Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (32 page)

FBI listening devices in Nelson's residence had not only overheard
Weinberg discussing the atomic bomb but had also in October 1942 overheard another young Berkeley physicist, Giovanni Rossi Lomanitz, tell
Nelson he was working on a highly secret weapon, a reference to the
atomic bomb project then in its very early stages. Nelson indicated prior
knowledge of the project and advised Lomanitz to be discreet and to consider himself an undercover member of the CPUSA. Military security officials immediately excluded Lomanitz from the Manhattan Project. In
1949 he was called to testify before Congress about atomic espionage and
was indicted for contempt after uncooperative testimony but acquitted.
David Bohm, who had ignored Oppenheimer's 1943 advice to cut his ties
with communism, had also been excluded from work at Los Alamos. In
1949 he refused to answer congressional committee inquiries about his
relationship to the CPUSA and was indicted for contempt but acquitted.
Bohm moved to Brazil in 1951 and in 1954 applied for and became a
Brazilian citizen. He later lost his belief in communism and asked for and
got an American passport, stating that he had not intended to repudiate
his American citizenship when he became a Brazilian citizen. He also admitted to American authorities that he had been a CPUSA member while
at the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory during World War II.147

Alfred Marshak was a Berkeley geneticist involved in radiation research and knew Oppenheimer but was closer to Ernest Lawrence. But
KGB hopes that he would provide access to either physicist were disappointed. Nonetheless, Grigory Kheifets claimed some success with him.
Although not part of the Manhattan Project, Marshak was the lead investigator on a war-related research project at the Berkeley Radiation
Laboratory, and in September 1944 Kheifets reported: "'Marshak refrained from any scientific exchange with us due to his pledge for the
time that he worked at the laboratory to protect industrial secrets. Mar shak has left the laboratory and considers himself freed from all pledges.
So he passed a portion of his work to "Map" [Bransten] for us. He is currently working on the rest of the material and expects to finish the preparation of these materials this October.' "148

What Kheifets did not know, and Marshak himself did not understand at the time, was that Army security had identified Marshak as likely
a Communist. Rather than fire him, however, security officials had simply terminated his project. Subsequently the navy declined his application for a commission, and after the war he had trouble getting a passport or finding employment involving his specialization in radiation. In
a 1952 letter to Ernest Lawrence he explained that it was not until 1948
that he "recognized the specific reasons for the termination of the osrd
[Office of Scientific Research and Development] project in Berkeley for
which I was the responsible investigator." He lamented, "I realized now
that I allowed myself to become involved in affairs which were of no immediate concern to me and which later had a devastating effect on my
career." 149

Weinberg, Lomanitz, Bohm, and Marshak all escaped prison, but they
were subjected to an ordeal (a public one for the first three) that likely
discouraged others in the postwar years who might have been inclined to
assist Soviet atomic intelligence.

After his discharge from the Army and Los Alamos in 1946, Theodore
Hall enrolled in the PhD program in physics at the University of Chicago.
Given the withdrawal of KGB officers from the United States in 1946,
Hall was without Soviet contact. Additionally, his own research interests
shifted to medical uses of radiation and away from subjects relevant to nuclear weapons. In 1947 Hall married and confessed his past activities to
his bride. A fellow radical, she fully accepted his work. Later that year
the two, eager to advance the Communist cause they shared, joined the
CPUSA and participated in its public activities.

Hall might have concluded that his espionage career was over, but
the Soviets had other ideas. In 1947 Moscow decided to renew contacts
with Morris and Lona Cohen, noting that she had served as Hall's courier.
At the end of April 1948 came an order to use them to renew ties with
Hall, who was finishing his graduate work, and encourage him to get a job
at Los Alamos. The KGB may have been receiving information about
Hall from Sax; there is some indication that late in 1947 the latter, then living in Chicago, traveled to New York and returned with at least $1,ooo
from the Soviets.r s0

By October 1948 the Russians had received news that both Hall and
Sax were active publicly in Communist causes, and they were not pleased.
Their "activities on their own while they were deactivated have resulted
in a significant weakening of their position. The advisability of their use
is called into question." Part of the blame was placed on the Cohens, who
had not been in regular contact with them and had failed "to get Mlad
[Hall] to stop working for progressive organizations" or from joining the
CPUSA. Even worse, the KGB had learned that the FBI was investigating Hall's wartime work at Los Alamos and that the wives of both Hall and
Sax knew about their work for the KGB.151

