The Battle of Midway (34 page)

Rochefort was late because he and his team were cobbling together information from a dozen messages, all of them dated May 20, that collectively provided a much clearer view of the Japanese plan.
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Though these messages had been intercepted four days earlier, they had been consigned to what was colloquially called the “crap traffic” bin because they were badly garbled and therefore less likely to reveal any useful intelligence. Layton noted in his private journal that Hypo analysts were “unable to do much with” the messages “due [to the] necessity [of] keeping up with current traffic,” which was exceptionally high, and that “only [a] garbled copy [was] available.” Nevertheless, as the cryptanalysts began to strip away the secondary cipher groups on one of those messages, the five number code for “attack” appeared in close association with the geographical designator “AF.” This provoked a burst of excitement, and both Hypo and Belconnen got to work on it in earnest. As it happened, the Melbourne version and the Hypo version were garbled in different places, which meant that with both versions in hand, more of the message could be recovered.
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Moreover, this message was accompanied by others. One noted the departure of two battleships and a cruiser division from Kure; another referred to a “main body” and a screen; a third referred to a rendezvous of this force with “the Striking Force” of CarDivs 1 and 2. One contained a reference to “AF and AO occupation forces.” The cryptanalysts at both Hypo and Belconnen worked furiously to break as many of these messages as they could, and the two units traded insights and information. Piece by piece, what emerged was, in Layton’s words, “a detailed report of Japanese forces to be used at Midway.” The time for Rochefort’s meeting with Nimitz came and went, but Rochefort was determined to take this new key intelligence with him. When he showed up at Nimitz’s headquarters a half hour late, he apologized and handed Nimitz a sheaf of papers, saying he hoped “this would explain everything.”
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It did. The new decrypts not only confirmed that Midway was the target, they offered important details about the Japanese plan of attack. They did not reveal the complete order of battle—the Americans still did not know that Yamamoto himself planned to be at sea with the
Yamato
, for example—but there was enough about the Kid
ō
Butai that Rochefort could tell Nimitz with some confidence that the enemy would have four carriers, and that those carriers would approach Midway from the northwest. Rochefort himself declared later that the intercepts contained “the strength of the attack and the composition of the attack forces,” and even “such things as where the Japanese carriers would be when they launched their planes,” though that last claim was slightly in error; all the messages revealed for sure was that the carriers would approach Midway from the northwest. Despite subsequent mythology about this intelligence breakthrough, it was not quite like having a copy of the enemy’s plans. Still, the information was detailed enough that some wondered if it might be a trick. Rochefort was convinced that it was genuine and stood his ground before probing questions from the flag and general officers. “I could not understand why there should be any doubt,” he later insisted.
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To all outward appearances, Nimitz remained impassive. When, years later, Rochefort was asked to describe the admiral’s reaction, all he could recall were those cool blue eyes looking at him. Nimitz did ask Rochefort
whether he was certain about the number of enemy carriers. If the Kid
ō
Butai consisted of all six carriers of the original Pearl Harbor strike force, the American carriers would be outnumbered two to one (or if the
Yorktown
could not be patched up in time, three to one). Rochefort predicted confidently that there would be only four enemy carriers. All of the message traffic referred only to Carrier Divisions 1 and 2, not to Carrier Division 5. Moreover, Rochefort knew that the
Sh
ō
kaku
had arrived in Japanese home waters some days before and an intercepted message sent on May 22 appeared to be the “arrival” message of the
Zuikaku
.

One missing piece of essential information was the date. To find it, Lieutenant Commanders Wesley Wright and Joe Finnegan stayed up all night in the Dungeon, trying to crack the various layers of encipherment in the messages. At 5:30 the next morning (May 26), Wright reported to Rochefort that the evidence suggested that the attack would begin at dawn on June 4 Tokyo time, June 3 Hawaii time. At the time they made that analysis they were correct, though that very afternoon the Japanese high command postponed the attack date from June 3 to June 4.
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Later that day, Nimitz asked his staff to outline the strengths and weaknesses of both sides in the forthcoming collision. The Japanese advantages were obvious: they would have more carriers and the gunfire support of two battleships; their fighters were superior; and their attack airplanes had a longer range. On the other hand, they were operating at a daunting distance from their base, and even moderate damage to their carriers might therefore prove fatal. The American advantage was their knowledge of Japanese plans. The wild cards were whether or not the
Yorktown
would be available, and the “uncertain” value of the Army bombers on Midway. Nimitz concluded that “we cannot afford to slug it out with the probably superior approaching Japanese forces” As King had suggested, the best approach would be to “reduce his forces by attrition.” To do that would require what Nimitz called “the principle of calculated risk.” As he had said in response to an earlier event, “Timidness won’t win this war, neither will foolish recklessness.” Much would depend, therefore, on the ability of the officer in tactical command, Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, to know the difference.
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As Nimitz soon learned, however, there was one more wild card in the deck.

