Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (35 page)

On 25 April the KGB New York station sent a letter to Moscow reporting that family complications had delayed Greenglass's departure.
Ruth, pregnant, had been badly burned in a kitchen fire and had only
recently returned home after ten weeks in the hospital. Because Ruth
had a rare blood type, David had made a radio appeal for blood, and
Panchenko saw mention of it in the newspapers. Since he did not know
David's last name, however, he had not connected it to Julius's brotherin-law and never realized how it would complicate and delay the plan to
exfiltrate the Greenglasses. He asked Rosenberg to let David know that
"`if he agrees to leave the USA, we would take upon ourselves all the expenses related to the move, see to it that he gets settled in the new place,
and take responsibility for looking after his relatives who remain in this
country."' Rosenberg interjected that the Russians would have to "`make
a good Communist of him."' Startled, Panchenko asked if David "`was a
bad Communist. King [Rosenberg] replied that lately, Zinger [Green glass] has been reading practically none of the Party publications and that
clearly his education needed to be supplemented."' 177

Panchenko met with Julius Rosenberg again on 23 May 1950. Julius
reported that Greenglass had finally agreed to leave the country, but it
would take three months since Ruth had just given birth and was still in
precarious health. They discussed various options, ruling out France,
since it would require a passport, and leaning toward Mexico. Unbeknownst to them, FBI agents had already tracked down Harry Gold, who
was arraigned the same day Panchenko and Rosenberg met; his arrest
was announced in the press the next day. Time was running out. When it
learned of Gold's arrest, the station proposed that the Greenglasses leave
for Mexico quickly, in the next two or three weeks. That same day Moscow agreed and sent detailed instructions on travel arrangements, contact
routines, and cover stories. It told the New York station:

"Despite all their family difficulties, Ida [Ruth Greenglass] and Zinger [David
Greenglass] need to leave the country as soon as possible, b/c if they remain in
the country, it will inevitably lead to their arrest. Therefore, they should be advised to prepare for departure immediately If need be, their preparations can
be covered as a trip to a summer house in view of Ida's poor health. At the
same time, their preparations should obviously not be publicized.

If it is not possible for Zinger to bring his entire family with him, we must
recommend that he leave only with Ida and the newborn and leave the eldest
with their parents. They should not free up their apartment in NY.

If extraordinary circumstances arise that prevent Ida from leaving, Zinger
should leave without her and explain to Ida that if he does not leave NY, it
would have direful consequences for Z. and his family"

Moscow directed that the New York station supply Julius with $1o,ooo
(more than $85,000 in zoo8 dollars) to facilitate the departures. Another
long memo went to the KGB Mexico City station about required legal
papers and secret housing. More telegrams ordered the KGB station in
Sweden to check on transit from Mexico; considered the possibility of
their going into hiding in the United States; cautioned against discussing
anything involving the Greenglasses and the Rosenbergs indoors, where
FBI listening devices (much feared by the KGB) might be present; and
suggested other security measures.171

On 1 June 1950, Julius Rosenberg met with his KGB contact and conveyed the welcome news that Greenglass had agreed to flee the United
States and would be ready to leave on 15 June. It was too late. Gold had
confessed and begun to cooperate with the FBI. His account of the sol dier from Los Alamos from whom he had obtained a report sparked a
massive operation that quickly zeroed in on David Greenglass. (Gold had
not known Greenglass's real name.) Gold identified a picture of him on
4 June, and Greenglass was quickly placed under surveillance. On 9 June
a highly agitated Julius Rosenberg spoke with his KGB contact, who relayed the following:

"During the day on Wednesday, June 7th, K. ["King'/Rosenberg] had stopped
by to see Z-r ["Zinger"/Greenglass]. As he was approaching Z-r's house, K. discovered that on the opposite side of the street, across from Z-r's doorway was
a car-D-45-25 (or W-45-25, K. does not remember the first letter of the license plate). According to K., there were three men sitting in the car and constantly looking in the direction of Z-r's doorway which seemed suspicious to K.
K. surmised that Z. was under surveillance, but he nevertheless went into Z-r's
house. According to K., during the conversation Z-r informed K. by note that
he has, in fact, been under surveillance since June 7th, and moreover, it was
constant surveillance.

