or the identities of Morris, Jack, Eva, and Roz. The rule resulted not from distrust of anyone personally but from fear of an inadvertent leak and from awareness that someday the KGB might succeed in penetrating the staff of the White House, the State Department, or the CIA. In the prevailing circumstances, however, Kelley and Wannall concluded that overriding national interests compelled an exception to the rule.

As Brezhnev said to Hall and Morris, Watergate was shaking not only the United States but the world. The scandals and turmoil preceding his resignation had left Nixon virtually powerless in world affairs during his last months in office. Allies of the United States from Western Europe to China and Japan were confused and apprehensive about future American policy, as were Morris'
friends in the Kremlin. In Southeast Asia, the North Vietnamese were exploiting internal American disarray by probing and testing to see just how brazenly they could flout the Paris Peace Accords without provoking U.S. retaliation.

Up until now, policymakers eagerly had accepted “Special Source” (SOLO) intelligence without demanding to know who the source was and how the information was procured, and they had submitted to the somewhat humiliating procedure of reading reports in the presence of an armed FBI agent, then handing them back. Now Kelley and Wannall reasoned that, given the international uncertainty and atmosphere of crisis, the new president, Gerald Ford, and Secretary of State Kissinger needed to know the origins of the “Special Source” intelligence so they could better judge whether to make major policy decisions on the basis of it. Accordingly, the FBI fully informed Ford and Kissinger of the nature and history of SOLO.

Wannall instructed Jim Fox and Boyle, without naming Kissinger, to tell Morris what Kissinger said: “This is a window not only into the Kremlin, but into the minds of the men in the Kremlin. This is fabulous.”

 

 

HALL IN SEPTEMBER 1974 dispatched Morris to Moscow with a letter warning the Soviets that they were misinterpreting political events in the United States and that their misguided public statements were fueling an anti-Soviet campaign. Morris found Ponomarev in an ebullient mood; he believed the tide of communism was rising, even in America.

“You should know that we are getting volumes of communications from your new administration and we value these contacts. We intend to work constantly for the improvement of relations and détente,” Ponomarev told him.

“We are well aware and apprised of the past thinking of Ford and Rockefeller. But they assure us that their thinking is quite different than in the past, that they think differently now.”

Ponomarev solicited the advice and help of Morris in doing the impossible: persuading American Jews that the Soviet Union did
not persecute or discriminate against Jews. “We are planning to send some Jewish persons to the United States. Please tell us what kind of people can we send to improve relations. We have some very famous ones you know about—artists, many writers, scientists. Please suggest to us who could invite them and help their trip. What should they do to overcome the bad anti-Soviet propaganda? We are really perturbed and sometimes surprised that even non-Zionist Jewish people don't understand us and are anti-Soviet. We have given the newspapers the facts. We want this material published. We really want to clarify the Jewish problem. We would like your help on this problem.”

Ponomarev was also in high spirits because the Soviets and he personally had just achieved what they regarded, with some justification, as a coup in the United States. They had duped the U.S. Congress into receiving and meeting with a delegation of Soviet “parliamentarians,” as if they were members of freely elected British, French, West German, Canadian, or other demo-cratic parliamentary bodies. Heading the Soviet delegation was that great parliamentarian, Boris Ponomarev. As Ponomarev beamingly recounted, in Washington members of Congress fawned over their Soviet counterparts, their colleagues in democratic governance:

Ponomarev acknowledged that he did encounter some killjoys or spoilsports who complained about the recent swindle (accomplished in part with the aid of KGB eavesdropping on telephone conversations pertaining to the commodities market) by which the Soviets bought huge quantities of American grain at what critics of the deal called below-market or giveaway prices:

Morris realized that they indeed were. Every member of the so-called Soviet parliamentary delegation had to be a member of either the International Department or the KGB or under their control. By establishing direct ties with Congress, these professional Soviet sharks could turn Capitol Hill into a hunting ground and possibly influence the actions of individual congressmen without having to bother with the trained diplomats responsible for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Of course, the very concept of a Soviet parliament or Foreign Relations Committee was ludicrous. Morris thought,
Is the U.S. Congress a nursery for children?

On September 30, the day before Morris departed Moscow, Ponomarev called him in, thanked him for Hall's letter and gave him a formal reply: “On behalf of our leadership, we want to send greetings to your leadership. We appreciate the work of your Party. Although it is still a small Party, it is doing good work. Most important, it is a principled Party. It stands fast, holds the banner of Marxism–Leninism high, and in internationalism it is second to none. We also want to tell you that we appreciate Comrade Gus Hall as an important figure in our international communist movement. We really want to tell him that we appreciate your successes, especially that the CPUSA is breaking its isolation from the masses and is on the road to increasing influence among the people and to further growth. We believe that the situation is more favorable for communists now than ten years ago. And, therefore, we are convinced that you will succeed.”

In Chicago, Morris asked Boyle if the FBI could warn members of Congress that, in consorting with Soviet “parliamentarians”
and the Soviet “Foreign Relations Committee,” they were dealing with skilled, hardened subversives bent on manipulating them. Boyle said he honestly did not know. The director of the FBI or his representatives could testify before congressional committees, and if an individual congressman requested assistance regarding a security matter, the FBI could provide it. But the FBI had to avoid the least appearance of trying to influence a member of Congress or of involving itself in politics. The most Boyle could do was ensure that Wannall read what Ponomarev said and hope that he could devise ways to alert the congressional targets.