Soldaten: On Fighting, Killing, and Dying (49 page)

Such facts alone hardly provide a differentiated picture of Japanese soldiers’
frame of reference. Interrogation protocols and war diaries show that Japanese soldiers’ will to survive was in fact sometimes more powerful than their sense of cultural duty. In addition, the American practice of not taking Japanese POWs meant that fear of being killed or tortured by the Americans created a fear of capitulation. The shame of capitulation alone, according to historian
Hirofumi Hayashi, would not have prevented Japanese soldiers from laying down their arms, had they not been convinced they would have been killed or tortured if they did so.
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Even in the relatively early phase of the war, fall and winter 1942, the Battle of
Guadalcanal had shown that the Japanese weren’t always willing to charge to their deaths, weapons drawn. Mostly, situational factors were what prevented Japanese soldiers from capitulating.

Moreover, interrogations of POWs in
Burma suggested that behind their facade of discipline and obedience, Japanese soldiers thought about the same sorts of issues as their
German allies at the time. Among the major points of reflection were the rapidly worsening course of the war in 1944 and ’45, the diminishing respect enjoyed by the
military leadership, insufficient supplies, and the disappointing performance of the
Japanese air force. Other parallels were the tendency of Japanese soldiers to be apolitical and the comparatively high morale and confidence in the
navy versus the
army. As was the case with the Wehrmacht, this may have been down to the fact that navy men experienced a different sort of war than ground troops.

A comparison between German, Italian, and Japanese soldiers shows that cultural factors had significant influence on their respective frames of reference. What from the Japanese perspective was a model soldier was an idiot for Italians and a partly admired, partly despised fanatic for Germans.

This book focuses on the soldiers of the Wehrmacht, but we shouldn’t forget that the Nazi Party had an army of its own, the Waffen SS, of which there were some 900,000 members over the course of the war.
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One interesting question is to what extent the perception and interpretations of Waffen SS fighters differed from those of regular soldiers. Himmler was always at pains to stress the special character of his men. Nonetheless, it’s impossible to overlook the fact that shared experiences of frontline fighting created tighter and tighter personal relationships and tended to erase differences. By November 1944, an SS Brigadeführer in a tank division,
Kurt Meyer, would state: “I don’t believe that there is any difference at all today between the SS and the army.”
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How much truth was there to this statement? Did the war truly override Himmler’s best efforts at forming an elite National Socialist troop that not only wore different uniforms than the regular army, but also had a different mind-set?

At the
Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, prosecutors had no doubts as to the special status of the Waffen SS, declaring it a criminal organization. Prominent SS generals like
Paul Hausser,
Wilhelm Bittrich, and Meyer vehemently protested against this ruling, which had far-reaching consequences for their own fates. In contrast to regular army servicemen, former Waffen SS men were denied pensions, and a number of avenues for advancement in postwar society and the military were closed off to them. An advocacy group founded in 1949 named the
Mutual Assistance Association of Former Members of the Waffen SS (HIAG) spared little effort in trying to show that SS men had been “soldiers like all others.” (A former SS general published a book with this title in 1966.) This argument fell flat because even in the immediate postwar years it was well known that the Waffen SS had committed a multitude of war
crimes and had remained an integral part of the SS, whose role was not limited to doing battle on the front
lines. Moreover, the
Waffen SS was an excellent scapegoat for absorbing blame for
crimes
against humanity, in particular ones associated with the
Holocaust, so that the Wehrmacht itself could be exonerated. We have now known for some years, of course, that the Waffen SS was not the sole perpetrator of
war crimes. Considering that historical research, especially in the past ten years, has cast considerable blame on the Wehrmacht, the question has become even more pertinent: Was there any difference between the two entities?
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Was the Wehrmacht perhaps not every bit as fanatical, radical, and criminal as the Waffen SS? Was the postwar debate perhaps not just part of a carefully staged diversion intended to create a myth of the “clean” Wehrmacht? Were the Waffen SS and the Wehrmacht not both components of one and the
same fighting community, in which differences in mentality were quickly smoothed over by the common experience of battle?

