Paradiso (98 page)
Authors: Dante
19.
The only other appearance of the word
infallibile
occurs in
Inferno
XXIX.56, where it modifies
giustizia
. Here Beatrice gives her infallible (because she speaks with the authority of her Maker) idea of the justness of God’s vengeance, the “negative form” of his justice, punishment.
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20–21.
For a consideration of the way in which Christ’s prediction of the fall of Jerusalem (Luke 19:36–46) and the city’s conquest by the Romans in a.d. 70 are reflected in this and other passages (and also look forward to the coming punishment of Florence), see Martinez (Mart.2003.1).
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20.
The presence of two words directly related to “justice” in this verse begins by far the largest single deployment in any canto of such words:
giusta
and
giustamente
here;
giustamente
(42);
giusta
(50 and 51);
giuste
(84);
giustizia
(119). The neighboring canto (VI) is tied for second place with four, thus making these two cantos the center of this concern in a poem that is perhaps more concerned with justice than with any other single concept. See the note to
Inferno
III.4.
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25–33.
Adam’s sin of transgression (and it is significant that Dante here is placing on
his
shoulders the sin of Eve) was what “brought sin into the world and all our woe” (Milton,
Paradise Lost
1.3), to borrow the words of another major poet’s reference to that transgression. It is this for which the Word of God chose, in his love for humankind, to offer Himself as flesh in sacrifical atonement for all sin since Adam. (It was precisely this humanity of Jesus in which Justinian did not at first believe [see
Par
. VI.13–15].)
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26.
Adam was not born; he was created directly by God, as was (almost) Eve.
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28.
Scartazzini/Vandelli (comm. on vv. 28–33) point to
Monarchia
III.iv.14 for the phrase
infirmitas peccati
(infirmity of sin) as corresponding to the sickness afflicting the human race after Adam’s fall.
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29.
Later Dante will spell out the exact amount of time that passed between Adam’s sin and his redemption—5,232 years. See
Paradiso
XXVI.118–123.
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31–33.
This tercet includes reference to the two other aspects of the triune God, the Sapience represented by the Son having been mentioned in verse 30 (where Beatrice refers to the Word becoming flesh); the Power represented by the Father, “Maker” of all things; the Love represented by the Holy Spirit.
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34–45.
Humankind, a combination of immortal soul and mortal body, as present in Adam and Eve, quickly (for exactly how quickly, see
Par
. XXVI.139–142) turned from God to sin, and was sent out of Eden. If we measure what was done to Christ upon the Cross by the enormous burden of sin He took on, His penalty was utterly just; if, on the other hand, we measure the worth of the one who was punished, no greater outrage was ever committed, especially when we consider what He had voluntarily consented to.
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39.
The verse repeats, as Benvenuto da Imola (comm. to vv. 34–39) was perhaps the first to realize, Christ’s dictum (John 14:6) “Ego sum via, et veritas, et vita” (I am the way, and the truth, and the life). The text continues, “No one comes to the Father unless through me.”
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46–48.
The paired results of Christ’s sacrifice are expressed in a chiasmus: The death of Jesus pleased (a) God and (b) the Jews; it caused both (b) the earthquake at the Crucifixion and (a) the opening of Heaven to humankind. The Jews took perverse pleasure at the killing of Jesus for which reason God made the earth shake, expressing His displeasure; at the same time, and of far greater importance, God accepted Jesus’ sacrifice and opened Heaven to redeemed humanity.
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49–51.
Beatrice’s repetition of the adjective
giusta
(just) underlines her main concern for Dante, that he understand that God never acts unjustly. She has taken care of his first doubt, which arose from what Justinian said about the reign of Titus.
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52–120.
Next Beatrice turns to the problem that arose for the protagonist in Justinian’s remarks about the reign of Tiberius. This is one of the most pernicious stumbling blocks for nonbelievers and even some Christians. It is the question posed (and answered) by Beatrice here (see Scartazzini’s lengthy gloss to this passage, which deals with Dante’s complex discussion
clearly). The two main sources for Dante’s thinking about the justification for the death of Jesus on the Cross are, according to Scartazzini, St. Thomas (
ST
III, q. 46, a. 1–3) and St. Anselm of Canterbury (
Cur Deus homo
). For insistence on the primacy, for Dante’s thinking on this subject, of Anselm’s tract, see Fallani (Fall.1989.1), pp. 233–34.
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52–63.
Now, reading Dante’s mind, Beatrice sees what is troubling him; there must have been some other way for human sin to have been canceled short of having the incarnate Godhead be slain upon a cross. Beatrice warns that her proof will be difficult, because only those nourished over time by the warmth of God’s affection ever understand this mystery, that is, only those inspired by the Holy Spirit are able to understand the love for humankind that impelled Jesus to give up his life for us.
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57.
From Lombardi (1791, comm. to vv. 56–57) to Grabher (1934, comm. to vv. 55–63), most commentators think the word
pur
here means “only.” Starting with Trucchi (1936, comm. to vv. 52–57), the tide begins swinging to
proprio
(precisely, exactly); Chimenz (1962, comm. to vv. 56–57) prefers this meaning to “only,” as do Bosco/Reggio (1979, comm. to vv. 56–57); as our translation indicates, we do, too.
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64–120.
