Reagan: The Life (88 page)

Gorbachev made the first specific proposal of the weekend. As a start toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, he suggested a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive weapons, the ones deliverable by long-range missiles and bombers. He offered the first concession of the weekend when he accepted the American position on intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The Kremlin had consistently rejected Reagan’s zero option as giving the Americans something for nothing—as giving up real Soviet missiles for notional American missiles. But the American deployment of Pershings and cruise missiles had begun, and so the calculation was changing. Gorbachev now accepted the zero option. “
We are agreeing to a great concession,” he said. “I think you understand what a great new step we are taking.” He additionally offered a commitment to the
ABM Treaty for at least ten years into the future, and he said the Soviets would interpret the treaty to allow testing of SDI technologies, but only in the laboratory.

Reagan hadn’t expected so much so soon. But he wanted more. “We are very encouraged by what you have presented,” he told Gorbachev. He said he too sought deep cuts in nuclear arsenals. But he had to point out that there remained important differences between the two sides. For instance, Gorbachev had said nothing about intermediate missiles in Asia. Intermediate missiles were mobile, and missiles based in Asia could quickly be moved to Europe.

The larger matter, however, was Gorbachev’s insistence that SDI be confined to the laboratory. The American interpretation of the ABM Treaty allowed research and testing, even outside the laboratory, but not
deployment of new systems. Reagan asserted that strategic defense was nonnegotiable for the United States. Strategic defense was at the heart of the American position. “The point is that SDI should make the elimination of nuclear weapons possible,” he said. He repeated his earlier offer to share SDI technology. “The Soviet Union is also researching defensive weaponry, and both sides would go forward within the limits of the ABM Treaty. If either reached the point that they decided it would be desirable to go beyond the ABM Treaty restrictions, they would conduct testing in the presence of representatives of the other country. For example, if the U.S. were first, Soviet representatives would be invited to witness the testing. Then, if the testing should reveal that a system is practical, we would be obligated to share it.” The United States could not abandon SDI, Reagan said. “The reason for this is that we can’t guarantee in the future that someone—a madman like Hitler, for example—might not try to build nuclear weapons.”

Gorbachev responded that he hoped the president’s remarks were simply preliminary. The Soviet side had made major concessions. The president needed to give them due consideration. Regarding the ABM Treaty, he expressed puzzlement. “We are proposing to preserve and strengthen the treaty. You are proposing to renounce it. We want to preserve it; you want to destroy it. We just don’t understand this.”

Gorbachev said he hoped the United States would not proceed with SDI. But if it did, the Soviet Union was prepared. “We will respond to it, but not in the same way,” he said. “If we do so, we will just have the arms race transferred to a new environment. If this is what the U.S. wants, then we can understand why it has made the proposals it has. However, the resulting situation will simply be more dangerous.”

Reagan couldn’t decide if Gorbachev was being stubborn for effect or willfully perverse. He replied that the general secretary was refusing to consider the essential aspect of strategic defense. “If SDI research is successful, it would make possible the elimination of nuclear weapons,” he said. “We are accused of wanting a first-strike capability, but we are proposing a treaty which would require the elimination of nuclear weapons
before
SDI is deployed. Therefore a first strike would be impossible.” Strategic defense was a hedge against an uncertain future. “After all, when the use of chemical weapons was prohibited after World War I, we did not reject gas masks. They were the guarantee of our protection against such a weapon in case someone decided to use it.”

Gorbachev answered that they had been over this ground in Geneva.
The Soviet side had thought about it thoroughly since then but found no reason to change its views.

Recognizing the impasse, he looked at his watch. It was time for lunch. “We will continue the discussion,” he said.

N
OT SINCE HIS
days with the actors’ guild had Reagan gone toe-to-toe in negotiations the way he was going against Gorbachev. And his battles with the bosses of the studios and the other unions, important as they had seemed at the time, were for trivial stakes compared with what he and the Soviet leader were arguing over. He remembered what he liked about bargaining: the give-and-take, the search for language that could bridge gaps, the test of his own mettle against a worthy adversary. The more he talked with Gorbachev, the worthier this adversary seemed. And the more Reagan liked testing himself against him.

