The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal (37 page)

26.
Phazotron, “From 20th to 21st Century,” notes that NIIP built the radar on parts from Phazotron. The handoff to NIIP is also described in “Overscan’s Guide to Russian Avionics,”
http://aerospace.boopidoo.com/philez/Su-15TM%20PICTURES%20&%20DOCS/Overscan%27s%20guide%20to%20Russian%20Military%20Avionics.htm
.

27.
Lyudmila Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg,
The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 4.

28.
Andrei Sakharov,
Memoirs
(New York: Knopf, 1990), 282–85.

29.
Ibid., 292–93. Michael Scammell,
Solzhenitsyn
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), 640.

30.
Joshua Rubenstein and Alexander Gribanov, eds.,
The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005), 144.

31.
Ibid., 150.

32.
Sakharov describes his meeting with the correspondents in his
Memoirs
, 385–86, and reproduces some of the attacks on him, 631–40. Also Robert G. Kaiser,
Russia: The People and the Power
(London: Martin Secker, 1976), 424–25.

33.
Rubenstein and Gribanov,
KGB File of Andrei Sakharov
, 155.

34.
Tolkachev wrote, “I would not begin to establish contact for any kind of money with, for example, the Chinese embassy. Why, the money does not smell? The money, yes. But societies, created by people, sometimes exude bad smells.” Moscow station to headquarters, April 26, 1979, 261013Z.

35.
Libin, “Detained with Evidence.”

1.
Moscow station to headquarters, Nov. 12, 1981, 120858Z; Rolph interview with author, May 6, 2012.

2.
“MASHINA,” undated, map and description of signal site, given to Tolkachev, released to author by CIA.

3.
On September 3, 1981, a CIA case officer had gone to meet an agent who was a Soviet citizen. The agent had been compromised. At the site, the case officer and the agent were detained. The newspaper
Izvestiya
identified the arrested man as Y. A. Kapustin. Dusko Doder, “Moscow Arrests Soviet Citizen as Agent of CIA,”
Washington Post
, Sept. 4, 1981, A25.

4.
Rolph, interview with author, May 6, 2012; Moscow station to headquarters, Nov. 12, 1981, 120858Z and 121233Z.

5.
Royden, “Tolkachev,” 21. Each broadcast lasted ten minutes, a burst of dummy messages with a genuine one mixed in. Tolkachev could later break out the genuine message by scrolling numbers on the demodulator. The first three digits of the message would indicate if it included a genuine message; if so, he could view the message, contained in five-digit groups, and then decode it using a onetime pad. He could receive up to four hundred five-digit groups in any one message. It was complex and cumbersome but a way to avoid the KGB.

6.
Casey, “Progress at the CIA,” memo, May 6, 1981.

7.
Burton Gerber, interview with author, Jan. 30, 2013.

8.
Gus Weiss, “The Farewell Dossier,”
Studies in Intelligence
39, no. 5 (1996). On the explosion, see Thomas C. Reed,
At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War
(New York: Ballantine Books, 2004). For more on Vetrov, see Sergei Kostin and Eric Raynaud,
Farewell: The Greatest Spy Story of the Twentieth Century
, trans. Catherine Cauvin-Higgins (Las Vegas, Nev.: Amazon Crossing, 2011).

9.
Moscow station to headquarters, Dec. 9, 1981, 091105Z.

10.
Headquarters to Moscow station, Nov. 25, 1981, 251829Z.

11.
Moscow station to headquarters, Feb. 16, 1982, 161100Z.

12.
This description of deep cover is from confidential sources.

13.
Moscow station to headquarters, Jan. 13, 1982, 130801Z, draft station ops note.

14.
Moscow station to headquarters, Feb. 16, 1982, 161100Z.

15.
Moscow station to headquarters, March 9, 1982, 091400Z.

16.
Moscow station to headquarters, March 15, 1982, 150742Z.

17.
Moscow station to headquarters, March 17, 1982, 171006Z.

18.
Royden, “Tolkachev,” 23.

19.
Moscow station to headquarters, May 25, 1982, 250800Z, and confidential source.

20.
William Plunkert, correspondence with author, March 28, 2014.

21.
Moscow station to headquarters, Dec. 8, 1982, 081335Z.

22.
Moscow station to headquarters, Dec. 10, 1982, 101400Z, and Dec. 22, 1982, 220940Z. Tolkachev had raised eyebrows at the CIA by suggesting in his ops note that he might use his money from the CIA to buy silence from a colleague at work if he was caught. The CIA thought this was alarming and unrealistic and told Tolkachev later that he had other options besides bribery. See headquarters to Moscow station, March 1, 1983, 010053Z.