Vassiliev's notebooks do not contain any more documents on Theodore Hall; in the final year of Vassiliev's work on the research project that
produced his notebooks, the flow of files from the KGB's archives slowed,
and he never received the second volume of the KGB's "Enormous" file,
which focused on post-World War II operations. American journalists
Joseph Albright and Marcia Kunstel maintain that after the KGB revived
contact with him, Hall helped to recruit two scientific colleagues working at the Hanford, Washington, plutonium facility, but the basis for that
claim is weak. 152

In the spring of 1950, just before American cryptanalysts broke a Soviet cable that named him as a spy, Hall once again decided to end his espionage career. By the time the FBI began to investigate him, Hall was
again active in left-wing activity and not in regular contact with the KGB.
His fortuitous decision likely saved him from prosecution. The FBI could
find no evidence of his current involvement in espionage, and both he
and Saville Sax stonewalled during FBI interviews. With KGB cables deciphered by the Venona project unavailable for use in court, the FBI did
not have enough other evidence to bring a criminal indictment, and it
put his case aside. He was, in any case, no longer a security threat. Not
only had he been identified by the FBI, but also his research interests
had turned to radiobiology and the medical uses of X-rays. In 1962 he
moved to Great Britain to take a position as a biophysicist at the
Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge University. After the release of the
Venona decryptions in the mid-199os made his espionage for the Soviet
Union public, he released a statement reaffirming his view that the
United States had been and continued to be a threat to the world and expressing no regret for his assistance to Stalin's Soviet Union. He died in
1999 at the age of seventy-four.153

Klaus Fuchs had been the KGB's most important source on the Manhattan Project. A dedicated Communist, brilliant physicist, and assigned
to a key post at Los Alamos, he had been in an ideal position to provide
Moscow with crucial information. In mid-1946 Fuchs left the United
States and returned to Great Britain. To the Center's consternation,
Fuchs did not show up at the prearranged rendezvous in London in August 1946, leaving the KGB with no clue as to his whereabouts.

Not only was Fuchs out of touch, but also there had been no word
from Gold as to the whereabouts of the final batch of Los Alamos material that he was supposed to pick up from Fuchs's sister, Kristel Heineman, in December 1945. And it was proving hard to reestablish contact
with Harry Gold. Sent a signal for a meeting, he missed two rendezvous
before Yatskov managed to meet him in the Bronx in December 1946.
Gold reported that he had last visited Kristel Heineman in April 1946, but
she told him that her brother had not left any papers for him; he also recalled seeing a July article in the Herald Tribune that Fuchs had been arrested for espionage in London. (There was no such article; Gold may
have seen a story on the espionage conviction of Allan Nunn May in
Britain and confused him with Fuchs.) In more dangerous news, Gold explained that after he had lost his job, he had gone to work for Abraham
Brothman as his chief chemist, violating, an angry Yatskov noted, "`our express directive not to meet"' with him. Brothman had been a longtime
Soviet industrial spy, and Gold had been his liaison with the KGB. A repentant Gold admitted "`that he made a serious mistake and is prepared
to make up for it at any price."' He promised to quit Brothman's company. Yatskov was upset because if Brothman, who had been named by
Elizabeth Bentley (Jacob Golos and Bentley had been Brothman's link
with the KGB for a period), were confronted by the FBI and confessed,
he might expose Gold. The KGB considered trying to persuade Gold to
go underground or move to another part of the country and to work out
a plausible story to tell the government if he were questioned. But
Yatskov and other KGB officers were being withdrawn from the United
States in the wake of the Bentley and Gouzenko defections, and there
was no follow-through. 154

