Roosevelt (98 page)

The Storm- Breaks.
Roosevelt’s letter on the “cross currents” was to Gertrude Ely, March 25, 1939, PLFDR, p. 872. The President’s indirect warning to Mussolini was via the newly appointed Italian Ambassador, whom Roosevelt asked to communicate it to the Duce; notes were taken by Sumner Welles and are to be found in PSF, Box 53, FDRL. Roosevelt’s reflections on the events of March-April 1939 can be seen best in three press conferences, PC 534, March 31, 1939, PC 437, April 8, 1939, and PC 540-A, April 20, 1939. Only the last of these is not included in PPA, but it is by far the most useful, a long, probing discussion of domestic and especially foreign affairs with members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Roosevelt’s view toward his policy toward Spain is reflected in Ickes
²
, pp. 569-570, and in Bowers [chap. 17]. See also Connally and Steinberg (B), p. 226, and Morgenthau (B). Bullock, pp. 461-464, has a good account of Hitler’s reply to Roosevelt; see N. H. Baynes (ed.),
The Speeches of Adolf Hitler
(London: Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 1605-1656, for virtually the whole text. Roosevelt’s reaction to Hitler’s bad manners is in his letter to Francis W. Hirst, May 13, 1939, PSF 1147, FDRL. Langer and Gleason, and Alsop and Kintner have good accounts of the Neutrality bill fight of spring 1939; for an account emphasizing the nature of the various bills considered see Francis O. Wilcox, “The Neutrality Fight in Congress: 1939,”
The American Political Science Review
, Vol. XXXIII, October 1939, pp. 811-825; useful though spotty notes and records of the fight are in PPF 1147 and in OF 1561 (Neutrality), FDRL. All accounts agree substantially on the proceedings of the famous White House conference where Borah spoke of his own sources of information; I have taken my language mainly from Alsop and Kintner, pp. 44-46, Connally and Steinberg, pp. 227-228, and Barkley [chap. 15], pp. 260-261. “Neutrality, Peace Legislation, and Our Foreign Policy,”
Hearings
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 76
^th
Cong., 1
^st
sess., Parts 1-22, April 5, 1939 to May 8, 1939, are a valuable source of information on attitudes toward neutrality
legislation at this time.
Time
magazine, June 19, 1939, and Eleanor Roosevelt
¹
present useful accounts of the royal visit from different perspectives: the meeting late at night between the King and the President is described in Daniel Roper to Roosevelt, July 5, 1939, PSF 43, FDRL. The description of the “war before the war” is taken in part from
Time
magazine, August 21, 1939. Alsop and Kintner is the chief source for the Roosevelt-Bullitt dialogue on the morning of the German attack on Poland. Charles Edison foresightedly took notes on Roosevelt’s statements to the Cabinet, September 1, 1939, and these indicate Roosevelt’s memories of World War I crisis times; Edison’s notes are printed verbatim in PLFDR, pp. 915-917. Ickes
²
, p. 700, and series of exchanges between White House and Treasury Department, PSF 42, FDRL, show that Roosevelt tried to hold up the
Bremen
from departing; see also PSF 42, FDRL, for Roosevelt’s consideration of seizing German ships. OF 1561 has a rich body of materials on Roosevelt’s role in getting the embargo provision repealed, including the minutes of his conference with Democratic and Republican leaders, September 20, 1939, marred unhappily by the failure of the reporter to indicate names of conferees speaking and by incomplete transcription of some of the remarks by conferees. This file also contains correspondence between Roosevelt and the changeable North Dakota Representative. Gunther
²
has a useful account of Roosevelt and the early discussions about the military exploitation of atomic energy.

Roosevelt as a Political Leader.
The letter quoted here was forwarded to Roosevelt by George T. Bye, Feb. 14, 1939, PPF 2865, FDRL. PSF, Box 47, FDRL, contains exchanges between the Administration and Pittman in regard to tactics on neutrality legislation revision. The press conference involving Guam was PC 519, January 20, 1939; for another example of Rooseveltian circumspection see Langer and Gleason, p. 126. Roosevelt’s attitude toward Kennedy is reflected in Ickes
²
, pp. 676 and 707; Farley
²
(B), p. 198; Hull (B), pp. 763, 766. Public opinion polling data are from Cantril (B), pp. 966-970, especially items 2, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22-27, 30, 42-44, 49. I have rounded most figures. It is to be noted that there is a contradictory aspect to some of the findings, especially in respect to the non-extremist elements; compare items 22-23 and 24-25 in this respect. I believe, however, that this contradiction is a faithful reflection of the many-sidedness of attitudes of this element and indicate again the possibilities of attitude change induced by strong leadership. Hadley Cantril,
Gauging Public Opinion
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944) has been of use in interpreting this polling material both because of his excellent interpretation of polling material and also because he uses foreign policy in the late 1930’s as examples in illustrating his analyses. The Whitehead quotation is from Thomas North Whitehead,
Leadership in a Free Society
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 230. An interesting question bearing on Roosevelt’s leadership is whether he saw polling results. While he rarely mentioned such results, he read newspapers that carried them, and much polling data was sent to him by friends. In the case of an important
Fortune
poll in September 1939, Robert Sherrod sent the President an advance copy of the release (see PPF 1820, 1939, folder on Neutrality, FDRL). The White House had a special file of polling returns. Evidence that the President
knew before September 15, 1939 that Congress would probably repeal the embargo provision is in OF 1561, Box 2, FDRL; see also Early memo to Roosevelt, Sept. 7, 1939, PLFDR, p. 918.

