Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (30 page)

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At this low point, a volunteer walked through the door. Theodore Hall
was a physics prodigy. Raised in New York, he had graduated from Harvard at the age of eighteen in 1944 and had immediately been recruited
to work at Los Alamos. Despite his youth and lack of an advanced de gree, Hall's brilliance earned him the status of a junior scientist working
on the plutonium bomb. Hall was also drafted into the U. S. Army as a private while at Los Alamos, where he spent the remainder of the war working in his same scientific post on the plutonium bomb. After he was exposed by the release in the mid-199os of the Venona decryptions, which
provided a general outline of his recruitment and assistance to the Soviet Union, Hall confirmed the story of his approach to the Soviets via
Sergey Kurnakov, a military writer for Soviet Russia Today, Russky Golos,
and other Communist-aligned journals.125

Vassiliev's notebooks contain Kurnakov's detailed account of his contact with Hall, written on 23 October 1944, the day after Hall handed
him a report on what was going on at Los Alamos. Hall had arrived in
New York on leave from Los Alamos and quickly contacted his Harvard
roommate, Saville Sax, also a young Communist. The two decided to locate a Soviet representative to whom they could pass Hall's information.
Reluctant to go directly to the consulate, which presumably would be
under FBI surveillance, Sax went to CPUSA headquarters but was unable
to persuade anyone to take him seriously. Hall had better luck. On a visit
to Nikolai Napoli, the head of Artkino, a company that exhibited Russian
films, he explained "he wanted to speak with someone about an important military issue." Napoli, in fact, had assisted Jacob Golds, head of the
CPUSAs covert organization, and had some knowledge of people linked
to Soviet intelligence. He refused to accept any information himself but
suggested Hall talk to Kurnakov. Hall recognized the name from articles
he had read about Red Army operations and made his way to the Russky
Golds office.126

Kurnakov had a brief conversation with Hall and apparently learned
that he was concerned about some kind of special military weapon on
which he was working. On Sunday, zz October, Hall called him at his
home and expressed an interest in meeting again. They met at Kurnakov's
apartment and talked on general matters for nearly an hour. Kurnakov
prepared a detailed report on their conversation:

"T. H. [Theodore Hall] 1g years old. He is a `wonder boy.' Graduated from
Towsend Harris High School ... at fourteen (in 1940. Studied for two years
at Queens College), and in 1942 he transferred to Harvard University, from
which he graduated this year with a B. S.' (Bachelor of Science) in theoretical
physics.... He had been a member of the Young Communist League and the
`Student League' at Queens College. At Harvard, he did organizational work
in the Steelworkers' Union (USW) at the Bethlehem Steel factory in Fall
River, Mass. Already at Queens College his feelings toward the Young Com munist League had begun to cool, because he couldn't stand the `narrowmindedness of the leadership.' I was unable to detect his current polit. bent,
although ... he has `long-range' doubts. For instance, he is troubled by the
idea that when Communism has made everyone's life good, people will lose
the incentive to fight, and their interests will be reduced to the level of smallscale personal ambitions. In short-people will go into spiritual atrophy when
nothing is left to `save' a mankind that has already been saved. I asked him
how he had reacted to the `turning points' of the Party line-1939, 1941, and
1944. He says that he had come to terms with both the pact and the attitude
toward the war."

Kurnakov wrote that although Hall came from a Jewish family, "`he does
not look Jewish"' and described him as tall, thin, "`a pale and slightly pimply face, carelessly dressed; you can tell his boots haven't been cleaned in
a long time; his socks are bunched up around the ankles."' He diagnosed
him as "`obviously neurasthenic"' but "'witty and somewhat sarcastic....
In conversation he is as sharp and agile as a rapier.' "127

As the conversation went on, Hall became more nervous. "`When he
finally started biting his naffs,"' Kurnakov produced a newspaper clipping about American development of missiles and asked if that was what
concerned him. Hall said, "`No, it's much worse than that."' At that, Kurnakov elicited the story of how Hall had come to find him. Concluding
that he really was a physicist despite his obvious youth and had been active in the left-wing movement and that simply promising to put him in
touch with an official Russian representative would be awkward, Kurnakov bluntly asked for his story:

"He told me that the new secret weapon was an `atomic bomb' of colossal destructive capacity. I interrupted him: Do you understand what you are doing?
What makes you think you should reveal the USAs secrets for the USSR's
sake? He replied: The S.U. is the only country that could be trusted with such
a terrible thing. But since we cannot take it away from other countries-the
USSR ought to be aware of its existence and stay abreast of the progress of experiments and construction. This way, at a peace conference, the USSR-on
which the fate of my generation depends-will not find itself in the position of
a power subjected to blackmail."

