Reagan: The Life (90 page)

Gorbachev ignored the allegation. “I still wish you would carefully examine our proposal,” he said. “It encompasses elements of both your and our proposals. If it is acceptable I am ready to sign it.”

George Shultz intervened. “Would you please give us this formula in printed form in English so that we can examine it carefully?” the secretary of state asked.

Gorbachev nodded. Trying yet again to convince Reagan, he said, “You are proposing SDI. To us, that option is unacceptable. We want to keep the possibility of finding something different. Hence our formula makes it possible to take account of the situation in the future, after the ten years. Summing up our proposal, let me emphasize that the two sides will strictly comply with the ABM Treaty for ten years and will pledge not to exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty. Simultaneously they will continue laboratory research. After the ten-year period, under condi
tions of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the two sides will get together and decide what to do next and come to an agreement.” Gorbachev paused. “I don’t understand what bothers you about that.”

Reagan answered with a query of his own. “If we have eliminated all nuclear weapons, why should you be worried by the desire of one of the sides to make itself safe—just in case—from weapons which neither of us has anymore? Someone else could create missiles, and extra guarantees would be appropriate. Your side and our side are completely eliminating our weapons. I can imagine us both in ten years getting together again in Iceland to destroy the last Soviet and American missiles under triumphant circumstances. By then I’ll be so old that you won’t even recognize me. And you will ask in surprise, ‘Hey Ron, is that really you? What are you doing here?’ And we’ll have a big celebration over it.”

Gorbachev was beyond being amused. “I don’t know whether I’ll live till that time,” he said.

“Well, I’m certain I will,” Reagan said.

“Sure you will,” Gorbachev said. “You’ve passed the dangerous age for men, and now you have smooth sailing to be a hundred. But these dangers still lie ahead for me. For a man they come by the age of sixty, and besides, I still have to meet with President Reagan, who I can see really hates to give in. President Reagan wants to be the winner. But in this case, on these matters, there can be no winner—either we both win or we both lose. We’re in the same boat.”

Reagan’s sense of humor was fraying too. “I know I won’t live to be a hundred if I have to live in fear of these damned missiles,” he said.

“Well, let’s reduce and eliminate them,” Gorbachev said.

“This is a rather strange situation,” Reagan said. “We have both put forth specific demands. You are in favor of a ten-year period. I have said that I will not give up SDI. But both of us, obviously, can say that the most important thing is to eliminate nuclear missiles.”

“But you wouldn’t have to give up SDI,” Gorbachev objected, “because laboratory research and testing would not be prohibited. And so you could continue activities within the framework of the SDI program. Your opponents won’t even be able to open their mouths, especially under conditions where we have eliminated nuclear weapons. Anyway, I am categorically against any situation where our meeting results in one winner and one loser. Even if this did happen now, in the next stage, in the process of preparing the text of agreements, it would make itself felt and the loser would act in such a manner that everything would end up destroyed. Therefore
equality is essential both at the present stage and in the next. After all, considerable time will pass between the achievement of agreements and the final ratification of the agreements. And only if the document accommodates the interests of the U.S. and the interests of the U.S.S.R. will it merit ratification and support.”

Reagan tried a different approach. “Perhaps we can resolve the matter this way,” he said. “The question of what research, development and testing are permitted by the
ABM Treaty should remain for discussion and negotiation at the meeting in the course of your visit”—to Washington. “We will come to an agreement regarding the ten-year period and breaking it down into two five-year periods, in the course of which nuclear weapons will be eliminated, while everything having to do with testing, laboratory research and the provisions of the ABM Treaty and so on are things we can discuss at the summit meeting.”

“But without that there’s no package,” Gorbachev objected. “All of these issues are interconnected. If we come to an agreement on deep reductions of nuclear weapons, we will have to have assurance, guarantees, that the ABM Treaty will not only be complied with but also strengthened in the course of this crucial period, this historic period when strategic offensive weapons will be eliminated. I repeat, this period is too crucial; it is dangerous to improvise.” He added, “I am convinced that preserving the ABM Treaty is also consistent with the interests of the U.S.”

