The Battle of Poitiers 1356 (7 page)

After the defeat at Crécy (as well as Courtrai (1302) and Morgarten (1315)), the French had made several attempts to combat those devastating infantry tactics. At the battles of Lunalonge (Poitou, 1349), Taillebourg (near Saintes, 8 April 1351), Ardres (6 June 1351) and Mauron (14 August 1352) the French used infantry and dismounted men-at-arms in greater numbers. They also endeavoured to find a weakness in the opposing infantry–archer formation. In the event these approaches proved ineffective or were not put into action at Poitiers and the defeat destroyed the French illusion that relatively minor military changes could be effective. As a consequence, for a generation, French commanders avoided battles with the English whenever possible. The contrast between the French response in 1356 with that of 1359–60 is very clear. During that campaign defensive tactics allowed them to turn the tables on the English by denying Edward the crown. Later they were able to reverse the territorial gains the English had gained through the treaty of Brétigny. This was only possible when they had an easily-assailable military objective – the principality of Aquitaine.

Archers and the Longbow

The role of the longbow in the early campaigns of the Hundred Years War is a contentious matter. A number of issues are open to argument and interpretation, ranging from the nature of the weapons themselves, their power and rate of accurate fire, to the disposition of the archers on the battlefield. In part, the trouble lays in the fact that no extant medieval longbows remain. The earliest examples are those reclaimed from the wreck of the Mary Rose. If these were finished longbows representative of those used at Poitiers then they were formidable weapons indeed with an effective range of 300 yards or more. By contrast, the wooden or composite crossbows of the time could shoot about 200 yards, and for every quarrel a bowman might fire up to ten arrows. Thus, well-trained longbowmen with a sufficient supply of arrows could, if this is an accurate interpretation, cause a great deal of damage and disruption to an enemy attack. What is not in doubt is that archers became an increasingly important component in English armies in the course of the Hundred Years War. The proportion of longbowmen to other troops was regularly three, four or five to one, and sometimes reached as high as twenty to one. However, the ‘invincibility’ of the longbow has been questioned in recent years. It is argued that, rather than causing a great number of casualties, archer fire caused the enemy either to be funnelled into a particular area where the English infantry defences were at their strongest or simply to disrupt the assault so that the enemy did not prove as great a threat.

Longbowmen alone did not win the battle of Poitiers (or those of Crécy and Agincourt) but they were a critical component of the armies that secured those victories. When working alongside infantry and with a final cavalry charge to rout the enemy they proved, whether through the number of casualties that they inflicted or through the sheer scale of the disruption they caused, to be an extremely effective military asset. The manner in which they were used and disposed on the battlefield is, however, somewhat uncertain.

The formation and disposition of the archer corps was described by Froissart,
a la maniere d’une herce
which according to Oman and Burne was a triangular formation with the apex facing the enemy placed between divisions of dismounted men-at-arms. This is based on the translation of herce as harrow. Alternatively, the archers may have been placed on the flanks, or in the shape of a candleabrum or a horn-shaped projection on the wings of the army, or a hedgehog possibly using stakes or pikemen for protection.
¹⁴

It appears likely that troop dispositions were not standard but dependent on a number of contingencies. At Crécy, the archers seem to have been used on the wings in a forward flanking position. They may have begun the battle beyond the front rank of dismounted troops to allow them to gain a little extra range, but they could have a more mobile role, and after the enemy approached they may have fallen back to the flanks curving slightly forward to provide crossfire. In this position they would not have provided the vanguard with much protection. Because of the numbers involved and the lie of the land in 1346 it may be that the front was almost a mile in length. This allowed only a very light defence of the prince’s division (the vanguard) which, at Crecy, fought in the centre. Formations at Poitiers are less certain but again archers seem to have been used on the wings and targeting, when possible, the less armoured flanks and rears of the French infantry and cavalry.