In summer 1934, then commander in chief of the German military
Werner von Blomberg accepted the creation of SS military units as a way of repaying Hitler for emasculating a dangerous Wehrmacht rival, the SA. Initially, Waffen SS men were few in number and had little military significance. With the beginning of World War II, however, they unmistakably began to compete with the Wehrmacht. The relationship of the two organizations at that point was especially tense. Regular army men, officers as well as ordinary soldiers, looked down their noses at the newly formed fighting troop. A conversation from July 1940 between an army sergeant and an
SS Rottenführer illustrates the subjective feelings of competition experienced by men serving in the two organizations:

The exchange is full of
stereotypes on both sides. The SS man’s reference to “subalterns” who purchased their positions and “decrepit old general” reflected a distorted version of the Wehrmacht as the direct descendant of the old Imperial Army. The army man’s accusations of the SS’s inflated self-image and “fathead” officers revived the classic Wehrmacht objection that Nazi soldiers were unprofessional. Significantly, both speakers use the same criteria for evaluating military achievement. The main factor is bravery, which itself is measured in numbers of casualties. The army sergeant counters the argument that the SS troops suffered heavy losses with the statement that Wehrmacht regiments had incurred just as many casualties elsewhere. For the sergeant, that was proof of equivalent courage. Both men also claim that their organization is a central pillar of the German state. The SS man explicitly defines the
Waffen SS as a part of the party that rules the country, while the army sergeant sees the Wehrmacht as a power of its own within German society.

The Wehrmacht was extremely critical of the Waffen SS’s military performance in both the Poland and France campaigns. But modest fighting efficiency was by no means a problem unique to the SS. It tended to affect all of the army divisions formed at the start of the war as well. Many of these divisions “failed,” as General
Erich von Manstein wrote.
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At the same time, the lack of professionalism among SS ranks was perfect fodder for Wehrmacht criticism. Over time, as the Waffen SS did indeed become more professional, the rivalry cooled off. Increasingly, Wehrmacht soldiers came to appreciate the merits of the Waffen SS as an elite troop. Nonetheless, the bickering never ceased entirely, and in official correspondence the two sides constantly accused each other of irregularities. The Wehrmacht, for instance, repeatedly complained that Waffen SS soldiers were insufficiently
trained, while SS men reproached the Wehrmacht for allegedly having lukewarm morale.
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Although heavy losses and the massive expansion of the Waffen SS changed the force’s structure, basic differences in
social
structure persisted between it and the Wehrmacht.
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Wehrmacht soldiers perceived SS men as “others,” and that impression was reinforced by their appearance. The tattoos of blood groups on their forearms and camouflage uniforms with SS runes carried a symbolic significance that should not be underestimated. Initially mocked as “SS tree frogs,” SS men were immediately recognizable and as such distinguishable from regular army soldiers. Their difference, impossible not to register, spurred on the rivalry between the two military organizations, and their competition for attention and recognition never ceased entirely. General
Crüwell, for instance, was outraged that an SS division had received the honorary name “
Prince Eugen,” after the Austrian general who conquered Belgrade in 1717, although his men had conquered the Serbian capital and felt his division had earned the appellation. Wehrmacht soldiers also complained that medals were handed out far more liberally within SS divisions. “Supposing, we’ll say, an infantry division got twenty
Iron Crosses, Class 1 for some affair or other, then the S.S. undoubtedly got forty,” Crüwell groused.
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“They are treated quite differently.” Another thing that rankled the Wehrmacht was the speed with which “morbidly ambitious” SS men were promoted.
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In particular, the meteoric career of
Kurt Meyer, who was made a division commander with the rank of major general at the age of thirty-four, occasioned considerable resentment. In addition, the Waffen SS received better equipment and vehicles
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and rations.
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Wehrmacht officers also viewed with envy the fine “human material” made available to SS divisions. “Even in 1943 the army only got old crocks from home,” complained Major General
Christoph von Stolberg-Stolberg. “The SS got, first of all, their volunteers, then secondly they got 4% of the best recruits, and then as well as that they take all the people away from the schools. That’s to say, the SS was blessed with nearly 100% officer cadets, and the army had none at all.”
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But SS divisions were not the only ones who were generously decorated, well equipped, and regularly replenished with select young personnel.
Elite units within the Wehrmacht also enjoyed such privileges. One good example is the armored grenadier division
“Greater Germany,” which the Wehrmacht leadership purposely built up as an army “praetorian guard” to complete with the Waffen SS.
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There were also
a number of
elite units within the Luftwaffe as well as paratroopers and the armored division “
Hermann Göring.” All enjoyed special status. Members of these groups were also perceived as “others,” thanks to their special
uniforms and helmets and the favoritism many claimed was shown to them when decorations were handed out.
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Their arrogant behavior also engendered resentment. “The famous or infamous Hermann G
ÖRING
Division,” Colonel
Hans Reimann complained while speaking of his time in
Tunisia, “was there, a lot of swine, nothing but puffed up—the officers were so loud-mouthed that young puppies and the older ones as well, they were so loud-mouthed that you simply didn’t know what sort of people they were; at the first attack they were scattered and ran away so fast from the tanks that we had to stop them!”
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