The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (136 page)

¹
Cf. v. 7.

²
The schools of Miletus and Elea.

³
The Pythagoreans and Empedocles.

⁴
Anaxagoras and the Atomists.

⁵
The Pythagoreans.

⁶
The school of Xenocrates.

⁷
1028
^b
33–6.

⁸
It seems convenient here to translate thus the phrase translated in v. 18 as ‘in virtue of itself’.

⁹
i. e. this identification does not give the essence of ‘surface’ (for ‘surface’ is repeated) but it gives the essence of ‘white’, since this is not repeated but replaced by an equivalent.

¹⁰
i. e. compounds of substance with the other categories.

¹¹
sc
. of the word ‘Iliad’.

¹²
Cf. Pl.
Soph
. 237, 256 ff.

¹³
i. e. it is known to be unknown.

^14
a
17-
^b
13.

¹⁵
1030
^a
17-
^b
13.

¹⁶
The Ideas or things-themselves.

¹⁷
The essences.

¹⁸
i. e. the Idea of good (l. 5).

¹⁹
i. e. as immanent in particulars.

²⁰
sc
. who is white.

²¹
sc
. and so
ad infinitum.
As an infinite process is absurd, why take the first step that commits you to it—why say that the essence of horse is separate from the horse?

²²
i. e. if the essence of one is different from the one, the essence of the essence of one is different from the essence of one.

²³
Cf. vi. 1025
^b
22.

²⁴
For the theory of these Cf.
Phys
. ii. 5, 6.

²⁵
Cf.
^b
23–30, 1034
^a
9–21,
^b
4–7.

²⁶
sc
. not the thinking, Cf. ll. 15–17.

²⁷
i. e. the minimum necessary basis.

²⁸
From the proportion established, warmth : health :: stones : house, and from the next paragraph, it would appear that warmth is treated as the matter which when specialized in a particular way becomes health.

²⁹
Cf. 1032
^a
17.

³⁰
i. e. including form as well as matter (Cf. 1029
^a
3).

^31
a
25.

³²
sc
. as well as the matter.

³³
i. e. the artist, or the father, turns a mere piece of matter into a qualified piece of matter.

³⁴
sc
. for building.

³⁵
i. e. an element of it pre-existing in the things themselves (Cf. 1032
^b
26–1033
^a
I, 1034
^a
12).

³⁶
sc
. of the rubber’s hand.

³⁷
i. e. essence.

³⁸
Cf. 1033
^b
33.

³⁹
Cf.
^a
9–32.

⁴⁰
And therefore not without soul.

⁴¹
sc
. to put it more widely so as to include the vegetable world.

⁴²
Aristotle is thinking of Pythagoreans.

⁴³
This probably includes Plato himself.

⁴⁴
Cf. Pl.
Theaet
. 147
D
;
Soph
. 218
B
;
Pol
257
C
;
Epp
. 358
D
.

⁴⁵
Cf.
^a
34–
^b
7.

⁴⁶
1035
^a
30–
^b
3.

⁴⁷
Cf. 1036
^a
16–17, viii. 1043
^b
2–4.

⁴⁸
i. e. as man = soul + body, Socrates = this soul + this body.

⁴⁹
Cf. xiii, xiv.

⁵⁰
Cf. vii. 12, viii. 6.

⁵¹
Ch. 4.

⁵²
Chs. 10, 11.

⁵³
Ch. 5.

⁵⁴
Ch. 6.

⁵⁵
Cf.
An. Post.
ii. 3–10, 13.

⁵⁶
Cf.
ib
. 97
^a
29.

⁵⁷
That of ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’.

⁵⁸
Chs. 4–6, 10–12.

⁵⁹
Ch. 3.

⁶⁰
1029
^a
2–3, 23–4.

⁶¹
Cf. i. 990
^b
17.

⁶²
Thales is said to have defined number as ‘a system of units’.

⁶³
Cf. 1031
^a
11–14.

⁶⁴
Cf. vii. 15, viii. 6.

⁶⁵
Ch. 8.

⁶⁶
i. e. the Ideas.

⁶⁷
Cf. l. 17.

⁶⁸
sc
. at night.

⁶⁹
sc
. and therefore in this case, when the fact is known, there is no question as to the ‘why’.

⁷⁰
sc
. the formal cause. Cf. v. 1014
^b
36 in contrast with ib. 27.

1
     
[1042a]
We must reckon up the results arising from what has been said, and compute the sum of them, and put the finishing touch to our inquiry.
(5)
We have said that the causes, principles, and elements of substances are the object of our search.
¹
And some substances are recognized by every one, but some have been advocated by particular schools. Those generally recognized are the natural substances, i. e. fire, earth, water, air, &c., the simple bodies; secondly, plants and their parts,
(10)
and animals and the parts of animals; and finally the physical universe and its parts; while some particular schools say that Forms and the objects of mathematics are substances.
²
But there are arguments which lead to the conclusion that there are other substances, the essence and the substratum. Again, in another way the genus seems more substantial than the various species,
(15)
and the universal than the particulars.
³
And with the universal and the genus the Ideas are connected; it is in virtue of the same argument that they are thought to be substances. And since the essence is substance, and the definition is a formula of the essence, for this reason we have discussed definition and essential predication.
⁴
Since the definition is a formula, and a formula has parts,
(20)
we had to consider also with respect to the notion of ‘part’, what are parts of the substance and what are not, and whether the parts of the substance are also parts of the definition.
⁵
Further, too, neither the universal nor the genus is a substance;
⁶
we must inquire later into the Ideas and the objects of mathematics;
⁷
for some say these are substances as well as the sensible substances.