Tozer’s summary of these passages may be helpful: “Man, inasmuch as his soul proceeded direct from God, possessed the gifts of immortality, free will, and likeness to God, and on these depended his high position (vv. 64–78). By the Fall the freedom of his will and his likeness to God were impaired, and his position was lost (vv. 79–81). There were only two ways by which he could recover this, i.e., either (1) that he should make satisfaction himself for his sin, or (2) that God in His mercy should pardon him freely (vv. 82–93). The former of these it was impossible for man to do, because he could not render any adequate recompense; it remained therefore for God to guarantee his pardon (vv. 94–105). This God did in a manner at once most consonant with His own nature, as being perfect Goodness, and most advantageous to man, and most in accordance with the demands of justice. He followed both the way of mercy and the way of justice. By the Incarnation and death of Christ He enabled man to regain his lost position, and at the same time made the satisfaction for his sins which justice required” (vv. 106–20).
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64–65.
For an attempt to demonstrate the closeness of the thought here to that found in Plato’s
Timaeus
, see Fraccaroli (Frac.1906.1), pp. 393–97,
disputing the more usual nineteenth-century claim of a dependence upon Boethius. However, see Richard Green’s note to the passage, in his translation of the
Consolatio
(Gree. 1962.1), p. 60, pointing out that the poem (“O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas” [O you who govern the world with eternal reason]) in Boethius (
Consolatio
III.m9) is recognized as being an epitome of the first section of the
Timaeus
. Among the early commentators, Pietro di Dante (comm. to vv. 64–78) cites Boethius (“Rather it was the form of the highest good, existing within You without envy, which caused You to fashion all things according to the external exemplar”), while Benvenuto da Imola (comm. to vv. 64–66) and Francesco da Buti (comm. to vv. 64–75) cite
Timaeus
29e (the opening of Book I): “Optimus erat, et ab optimo omnis invidia relegata est” (He [the god who made universal disorder into order] was good: and in the good no jealousy in any matter can ever arise [tr. F. M. Cornford]—Plato is speaking of the divine mind, as is Boethius). For more support of Plato’s candidacy and general consideration of the problem, see Galimberti (Gali.1968.1), pp. 227–35. Sapegno (comm. to vv. 64–66) was perhaps the first to cite both (Boethius,
Cons
. III.m9.1–6; Plato,
Tim
. I). Giacalone (comm. to vv. 64–66) offers helpful discussion and a bibliography.
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67.
Those things created directly, that is, without mediation, by God include the angels, the heavenly spheres, unformed matter (e.g., the earth’s surface, awaiting the formal intervention of God to be given its definitive shape), and the rational part of the tripartite human soul. For the distinction between this unformed God-created matter, Augustine’s
materia informis
, and “prime matter” (
materia prima
), see O’Keeffe (Okee.1924.1), pp. 51–57.
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72.
The “more recent” things were created not directly by God, but with some mediation (e.g., planetary influence), since all of these were part of a “secondary creation.”
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85–87.
In Adam we all sinned, and have been denied the privileges that once were his, particularly three things: immortality, the earthly paradise, and our resemblance to God.
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97–100.
We were not capable of abasing ourselves in humility deep enough to make up for the amount we had risen up in pride.
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103–111.
Thus it remained for God to ransom us using either mercy or justice. He elected to employ both of these.
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112–120.
Dante employs
hysteron proteron
yet again to mark either end of human history, the last night of life on earth (see the Apocalypse) and the first day (see Genesis). In the period of time sectored in that arc no greater act ever was or shall be than Jesus’ act of self-humiliation to save humankind.
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124–138.
This passage and the rest of the canto deal with the ontology of God’s creation, specifically the distinctions between the nature of being in that which is created directly by God (things eternal or, more properly, since they have a beginning in time, sempiternal) and in that which, though created by God (for nothing that exists owes or can owe its existence to any other first cause), has other participation in its making (i.e., they are made by the intervention of other already existent things, as are almost all things that we encounter: butterflies, the cliffs of Dover, rain). On this question see Moore’s late essay, “Dante’s Theory of Creation” (Moor.1917.1), pp. 134–65, and the stern response by David O’Keeffe (Okee.1924.1); Moevs’s discussion (Moev.2005.1), pp. 122–26, agrees with O’Keeffe’s objections to Moore’s formulations, which underlie many later (mis)understandings of the basic cosmic views put forward here by Beatrice, and which, as a result, are incorrect. As Moevs points out (pp. 123–24), Beatrice fears lest Dante, mistaking her words at vv. 67–69, fail to distinguish between primary creation (i.e., directly by God) and secondary creation (God acting in collaboration with other agents). As Moevs rightly insists, for Dante there is no such thing as creation independent of God; but there is (1) direct creation and (2) indirect creation; in the latter other agents besides the deity have a role. All such entities, Beatrice concludes, are “mortal,” including the four elements. This passage is not made easier by its frequent use of the past participle of the verb
creare
. The word
creature
at verse 127 has the sense of “things created” (by God). But this, mirroring the protagonist’s confusion, blurs the crucial distinction that Beatrice will make; all things are created by God, some few directly (and they are eternal or, to use the correct term, sempiternal) but most parts of the made universe, as the four elements, indirectly. At verse 131
creati
also refers to divine creation, but this time (and for the only time in this passage) of direct creation by God, and hence of eternal things, both angels and the heavenly spheres. In verse 135
creata
refers to the secondary creation of the informative power in the stars, as it does in both of its iterations
in vv. 136 and 137. The next could not be clearer, but its use of the same term,
creare
, for both kinds of creation, primary and secondary (i.e., direct and indirect), makes a reader’s task more difficult.
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