Ship of Ghosts (71 page)

The approach of the Japanese invasion force
is based on Hara,
Japanese Destroyer Captain
, 72–76; Dull,
Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy
, 72; and Morison,
History of United States Naval Operations
, Vol. 3, 335.
Memories of the
Exeter
: Paul E. Papish, UNT interview, 36. “
A-Hunting We Will Go
…”: Schultz,
The Last Battle Station
, 143. “
Even when we found that it was merely a bugle call
…”: Hamlin, “The
Houston
’s Last Battles,” 10. “
Notwithstanding air attack
…”: CZM (Helfrich) to E.C. (Doorman), INFO COMSOWESPAC (Glassford), Feb. 27, 1942. “
Was proceeding eastward
…”: Doorman to Helfrich, Feb. 27, 1942. “
This day the personnel reached the limit of endurance
…”: quoted in Parkin,
Out of the Smoke
, 214. “
Throughout
Perth
there was general frustration
…”: ibid., 215. “
The word spread like wildfire
…”: Winslow,
The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait
, 111.

“
Am proceeding to intercept
…”: USS
John D. Edwards
, Action Report, 2. Rooks’s “
hurried but deadly serious
” conference: Winslow,
The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait
, 112. Lamade would return stateside as an instructor at NAS Jacksonville. Later he went aboard the USS
Hancock
as Commander of Air Group Seven, striking at Japan. He named his fighter plane
T. Benny
in honor of the
Houston
’s senior aviator, Thomas B. Payne; Schultz,
The Last Battle Station
, 129.
Doorman’s formation departing Surabaya
: Parkin,
Out of the Smoke
, 216; cf. Winslow,
The Ghost That Died
, 113, who wrote, “Such an unorthodox deployment of forces suggested that Doorman knew little about proven naval tactics, or chose to ignore them.” Winslow did not account for the nagging mechanical problems of the destroyers. The British Admiralty’s
Battle of the Java Sea
(Battle Summary No. 28) (fn. on 16) states the U.S. destroyer commander (Commander Binford) wanted the cruisers to scout for the destroyers in advance of any torpedo attack. “
A tactical instrument of collective genius
…”: Hughes,
Fleet Tactics
, 74.
Communications within Doorman’s squadron
: Morison,
History of United States Naval Operations
, Vol. 3, 342; but Winslow, at 113, says a Dutch liaison officer on the
Houston
translated the orders, though he too mentions Lt. Otto Kolb on Doorman’s staff on the
De Ruyter
, 124 fn., without explanation of his duties; see also Schultz, 143. “
Everyone knows that you cannot assemble eleven football players
…”: Hamlin, “The
Houston
’s Last Battles,” 10. “
One cruiser, large destroyers, number unknown
…”: Van Oosten,
Battle of the Java Sea
, 46; British Admiralty,
Battle Summary
, 77. “
Two battleships, one cruiser, six destroyers
…”: British Admiralty,
Battle Summary
, 77; Winslow,
The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait
, 113; Parkin,
Out of the Smoke
, 216–217.
Enemy bearings
: USS
John D. Ford
and USS
John D. Edwards
action reports. “
We realized help would come, but not today
…”: Marvin Robinson, UNT interview, 15. HMS
Electra
“
twisting like a hare
”: Cain, HMS
Electra
, 221–222.
The predicament about fleet air cover
was reflected by Admiral Helfrich, who stated: “All my previous requests for fighter protection had been refused. The lack of cooperation in this instance shows clearly that the fleet and the aircraft operating over the sea
must
be under the same command”: British Admiralty,
Battle of the Java Sea
, 24, fn. 1.
Regarding air reconnaissance reports
, the British Admiralty further reports: “In order to minimize the delay attendant on the centralized system adopted by the [Dutch] Reconnaissance Group at Bandoeng, RADM Doorman urgently requested the Naval Seaplane Base at Moro-Krambagan, Surabaya to repeat to him immediately all reports made by Reconnaissance Group flying boat pilots to their headquarters at Bandoeng. However, since ABDAair and Recgroup (although they…[were] both at Bandoeng) [had] been separated, it frequently happened that reconnaissance signals only…[reached Doorman] after great delay”: British Admiralty, 15.
Report of the U.S. air attack on troop transports
: Army Air Forces, “Summary of Air Action,” 241–242. “
Our first shots were fired almost ahead
…”: Hamlin, “The
Houston
’s Last Battles,” 11. “
Jesus Christ, you just can’t imagine
…”: James W. Huffman, interview with the author. “
This is a thing that you couldn’t do in peacetime
…”: Hamlin, “USS
Houston
in Battle of Java Sea,” 1. “
Near-miss underwater well aft
”: Capt. Oliver Gordon in HMS
Exeter
, Dispatch on Battle of the Java Sea, para. 19. “
What possible bloody good can we do here?
”: Captain Waller quoted in Parkin,
Out of the Smoke
, 218.
Regarding damage to Japanese ships during the engagement
: Judging claimed hits is difficult. However, most all Allied witnesses report seeing hits on a Japanese CA early in the engagement. Because no Japanese sources cite any damage, some historians have concluded that no Japanese ships were hit. See Prados,
Combined Fleet Decoded
, 261. However, numerous American and British observers reported hits on the enemy heavy. The abundance of simultaneous and specific Allied reports of damage to a Japanese heavy cruiser in this action cannot be negated by documentary silence on the other side. Capt. Oliver Gordon reported hitting a
Sendai
-class light cruiser after ten salvoes, forcing her to turn 180 degrees, and “she was last seen disappearing in a thick high column of smoke”:
Exeter
dispatch, para. 16. Prados, at p. 263, speculates that the smoke was of the Japanese ship’s own making, concealing in by-the-book fashion the countermarch following a torpedo launch. “
I saw us hit this enemy cruiser one very good wallop indeed
…”: Hamlin, “USS
Houston
in Battle of the Java Sea,” 1. N.B.: Hamlin also reported seeing a Japanese light cruiser “simply blow up and disappear in a tremendous
column of smoke and spray and steam that must have gone up four or five hundred feet.” However, all evidence indicates that the Japanese light cruisers in this battle survived. “
I whooped lustily and dashed for the voice tube
…”: Hamlin, 2.
The Japanese cruiser was
“
put on fire early in the engagement
…”: Maher, “Jap Prison Experiences,” 6. “
The target was aflame both forward and amidships
…”: USS
Houston
, Action Report. “
Clouds of black smoke poured out of her top
…”: Parkin,
Out of the Smoke
, 224.
Exeter
’s hits on the
“
lower bridge structure
”:
Exeter
, Dispatch, para. 18. “
The range was perfect
”: Charles D. Smith, narrative, 7.
Premature explosions of Japanese torpedoes
: Hara,
Japanese Destroyer Captain
, 80.