By the opening of the afternoon session, both sides understood that SDI was the impediment to the big deal both men wanted. Gorbachev wouldn’t let the Americans take SDI out of the laboratory; Reagan wouldn’t agree to confine it there.

The question was whether either party would bend. Reagan spoke first. “
As I listened to you this morning I had to agree that arms reduction is a matter of the highest priority and that the time for real action has come,” Reagan said. An agreement was in reach. Gorbachev merely had to drop his restrictions on SDI. “You are concerned that defense could be used for offense,” Reagan said. “I can assure you that this is not the purpose of SDI.” The system was purely defensive. Gorbachev had expressed concern that the United States might use SDI to launch a retaliation-proof first strike. “I can say that we do not have the capability for carrying out a first strike, and that this is not our goal.”

Reagan said the answer was not less defense but less offense. He made his first novel proposal of the weekend. “The concern you voiced encouraged me to suggest drawing up a treaty eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles,” he said. Gorbachev’s idea of eliminating nuclear weapons entirely was too much for the present, but ridding the world of ballistic missiles was achievable, Reagan said. And it would resolve the first-strike worries Gorbachev had expressed about SDI. “The question as to the combinations of offensive and defensive systems that would allow one of the sides to make a first strike disappears automatically.”

Gorbachev wasn’t persuaded. But he shifted the ground, hoping to
make a smaller deal. He returned to the subject of intermediate missiles. He reiterated his acceptance of the American zero option in Europe and offered to talk about the intermediate missiles in Asia. “Zero in Europe, and negotiations regarding Asia,” he summarized. Would the United States accept that?

George Shultz had been letting Reagan do the talking. But at this point he said, “The problem is that—”

Gorbachev cut him off. “I would like to hear the president’s opinion,” he said. He repeated: “If a solution is found for Asia, will you agree to the zero option in Europe?”

“Yes,” Reagan said.

Gorbachev wanted to nail this down. “Do I understand correctly? If a solution is found regarding Asia, will you agree to the zero option in Europe?”

“Yes,” Reagan said again.

Gorbachev nodded, evidently pleased at having secured one solid agreement. “Now, about something else,” he continued. “I am referring to the open-ended
ABM Treaty.” He was back to SDI. “Can we really go and violate it, rather than strengthening it?” he said of the treaty. “If we are really going to have reductions, it is very important for both sides to be certain that no one will create weapons during this time that would undermine stability and parity.” He proposed commitments not to violate the ABM Treaty for ten years. This would give both parties confidence while they were reducing their offensive arms. “Otherwise when someone is doing something behind your back during the reductions, a dangerous situation is created.” He added, “In the meantime your SDI will be limited to laboratory research.”

Reagan shook his head. He defended SDI once more. “I feel certain that this is the best possibility for ensuring peace in our century.” He repeated that the United States sought no advantage. “We propose writing it into the treaty that we will share with you the defensive weapons we are able to create.”

He grew emotional as he spoke. Some of his feeling might have been feigned, but much was sincere. Reagan had long dreamed of a world without the specter of nuclear war, and finally he was in a position, perhaps, to bring that world into being. “Listen, we are two civilized countries, two civilized peoples,” he said. “When I was growing up—that was before your time—countries had rules of warfare directed at protecting the peaceful population. But now that an ABM regime exists, both coun
tries have terrible missiles aimed at each other that can annihilate countless numbers of people, and primarily noncombatants—women, children. And the sole defense against this possibility is the threat that we are also in a position to carry out such mass extermination. This is an uncivilized situation.” Strategic defense promised an escape. “I think the world will become much more civilized if we, the two great powers, demonstrate this example, create defensive systems and eliminate terrible modern armaments. I think that we would then be able to look proudly into the eye of the entire world.”

