Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (21 page)

Did it matter that the Soviet Union got the atomic bomb two to four
years sooner than it otherwise would have? Historical what-ifs are always
speculative. But Joseph Stalin's, rather than one of his less aggressive successors', having the atomic bomb may have helped precipitate the Korean War. In the spring of 1949 Kim 11 Sung, the Communist dictator of
North Korea, asked Stalin's agreement to an invasion of South Korea but
was refused; Stalin cited the uncertainty of success and the risk of American intervention. Without massive Soviet military support (weaponry,
munitions, vehicles, supplies, and military technicians), North Korea was
incapable of attacking the South. But in August 1949 the USSR exploded
its first atomic bomb, and in early 1950 Stalin informed Kim that he was
now willing to support an invasion. He cited several reasons for his shift
in position, and one was a lessened risk of American intervention due to
Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb. Said Stalin: "The prevailing mood
[in the United States] is not to interfere. Such a mood is reinforced by the
fact that the USSR now has the atomic bomb." Stalin's judgment was
wrong. The North Korean attack brought swift American intervention,
and the war produced four million casualties, including more than thirty
thousand American dead, several hundred thousand Chinese dead, and
more than a million military and civilian war dead in the two Koreas. Several million people were wounded, and the peninsula suffered horrific
physical devastation.45

Early Soviet possession of the atomic bomb also had important psychological consequences. When the USSR exploded a nuclear device in
1949, ordinary Americans as well as the nation's leaders realized that an
exceptionally cruel despot with a history of mass murder had just gained
the power to destroy entire cities with a single bomb. This perception
was not merely unsettling; it was deeply frightening and colored the early
Cold War with the hues of the apocalypse. While the Cold War never lost
the potential for a civilization-destroying conflict, Stalin's death in March
1953 noticeably relaxed Soviet-American tensions.46

Often in the history of espionage it is difficult to tell if the information gained made a significant difference in ensuing events. With Soviet
atomic intelligence, however, one can be reasonably certain that it
changed history.

Part of the history of Soviet atomic intelligence has been well documented, with some Soviet sources inside the Anglo-American atomic project revealed in the 19405 and others only a few years ago. In 1943
an FBI listening device recorded Joseph Weinberg, a young nuclear
physicist at the University of California, discussing the atomic program
with a Communist Party official. Security officials quickly removed
Weinberg from the Manhattan Project. In 1944 the FBI observed
Clarence Hiskey, a senior chemist at the Manhattan Project facility at
the University of Chicago, meeting covertly with a Soviet intelligence
officer operating in the United States under a false identity. He, too,
was removed from the project. In September 1945 Igor Gouzenko, a
Soviet military intelligence cipher officer, defected in Canada. He
brought with him GRU documents that revealed widespread Soviet espionage in Canada. One of those identified was Allan Nunn May, a
young British physicist who in 1944 had been sent to work at the AngloCanadian Chalk River nuclear laboratory, a facility supporting the
Anglo-American bomb project. May was arrested, confessed, and was
imprisoned.

Most important was the arrest of Klaus Fuchs, a scientist who was
part of the British contingent working at Los Alamos. Fuchs had been
part of the scientific team that worked on designing the implosion detonation method that made a plutonium bomb practical. After the war he
had returned to Britain to a senior position in the British atomic program.
In 1949 the American Venona project deciphered KGB cables that identified Fuchs as a Soviet spy, and the British Security Service (MI5) confronted him. He confessed, pled guilty, and was imprisoned in 1950.
Fuchs's confession led to the identification of his American courier, Harry
Gold. Confronted, Gold confessed and fingered another Soviet spy at Los
Alamos, David Greenglass. A far less important figure than Fuchs, Greenglass was, nonetheless, not without value. Part of a U.S. Army engineering unit, he worked as a skilled machinist preparing model implosion
lenses and triggering devices for the plutonium bomb, a practical complement to Fuchs's more theoretical contribution. Confronted, Greenglass also confessed.