But now let us resume the discussion of the generally recognized substances.
(25)
These are the sensible substances, and sensible substances all have matter. The substratum is substance, and this is in one sense the matter (and by matter I mean that which, not being a ‘this’ actually, is potentially a ‘this’), and in another sense the formula or shape (that which being a ‘this’ can be separately formulated),
(30)
and thirdly the complex of these two, which alone is generated and destroyed, and is, without qualification, capable of separate existence; for of substances completely expressible in a formula some are separable and some are not.

But clearly matter also is substance; for in all the opposite changes that occur there is something which underlies the changes, e. g. in respect of place that which is now here and again elsewhere,
(35)
and in respect of increase that which is now of one size and again less or greater, and in respect of alteration that which is now healthy and again diseased; and similarly in respect of substance there is something that is now being generated and again being destroyed, and now
⁸
underlies the process as a ‘this’ and again
⁹
underlies it in respect of a privation of positive character.
[1042b]
And in
this
change the others are involved. But in either one or two of the others this is not involved; for it is not necessary if a thing has matter for change of place that it should also have matter for generation and destruction.
(5)

The difference between becoming in the full sense and becoming in a qualified sense has been stated in our physical works.
¹⁰

2
     Since the substance which exists as underlying and as matter is generally recognized, and this is that which exists potentially,
(10)
it remains for us to say what is the substance, in the sense of
actuality
, of sensible things. Democritus seems to think there are three kinds of difference between things; the underlying body, the matter, is one and the same, but they differ either in rhythm, i. e. shape, or in turning, i. e. position, or in inter-contact, i. e. order.
¹¹
But evidently there are many differences; for instance, some things are characterized by the mode of composition of their matter,
(15)
e. g. the things formed by blending, such as honey-water; and others by being bound together, e. g. a bundle; and others by being glued together, e. g. a book; and others by being nailed together, e. g. a casket; and others in more than one of these ways; and others by position, e. g. threshold and lintel (for these differ by being placed in a certain way); and others by time,
(20)
e. g. dinner and breakfast; and others by place, e. g. the winds; and others by the affections proper to sensible things, e. g. hardness and softness, density and rarity, dryness and wetness; and some things by some of these qualities, others by them all, and in general some by excess and some by defect. Clearly, then, the word ‘is’ has just as many meanings; a thing
is
a threshold because it lies in such and such a position,
(25)
and its being means its lying in that position, while being ice means having been solidified in such and such a way. And the being of some things will be defined by
all
these qualities, because some parts of them are mixed, others are blended, others are bound together, others are solidified,
(30)
and others use the other differentiae; e. g. the hand or the foot requires such complex definition. We must grasp, then, the kinds of differentiae (for these will be the principles of the being of things), e. g. the things characterized by the more and the less, or by the dense and the rare, and by other such qualities; for all these are forms of excess and defect.
(35)
And anything that is characterized by shape or by smoothness and
roughness is characterized by the straight and the curved.
[1043a]
And for other things their being will mean their being mixed, and their not being will mean the opposite.

It is clear, then, from these facts that, since its substance is the cause of each thing’s being, we must seek in these differentiae what is the cause of the being of each of these things. Now none of these differentiae is substance, even when coupled with matter,
(5)
yet it is what is analogous to substance in each case; and as in substances that which is predicated of the matter is the actuality itself, in all other definitions also it is what most resembles full actuality. e. g. if we had to define a threshold, we should say ‘wood or stone in such and such a position’, and a house we should define as ‘bricks and timbers in such and such a position’ (or a purpose may exist as well in some cases), and if he had to define ice we should say ‘water frozen or solidified in such and such a way’,
(10)
and harmony is ‘such and such a blending of high and low’; and similarly in all other cases.

Obviously, then, the actuality or the formula is different when the matter is different; for in some cases it is the composition, in others the mixing, and in others some other of the attributes we have named. And so, of the people who go in for defining, those who define a house as stones,
(15)
bricks, and timbers are speaking of the potential house, for these are the matter; but those who propose ‘a receptacle to shelter chattels and living beings’, or something of the sort, speak of the actuality. Those who combine both of these speak of the third kind of substance, which is composed of matter and form (for the formula that gives the differentiae seems to be an account of the form or actuality,
(20)
while that which gives the components is rather an account of the matter); and the same is true of the kind of definitions which Archytas used to accept; they are accounts of the combined form and matter. e. g. what is still weather? Absence of motion in a large expanse of air; air is the matter, and absence of motion is the actuality and substance.
(25)
What is a calm? Smoothness of sea; the material substratum is the sea, and the actuality or shape is smoothness. It is obvious then, from what has been said, what sensible substance is and how it exists—one kind of it as matter, another as form or actuality, while the third kind is that which is composed of these two.