When he left Z-r's house, K. saw a truck on the comer, with a sign on the
side that said `Acme Construction Company' At first, K. did not give this truck
a second thought. To verify that Z-r was under surveillance, K. walked by Z-r's
house on the evening of the same day. The automobile and truck were in the
same places they had been during the day; moreover K. saw that two people
had gotten out of the automobile, who then walked over to the truck and sat in
the back. As he walked by Z-r's house that evening, K. also noticed that there
was someone standing on each of the four corners by Z-r's house; in K's opinion, these were undoubtedly counterintelligence agents.

During his conversation with Z-r that day, K. had warned Z-r about the
danger he was in, and once more mentioned to Z-r that if he was arrested, he
should not say a thing about his operational activities. According to K., Z-r assured him that under no circumstances would he say a word about his intelligence activities. As a result of discovering the surveillance, K. and Z. came to
the conclusion that leaving at present was out of the question. K. informed Z.
that Z. should calmly stay at home and do nothing, and that his departure for
Mexico would now depend on whether there was any surveillance present."

Julius had already given Greenglass $6,ooo to finance preparations to
leave the United States, and the KGB advised him to send his wife Ethel
to the Greenglass apartment to retrieve all but $1,ooo since the presence
of $6,ooo would be hard to explain.179

Greenglass was picked up for questioning on 15 June and arrested
early the next morning. Moscow sent a cable to New York on 13 July asking if it should try to secure a lawyer for him. New York doubted it could find anyone as prominent as O. John Rogge, whom the family had already
hired. But when Moscow Center learned that Rogge was arranging for his
client to assist the prosecution, it decided he was a government agent and
ordered the KGB New York station to find a new lawyer. This notion,
however, was quickly reconsidered as impractical and canceled. After his
testimony in the Rosenberg trial, David Greenglass was sentenced to fifteen years in prison. (Rogge's deal allowed Ruth Greenglass, who also cooperated, to avoid prosecution altogether.) By American standards that
seemed a stiff sentence for a cooperating witness, but Leonid Kvasnikov,
more used to harsher Soviet practices, commented that it was part of a
plan "to show that the court spares those who cooperate with it."180

Julius Rosenberg was questioned the same day Greenglass was arrested and then released. But the Greenglasses' decision to cooperate
with the government provided more than enough evidence to charge
him. Julius was arrested on 17 July 1950, his wife a month later. They admitted nothing and rejected prosecution offers of leniency in exchange
for a confession and identification of other Soviet spies. They were convicted in 1951 and in April sentenced to die.

The New York station immediately prepared a lengthy letter for
Moscow with a proposal to try to save them. Almost every tactic and talking point later used by the Rosenberg defense was laid out in this KGB
proposal. The passionate and emotional language suggests not only the
gratitude and loyalty KGB officers felt for the Rosenbergs, but also their
shock that the American legal system had decided to punish espionage so
severely-the latter a surprising view considering that the USSR routinely executed spies.

The first suggestion offered by the New York station was to use the
Soviet and foreign press, but the letter noted that "`it would be preferable
to publish articles about the trial first and foremost in the non-Communist press."' It listed eighteen different themes that could be emphasized,
including depicting the trial as an exercise in "`coarse anti-Soviet propaganda and a crusade against the CPUSA "; an effort to frighten Americans; an effort to "`shift the blame for war in Korea off of the govt. and
onto Jews and Communists"'; or an attempt by reactionaries to turn
America in a fascist, repressive direction, contrasting the death sentences
with lenient sentences for such Axis spies as Tokyo Rose and Axis Sally,
as well as arguing that the trial was motivated by "`the hatred against all
things progressive,"' symbolized by the ability of "`gangsters, grafters,
and murderers"' like Mafia boss Frank Costello to "`command respect
and become national heroes,"' "`while a mother of two is sentenced to die by electric chair ... because of some villainous brother's slanderous denunciation,"' pointing to pre-judgment of the court, the immorality of
the sentence, the absurdity of being "`charged with passing secrets,
which, as scientists have admitted, do not exist,"' and deploring that
David Greenglass, supposedly the man who actually passed information,
got the lightest sentence.rsr