Another major Soviet source became public in 1995, when KGB cables deciphered by Venona were opened for research. Theodore Hall, a
young physics prodigy, graduated from Harvard in 1944 at the age of
eighteen. He was immediately recruited by the Manhattan Project and
sent to Los Alamos, where he was assigned as a junior scientist to the
team working on the plutonium bomb. Hall was also a secret Communist
and volunteered to spy for the KGB. The decrypted cables allowed the
FBI to identify Hall as a spy, but when confronted in 1951, he denied everything. For security reasons, the cables could not be used in a court
for criminal prosecution, and since the FBI was unable to find other compelling evidence, Hall escaped prosecution. When Venona publicly identified him as a Soviet source in 1995, an unrepentant Hall confirmed his
assistance to the Soviets.

In addition to Russell McNutt, Alexander Vassiliev's notebooks identify
two other unknown Soviet atomic sources, one who provided information on the key issue of uranium isotope separation and a second with access to the British atomic program in England. Scientists and others are
also identified who, while not themselves directly involved in the atomic
bomb project, attempted to recruit colleagues who were. In addition to
documenting the KGB's futile pursuit of Robert Oppenheimer, the notebooks detail its frustration with its ineffectual recruitment in 1942 and
1943 and its ultimate success beginning in 1944, when its sister service,
GRU, handed over Klaus Fuchs and Theodore Hall volunteered his assistance. The notebooks also document that several scientists regarded
as security risks and fired from the program at the FBI's instigation and
subsequently treated as victims of irrational paranoia in some historical
accounts were, in fact, Soviet sources or Soviet sympathizers who were
candidates for KGB recruitment. Additionally, Vassiliev's notebooks
show that the confessions of Fuchs and Greenglass were partial, and
both held back the full extent of their espionage. Finally, the notebooks
provide the first start-to-finish story of the KGB's attack on the Manhattan Project.

Britain's atomic bomb project began in 1940, more than a year before
the American Manhattan Project. In a retrospective report written in
1945, Pavel Fitin, chief of KGB foreign intelligence, noted that Soviet
sources in England were the first to provide Moscow with atomic intelligence. Further, their intelligence revealed not only Britain's progress on
the atomic bomb but also, due to Britain's partnership, that of the United
States:

"There is highly valuable info. coming in from the London station regarding
scientific work on `En-s' ["Enormous"]. The first materials on `En-s' were re ceived at the end of 1941 from the source `Liszt.' The materials included valuable and top secret documents, both on the substance of the problem of `E-s'
and on measures taken by the Brit. gov't to organize and develop work on the
problem of atomic energy. These materials served as a starting point for laying
down the groundwork and organizing work on the problem of atomic energy
in our country. Because Amer. and Canadian work on `En-s' is sent to E. as
part of a tech. information exchange, the London station sends materials covering the state and progress of work on `En-s' in three countries: England, the
USA, and Canada."47

"Liszt" was John Cairncross. An ardent young Communist at Cambridge
University in the mid-1930s, he was spotted by Anthony Blunt and Guy
Burgess, already KGB contacts. After graduation in 1936 Cairncross
joined the Foreign Office, and Burgess completed his recruitment as a
KGB source. In addition to the Foreign Office, he also held posts with the
Treasury and Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or M16). In 1941
Cairncross was in an excellent position to keep the Soviets informed
about Britain's atomic bomb project: he was then working as secretary to
Lord Maurice Hankey, a cabinet member and head of a committee that
reviewed Britain's atomic program.

In addition to Cairncross, Fitin cited two other valuable sources in
Britain, "Quid" and "Tina." "Quid" was a 1945 cover name; earlier it was
"Eric." "Eric" appeared in a number of deciphered Venona messages as
a key Soviet atomic spy in Great Britain, but British authorities were unable to identify "Eric's" real name. Unidentified atomic spies often generate speculation, and in the case of "Eric" one candidate advanced was
Sir Eric Rideal, a prominent British scientist. The speculation was wrong:
"Eric" was Engelbert (Bertl) Broda, a refugee Austrian physicist who had
arrived in Britain in 1938, after his country's annexation by the German
Reich. A talented physicist, he found haven at Cambridge University and
by 1942 was working at the Cavendish Laboratory assisting Hans Halban, a physicist working on atomic reactors and controlled chain reactions and a major participant in the British atomic project. (Halban, a scientist in the French atomic program, had fled the continent in 1940 in
front of the advancing German Army, carrying in his luggage much of
France's supply of the scarce "heavy water" used in nuclear reactors.)
Broda was also a secret Communist and a close friend of Austrian-born
Edith Tudor Hart (cover name "Edith"), a veteran KGB courier and talent spotter. In December 1942, KGB's London station reported the following:

"`Edith' [Hart] sent us a detailed report through Mary [unidentified] on the
results and status of work on enormous, both in England and in the USA.
`Eric' [Broda] had given her this report on his own initiative to pass to the fraternal [Communist Party]. The materials will be sent out in the near future.
According to additional information that has been gathered, `Eric'-who since
Jan. 1942 has been Professor Halban's assistant in a special division (devoted
to enormous) of the central laboratory on explosives in Cambridge-is completely informed about all the work being done on `Enormous,' both in England and in the USA, b/c he has access to Amer. materials on enormous that
the English had received as part of an information exchange.... Eric is a longtime fellowcountryman [Communist] who understands the need for such
work. -48

Impressed with the report and Broda's volunteering it, the KGB London station, with Moscow Center's agreement, arranged for Hart to press
Broda for more. London reported:

"We instructed `Edith' [Hart] to conduct a preliminary conversation with him
and get him to agree to meet with our comrade. During the conversation between `Edith' and `Eric' [Broda], the latter was initially hesitant and said that
he had to think about it and that he does not see any need to meet with someone, b/c he has already written down everything he knows about `Enormous.'
Later in the same conversation, `Eric's' attitude changed, and he said that he
hopes the person he meets will not be an Englishman, b/c English comrades
are generally very indiscreet. And, in the end, once `Edith' had told him that
everything had been properly arranged, `Eric' said that he would be happy to
meet with our comrade."

In January 1943 Broda met with a KGB officer, and the London station
told Moscow:

"`Eric' [Broda] met `Glan' [unidentified KGB officer] cordially and carried
himself with great ease and friendliness, although it was obvious that he was
nervous. He carefully verified all of the rendezvous terms. At the outset of the
meeting, `Eric' said that he had only been notified of the meeting the day before and therefore was unprepared for a serious discussion about `Enormous.'
Because `Glan's' primary objective was to strengthen ties with `Eric,' obtain his
direct consent to work with us, and determine the course of this work, `Glan'
did not press him for information right away and instead set about achieving
the aforementioned objectives. The first conversation with `Eric' lasted over an
hour and a half. As a result of the conversation, `Eric' gave his full consent to
work with us. During the conversation, nothing was called by its proper name,
but `Eric' knows who it is he agreed to work for.... `Eric' reports that in their field of work, the Americans were significantly ahead. As part of a tech. infor-
mnation exchange, their laboratory receives bulletins from the Americans on
the progress of work on `Enormous' in America. Owing to the nature of his
work, `Eric' has access to these bulletins, and the info. he gives us reflects
Amer. achievements in this field as well as English ones."

Broda agreed to meet a KGB courier every two or three weeks to provide
reports and technical information on the atomic project .49

The KGB relationship with Broda went well, and in August 1943
Moscow referred to Broda as "at pres., the main source of info. on work
being done on E. ["Enormous"], both in England and in the USA." In
1944 the London station reported that Broda's access to British and
American technical data had further increased, explaining:

One of `Eric's' [Broda's] colleagues went to Canada for a while and gave him
his personal key to the library containing reports on `En-s' ["Enormous"]....
"We made 'Eric'a copy of the key and arranged contact terms that allowed its
to contact him in London three times a week without any prior arrangement.
In accordance with these terms, on arriving in London on one of the agreed
upon days, `Eric' was supposed to mark a page of a phone book inside a designated phone booth. After entering this phone booth at a fixed time and finding
the mark he had made, we would go out to meet him at the appointed place
and time.... As a result, we were able to receive from TACO available
Amer. reports of the second batch, as well as oth. interesting mater-s [materials] on `En-s.....