The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (18 page)

29
     Syllogisms which lead to impossible conclusions are similar to ostensive syllogisms; they also are formed by means of the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question.
(25)
In both cases the same inquiry is involved. For what is proved ostensively may also be concluded syllogistically
per impossibile
by means of the same terms; and what is proved
per impossibile
may also be proved ostensively, e. g. that
A
belongs to none of the
E
s. For suppose
A
to belong to some
E:
then since
B
belongs to all
A
and
A
to some of the
E
s,
B
will belong to some of the
E
s: but it was assumed that it belongs to none.
(30)
Again we may prove that
A
belongs to some
E:
for if
A
belonged to none of the
E
s, and
E
belongs to all
G, A
will belong to none of the
G
s: but it was assumed to belong to all. Similarly with
the other propositions requiring proof. The proof
per impossibile
will always and in all cases be from the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question.
(35)
Whatever the problem the same inquiry is necessary whether one wishes to use an ostensive syllogism or a reduction to impossibility. For both the demonstrations start from the same terms, e. g. suppose it has been proved that
A
belongs to no
E,
because it turns out that otherwise
B
belongs to some of the
E
s and this is impossible—if now it is assumed that
B
belongs to no
E
and to all
A,
(40)
it is clear that
A
will belong to no
E.
[45b]
Again if it has been proved by an ostensive syllogism that
A
belongs to no
E,
assume that
A
belongs to some
E
and it will be proved
per impossibile
to belong to no
E.
Similarly with the rest. In all cases it is necessary to find some common term other than the subjects of inquiry,
(5)
to which the syllogism establishing the false conclusion may relate, so that if this premiss is converted,
⁷⁰
and the other remains as it is, the syllogism will be ostensive by means of the same terms. For the ostensive syllogism differs from the
reductio ad impossibile
in this: in the ostensive syllogism both premisses are laid down in accordance with the truth,
(10)
in the
reductio ad impossibile
one of the premisses is assumed falsely.

These points will be made clearer by the sequel,
⁷¹
when we discuss the reduction to impossibility: at present this much must be clear, that we must look to terms of the kinds mentioned whether we wish to use an ostensive syllogism or a reduction to impossibility.
(15)
In the other hypothetical syllogisms, I mean those which proceed by substitution,
⁷²
or by positing a certain quality, the inquiry will be directed to the terms of the problem to be proved—not the terms of the original problem, but the new terms introduced; and the method of the inquiry will be the same as before.
(20)
But we must consider and determine in how many ways hypothetical syllogisms are possible.

Each of the problems then can be proved in the manner described; but it is possible to establish some of them syllogistically in another way, e. g. universal problems by the inquiry which leads up to a particular conclusion, with the addition of an hypothesis. For if the
C
s and the
G
s should be identical, but
E
should be assumed to belong to the
G
s only,
(25)
then
A
would belong to every
E:
and again if the
D
s and the
G
s should be identical, but
E
should be predicated of the
G
s only, it follows that
A
will belong to none of the
E
s. Clearly
then we must consider the matter in this way also. The method is the same whether the relation is necessary or possible. For the inquiry will be the same, and the syllogism will proceed through terms arranged in the same order whether a possible or a pure proposition is proved.
(30)
We must find in the case of possible relations, as well as terms that belong, terms which can belong though they actually do not: for we have proved that the syllogism which establishes a possible relation proceeds through these terms as well.
(35)
Similarly also with the other modes of predication.

It is clear then from what has been said not only that all syllogisms can be formed in this way, but also that they cannot be formed in any other. For every syllogism has been proved to be formed through one of the aforementioned figures,
(40)
and these cannot be composed through other terms than the consequents and antecedents of the terms in question: for from these we obtain the premisses and find the middle term.
[46a]
Consequently a syllogism cannot be formed by means of other terms.