Whatever the formation and disposition of longbowmen and whatever the nature of the bows themselves, archers formed an integral part of the English tactical system from the 1330s onwards; seeking to slow or disrupt an enemy advance. At Crécy, the bowmen proved very effective against the French cavalry, and at Poitiers against dismounted men-at-arms at close range. These battles also showed the superiority of the longbow over the crossbow in terms of effective range and rate of fire. The success of the archers in Scotland and at Crécy made a profound influence on English tactical thinking and on the Black Prince and his retinue, many of whom first saw military service in 1346. Consequently, the battle of Crécy laid the foundations for the battle that was fought outside Poitiers ten years later and it influenced the structure of the Anglo-Gascon army both proportionally and tactically.

The importance of archers and their longbows was such that they became the subject of a number of governmental ordinances. In 1357 and 1369 the export of bows and arrows was forbidden, and in 1365 archers were forbidden to leave England without royal licence. In 1363, instructions were issued requiring everyone, including the nobility, to participate in regular archery practice. The use of the longbow, a popular, not aristocratic weapon, demonstrated the need of the king to draw on the support of all levels of society in his (at least theoretical) quest for the French throne.

The success at Poitiers also influenced the composition of English armies in France in other ways. The Reims campaign (1359–60) witnessed the full emergence of the mounted archer and establishment of mixed retinues (men-at-arms and archers). This in turn led to a shift in the social composition of the military community as knights and mounted men-at-arms became less significant in the degree to which they might influence the outcome of a battle. Further, heavy cavalry was not conducive to conducting wide-scale, extensive raids. Lightly armed mounted troops, by contrast, gave the necessary mobility that allowed them to participate fully in
chevauchées
and for such raids to become engrained as the predominant strategy, while a balanced troop composition allowed for an effective and flexible tactical response to a variety of military situations. Such forces were particularly effective when used in defensive positions, preferably prepared in advance or chosen for their advantageous terrain and natural features. The massed power of the archers could thin out the enemy at a distance and slow their advance, and disciplined infantry would deal with any opposing forces that reached the front line.

However, the longbow was not all-powerful and the tide began to turn against the English in the Hundred Years War as the French continued to experiment with various tactics to negate its influence on the battlefield. Longbows did not have quite the same impact in 1356 as they did at Crecy, partly due to the French use of dismounted troops advancing slowly under cover of their shields. Charles de Blois and Bertrand du Guesclin at Auray (1364) further demonstrated that close formations of well-armoured soldiers could provide a less easy target. However, on both occasions the French were defeated, although mainly because of the disciplined fighting of the infantry who were entrenched in a well-defended position. Once du Guesclin became constable of France he employed what were essentially guerrilla tactics and refused to be brought to battle. If it could not be employed in substantial numbers against an enemy willing to take the initiative to attack then the longbow was all-but useless.

CHAPTER FIVE:

Aftermath

The Black Prince returned with his prisoner to Bordeaux and negotiations began almost immediately for the king’s release. These negotiations formed the backdrop to Anglo-French relations for the next several years. King Jean was not, of course, the only prisoner taken captive at Poitiers, indeed the battle was extraordinary by late medieval standards for the number of prisoners taken.
¹
As opposed to Crécy, the soldiers received permission to take hostages, and the conditions of the battle made the capture of the great nobles in the king’s division comparatively easy. Some contemporaries complained that the French nobles had purchased their lives too cheaply and surrendered too soon, but in reality there was nothing to gain by continuing the fight and everything to lose. It is also too simplistic an explanation for the French defeat.

