The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal (35 page)

20.
Royden, “Tolkachev,” 9.

21.
Headquarters to Moscow station, June 13, 1978, 13000Z.

22.
Moscow station to headquarters, Aug. 25, 1978, 251205Z.

23.
Royden, “Tolkachev,” 9.

24.
Moscow station to headquarters, Nov. 1, 1978, 011315Z.

1.
It is not possible to give a meaningful equivalent in dollars to such a sum. Although there was an official exchange rate of 0.60 ruble for $1.00, the Soviet ruble was not a freely convertible currency, and Tolkachev had no access to dollars. His rubles had a value based entirely on what could be bought or acquired inside the Soviet economy. A thousand rubles was about three times Tolkachev’s monthly salary.

2.
Moscow station to headquarters, Jan. 2, 1979, 020805Z, and a longer cable to headquarters that followed on Jan. 2, 1979, 021403Z. Also Catherine Guilsher, interview with author, March 30, 2011.

3.
Draft of Moscow station ops note to agent, untitled and undated, in Tolkachev collection from the CIA.

4.
Moscow station to headquarters, March 2, 1979, 021410Z, which contains Guilsher’s draft ops note for the next meeting.

5.
Moscow station to headquarters, April 5, 1979, 050859Z.

6.
Royden, “Tolkachev,” 9–10, and a confidential source.

7.
Moscow station to headquarters, April 26, 1979, 261013Z, and April 30, 1979, 301033Z.

8.
Headquarters to Moscow station, May 1, 1979, 012316Z.

9.
Moscow station to headquarters, May 4, 1979, 041429Z.

10.
Headquarters to Moscow station, May 7, 1979, 072329Z.

1.
For more about the Soviet economy of shortages, see David E. Hoffman,
The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia
(New York: PublicAffairs, 2002). On the gastronomes, David Hoffman, “Stalin’s ‘Seven Sisters’: ‘Wedding-Cake’ Style 1950s Towers Define Moscow Skyline,”
Washington Post
, July 29, 1997, 1.

2.
Royden, “Tolkachev,” 11.

3.
Hathaway, interview with author, June 10, 2011.

4.
Headquarters to Moscow station, May 1, 1979, 012316Z.

5.
Ibid.

6.
Headquarters to Moscow station, May 18, 1979, 182251Z.

7.
Moscow station to headquarters, May 22, 1979, 221139Z.

8.
Moscow station to headquarters, May 8, 1979, 081522Z.

9.
For example, in the 1960s and early 1970s, the United States spoon-fed leaks to the GRU, Soviet military intelligence, about development of a “breakthrough” nerve gas, but it was a fabrication. The nerve gas wasn’t in the U.S. arsenal. See David Wise,
Cassidy’s Run: The Secret Spy War over Nerve Gas
(New York: Random House, 2000).

10.
In the cable released to the author, the field of resarch at issue has been redacted.

11.
Headquarters to Moscow station, June 1, 1979, 011954Z.

12.
Moscow station to headquarters, May 8, 1979, 081522Z.

13.
The CIA had used a similar procedure when it distributed intelligence from inside the Warsaw Pact through the agent Ryszard Kuklinski, a highly respected colonel in the Polish army. Confidential source.

14.
Headquarters to Moscow station, April 12, 1979, 120107, and additional information from a confidential source.

15.
The confusion might have been caused by Tolkachev. In his letter, he wrote “I have” the ailment. But then, after describing the treatment, he wrote, “If there are more effective means of treatment in this field, then it would be very beneficial for our family to know them.” Moscow station to headquarters, April 30, 1979, 301033Z.

16.
Moscow station to headquarters, June 7, 1979, 071342Z.

17.
On the Ford discussion, see Erin R. Mahan, ed.,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2013), 452.

18.
William Perry, deputy defense secretary for research and engineering in 1979, estimated that even if the Soviet Union invested in a massive catch-up effort, including fifty to a hundred airborne warning and control planes, two thousand advanced interceptors with look-down, shoot-down radars and new air-to-air missiles, and five hundred to a thousand surface-to-air missiles, perhaps costing $30 billion to $50 billion and requiring five to ten years to deploy, it could only destroy half of any onslaught of American cruise missiles. Kenneth P. Werrell,
The Evolution of the Cruise Missile
(Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 1985), 191.