30
     The method is the same in all cases, in philosophy, in any art or study. We must look for the attributes and the subjects of both our terms, and we must supply ourselves with as many of these as possible,
(5)
and consider them by means of the three terms, refuting statements in one way, confirming them in another, in the pursuit of truth starting from premisses in which the arrangement of the terms is in accordance with truth, while if we look for dialectical syllogisms we must start from probable premisses.
(10)
The principles of syllogisms have been stated in general terms, both how they are characterized and how we must hunt for them, so as not to look to everything that is said about the terms of the problem or to the same points whether we are confirming or refuting, or again whether we are confirming of all or of some, and whether we are refuting of all or some; we must look to fewer points and they must be definite.
(15)
We have also stated how we must select with reference to everything that is, e. g. about good or knowledge. But in each science the principles which are peculiar are the most numerous. Consequently it is the business of experience to give the principles which belong to each subject. I mean for example that astronomical experience supplies the principles of astronomical science: for once the phenomena were adequately apprehended,
(20)
the demonstrations of astronomy were discovered. Similarly with any other art or science. Consequently, if the attributes of the thing are apprehended, our business will then be to exhibit readily the demonstrations. For if none
of the true attributes of things had been omitted in the historical survey,
(25)
we should be able to discover the proof and demonstrate everything which admitted of proof, and to make that clear, whose nature does not admit of proof.

In general then we have explained fairly well how we must select premisses: we have discussed the matter accurately in the treatise concerning dialectic.
⁷³
(30)

31
     It is easy to see that division into classes
⁷⁴
is a small part of the method we have described: for division is, so to speak, a weak syllogism; for what it ought to prove, it begs, and it always establishes something more general than the attribute in question. First,
(35)
this very point had escaped all those who used the method of division; and they attempted to persuade men that it was possible to make a demonstration of substance and essence. Consequently they did not understand what it is possible to prove syllogistically by division, nor did they understand that it was possible to prove syllogistically in the manner we have described.
⁷⁵
In demonstrations,
(40)
when there is a need to prove a positive statement, the middle term through which the syllogism is formed must always be inferior to and not comprehend the first of the extremes.
[46b]
But division has a contrary intention: for it takes the universal as middle. Let animal be the term signified by
A,
mortal by
B,
and immortal by
C,
and let man,
(5)
whose definition is to be got, be signified by
D.
The man who divides assumes that every animal is either mortal or immortal: i. e. whatever is
A
is all either
B
or
C.
Again, always dividing, he lays it down that man is an animal, so he assumes
A
of
D
as belonging to it. Now the true conclusion is that every
D
is either
B
or
C,
(10)
consequently man must be either mortal or immortal, but it is not necessary that man should be a mortal animal—this is begged: and this is what ought to have been proved syllogistically. And again, taking
A
as mortal animal,
B
as footed,
C
as footless, and
D
as man,
(15)
he assumes in the same way that
A
inheres either in
B
or in
C
(for every mortal animal is either footed or footless), and he assumes
A
of
D
(for he assumed man, as we saw, to be a mortal animal); consequently it is necessary that man should be either a footed or a footless animal; but it is not necessary that man should be footed: this he assumes: and it is just this again which he ought to have
demonstrated. Always dividing then in this way it turns out that these logicians assume as middle the universal term,
(20)
and as extremes that which ought to have been the subject of demonstration and the
differentiae.
In conclusion, they do not make it clear, and show it to be necessary, that this is man or whatever the subject of inquiry may be: for they pursue the other method altogether, never even suspecting the presence of the rich supply of evidence which might be used.
(25)
It is clear that it is neither possible to refute a statement by this method of division, nor to draw a conclusion about an accident or property of a thing, nor about its genus, nor in cases in which it is unknown whether it is thus or thus, e. g. whether the diagonal is incommensurate. For if he assumes that every length is either commensurate or incommensurate,
(30)
and the diagonal is a length, he has proved that the diagonal is either incommensurate or commensurate. But if he should assume that it is incommensurate, he will have assumed what he ought to have proved. He cannot then prove it: for this is his method, but proof is not possible by this method. Let
A
stand for ‘incommensurate or commensurate’,
B
for ‘length’,
C
for ‘diagonal’. It is clear then that this method of investigation is not suitable for every inquiry,
(35)
nor is it useful in those cases in which it is thought to be most suitable.