In 1352, partly in response to the establishment of the Order of the Garter, although a similar project had been in mind since 1344, Jean II founded the Company of Our Lady of the Noble House, commonly called the Company of the Star. It was a monarchical order of knighthood with a number of privileges and obligations, one of which was never to flee from battle. It is recorded that at the battle of Mauron in 1352, 89 members of the Company died because of their oath never to retreat. A number of the much-depleted Company were also at Poitiers (as indeed were many members of the much smaller Order of the Garter) including the king’s sons, Jean de Melun, Jean de Clermont, Charny, and Armagnac. Charny, the author of a number of chivalric manuals and treatises, some probably written for the Company of the Star, died at Poitiers, and it seems unlikely that these were men who would only retreat or surrender, especially in the presence of their king, unless there was no other option.
²

It is impossible to be precise about the number of captives: chronicle accounts range in number between 1,000 and 3,000, and the most recent study suggests that a figure of about 2,000 is probable. The situation that this provided was novel, problematic, and offered a range of opportunities for Edward III and the Black Prince. Clearly a financial benefit could accrue from ransoming some of the exalted figures taken captive, and more particularly there were political advantages. For the majority of the 2,000, however, the financial gains were limited and the political advantages virtually non-existent, so most were released within weeks upon payment or the promise of payment to their captors. There were 17 individuals, however, who were considered to be of national importance, and after the return to Bordeaux the prince and his father purchased the rights to these prisoners from their captors. The total cost to the royal purse was around £65,000, £20,000 of which was pledged to the Black Prince. Surprisingly, the great majority of money due to Anglo-Gascon captors from the Crown was paid. The prince himself, however, received just over a third of the sum owed to him although he received much of the residual sum in grants made during the establishment of the principality of Aquitaine in 1362–3.

The final economic benefits to the English Crown are difficult to establish for many of these prisoners. Indeed, with the exception of King Jean, it is unlikely that after the outlay and expense of maintaining such noble figures in England and Bordeaux Edward made any real financial gains. His motivation in purchasing them was political and he hoped to acquire influence over them. He also managed to remove Jean II and a number of his leading councillors and nobles from positions of power leaving France without guidance or direction and, hopefully, willing to accept a peace treaty on English terms. In the event, although it weakened his position at Poitiers, Jean’s decision to dismiss Charles, the dauphin, from the field proved extremely significant. Without his steadying influence, the turmoil in the months after the battle might have been even greater and the experience of ruling in these troubled times provided an excellent training for one of the most of the most gifted and capable of French monarchs.

Jean was brought to England and treated as his status demanded. Froissart and the author of the Anonimalle Chronicle described the journey from Bordeaux to London (11 April – 24 May 1357) vividly. Edward III and various magnates entertained the captured king with various pageants, displays and diversions en route. King Jean entered London on a white courser and the prince followed him on a black hackney.
³
The king then lodged in the duke of Lancaster’s Savoy palace.

The first concrete agreement between the sides was the First Treaty of London, concluded on 8 May 1358. Negotiations, encouraged by the papacy, continued after an initial truce had been established at Bordeaux on 23 March 1357. The treaty set Jean's ransom at four million gold écus (£666,666). In addition, it demanded the restoration of all English lands in Aquitaine and Ponthieu, and confirmation of Calais as English territory. Nothing was offered in return; it was a ransom agreement, not a peace treaty, and Jean’s willingness to concede was prompted by his fear for France and his own desire for freedom. However, by accepting a ransom, Edward III implied that he accepted Jean’s title as king of France. The first instalment of 600,000 écus, due to be paid prior to the king’s release, was, however not delivered by the agreed date of l November.

The second treaty, signed on 24 March 1359, was even more demanding. In return for Jean’s release and (on this occasion) Edward’s renunciation of his claim to the French throne, the English king demanded nothing less than the return of the lands of the Angevin Empire with the addition of Ponthieu, Boulogne, Guînes, and Calais in full sovereignty. The French were to pay three million écus by
L
August 1359, and a further million was to follow, to be guaranteed by various royal and noble hostages. The territorial demands were so great that Edward may have agreed to give up his claim to the throne, knowing that the treaty could never be accepted and its refusal would provide him with an excuse for a further invasion. Even if this did not give him the throne, it would put further pressure on the French to accept his terms for a major territorial settlement. The truce that had been agreed at Bordeaux was extended from 9 April to 24 June 1359.