“
Salvo after salvo exploded into the sea around us
…”: Winslow,
The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait
, 116. “
Throughout this madness
…”
and
“
We were appalled
…”: Winslow, 117.
Damage to
Houston
’s communications apparatus:
Sholar quoted in Mullin,
Another Six Hundred
, 226; USS
John D. Edwards
action report. “
I’ll never forget the
Perth
as she came by
…”: Hamlin, “USS
Houston
in Battle of Java Sea,” 2. “
The sea seemed alive with torpedoes
…”: Winslow, 118. “
It was not going at sufficient speed to detonate
”: Charles D. Smith, narrative, 6. “
There was only fifteen or twenty feet
…”: Ibid.
Loss of the
Kortenaer
: Her captain, Lt. Cdr. A. Kroese, and an officer from the
Witte de With
, Lt. Cdr. H. T. Koppen, believe
Kortenaer
was sunk by a submarine torpedo, but Japanese sources do not mention the presence of submarines in the Java Sea on February 27. See also British Admiralty,
Battle of the Java Sea
, 33; according to HIJMS
Haguro
, “Tabular Record of Movement,”
Haguro
fired eight torpedoes at 1622 and hit
Kortenaer
at 1640. “
Passing close aboard
…”
and
“
No ship stopped to take on survivors
…”: Winslow, 118; see also Quentin C. Madson, diary. “
The crystal ball was our only method
…”:
John D. Edwards
, action report, para. 9. From his perch on the
Houston
’s signal bridge, Walter Winslow, at p. 119, reported witnessing two startling events around this time. First, he saw the HMS
Jupiter
, returning from a torpedo run, breaking through the smoke screen near the
Houston
and launching a torpedo in the American cruiser’s general direction. The missile traveled some five hundred yards before exploding, launching into the air two large tubular chunks of metal. An oil slick and a spread of flotsam rose from the deep. It was, Winslow surmised, a Japanese submarine, sunk right in their midst. The
John D. Edwards
action report, in paragraph 8, mentions “a torpedo apparently hit a submarine about 1,500 yards broad on our port bow, for a column of water and debris went up about 100 feet.” Equally likely it was a Long Lance that passed near the
Jupiter
and self-destructed at the limit of its range. “
Enemy retreating west. Where is convoy
?”: British Admiralty,
Battle of the Java Sea
, 41.