My general analysis in this evaluation of Roosevelt as a political leader stems largely from the leadership studies that are described in my discussion of method; see Note on the Study of Political Leadership, above, pp. 479-485. Data on prevailing popular attitudes toward party realignment are found in Cantril (B), pp. 575-578; compare especially items 1 and 17. The statement on the importance of the leader’s own personality is taken, slightly paraphrased, from Lewis A. Dexter, “Some Strategic Considerations in Innovating Leadership,” in Gouldner (B), p. 592. The influence of the leader on unstructured attitudes is spelled out in Cantril,
Gauging Public Opinion,
pp. 228-229. Among other important studies of political leadership are Sidney Hook,
The Hero in History
(John Day, 1943), a fruitful study in “limitation and possibility”; and Elmer Cornwell, “Lloyd George: A Study in Political Leadership” (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1954), a pioneering comparative study.

This description of the White House over the 1939 holidays is based on Eleanor Roosevelt
¹
, pp. 155-160;
Time
magazine, December 25, 1939; the New York
Times
, December 23, 1939–January 2, 1940; Ickes
³
(B), p. 100; and personal observation, December 24, 1939.

The Sphinx.
Virtually all the memoirs of the time give extensive treatment to the preliminaries to the third-term campaign. All of these are worth consulting, and all, I think, give faithful accounts of factual developments and conversations without necessarily interpreting Roosevelt’s motives correctly. Those motives emerge out of the total impressions and descriptions of all the memoirs involved: see Farley
²
(B), chaps. 15-25; Edward J. Flynn (B), pp. 151-157; Hull (B), chap. 62; Ickes
^{2, 3}
,
passim
; Rosen-man (B), chap. 13; Michelson (B), chaps. 10-11; Perkins (B), pp. 125-128; Tally (B), pp. 236ff.; Creel (B), pp. 311ff.; Timmons (B), chaps. 15-16; Barkley [chap. 15], chap. 13; I have also made use of my Cohen interview, and Krock interview, OHP. There is not much on the third-term problem in the President’s files, FDRL, although PSF, Box 49, contains an interesting description of Garner’s probable tactics as seen from the White House. P. H. Appleby, “Roosevelt’s Third-Term Decision,”
The American Political Science Review
, Vol. XLVI, No. 3, September, 1952, pp. 754-765, is an indispensable analysis by an official who was on the outer fringes of the inner circle. Charles W. Stein,
The Third-Term Tradition
(Columbia University Press, 1943), amply and objectively covers the subject through 1940. My own analysis of Roosevelt’s motives and methods treats the President’s conscious and deliberate approach to the problem, and I have concluded that he was not sure until the convention as to whether he would accept the nomination (even though all the while keeping alternatives open). My interpretation of Roosevelt’s personality, however, leads me to think that even if there had been no intensified international crisis, Roosevelt would have run again. It is inconceivable to me that a man still in his prime,
conscious of Theodore Roosevelt’s difficulties after quitting the Presidency, eager to play a role on the international scene, and not very confident of the abilities of his possible successors, would give up the nomination to someone else. Roosevelt’s attempts to widen the presidential field can be seen from the works cited above; on Lehman, see Roosevelt to Lehman, March 26, 1940, PPF 93, FDRL. Cantril (B) covers extensively polling of anti-third-term sentiment; see especially pp. 647-653. Contrary to general impression, the Constitution does not prohibit two men from the same state from running on the same presidential ticket, but would deny the ticket the electoral votes of the state from which both came; see the 13
^th
Amendment. My sources on the Mundelein intercession with Farley are Farley
²
, chap. 17, and Ickes
²
, p. 688; FDRL files show the close relationship the President had with the Catholic hierarchy. Roosevelt’s satisfaction with the confused situation in the Democratic party is reflected in Ickes
³
, p. 160.