Hall then explained the principles of the bomb, "`took out a neatly written report,"' and gave it to Kurnakov. "`Show this to any physicist,"' he
instructed, "`and he will understand what it's about."' While he didn't
know the structure of the bomb itself, he could find out. Hall also pro vided a list of the scientists working on the atom bomb and described the
conditions at Los Alamos.128

Kurnakov now faced a dilemma. How could he be sure this was not
some kind of FBI sting or provocation? He concluded, however, that
since Hall had been hoping to have a Soviet official present, if he was a
provocateur, he would not have produced his written report until someone more important than Kurnakov could be entrapped. Kurnakov also
had his wife go outside and look for signs of surveillance; she had seen
none. Still, as soon as Hall left, Kurnakov walked around in his neighborhood to lure away anyone watching, while his wife removed Hall's report from the apartment. He was also concerned that as a KGB agent
(not a professional officer), he had no authority to accept such sensitive
material without approval. But, he reasoned, the importance of this information and the urgency of ensuring that Hall, who was returning to
Los Alamos (where he would be very hard to reach) in just a few days, had
a contact justified his assumption of risk. Kurnakov promised Hall that he
would contact him in the day or so before he left.

Worried that Kurnakov had not taken him seriously, Hall sent Saville
Sax to the Soviet Consulate the next day with a copy of the report he had
already handed over. Sax devised a cover story to explain the trip in case
he was questioned by American counterintelligence: he was inquiring
about the fate of family relatives still in the Soviet Union. Referred to
Anatoly Yatskov, he elicited immediate interest. Yatskov arranged to meet
with Sax and Hall the next day, z6 October, unaware that Hall had already met with Kurnakov. When the latter called Hall to arrange another
meeting and learned what was planned, he worried that the Soviet diplomat might be tailed to the meeting and advised Hall not to go but to send
Sax by himself. Kurnakov himself surreptitiously observed the meeting
and was relieved to see no surveillance. With the permission of the KGB
New York station chief, Kurnakov obtained a photograph from Hall and
set up preliminary future meeting arrangements.'29

It took the New York station almost two weeks to send news to
Moscow of its new source on "Enormous." The delay may have been occasioned by its concern that Hall, a walk-in about whom it had no prior
knowledge, was an FBI plant or just a fantasist. During the interim, it
likely investigated both Hall and Sax via its contacts with the CPUSA; the
ciphered telegram to Moscow contained details about Sax's Communist
family, including his mother's work for Russian War Relief. The message
also noted that Hall was "'characterized by political development, broad mindedness, and exceptionally sharp intelligence."' Because of his imminent return to Los Alamos "`urgent measures were adopted."' Kvasnikov recommended that Sax be used as the courier with Hall instead of
involving yet another person. Moscow Center expressed great interest, assigned cover names-"Mlad" and "Star"-to Hall and Sax, approved the
measures taken, ordered Yatskov to train Sax in conspiratorial methods,
suggested cutting Kurnakov out of this important project (probably to increase security), and demanded detailed information about both Hall and
Sax 130

Early in December 1944, Kvasnikov telegraphed Moscow the names
Hall had supplied of scientists working on the atom bomb-the cable, deciphered in 1946, was one of the earliest read by American cryptanalysts
in the Venona project-and a brief account of Hall's odyssey. He also
sent Kurnakov's report of his meetings by diplomatic pouch and a longer
explanation written by the station of the events that led to this unexpected
intelligence windfall. In late January 1945 Kvasnikov informed Moscow
that Hall had been inducted into the U.S. Army but kept at Los Alamos.
He also noted that Kurnakov was upset that he had been cut out but that
Yatskov, an experienced professional officer, had been assigned to supervise Sax and the contact with Hall. While Kurnakov had expressed great
confidence in Sax, Yatskov was not so sure he was the appropriate person
to use as a courier. The station had asked Bernard Schuster, its CPUSA
liaison, to check on Hall and Sax, as well as Sax's mother. By 1 February
1945, when it listed its American sources and agents, the New York station included "Mlad"/Hall and "Star"/Sax, although it noted that Hall had
only been "with us since Oct. 44. He has not been tested at work yet, nor
has he been studied." But the information he had given Kurnakov in October had already proven exceedingly valuable. When Merkulov wrote a
report for Beria on z8 February, he included specific details about Los
Alamos and discussed such matters as the plutonium implosion concept
that likely came from Hall because Klaus Fuchs had not yet reestablished
contact with the KGB.131