19.
David Binder, “George T. Kalaris, 73, Official Who Changed CIA’s Direction,”
New York Times
, Sept. 14, 1995.

20.
George T. Kalaris to Director of Central Intelligence and deputy directors for operations and for intelligence, memo, June 25, 1979.

1.
Moscow station to headquarters, April 30, 1979, 301033Z.

2.
Wallace and Melton,
Spycraft
, 37. On Minox characteristics, see
http://www.subclub.org/shop/minoxa.htm
.

3.
Wallace and Melton,
Spycraft
, 37–40.

4.
Ibid., 90–92, 233. Tropel Inc. of Fairport, New York, was established in 1953 by three professors from the Institute of Optics at the University of Rochester: Robert Hopkins, Jim Anderson, and Jack Evans. They were joined by a fourth, John Buzawa, who was president of the firm at the time of the CIA work. Tropel was later bought by Corning Inc. and was subsequently spun off again. Louis Denes (Corning Inc.), correspondence and telephone interview with author, Sept. 18, 2013.

5.
Moscow station to headquarters, Feb. 15, 1979, 151440Z.

6.
The spy was Elyesa Bazna, code-named CICERO, who photographed documents taken from the British ambassador to Turkey and passed them to the German service, SD. H. Keith Melton,
Ultimate Spy
, 2nd ed. (New York: Dorling Kindersley, 2002), 34.

7.
Moscow station to headquarters, undated but apparently written immediately after the meeting.

8.
Moscow station to headquarters, Oct. 18, 1979, 181630Z.

9.
Moscow station to headquarters, Nov. 16, 1979, 161426Z.

10.
George T. Kalaris, memo for the Director, Dec. 12, 1979.

11.
Charles Battaglia, interview with author, Feb. 7, 2013.

12.
Headquarters to Moscow station, Dec. 15, 1979, 150019Z.

1.
Moscow station to headquarters, Dec. 28, 1979, 281255Z.

2.
Guilsher later admonished Tolkachev for running after him. “I was a little scared,” he confessed. “In such a case it is simply better to leave the forgotten until next time.” Guilsher wrote this in his draft ops note in February 1980, undated.

3.
Moscow station to headquarters, Dec. 29, 1979, 290943Z.

4.
Royden, “Tolkachev,” 18. The $70 million estimate is contained in Moscow station to headquarters, March 20, 1980, 200825Z.

5.
The nuclear-armed cruise missile was prominent in this new arms race. After the Soviet Union deployed SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe in the late 1970s, NATO responded with the “dual-track” approach, seeking talks but deploying new weapons, including the Pershing II missile and 484 cruise missiles.

6.
Moscow station to headquarters, Jan. 9, 1980, 091410Z.

7.
Headquarters to Moscow station, Jan. 16, 1980, 160052Z.

8.
Moscow station to headquarters, Jan. 8, 1980, 081240Z.

9.
“Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence,” Jan. 17, 1980.

10.
Moscow station to headquarters, Jan. 28, 1980, 281127Z.

11.
Headquarters to Moscow station, Jan. 12, 1980, 120429Z. Headquarters proposed a cover story to the effect that “he has run into a certain problem in the design of a system he is now working on and wanted to check specifications on older systems to see if the same weakness was evident in them. It would obviously be best if the weakness
cksphere
chooses is a true one.”

12.
Headquarters to Moscow station, Jan. 16, 1980, 160052Z.

13.
Headquarters to Moscow station, Jan. 16, 1980, 160058Z.

14.
Headquarters to Moscow station, Jan. 23, 1980, 231655Z. In this cable, headquarters wrote, “The feeling here is that at this juncture we simply must make every effort to try to dissuade
cksphere
from taking unnecessary risks. This includes photographing at home … We recognize that
cksphere
is a headstrong individual, bent on doing the greatest damage to the Soviet authorities in the shortest possible time. While we fully intend to live up to our commitment, we also feel that our commitment includes a moral obligation to protect our collaborator to the best of our ability. We cannot let ourselves be carried along by the
Gotterdammerung
psychology which seems to drive this asset. While as an intelligence organization we are certainly in the business of collecting information, it is professionally incumbent upon us in the present situation to somehow slow
cksphere
down.”