Halsey’s two big carriers entered Pearl Harbor that afternoon (May 26). On board the flagship
Enterprise
, a haggard-looking Halsey prepared to go ashore. For weeks he had been suffering from a severe form of dermatitis that was aggravated by exposure to the sun. It was so painful that he could not leave his cabin in the daytime. In consequence Halsey had not slept in days, and he had lost more than twenty pounds. His ravaged skin hung on his frame like an old coat, and the ship’s doctor told him in no uncertain terms that he had to go to the hospital. Despite that, he was determined to call on Nimitz first. When he showed up at CinCPac headquarters, Nimitz was horrified by his appearance and ordered him at once to report to the hospital. Before he went, however, Nimitz asked him who should assume command of Task Force 16 in his absence. Halsey had anticipated the question and had an answer ready: Raymond Spruance.
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Fifty-five-year-old Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (he would turn 56 on July 3) was a 1907 Academy graduate
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who had served in cruisers and destroyers for his entire career, and currently commanded the cruiser escort of Task Force 16. At 5 feet 9 1/2 inches and 140 pounds, he had a slender, almost skeletal frame and a thin face. He was calm in his demeanor and courtly in his manners, reminding one interviewer of “a soft-spoken university professor.” His chief of staff noted later, “There were some who thought he had no sense of humor. He actually had a very keen one, but it was recognized only by those who knew him well and could spot a slight twinkle of the eye.” Spruance and Halsey were close friends. It was a curious friendship; Halsey was outgoing and affable, colorful, and emotional, while Spruance was cool, reserved, and disciplined. Halsey tended to shoot from the hip, and Spruance was “serene and methodical.” As the historian John Lundstrom aptly puts it, Halsey and Spruance were “fire and ice.” Yet in spite of those differences, or perhaps because of them, they had been close for years. They had seen duty together, and their families were also close. In some ways they complemented each other: Halsey admired Spruance’s ascetic intellectualism, and Spruance admired Halsey’s cheerful bonhomie. One great advantage in making Spruance the stand-in commander, was that he was already familiar with the personnel in Task Force 16.
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Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance commanded the cruiser escorts of Halsey’s Task Force 16. Just days before the Battle of Midway, he was charged with overall command of Task Force 16, including its two carriers. (U.S. Naval Institute)

The problem was that Spruance was a black shoe. Unlike Halsey, he had never earned his gold wings—or even the silver wings of a “naval observer.” Like Frank Jack Fletcher, he was a dedicated surface-warfare officer. Moreover, he was junior to Fletcher, which meant that Fletcher would be the officer in tactical command of the combined carrier group—assuming that the
Yorktown
could participate at all. Spruance’s selection to command Task Force 16 meant that the fate of America’s crippled and dwindling carrier force would be in the hands of two black-shoe admirals. Although Nimitz did not know Spruance personally, he admired his record and had already formally requested Spruance as his new chief of staff. Moreover, Spruance’s partnership with Halsey in all the operations of Task Force 16 since the raid on the Marshalls had prepared him to move into the command position. For his part, Halsey was so sure of his recommendation
that he had prepared a letter, which he now handed to Nimitz. In it, Halsey praised his subordinate’s “outstanding ability” as well as his “excellent judgment and quiet courage.” He concluded: “I consider him fully and superbly qualified to take command of a force comprising mixed types [of ships] and to conduct protracted independent operations in the combat theater in war time.”
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Nimitz approved Halsey’s proposal on the spot. Halsey turned to his flag lieutenant, William H. Ashford. “Go back to the
Enterprise
and tell Ray Spruance he’s to take the task force out, using my staff. Tell him to shift his flag to the
Enterprise.”
Then Halsey went resignedly to the base hospital to begin what would stretch into two months of sick leave.
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