Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (25 page)

Darling stayed at U.S. Rubber but was more helpful in facilitating the
KGB's contact with an old graduate school colleague and fellow Communist from the University of Wisconsin, Joseph Weinberg. Born in 1917
in New York to Jewish immigrants from Poland, Weinberg grew up in a
Communist milieu. Described as a brilliant student, he graduated from
the City College of New York (CCNY), moved to Wisconsin for his master's degree, and then migrated to the University of California, Berkeley,
in 1939 to study with J. Robert Oppenheimer for his PhD, obtained in
1943.

On 29 March 1943, an FBI wire tap on the telephone of Steve Nelson (chief of the CPUSA in the San Francisco Bay Area) picked up someone named "Joe" telling Nelson's wife that he had urgent and important
information and would come to the house to wait for Nelson's arrival.
FBI listening devices collected most of the conversation in the subsequent meeting. "Joe," later identified as Weinberg, and Nelson discussed
"the professor," presumably Robert Oppenheimer. Nelson acknowledged
that Oppenheimer earlier had told him in general terms about the atomic
project but had recently become more reticent. Weinberg indicated that
Oppenheimer was also becoming increasingly uncomfortable with his
young, radical graduate students, like Weinberg himself. Nelson pressed
Weinberg for information about "the project" and asked for a copy of
what had already been produced. Weinberg was hesitant, noted that he
expected that he would be moving to the new site where work on the
bomb would be conducted, and was concerned that his membership in
the CPUSA since 1938 might cause him problems. Nevertheless, he offered a verbal description of the research work being undertaken on the
atomic bomb, and the two discussed methods of future contact. Nelson
cautioned Weinberg against writing anything down. The next day Nelson called the Soviet consulate and arranged to meet "at the usual place"
with Peter Ivanov, a GRU officer operating under diplomatic cover at the
consulate. Six days later the two rendezvoused on the grounds of a San
Francisco hospital.11

By June 1943 the FBI informed military security officers about Weinberg's meeting with Nelson. They raised the matter with Oppenheimer,
and in August he informed Weinberg the latter would not be moving to
Los Alamos to take a role in the atomic bomb project. During a series of
encounters Oppenheimer berated several of his former graduate students
for their Communist political activities. Weinberg then mailed a package that the FBI intercepted; it contained a plea that Nelson and Bernadette
Doyle (another Bay Area CPUSA official) not communicate with him and
not mention his name. Spooked by the rebuff from Oppenheimer and
frightened by the dismissals of several of his Communist friends from the
Berkeley Radiation Laboratory, Weinberg had decided to lay low. He remained at Berkeley, teaching Oppenheimer's course on quantum theory
but with no role in the Manhattan Project."

There is no indication that the KGB had any idea that American security officers had identified Joseph Weinberg as a security risk and had
isolated him from the Manhattan Project. Consequently, the New York
station continued to regard him as a candidate for recruitment, although
it was not until September 1945 that it notified Moscow that it was prepared to move to formal recruitment. In a report on "Enormous" sent to
KGB chief Merkulov, Leonid Kvasnikov and Andrey Shevchenko noted
that they were cultivating Weinberg and his wife through Darling:
"Method [Joseph Weinberg] fills in for "Yew" [Oppenheimer] at the Univ.
of Calif. and is a close friend of his. "Method" and "Idea" [Mrs. Merle
Weinberg] are fellowcountiymen [Communists] who were brought into
that fold by Huron [Darling]. Huron intends to meet with Method in
Sept. or Oct. in NY or Detroit during the latter's vacation. The plan is to
find out whether it is possible to obtain assistance from Method as well
as from "Yew" himself. "87

Darling met with Weinberg in New York on 5 and 6 October, and the
New York station sent a detailed report to Moscow:

