The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (139 page)

5
     As all potencies are either innate, like the senses, or come by practice, like the power of playing the flute, or by learning, like artistic power, those which come by practice or by rational formula we must acquire by previous exercise but this is not necessary with those which are not of this nature and which imply passivity.

Since that which is ‘capable’ is capable of something and at some time and in some way (with all the other qualifications which must be present in the definition),
(35)
and since some things can produce change according to a rational formula and their potencies involve such a formula, while other things are non-rational and their potencies are non-rational, and the former potencies must be in a living thing, while the latter can be both in the living and in the lifeless; as regards potencies of the latter kind, when the agent and the patient meet in the way appropriate to the potency in question, the one must act and the other be acted on, but with the former kind of potency this is not necessary.
[1048a]
For the non-rational potencies are all productive of one effect each, but the rational produce contrary effects,
(5)
so that if they produced their effects necessarily they would produce contrary effects at the same time; but this is impossible. There must, then,
(10)
be something else that decides; I mean by this, desire or will. For whichever of two things the animal desires decisively, it will do, when it is present, and meets the passive object, in the way appropriate to the potency in question. Therefore everything which has a rational potency, when it desires that for which it has a potency and in the circumstances in which it has the potency, must do this.
(15)
And it has the potency in question when the passive object is present and is in a certain state; if not it will not be able to act. (To add the qualification ‘if nothing external prevents it’ is not further necessary; for it has the potency on the terms on which this is a potency of acting, and it is this not in all circumstances but on certain conditions, among which will be the exclusion of external hindrances; for these are barred by some of the positive qualifications.
(20)
) And so even if one has a rational wish, or an appetite, to do two things or contrary things at the same time, one will not do them; for it is not on these terms that one has the potency for them, nor is it a potency of doing both at the same time, since one will do the things which it is a potency of doing, on the terms on which one has the potency.

6
     Since we have treated
¹³
of the kind of potency which is related to movement,
(25)
let us discuss actuality—what, and what kind of thing, actuality is. For in the course of our analysis it will also become clear, with regard to the potential, that we not only ascribe potency to that whose nature it is to move something else, or to be moved by something else, either without qualification or in some particular way, but also use the word in another sense, which is the reason of the inquiry in the course of which we have discussed these previous senses also.
(30)
Actuality, then, is the existence of a thing not in the way which we express by ‘potentially’; we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line is in the whole, because it might be separated out, and we call even the man who is not studying a man of science, if he is capable of studying; the thing that stands in contrast to each of these exists actually.
(35)
Our meaning can be seen in the particular cases by induction, and we must not seek a definition of everything but be content to grasp the analogy, that it is as that which is building is to that which is capable of building, and the waking to the sleeping, and that which is seeing to that which has its eyes shut but has sight, and that which has been shaped out of the matter to the matter, and that which has been wrought up to the unwrought.
[1048b]
Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis,
(5)
and the potential by the other. But all things are not said in the
same sense
to exist actually, but only by analogy—as
A
is in
B
or to
B, C
is in
D
or to
D
; for some are as movement to potency, and the others as substance to some sort of matter.

But also the infinite and the void and all similar things are said to exist potentially and actually in a different sense from that which applies to many other things,
(10)
e. g. to that which sees or walks or is seen. For of the latter class these predicates can at some time be also truly asserted without qualification; for the seen is so called sometimes because it is being seen, sometimes because it is capable of being seen. But the infinite does not exist potentially in the sense that it will ever actually have separate existence; it exists potentially only for knowledge.
(15)
For the fact that the process of dividing never comes to an end ensures that this activity exists potentially, but not that the infinite exists separately.

Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end but all are relative to the end, e. g. the removing of fat, or fat-removal,
(20)
and the bodily parts themselves when one is making them thin are in movement in this way (i. e. without being already that at which the movement aims), this is not an action or at least not a complete one (for it is not an end); but that movement in which the end is present is an action. e. g. at the same time we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood, are thinking and have thought (while it is not true that at the same time we are learning and have learnt,
(25)
or are being cured and have been cured). At the same time we are living well and have lived well, and are happy and have been happy. If not, the process would have had sometime to cease, as the process of making thin ceases: but, as things are, it does not cease; we are living and have lived. Of these processes, then, we
must call the one set movements, and the other actualities. For every movement is incomplete—making thin, learning, walking, building; these are movements, and incomplete at that. For it is not true that at the same time a thing is walking and has walked,
(30)
or is building and has built, or is coming to be and has come to be, or is being moved and has been moved, but what is being moved is different from what has been moved, and what is moving from what has moved. But it is the same thing that at the same time has seen and is seeing, or is thinking and has thought. The latter sort of process, then, I call an actuality, and the former a movement.