15.
Moscow station to headquarters, Jan. 18, 1980, 181453Z.

16.
For reasons never clear, the identical red Tropel worked fine.

17.
A foot-candle is a unit of illumination equal to the light cast by one candle onto one square foot. The Tropels probably would not work well at Tolkachev’s office, if he could manage to use them covertly there; he measured only about fifteen to twenty foot-candles of light at his office desk with a meter the CIA had provided.

18.
At the time, there was a major debate in U.S. intelligence and policy circles about Soviet emphasis on civil defense and whether it meant the Soviets were preparing for possible nuclear war.

19.
Guilsher draft ops note, typewritten, undated.

20.
Moscow station to headquarters, Jan. 28, 1980, 281135Z. The questions about the building pass are included in Guilsher’s draft ops note for the February meeting, undated, typewritten.

21.
Moscow station to headquarters, Feb. 12, 1980, 121358Z.

22.
Moscow station to headquarters, Feb. 14, 1980, 141235Z.

23.
Moscow station to headquarters, March 20, 1980, 200825Z.

24.
Headquarters to Moscow station, March 26, 1980, 262244Z.

25.
U.S. intelligence assessment quoted in cable, undated but believed to be March 27, 1980. The document has no time-date stamp.

26.
Moscow station to headquarters, March 20, 1980, 200825Z.

27.
Headquarters to Moscow station, April 12, 1980, 12184Z.

28.
Headquarters to Moscow station, May 10, 1980, 100049Z.

29.
Moscow station to headquarters, Feb. 14, 1980, 141235Z.

30.
Moscow station to headquarters, March 20, 1980, 200825Z.

31.
Headquarters to Moscow station, May 10, 1980, 100049Z.

32.
Moscow station to headquarters, May 8, 1980, 081428Z.

33.
Sakharov was arrested and sent to Gorky on January 22, 1980.

34.
Guilsher reported to headquarters that apparently there were guests at home and Tolkachev could not leave, based on the call and unfamiliar voice. Later Tolkachev told him that his son, Oleg, had answered. In general, identity transfer required the case officer to have a “matched” partner of an embassy worker with similar build and appearance. Guilsher did not have such a partner; his efforts to don a workable disguise were more ad hoc and problematic, but they worked.

35.
Moscow station to headquarters, May 23, 1980, 231415Z.

36.
The Discus was ready some two decades before the first BlackBerry consumer device, which came along in 1999.

37.
Headquarters to Moscow station, June 4, 1980, 042348Z.

38.
Moscow station to headquarters, June 5, 1980, 051345Z.

39.
Moscow station to headquarters, June 11, 1980, 111407Z.

1.
Moscow station to headquarters, June 20, 1980, 201145Z.

2.
Ibid.

3.
Moscow station to headquarters, June 24, 1980, 241232Z.

4.
In the spring of 1980, Guilsher struggled with his health and stamina. The Tolkachev meetings were draining him. His wife begged him to leave Moscow to seek medical attention. The U.S. embassy doctor examined him and said he should get on the next plane to Frankfurt for medical treatment. But Guilsher would not leave Moscow station until he was finished with Tolkachev. He insisted that he couldn’t let him down. Later, when he got home, he underwent surgery to remove cancerous tumors on his thyroid gland (Catherine Guilsher, interview with author, Dec. 14, 2013. Guilsher, who passed away in 2008, was posthumously honored with the CIA’s Trailblazer award in 2009, recognizing his “significant and enduring” contribution to U.S. national security in the Tolkachev operation.

5.
Memo to the Director of Central Intelligence from chief, Soviet division, July 23, 1980.

6.
Moscow station to headquarters, June 21, 1980, 210715Z.