"The conversation was held first in a restaurant and subsequently in a park.
Earlier, Huron [Darling] had already discussed the question of the balloon
[atomic bomb] in the context of the int'l situation. He continued it here and
concluded that it was essential for our country to obtain the secret of balloon
construction. In conversation, he noted that `Method' [Weinberg], who is involved in the balloon project and knows a lot of people who work there, has
the resources to do something about this. Having correctly assessed the polit.
situation and agreed that the USSR should have its own balloons, he argued,
however, that in view of the strict measures to protect secrecy, it was impossible to pass materials across the border; that there was clearly a great danger of
damaging relations between our country and the USA, and that if the USSR
knew about the existence of such plans, it would prohibit taking any steps in
that direction; that there could always be a provocateur among the accomplices who would get everyone exposed, b/c no one can be trusted; that a
number of progressive scientists were taking part in the project who understand and stay abreast of the polit. situation, and they (or at least one of them-added `Method') would not allow the balloon to be used against our
country...

During their conversation, Method said that he himself does not work on
the balloon, and that he does not see `Yew' [Oppenheimer] at all these days.
Moreover, he tried to create the impression, as though inadvertently, that
`Yew' had changed and was losing his left convictions. Nevertheless, Huron is
inclined to argue that the phrase `or at least,' which Method let slip several
times during the conversation, refers specifically to `Yew.' Method noted that
he has no ties with anyone and at the same time affirmed, in confirmation of
his views, that a number of progressive scientists work there who hold the
same views as himself.

One of the interesting points in the conversation was the idea, expressed
by Method, where he noted that it would be better-and entirely possibleto move the `brains' themselves that created the balloon to Moscow, rather
than sending over information. To Huron's objection that it would be impossible for a scientist like that to leave, considering the security measures in place,
Method countered that there was at least one person who would agree to leave
the country behind and work in the USSR, after first getting sick and leaving
work on En-s ["Enormous"]. Huron did not go any further into these matters;
he believes that this scientist is `Yew.' All this creates the impression that
Method continues to maintain contact with `Yew' and that the views he expressed to Huron may, in part, express `Yew's' own point of view"

Kvasnikov and Darling optimistically and erroneously concluded that
Weinberg remained in close touch with Oppenheimer and that his views
reflected those of his one-time mentor. Likely because of its suggestion
that some American Manhattan Project scientists, possibly Oppenheimer
himself, might be willing to defect to the USSR, an annotation on the report noted that a copy was forwarded to Lavrenty Beria, then supervising the Soviet atomic bomb program.ss

There are no more mentions of Weinberg in Vassiliev's notebooks.
Perhaps the KGB finally realized that, once a promising source, he had
been excluded from the Manhattan Project, was under security scrutiny,
and was no longer a trusted Oppenheimer associate. Darling's value to the
KGB also quickly deteriorated. A KGB officer reported that on 7 October 1945, on his way home after his meeting with Weinberg, Darling was
detained by FBI agents for three days after he had noted surveillance at
the railroad station. Although the FBI had told Darling that it was simply a mistake because "they had suspected he was an escapee from a mental institution," the KGB wasn't taking any chances and suspended meet ings between Anatoly Yatskov (Darling's contact) and his agents. There is
no record of any further contacts with Darling.89

Darling left Detroit in 1946 and worked at short-term positions at the
University of Wisconsin and Yale University until he won a physics professorship in 1947 at Ohio State University, where later he also worked on
a U.S. Air Force research project. The House Committee on Un-American Activities twice called him to testify in 1953, the first time in Washington, the second in Columbus, Ohio. At both hearings he took the Fifth
Amendment to questions about communism and espionage. Suspended
by Ohio State after the first hearing, he faced a university disciplinary
committee. Instead of taking the Fifth Amendment, he lied, asserting
that he had never belonged to either the CPUSA or "any organization
which, to my knowledge or belief, was affiliated or connected with the
Communist Party," and defended his refusal to answer questions under
oath. He was fired. He moved to Canada and held a professorship at
Laval University for the rest of his professional career. He never admitted his Communist loyalties or his cooperation with Soviet intelligence.
Several historical accounts of the era have treated Darling as an innocent
man persecuted by witch hunters.00

When former KGB San Francisco station chief Grigoiy Kheifets returned
to Moscow in August 1944 to face accusations of inefficiency, he prepared
reports on his tenure emphasizing the positive. A September report, for
example, proudly noted that just days prior to his departure from San
Francisco he met with a new prospect with connections to the Manhattan Project:

"Doctor Kamen is a PhD in chemistry. Lawrence's closest colleague at the laboratory (cyclotron). A chance acquaintance by "Map" [Louise Bransten]
through the line of the American-Russian Inst. Kamen is 32-35 years old.
Born to Russian parents in Chicago, also graduated from the university there.
According to the comments of experts, "Dorin" [Eltenton] in particular, he is a
brilliant chemist and the best informed on the cyclotron's operations. According to "Dorin," Kamen knows the secret of the special formula of neutron flow.
I have maintained a friendly relationship with Kamen. He is a big Russian
vodka lover and when there's no vodka, he also likes top brands of American
whiskeys. In connection with my departure he passed along semi-official scientific anthologies as a present for the USSR's scientific institutions. Shortly be fore that he gave similar material to "Map" to send to the Union through the
American-Russian Institute. To secure the contact, a letter of thanks should be
sent to K. from the appropriate scientific institution and a present sent. "Gift"
[Kasparov] maintains personal contact with K."9'

Martin Kamen was everything that Kheifets described and more. He
was a close associate of Ernest Lawrence, and while not a CPUSA member, Kamen was an ardent pro-Soviet fellow traveler, accounting for his
association with the American-Russian Institute and Louise Bransten, secret CPUSA member and Kheifets's intimate companion in San Francisco. That Kamen would at his own initiative deliver "semi-official scientific" information to Kheifets and Bransten as gifts to the Soviet Union
marked him as a prospect for KGB cultivation. And Kheifets noted that
his successor as San Francisco KGB station chief, Grigory Kasparov, already had established contact with Kamen. Kamen, in fact, was a more
desirable prospect than Kheifets realized. Kheifets didn't appear to know
it, but Kamen was also working at the Manhattan Project laboratories at
Oak Ridge.

However, by the time Kheifets wrote his report about his new
prospect, Kamen had been rendered useless. One of the reasons Kheifets
made so little progress against "Enormous" was that American counterintelligence had identified him as a Soviet intelligence officer at least by
1943. As Soviet vice-consul in San Francisco, Kheifets was immune from
arrest. But mindful of the Manhattan Project activities across the bay at
Berkeley, both FBI agents and military security operatives dogged his
every step. (Surprisingly, Kheifets does not appear to have realized that
he was subject to other than routine American security surveillance.) So
intense was surveillance that operatives of the FBI and Army security
stumbled over each other when Kheifets, accompanied by Grigoiy Kasparov, took Martin Kamen to lunch at the Fish Grotto in San Francisco
on z July 1944. The FBI agents got through the door of the restaurant
first and procured a table in close proximity to the one where Kamen lectured to the two Soviet diplomats/intelligence officers all through the
meal. The noise level in the restaurant prevented them from clearly understanding what Kamen was saying, but they heard enough to record
that he was discussing radiation and atomic research. They also observed
Kamen giving the Soviets a thick sheaf of papers.

Kamen later testified to Congress about the incident and admitted
discussing radiation, but only the latest research about the medical use
of X-rays, particularly with cancer, then a cutting-edge medical tech nology. He insisted the documents he gave the Soviets dealt with scientific research but were unclassified and denied providing any information on the Manhattan Project. He also confirmed that Louise
Bransten had introduced him to Kheifets. Kheifets's September 1944
report corroborates Kamen's story. For that matter, the FBI agents'
notes only partly contradicted his version. They included indications
that Kamen had also spoken about Oak Ridge and Washington (site of
the Hanford facility) and of an atomic pile, as nuclear reactors were then
termed. But what they were able to hear and note down was so intermittent that it was not sufficient to establish if Kamen had spoken of
those matters only in passing or in detail. Kamen, for his part, denied
that he had even mentioned these matters casually. In any event,
Kheifets's September summary of the relationship with Kamen does not
indicate that he betrayed classified information to the Soviets or had a
knowing relationship with Soviet intelligence. Given that Moscow Center was then accusing Kheifets of failing to make progress on "Enormous," he could have been expected to boast about any bomb-related
information that Kamen had provided.92