Reagan’s fatigue and frustration grew more obvious. “It looks like we’re not getting anywhere,” he said. He reiterated his inability to understand why Gorbachev was so worried about what would happen in ten years, when all strategic missiles would have been eliminated. “Perhaps we ought to take another look at what we disagree about.”

George Shultz again intervened. “It seems to me there are two differences between us,” he said. “First, what to consider to be permissible research in the course of the ten-year period. Second, it seems to me the Soviet side has in mind an indefinitely long period during which we will not be able to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. We have in mind ten years.”

“No,” Gorbachev said. “We need absolute clarity here. We believe that in the stage in which we are undertaking actual reductions in nuclear weapons the ABM Treaty needs to be made stronger, not made weaker. Over the period of ten years the two sides will refrain from exercising the right to withdraw from the treaty. After those ten years, we will see. Perhaps we will continue to comply with the treaty. Perhaps some new
elements will emerge. But for the period of ten years the treaty must be preserved, in fact made stronger.”

“In other words,” Shultz said, “for ten years the two sides will not exercise the right to withdraw from the treaty. After the ten years, this aspect will be gone. Then the sides can exercise that right.”

Now
Eduard Shevardnadze stepped in. “Let me remind you, moreover, that research will not be restricted, but it can only be conducted in the laboratory,” he said.

Gorbachev urged Reagan to do what he himself had done in Geneva. “Mr. President,” he said, “I remember how things went in Geneva. You and I were sitting in a room drinking coffee, we were in a good mood and we thought we were going to succeed. Secretary of State Shultz came in and told us how things stood. He said that the Soviet delegation would not give its consent to an agreement with respect to certain questions. And then you said to me, ‘Pound the table and order your people to come to an agreement!’ I went out and in fifteen minutes the agreement had been reached. If we take a break now, and if you achieve agreement in ten minutes, you can consider it another victory for you.”

Before Reagan could respond, Shultz asked for additional clarification. At times Gorbachev had spoken of the elimination of ballistic missiles, at times of strategic offensive weapons, at times of nuclear weapons generally. What precisely did the general secretary have in mind?

“The weapons to be eliminated would include all components of the triad,” Gorbachev said. “Missiles, including heavy missiles; submarine missiles; and bombers.”

Shultz explained that the American proposal dealt with offensive ballistic missiles. “These missiles include not only strategic missiles”—long-range missiles—“but also, for example, intermediate-range missiles and others. What you are talking about are strategic offensive weapons. That is a different category of weapons.”

Gorbachev’s impatience with details surfaced once more. “I thought that yesterday we had offered, and you had agreed to, an option which calls for a fifty-percent reduction of the entire triad of strategic weapons, including missiles like the SS-18 that you are so worried about,” he said. “That option did not come easy to us. But we went along with it in order not to get bogged down in a swamp of levels, sublevels and so on. So let’s agree that in this case, again, we’re talking not only about missiles but about all strategic offensive weapons.”

Everyone was exhausted by now. The clock showed 4:30. Reagan
wanted to board his plane and head back toward Washington and Nancy. But he could see that Gorbachev was tired too, and he knew from his union days that fatigue could be the deal maker’s friend.

Perhaps Gorbachev was thinking something similar. Surely he could outlast the old man across the table.

They agreed to another recess.

T
HE DISTANCE BETWEEN
the two sides was heartbreakingly small. Gorbachev wanted testing on SDI to be confined to the laboratory for ten years; Reagan refused the constraint. What made the heartbreak the more excruciating was that the distance was almost wholly political. No one had shown Reagan evidence that SDI would be ready to emerge from the laboratory before Gorbachev’s ten years had expired. He was standing on principle, but the principle had little to do with the technology. He just couldn’t be seen as giving ground on SDI.

Reagan again gathered with his team. He made clear he wasn’t going to move, but they thought Gorbachev might. Gorbachev, after all, had made big concessions so far. Perhaps he had another in him. Someone suggested giving Gorbachev an additional night to think it over. “
Oh, shit!” Reagan burst out. He had no desire to remain in Iceland until Monday. The suggestion was abandoned.