Dutch report of the location of Japanese transports
: ONI,
Java Sea Campaign
, 73.
Fetid conditions in
Houston
’s turrets and magazines
: Otto C. Schwarz, interview with the author. “
As fast as we popped one group of lights
…”: Winslow,
The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait
, 123. “
Like a long string of
Christmas lights
”: James Gee, UNT interview, 27.
Sinking of HMS
Jupiter
: British Admiralty,
Battle of the Java Sea
, 46, and ONI,
Combat Narrative
, 74. “
We stopped shooting star shells
…”: Hamlin, “USS
Houston
in Battle of the Java Sea,” 3–4.
Sinking of
Java
: Charley L. Pryor, UNT interview, 95; Parkin,
Out of the Smoke
, 239; Charles D. Smith, narrative, 7; and Weissinger, interview with Samuel Milner, 6.
De Ruyter
“blew up with an appalling explosion…”:
HMAS
Perth
, action report. “
It happened with the suddenness and completeness
…”: Hamlin, “The
Houston
’s Last Battles,” 25. “
I thought it would fry us
”: Parkin, 240. “
Captain Rooks frantically maneuvered
…”: Winslow, 124–125. “
Counted nine separate and distinct explosions
…”: Charles D. Smith, 7. “
The
Houston
and
Perth
raced on
…”: Winslow, 125.

“
Walking to the telephone building
…”
and
“
Java died that night
…”: White,
Queens Die Proudly
, 223. “
They are done for
,”
and
“
the last Japanese mistake of the battle
”: Hara,
Japanese Destroyer Captain
, 85. “
H
ouston and
P
erth
retiring to
B
atavia
…”:
Houston
to COMSOWESPAC, Feb. 27, 1942. “
In the era before radar
…”: Richardson,
On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor
, 222–223.
The Japanese as
“
the world’s most capable users of the torpedo
”: Rooks, “Estimate of the Situation, Far East Area,” unpaginated. “
I don’t think there was ever a minute
…”: James Gee, UNT interview, 28. “
He was so very cheery
…”: Glassford to Edith Rooks, May 21, 1942, 2.
Report that Sunda Strait was clear
: Hamlin, “USS
Houston
in Battle of Java Sea,” 4.
Houston
at Surabaya
: Dull,
Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy
, 71; Robert B. Fulton II, interview by Joe Kollmyer, 10; Lloyd V. Willey, UNT interview, 30. “
O
il position is serious
…”: Helfrich, ABDAfloat message dated Feb. 21, 1942.
Houston
’s fuel situation
: According to Walter Winslow, “The
Houston
, it was determined, probably had enough remaining fuel to reach Australia,”
The Ghost That Died at Sunda Strait
, 130. The
Houston
’s Battle of Sunda Strait action report puts her bunkers at 350,000 gallons. However, the ship’s assistant engineering officer, Robert B. Fulton, disputes that enough fuel was on hand for the ship to reach Australia. “
Concussion from the main batteries had played havoc
…”: Winslow, 128–129. Other damage to
Houston
, action report, 7. “
He had been off-color for days
”: McKie,
Proud Echo
(or
The Survivors
), 14.
Captain Waller’s service in the Mediterranean:
Ibid., 18–19.
Regarding Admiral Doorman’s employment of his light cruisers
: Admiral Helfrich later discussed why Doorman didn’t separate his heavy and light cruisers, speculating that the poor status of communications made anything other than a simple single-column “follow me” approach unworkable; see British Admiralty,
Battle of the Java Sea
, Appendix P, 78. “
Everyone was lighthearted, and thinking that we had done our share
…”: Lloyd V. Willey, interview with the author. “
Tom was hoisted on board
…”: Winslow, 131.