7
     What, and what kind of thing, the actual is,
(35)
may be taken as explained by these and similar considerations. But we must distinguish when a thing exists potentially and when it does not; for it is not at any and every time.
[1049a]
e. g. is earth potentially a man? No—but rather when it has already become seed, and perhaps not even then. It is just as it is with being healed; not everything can be healed by the medical art or by luck, but there is a certain kind of thing which is capable of it, and only this is potentially healthy. And (1) the delimiting mark of that which as a result of
thought
comes to exist in complete reality from having existed potentially is that if the agent has willed it it comes to pass if nothing external hinders,
(5)
while the condition on the other side—viz. in that which is healed—is that nothing in it hinders the result. It is on similar terms that we have what is potentially a house; if nothing in the thing acted on—i. e. in the matter—prevents it from becoming a house,
(10)
and if there is nothing which must be added or taken away or changed, this is potentially a house; and the same is true of all other things the source of whose becoming is external. And (2) in the cases in which the source of the becoming is in the very thing which comes to be, a thing is potentially all those things which it will be of itself if nothing external hinders it. e. g. the seed is not yet potentially a man; for it must be deposited in something other than itself and undergo a change. But when through its own motive principle it has already got such and such attributes,
(15)
in this state it is already potentially a man; while in the former state it needs another motive principle, just as earth is not yet potentially a statue (for it must first change in order to become brass).

It seems that when we call a thing not something else but ‘thaten’—e. g. a casket is not ‘wood’ but ‘wooden’, and wood is not ‘earth’ but ‘earthen’,
(20)
and again earth will illustrate our point if it is similarly not something else but ‘thaten’—that other thing is always potentially
(in the full sense of that word) the thing which comes after it in this series. e. g. a casket is not ‘earthen’ nor ‘earth’, but ‘wooden’; for this is potentially a casket and this is the matter of a casket, wood in general of a casket in general, and this particular wood of this particular casket. And if there is a first thing, which is no longer, in reference to something else, called ‘thaten’,
(25)
this is prime matter; e. g. if earth is ‘airy’ and air is not ‘fire’ but ‘fiery’, fire is prime matter, which is not a ‘this’. For the subject or substratum is differentiated by being a ‘this’ or not being one; i. e. the substratum of
modifications
is, e. g., a man, i. e. a body and a soul,
(30)
while the modification is ‘musical’ or ‘pale’. (The subject is called, when music comes to be present in it, not ‘music’ but ‘musical’, and the man is not ‘paleness’ but ‘pale’, and not ‘ambulation’ or ‘movement’ but ‘walking’ or ‘moving’—which is akin to the ‘thaten’.) Wherever this is so, then, the ultimate subject is a substance; but when this is not so but the predicate is a
form
and a ‘this’,
(35)
the ultimate subject is matter and material substance. And it is only right that ‘thaten’ should be used with reference both to the matter and to the accidents; for both are indeterminates.
[1049b]

We have stated, then, when a thing is to be said to exist potentially and when it is not.

8
     From our discussion of the various senses of ‘prior’,
¹⁴
it is clear that actuality is prior to potency.
(5)
And I mean by potency not only that definite kind which is said to be a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself regarded as other, but in general every principle of movement or of rest. For nature also is in the same genus as potency; for it is a principle of movement—not,
(10)
however, in something else but in the thing itself
qua
itself. To all such potency, then, actuality is prior both in formula and in substantiality; and in time it is prior in one sense, and in another not.

(1) Clearly it is prior in formula; for that which is in the primary sense potential is potential because it is possible for it to become active; e. g. I mean by ‘capable of building’ that which can build,
(15)
and by ‘capable of seeing’ that which can see, and by ‘visible’ that which can be seen. And the same account applies to all other cases, so that the formula and the knowledge of the one must precede the knowledge of the other.

(2) In time it is prior in this sense: the actual which is identical in species though not in number with a potentially existing thing is prior to it. I mean that to this particular man who now exists actually
and to the corn and to the seeing subject the matter and the seed and that which is capable of seeing,
(20)
which are potentially a man and corn and seeing, but not yet actually so, are prior in time; but prior in time to these are other actually existing things, from which they were produced. For from the potentially existing the actually existing is always produced by an actually existing thing, e. g. man from man, musician by musician; there is always a first mover,
(25)
and the mover already exists actually. We have said in our account of substance
¹⁵
that everything that is produced is something produced from something and by something, and that the same in species as it.

This is why it is thought impossible to be a builder if one has built nothing or a harper if one has never played the harp; for he who learns to play the harp learns to play it by playing it,
(30)
and all other learners do similarly. And thence arose the sophistical quibble, that one who does not possess a science will be doing that which is the object of the science; for he who is learning it does not possess it. But since, of that which is coming to be, some part must have come to be,
(35)
and, of that which, in general, is changing, some part must have changed (this is shown in the treatise on movement
¹⁶
), he who is learning must, it would seem, possess some part of the science.
[1050a]
But
here
too, then, it is clear that actuality is in this sense also, viz. in order of generation and of time, prior to potency.