The president summoned the energy for one more try. “
We have kept you a long time because it hasn’t been easy reaching an agreement between us,” he told Gorbachev upon returning to the conference room. “We have sought a formulation which would meet you halfway with respect to your desire regarding the ten-year period. Here is the final option which we can offer.” Reagan read essentially the same proposal he had laid out earlier regarding a pledge not to withdraw from the
ABM Treaty for ten years and meanwhile to comply strictly with its provisions regarding research, development, and testing. He continued to the question of arms reductions. “In the course of the first five years (until 1991 inclusive), there will be a fifty-percent reduction in the two sides’ strategic offensive weapons.
In the course of the following five years of that period, the remaining offensive ballistic missiles of both sides will be reduced. In this way, by the end of 1996 the USSR and the U.S. will have completely eliminated all offensive ballistic missiles. At the end of the ten-year period, each side may deploy defensive systems if they so desire, provided that the two sides do not agree on something else.” Reagan put down the paper. “How do you feel about that formula?” he asked Gorbachev.

Gorbachev didn’t immediately say no, which Reagan took for a good sign. “I have two questions for you by way of clarifying the American formulation,” Gorbachev said. “You speak of research, development and testing permitted by the ABM Treaty. Your formula omits any mention of laboratory testing. Was this done specially?”

Reagan at first dodged the question, saying it had been discussed at the continuing Geneva arms talks.

“What I’m asking is,” Gorbachev pressed, “did you omit the mention of laboratories deliberately or not?”

“Yes, it was deliberate,” Reagan acknowledged. “What’s the matter?”

“I’m simply clarifying,” Gorbachev said. “For the time being I’m not commenting. Another question: The first half of the formula talks about the two sides’ strategic offensive weapons which will be reduced by fifty percent in the first five years, but in the second part, which talks about the following five years, it mentions offensive ballistic missiles. What is being referred to here? Why this difference in approach?”

Reagan replied that during the break he was told that the Soviet side wanted the special mention of offensive strategic missiles. “That’s why we included it in the formula.”

“There is some kind of confusion here,” Gorbachev said. “When it comes to strategic offensive weapons, we agreed between us long ago that they included all components of the triad—
ICBMs,
SLBMs and heavy bombers. I don’t see what could have changed in this question.” Having dismissed details earlier, Gorbachev now stickled. “The wording has to be identical,” he said of the two five-year periods.

“I understand, then, that by the end of 1996 all strategic offensive ballistic missiles will be eliminated?” Reagan asked.

“How about airplanes?” Gorbachev insisted. “After all, strategic weapons represent a triad which includes ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers. So it is clear between us what strategic weapons are.”

“What I want to know is will all offensive ballistic missiles be eliminated?” Reagan rejoined.

Gorbachev repeated his objection that the first part of the American proposal spoke of strategic offensive weapons, presumably including bombers, while the second part confined itself to missiles.

“Is that the only thing you object to?” Reagan asked. He couldn’t tell where Gorbachev was going.

“I’m just trying to clarify the issue,” Gorbachev said.

“It will have to be sorted out,” Reagan said.

“What we need is for both formulations to be identical,” Gorbachev said. “If we talk about all the components in the first case, everything also needs to be clear in the second case.”

“Evidently we have simply misunderstood you,” Reagan said. “But if that’s what you want, all right.”

George Shultz spoke up. “We need to be careful here,” he said. “When we talk of eliminating all strategic offensive weapons, it does not refer to shorter-range ballistic missiles. I know that the question of them is handled within the framework of a different category, but it is here, it seems to me, that we ought to take decisive measures.”

Gorbachev and Shultz tried out wording that might satisfy both sides. After a couple of minutes, Reagan broke back in. “Let me ask this,” he said. “Do we have in mind—and I think it would be very good—that by the end of the two five-year periods
all
nuclear explosive devices would be eliminated, including bombs, battlefield systems, cruise missiles, submarine weapons, intermediate-range systems and so on?”