The Hurricane of Events.
Langer and Gleason (B) has a remarkably detailed and vivid treatment of the Roosevelt Administration’s response to the Nazi blitz in Scandinavia and on the Continent; Tansill (B) is also useful but tends to thin out during this period. The estimate on page 415 of the effect of the “cash and carry” compromise is from D. F. Fleming’s excellent contemporary analysis, “Arms Embargo Debate,”
Events
, November 1939, pp. 339-346. The President’s early actions on the Panama registry question are not wholly clear, but that he initially favored the device is strongly indicated in Hull, p. 698, in Farley
²
, p. 210, and in PPF 3684, FDRL (Watson to Roosevelt, Nov. 10, 1939); the Maritime Commission file (OF 1705, FDRL) is, however, no more than suggestive on the matter. For Roosevelt at his most disarming, see his letter to William Allen White in this connection, Nov. 13, 1939, PLFDR, pp. 953-954. Quotations from Churchill’s messages to Roosevelt are taken from Churchill,
The Gathering Storm
[chap. 13] and
Their Finest Hour
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), the first two volumes of his epic accounts of the Second World War. Currie’s memo to Roosevelt on the economic situation is in PSF, Box 58, FDRL. The President’s continued sensitivity on budget balancing is manifested in press conferences toward the end of 1939 and in his “budget seminar” at the beginning of 1940. The relations of the White House with the Workers Alliance and with Lasser are documented in PPF 6794, FDRL. On the administrative situation in the National Labor Relations Board see J. M. Burns, “A New House for the Labor Board,”
The Journal of Politics
, Vol. III, No. 4, November 1941, pp. 486-508. Roosevelt’s behavior during the crisis days of spring 1940 is indicated in Ickes and in other contemporary reports; see also an excellent account in
Time
magazine, June 10, 1940. Roosevelt agreed that it was a “hurricane of events” in letter to Edward Weeks, May 21, 1940, PPF 5553, FDRL. The description of Roosevelt receiving news of the Allied disasters on May 26 is from Rosenman, pp. 195-196. Roosevelt described his indecision over whether to use the “stab-in-the-back” phrase in letter to Edw. Bruce, June 15, 1940, FDRL. I have relied heavily on Langer and Gleason’s detailed treatment of the diplomatic events of June 1940, but I would stress somewhat more than they do Roosevelt’s concern about Congress and the coming national conventions
and election. The description of Hitler at Compiègne is from William Shirer.

“We Want Roosevelt.”
Roosevelt’s concern with domestic political affairs during the spring of 1940 is reflected in Ickes
³
,
passim.
Hopkins’ admonition against third term talk is in Hopkins to Early, June 7, 1940, Hopkins Papers, FDRL. Rowe interview was very helpful on this period. On the impact of the European crisis on Roosevelt’s popularity, see Cantril, pp. 649, 756. Roosevelt agreed that the word “shrimps” was appropriate for young pacifists in letter to Roger B. Merriman, May 20, 1940, p. 1028, PLFDR; Ickes
³
, p. 179, suggests the President’s reaction to the isolationist sentiment. The President’s evening discussion with youth leaders was transcribed and affords a striking picture of his attitudes in June of 1940, especially on domestic affairs, discounted, of course, by the special role he assumed in trying to win the confidence of the group; the transcription is included as PC No. 649-A, June 5, 1940, FDRL. For Eleanor Roosevelt’s mixed but generally sympathetic attitudes toward the youth groups and their leaders, see
This I Remember
(B), chap. 12, and her column “My Day” (file in FDRL), especially Feb. 12-13, 1940. Hull, p. 858, describes his June conversation with Roosevelt on the nomination; Hull was impressed enough with the President’s remarks to write down longhand notes shortly afterwards, and I have quoted from Hull. The preliminaries to the Knox and Stimson appointments were remarkably complex, stretching over many months. See Langer and Gleason, pp. 509 ff., and sources cited therein; Ickes
^{2, 3}
,
passim
; PPF 3855; Tully, p. 242 (although letter of William Bullitt in the New York
Times
, Feb. 19, 1948, p. 22, indicates that, contrary to Tully, Roosevelt had promised him the Secretaryship of the Navy, not of War); PPF 4773, FDRL; and Sherwood (B), p. 163, which is especially useful on Roosevelt’s timing of the appointments. There has been some controversy as to whether Roosevelt hoped that the appointments might lead the Republicans to call off their convention; see Eliot Janeway,
The Struggle for Survival
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), p. 143, and Henry Steele Commager, New York
Herald Tribune Book Review
, Feb. 3, 1952. That Roosevelt entertained any serious hopes on the matter is doubtful in view of his announcement of the appointments
just
before the convention and in view of his political realism; on the other hand, it seems entirely possible to me that he made, simply as a maneuver, the statement reported by Janeway. Farley
²
, p. 244, and Ickes
³
, p. 221, both report Roosevelt’ s campaign plans immediately upon Willkie’s nomination. On the Roosevelt-Farley Hyde Park conference see Farley
²
, chap. 24, and Ickes
³
, p. 284: I have quoted Farley at p. 251 on Roosevelt’s statement. The cardinal fact that Roosevelt did not give general directions to any representative at Chicago is amply documented in Ickes
³
, pp. 193, 201, 203, 207, 235-236, 238, 240; Farley
²
, p. 264; Sherwood, pp. 176-177; Eleanor Roosevelt
¹
, p. 218; Rosenman, p. 206; Appleby, p. 755. The convention proceedings are well described in the works cited above. Totals on the first ballot omit fractions. In describing Roosevelt’s activities in the White House I have relied wholly on Rosenman’s vivid description, although other sources agree that he was ready to decline the nomination had Wallace failed.