But (3) it is also prior in substantiality; firstly, (
a
) because the things that are posterior in becoming are prior in form and in substantiality (e. g. man is prior to boy and human being to seed; for the one already has its form,
(5)
and the other has not), and because everything that comes to be moves towards a principle, i. e. an end (for that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and the becoming is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potency is acquired.
(10)
For animals do not see in order that they may have sight, but they have sight that they may see. And similarly men have the art of building that they may build, and theoretical science that they may theorize; but they do not theorize that they may have theoretical science, except those who are learning by practice; and these do not theorize except in a limited sense, or because they have no need to theorize. Further,
(15)
matter exists in a potential state, just because it may come to its form; and when it exists
actually
, then it is in its form. And the same holds good in all cases, even those in which the end is a movement. And so, as teachers think they have achieved their end when they
have exhibited the pupil at work, nature does likewise. For if this is not the case,
(20)
we shall have Pauson’s Hermes over again, since it will be hard to say about the knowledge, as about the figure in the picture, whether it is within or without.
¹⁷
For the action is the end, and the actuality is the action. And so even the
word
‘actuality’ is derived from ‘action’, and points to the complete reality.

And while in some cases the exercise is the ultimate thing (e. g. in sight the ultimate thing is seeing, and no other product besides this results from sight),
(25)
but from some things a product follows (e. g. from the art of building there results a house as well as the act of building), yet none the less the act is in the former case the end and in the latter more of an end than the potency is. For the act of building is realized in the thing that is being built, and comes to be, and is, at the same time as the house.

Where,
(30)
then, the result is something apart from the exercise, the actuality is in the thing that is being made, e. g. the act of building is in the thing that is being built and that of weaving in the thing that is being woven, and similarly in all other cases, and in general the movement is in the thing that is being moved; but where there is no product apart from the actuality,
(35)
the actuality is present in the agents, e. g. the act of seeing is in the seeing subject and that of theorizing in the theorizing subject and the life is in the soul (and therefore well-being also; for it is a certain kind of life).
[1050b]

Obviously, therefore, the substance or form is actuality. According to this argument, then, it is obvious that actuality is prior in substantial being to potency; and as we have said,
¹⁸
one actuality always precedes another in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover.
(5)

But (
b
) actuality is prior in a stricter sense also; for eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things, and no eternal thing exists potentially. The reason is this. Every potency is at one and the same time a potency of the opposite; for, while that which is not capable of being present in a subject cannot be present,
(10)
everything that is capable of being may possibly not be actual. That, then, which is capable of being may either be or not be; the same thing, then, is capable both of being and of not being. And that which is capable of not being may possibly not be; and that which may possibly not be is perishable, either in the full sense, or in the precise sense in which it is said that it possibly may not be,
(15)
i. e. in respect either
of place or of quantity or quality; ‘in the full sense’ means ‘in respect of substance’. Nothing, then, which is in the full sense imperishable is in the full sense potentially existent (though there is nothing to prevent its being so in some respect, e. g. potentially of a certain quality or in a certain place); all imperishable things, then, exist actually. Nor can anything which is of
necessity
exist potentially; yet these things are primary; for if these did not exist, nothing would exist. Nor does eternal movement, if there be such, exist potentially; and,
(20)
if there is an eternal
mobile
, it is not in motion in virtue of a potentiality, except in respect of ‘whence’ and ‘whither’ (there is nothing to prevent its having matter which makes it capable of movement in various directions). And so the sun and the stars and the whole heaven are ever active, and there is no fear that they may sometime stand still, as the natural philosophers fear they may.
¹⁹
Nor do they tire in this activity; for movement is not for them, as it is for perishable things, connected with the potentiality for opposites,
(25)
so that the continuity of the movement should be laborious; for it is that kind of substance which is matter and potency, not actuality, that causes this.

Imperishable things
²⁰
are imitated by those that are involved in change, e. g. earth and fire. For these also are ever active; for they have their movement of themselves and in themselves.
²¹
But the other potencies,
(30)
according to our previous discussion,
²²
are all potencies for opposites; for that which can move another in this way can also move it not in this way, i. e. if it acts according to a rational formula; and the same
non-rational
potencies will produce opposite results by their presence or absence.

If, then, there are any entities or substances such as the dialecticians
²³
say the Ideas are,
(35)
there must be something much more scientific than science-itself and something more mobile than movement-itself; for these will be more of the nature of actualities, while science-itself and movement-itself are potencies for these.
²⁴
[1051a]

Obviously, then, actuality is prior both to potency and to every principle of change.