In addition to the press campaign the letter considered ways to refute
David and Ruth Greenglass's testimony, since they had provided key evidence used to convict the Rosenbergs. Because the KGB was sure that
neither David not Ruth had been "`psychologically prepared for such a
harsh sentence,"' it recommended letters to their mothers, pleading that
they persuade David "`to publicly retract his testimony"' since he had already received his sentence. The KGB counseled that the letters could
not appear to have been written by Communists or Russians but should
seem to come from the Rosenbergs' friends and should be hand-delivered to prevent American authorities from interfering (one suggestion was
to use a "street urchin" to deliver them). Among the points the letters
should emphasize was that if he had "`even an iota of conscience,"' David
must be ashamed before his sister, Julius, and his mother, "`who, if she is
an honest woman, will also turn her back on him, as people once turned
their back on Judas when he sold Christ for 30 silver pieces. He must also
be ashamed before honest Amer-s, who will spit whenever they speak his
name."' But it was not too late "`to fix his mistake and deserve to be called
a man and to look people straight in the eye"' by openly confessing "`that
the reason for his false testimony was a desire to save himself and his wife,
that he cannot live in peace after such a sentence, and that before God and
all honest men, he rescinds his testimony."' The KGB New York station
also thought that lethal threats against the Greenglass family should be
part of the theme: "`The letter has been written by Z-r's ["Zinger"/Green-
glass's] Amer. friends, who could turn out to be his sworn enemies, and
who never forget the bad or the good.... The only reward for mitigation
of his sentence was at the cost of the lives of his sister and King [Rosenberg], the only reward for betrayal is death. Neither Z-r, nor his wife, nor
their children, nor their parents will live a moment longer.' 182

David Greenglass did not withdraw his testimony. While the Rosenbergs were awaiting execution, the government offered them the opportunity to avoid death if they confessed and cooperated. Neither did. They
were executed on 1g June 1953. Greenglass was released from prison
after serving ten of his fifteen-year term.

Despite the disappointments and setbacks of the postwar era, by any reasonable standard the KGB's Enormous project had been an outstanding
success. The KGB supplied the Soviet atomic program during its early
years with thousands of pages of high-level technical information that allowed the USSR to detonate a bomb in a remarkably short time and at
only a fraction of the cost of the Manhattan Project. If spies such as Alger
Hiss gave the USSR an invaluable window into American foreign policy
decision making, Klaus Fuchs, Theodore Hall, David Greenglass, Russell
McNutt, Boris Podolsky, Engelbert Broda, Melita Norwood, and Allan
Nunn May offered technological and scientific information that saved
untold billions of rubles and years of scientific experiments and blind alleys. That the Soviet Union would develop an atomic bomb was never in
doubt. That it would obtain one so quickly with only minimal strain on its
postwar reconstruction and that it would be a replica of that built by the
United States was a product of Soviet espionage.

The consequences of "Enormous" were enormous. The shock of the
Soviets' atomic test of 1949 produced fear and insecurity in the United
States. Not only did it ramp up the hunt for the atomic spies believed to
have made the feat possible, but it also seemed to demonstrate that no
American secret was safe from betrayal. And the fallout was not limited
to more investigations, charges and countercharges, and increased security regulations. Confident that his possession of atomic weapons neutralized America's strategic advantage, Stalin was emboldened to unleash
war in Korea in 1950.