Gorbachev wasn’t moved. “I would prefer to reply in a less philosophical spirit, more on a practical plane,” he said. The president’s insistence on SDI would not rid the world of fear; it would simply push the arms race in a new direction. “Our response will be different, asymmetrical,” he said. “We will not deploy SDI. We have another concept.” The new race would be expensive, and it would prevent the arms reductions the president said he desired.

Reagan tried again. He reiterated that the two sides could share what they learned from SDI research.

“Excuse me, Mr. President,” Gorbachev cut in, clearly annoyed. “I do not take your idea of sharing SDI seriously. You don’t want to share even petroleum equipment, automatic machine tools or equipment for dairies. Sharing SDI would be a second American revolution. And revolutions do not occur all that often. Let’s be realistic and pragmatic. That’s more reliable.”

Reagan declared that he was serious. “If I thought SDI could not be shared, I would have rejected it myself,” he said.

Gorbachev shrugged and said he didn’t think the president knew what SDI entailed.

And on this sour note the Saturday session ended.

Y
ET
R
EAGAN WASN
’
T
dismayed. He understood the extraordinary nature of what he was doing. Never in American history had a president negotiated major arms reductions directly with his Soviet counterpart; previous negotiations had always been conducted through intermediaries, with the principals exchanging signatures after the hard work was done. Never in world history had the heads of the two major powers of an era argued matters more portentous for so many people in so many countries across the planet. Almost literally, Reagan and Gorbachev held the fate of humanity in their hands. The power and the responsibility were daunting, even terrifying. An error could have horrendous consequences.

But Reagan wasn’t daunted, and he certainly wasn’t terrified. At an informal dinner at the American embassy that evening he exuded good cheer. The day’s talks hadn’t produced an agreement, he observed, but he and Gorbachev had spoken frankly and identified the issues that still separated them. After several months of communicating at cross-purposes, this counted as progress. He went to bed shortly after nine and slept well.

W
HAT WAS SUPPOSED
to be the last meeting of the weekend, on Sunday morning, commenced with a Gorbachev joke. The Bible said that creation had begun on the first day, proceeded to the second day, and so on. He and President Reagan were now on the second day, and they had a long way to go before they rested on the seventh day. (Gorbachev’s note taker discreetly left this comment out of the Soviet transcript of the meeting.)

Gorbachev suggested a review of the progress to this point, and he invited Reagan to go first. The president said that he was disappointed with what had been accomplished. The two leaders had shared their desire to rid the world of nuclear weapons; this was good. Their staffs, working overnight, had mutually accepted a 50 percent reduction in strategic arsenals. This too was good. But vexing details remained to be worked out. On intermediate-range weapons, the two sides had accepted the zero option for Europe but hadn’t figured out how Asian missiles affected this result; in other words, they had not reached an agreement they could write into a treaty. The hardest nut was strategic defense. “
Here we have differences,” Reagan said. “I cannot retreat from the policy I have declared in the field of space and defensive weapons. I simply cannot do it.”

Gorbachev shared Reagan’s disappointment at the lack of progress. He blamed the president. “We have made major concessions to the United States in the hope that it will be possible to get the arms control talks moving and work seriously on reducing nuclear weapons,” he said. “It is my impression that the American side is not taking this position of ours into account.” He repeated that the Soviet side had accepted the American zero-option plan for Europe. What had the United States offered of equal substance? Gorbachev questioned whether Reagan really wanted an agreement. “When you listen closely to the American positions you get the impression that the U.S. president and administration are beginning from false premises. You and your people think that we have a greater interest in nuclear disarmament than the United States does, that if you put a little pressure on the Soviet Union it will raise its hands and surrender. This is a dangerous mistake.”

Gorbachev stressed that the window of opportunity for meaningful arms reduction wouldn’t be open forever. “A year ago it was not the case that the Soviet Union had advanced major compromise proposals, and certainly not two to three years ago. I simply did not have the capability then. I am not certain I will still have it in a year or two to three years. What will happen if we do not make use of this opportunity? Reykjavik will just be mentioned in passing, nothing more. A shame that all that was missed.”