The KGB's frustration with its lack of access to the Manhattan Project was over. Evaluating the station's progress report, Pavel Fitin, chief of
KGB foreign intelligence, affirmed: "`The information we received from
`Mlad' [Hall] about `Preserve' [Los Alamos] and the work that is being
done there confirms that `Mlad'-as a probationer [source] -and `Star'
[Sax]-as a courier-are of great interest to us., " In fact, their potential
was so great that Fitin reprimanded the station for not sending Kurnakov's entire report of his meeting with Hall "'by telegraph in its en tirety at that time"' rather than by slower diplomatic pouch. Fitin liked
the idea of using Sax as a courier, suggested that he transfer to the University of New Mexico, and urged that he "`be provided with all possible
support to ensure the success of his studies and his graduation from the
university."' Several weeks later, in late March, Kvasnikov sent news that
Hall had sent Sax a letter asking for a meeting and he was setting it up for
mid-April. Moscow approved the rendezvous.132

Sax took a bus both ways between Boston and Albuquerque, forgoing
a faster and more comfortable train on the grounds that a bus fitted better with his cover as a prospective college student. In a ciphered telegram
on ii May, Kvasnikov reported to Moscow that the trip had been a success. When he arrived, Sax had been questioned by government agents
who asked about his citizenship and draft status. Both types of questions
were "`brief and superficial."' Sax explained that he was in town to check
out the university, to which he was considering applying. After receiving
Hall's original handwritten notes, he copied them onto a newspaper with
milk to make them invisible to the naked eye and burned Hall's handwritten originals in case of a search. A cable transmitted a few weeks later
reported that Hall had provided a list of what each Manhattan Project
facility was doing and described the various methods of uranium separation. While the initial report concluded that the results Sax brought back
were "satisfactory," a later message complained about Sax's decision to
copy Hall's material: "`As we informed you by telegraph, the contents of
Mlad's [Hall's] report that Star [Sax] brought over were written out in
milk on newspaper. Aleksey [Yatskov] had to work hard to make out what
it said and transcribe it. Given how much work we have, such a method
of transmitting materials is extremely undesirable. He was unable to make
out some of the words, but there weren't many of them, and the material
was on the whole very valuable.' "133

It was not until the end of June that Sax disclosed a problem that he
had not bothered to report earlier. Hall had told him that early in 1945,
he had been talking to Roy Glauber, a fellow young physicist and friend
from Haivard with whom he shared a room at Los Alamos. Glauber had
grumbled that the British and American governments were keeping news
of the atomic bomb from the Russians "`and added that, given the opportunity, he would inform our representatives about the project."' Intelligence tradecraft (and common sense) dictated that the appropriate
response from a covert source would have been to shrug off the comment and do no more than report it to the KGB in case it wished to attempt a follow-up. Instead, Hall "`hinted that he had taken some steps in this direction and, in turn, asked what Roy intended to do, practically
speaking, to realize his wish. Roy got scared, started taking back everything he had said, and two weeks later he even moved out of Mlad's
[Hall's] room and has since stopped being his friend."' Despite the incident, Hall was sure that Glauber would not go to the authorities because
he was a leftist, although he was "`incapable of taking decisive action
when there is risk involved. The fact that he moved out of Mlad's [Hall's]
room shows that he wants to stay away from `dangerous acquaintances.""
Kvasnikov attributed the incident to Hall's "`inexperience and youth"'
and thought it demonstrated the need to have direct contact with him
"`in order to conduct a detailed tutorial on the principles of our work and
of personal conduct."' He had also decided to use Lona Cohen as the
courier for the next trip in July to pick up Hall's materials. Kvasnikov
feared that Sax might be under surveillance since Hall corresponded with
him, thought that his previous cover story that he was a prospective student looking at a school would not work a second time, and felt Cohen
had a perfect excuse for a trip to New Mexico since she had a doctor's
note suggesting a long vacation. She had already bought a ticket for Denver, leaving 14 July, but was as yet unaware of her assignment.134