From what has been said it is clear from what elements demonstrations are formed and in what manner, and to what points we must look in each problem.…

¹
100
^a
29, 104
^a
8.

²
The nature of demonstrative premisses is discussed in the
Post. An.;
that of dialectical premisses in the
Topics.

³
ll. 12, 22–6.

⁴
In ll. 7–13.

^5
a
20–2.

^6
a
14–17.

⁷
In
^a
12.

⁸
cc. 13, 17.

⁹
c. 46.

¹⁰
In the
Posterior Analytics.

¹¹
Barbara, major
A,
minor
A.

¹²
24
^b
28.

¹³
Celarent, major
E,
minor
A.

¹⁴
Major
A,
minor
E.

¹⁵
Major
E,
minor
E.

¹⁶
Darii.

¹⁷
24
^b
28.

¹⁸
Ferio.

¹⁹
24
^b
30.

²⁰
The Aristotelian formula for the proposition,
AB,
in which
B
represents the subject and
A
the predicate (
A
belongs to
B
), has been retained throughout, because in most places this suits the context better than the modern formula in which
A
represents the subject and
B
the predicate.

²¹
Major
I
or
O,
minor
A.

²²
Major
I
or
O,
minor
E.

²³
Major
A,
minor
O.

²⁴
Major
E,
minor
O.

^25
a
2.

²⁶
Major
A,
minor
O.

²⁷
i. e. the major premiss.

²⁸
Major
E,
minor
O.

²⁹
II, OO, IO, OI.

³⁰
Cesare.

³¹
25
^b
40.

³²
Camestres.

³³
l. 3.

³⁴
Festino.

³⁵
Baroco.

^36
a
21.

³⁷
l. 18.

³⁸
Darapti.

³⁹
Felapton.

⁴⁰
See note 20.

⁴¹
Disamis.

⁴²
Datisi.

⁴³
Bocardo.

⁴⁴
27
^b
20.

⁴⁵
28
^a
30.

⁴⁶
Ferison.

⁴⁷
Fesapo, Fresison.

⁴⁸
sc.
in the first figure.

⁴⁹
viz. by reduction
per impossibile
to Celarent and Barbara.

⁵⁰
25
^b
21.

⁵¹
Post An.
i. 8.

⁵²
Cf. 25
^b
32.

⁵³
Aristotle is thinking of the method of establishing a proposition
A
is
B
by inducing the opponent to agree that
A
is
B
if
X
is
Y.
All that remains then is to establish syllogistically that
X
is
Y.
That
A
is
B
thus follows from the agreement.

⁵⁴
The diagram Aristotle has in mind appears to be the following:

Here
A
and
B
are the equal sides,
E
and
F
the angles at the base of the isosceles triangle.
C
and
D
are the angles formed by the base with the circumference. The angles formed by the equal sides with the base are loosely called
AC, BD.

⁵⁵
sc.
but imperfect.

⁵⁶
40
^b
30.

⁵⁷
l. 6.

⁵⁸
The reference is to the new premisses produced by conversion, when a syllogism in the second or third figure is being reduced to one in the first. Cf. 24
^b
24.

⁵⁹
Post An.
i. 19–22.

⁶⁰
i. e. on the major and minor terms. Two affirmative premisses in the second figure give no conclusion.

⁶¹
44
^b
20.

⁶²
We thus get a syllogism in Barbara.

⁶³
Darapti.

⁶⁴
Cesare.

⁶⁵
Camestres.

⁶⁶
By converting the major premiss of the Cesare syllogism or the minor premiss of the Camestres syllogism.

⁶⁷
Felapton, by conversion.

⁶⁸
i. e. the consequents of
A
and
E.

⁶⁹
27
^a
18–20,
^b
23–8.

⁷⁰
i. e. if this false conclusion is replaced by its contradictory and this is treated as a premiss.

⁷¹
ii. 14.

⁷²
Cf. 41
^a
39.

⁷³
Topics,
especially i. 14.

⁷⁴
Aristotle is thinking of Plato’s establishment of definitions by means of division by dichotomy.

⁷⁵
In cc. 1–30.