Fuchs, meanwhile, had been unable to make the prearranged meeting in Britain but was, nonetheless, anxious to reestablish contact with
Soviet intelligence. He approached Jurgen Kuczynski's wife, asking for
help in getting in touch with the Russians. She contacted Hans Siebert, now in charge of German Communists in Britain. Siebert met with a
KGB officer in late September, provided Fuchs's address, word that he
was working at a top-secret installation, and a warning that while he was
not under suspicion, meetings would be difficult to arrange. The KGB
was uneasy about the contact via the Kuczynskis; although Jurgen had
provided it information beginning in 1941, he had never been formally recruited and had been cut loose in 1943 due to concerns that British counterintelligence might be suspicious about him. When he had been recontacted in December 1945, he had rebuffed the KGB on the grounds
that he wanted to work exclusively on German matters. Finally "`he
agreed to cooperate in the future only under strong pressure, but in all
this time he has not given any valuable material, getting away with reports of low value."' Moreover, the KGB noted that KPD leaders in
Britain had criticized Kuczynski "`as someone with reactionary views who
does not agree with the decisions of the Tehran Conference of the Big
Three regarding the need to disarm G. [Germany] and destroy its military and industrial potential created by the Nazi regime."' Suspicious that
he might be a double agent, the KGB cut off contact with him after August 1946.155

Worried that it might be risky to meet directly with Fuchs, the KGB
authorized another German Communist, Hanna Klopstock, to tell Fuchs
that he "has not been forgotten, and the connection will be renewed
whenever this becomes possible." After some delays because Klopstock's
ill child prevented her from meeting with Fuchs, she finally delivered the
message on 19 July 1947. She set up a meeting for Saturday, 27 September 1947, at a pub, with follow-up meetings to take place every three
months. Klopstock's report read:

"I had the appointment with K. [Klaus] on the 19th of July at 2:30. He came
with his little own car and we went through Richmond took several turnings
until we came out in the open country and took a walk in the park. There I informed him and have given him the messages and also the guide words. I also
informed him of the meeting on September, Saturday the 27th at 8 o'clock,
Public Bar opposite Wood Green Tube Station, every 3rd months, so the next
meeting would be on the 27th of December 1947. K. should enter the Public
Bar, take a table in the corner and drink something. His contact would have a
glass of beer, approach the table and would say: `Stout is not so good. I generally take lager.' K. would answer: `I think Guinness is the best.' After that conversation K. would leave the Bar and go outside. His contact would follow him
and ask him: `Your face looks very familiar to me.' K. would say: `I think we
met in Edinburgh a year ago.' His contact would then answer: `Do you know big Hannah?' K. would carry the Tribune with the letters well in sight and
your contact would carry a book in a red cover. -156

Alexander Feklisov, former KGB New York station officer newly assigned to London, met Fuchs as arranged. The KGB London station report to Moscow Center read:

"After a careful checkup in the city in which Korobov [KGB officer Nikolay
Ostrovsky] and Jack [unidentified KGB officer] took part, Callistratus [Feklisov] got in our oper. car [operational car] at the prearranged location and, in
the next 35 minutes, checked out additionally in the car, which was driven by
Boris [unidentified KGB officer]. There were no signs of surveillance during
the checks in the buses, on foot, or in the car. Call-s ["Callistratus"/Feklisov]
arrived at the meeting area 30 minutes before and familiarized himself with
the streets and park that had been chosen for conducting the conversation
with the athlete [source]. The meeting itself took place precisely at the
agreed-on time. When C-s entered the bar, the athlete was already there, sitting at a table and drinking beer, and there were several other people sitting
next to him. After exchanging the first half of the oral password, they both
went outside, one after the other with a short interval, where the second half
of the oral password was exchanged." (C-s began the conversation by asking
after the health of his father, brother-who suffers from tuberculosis-sister,
and nephews. C. ["Charles"/Fucks] discussed work being done on E. in England. Progress has been very insignificant.)

"In the middle of November, a delegation of skier [British] scientists to
which Ch. was appointed a member will go to the alpinists [Americans] to take
part in the aforementioned conference. According to the current plan, the delegation should stay there only five days before returning to the island [Britain].
We think that C's inclusion in this delegation speaks to the fact that C. enjoys
the skiers' trust. When asked whether he could meet with our man in Tyre
[New York] during his stay in the alpinists' country, C. said that he would
rather not meet with our man during this brief trip. He said he was afraid that
after the May incident, the alpinists would be keeping a close watch on all scientists working on enormous who were coming into their country from the island. He is also unsure whether he will be able to notify his sister during this
trip. Therefore, we did not arrange with him to have any mater-al passed
through his sister." (He described the working principle of the hydrogen bomb
that Fermi and Teller were working on at U. Chicago.)