23.
Moscow station to headquarters, Dec. 10, 1982, 100945Z.

24.
Thomas Mills, interview with author, Feb. 16, 2013, and correspondence Dec. 19, 2013.

25.
Headquarters to Moscow station, Feb. 19, 1983, 190143Z.

26.
Headquarters to Moscow station, March 1, 1983, 010053Z.

27.
Robert O. Morris, interviews with author, May 4, 2012, and Dec. 19, 2013; Robert O. Morris,
Fighting Windmills
(Virginia Beach, Va.: Legacy, 2012), 144.

28.
Moscow station to headquarters, March 17, 1983, 171555Z.

29.
Headquarters to Moscow station, March 22, 1983, 220128Z.

30.
Moscow station to headquarters, March 22, 1983, 221210Z.

31.
Headquarters to Moscow station, April 1, 1983, 010055Z.

32.
Moscow station to headquarters, April 25, 1983, 250900Z.

33.
Moscow station to headquarters, April 25, 1983, 251445Z.

34.
Headquarters to Moscow station, June 13 and 23, 1983, no time-date stamp on either cable.

35.
Headquarters to Moscow station, June 23, 1983, no time-date stamp.

36.
Headquarters to Moscow station, July 6, 1983, no time-date stamp.

1.
Except where otherwise noted, this account is based on the translation of Tolkachev’s ops note passed to the CIA describing the events in detail, contained in Moscow station to headquarters, Nov. 17, 1983, 171810Z. The cable translates the regime as a “procedures” department, but the author believes “security” better reflects the purpose and duties.

2.
In these weeks of early 1983, there was a renewed campaign for “discipline and order” imposed by the new Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, who used the KGB and the Interior Ministry to attack the problems of absenteeism and poor economic performance. People were “caught loafing” during working hours in subways, saunas, and shops. Tolkachev would certainly have known about the new climate, although it seems unlikely to have triggered the investigation. Andropov’s campaign is described in R. G. Pikhoia,
Soviet Union: History of Power, 1945–1991
[in Russian] (Novosibirsk: Sibersky Khronograf, 2000), 377–79, and in Mikhail Gorbachev,
Memoirs
(New York: Doubleday, 1995), 147.

3.
Tolkachev was named as the inheritor of the house by the owner but had no explicit title, and a dishonest owner could change it at any time. Libin, “Detained with Evidence.” Other sources confirmed to the author this was a common technique.

4.
Ibid.

5.
For details about
ckelbow
, see Wallace and Melton,
Spycraft
, 138–56; Bearden and Risen,
Main Enemy
, 28–29; and Rem Krasilnikov,
Prizraki s ulitsy Chaikovskogo
[The ghosts of Tchaikovsky Street] (Moscow: Gei Iterum, 1999), 179–88.

6.
Moscow station to headquarters, Nov. 17, 1983, 171007Z.

7.
Moscow station to headquarters, Nov. 17, 1983, 171810Z.

8.
Moscow station to headquarters, Nov. 22, 1983, 221400Z, on the suggestion to bury the cameras.

9.
Headquarters to Moscow station, Nov. 30, 1983, time-date stamp redacted. Headquarters said Tolkachev’s handwritten materials had never left the division. When his material was translated, it was disseminated only in top secret, blue-bordered memorandums. The material was marked at a level of sensitivity above top secret, and the blue borders were a control system indicating it was extremely sensitive. No defense contractors ever saw it. When sent to the government “customers,” it was kept in secure vaults at each agency dedicated to such blue-border sensitive reporting, and only a select few had access to it. “This, unfortunately, would not preclude loose talk,” headquarters said in a cable to Moscow. But “we are aware of no leak, verbal or written, of No. 19 material.”

10.
“Expanding Navy’s Global Power,”
Aviation Week and Space Technology
, Aug. 31, 1981, 48.

11.
Headquarters to Moscow station, Nov. 23, 1983, time-date stamp redacted. The identity of the officer is not known.

1.
Thomas Mills, interview with author, Feb. 16, 2013.

2.
“Edward L. Howard,” résumé, contained in Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Prosecutive Report of Investigation Concerning Edward Lee Howard; Espionage-Russia,” Nov. 26, 1986, Albuquerque, N.M., file No. 65A-590, sec. 2, 201–2, released in part under FOIA, hereafter cited as FBI report. Also see Edward Lee Howard,
Safe House: The Compelling Memoirs of the Only CIA Spy to Seek Asylum in Russia
(Bethesda, Md.: National Press Books, 1995), 15–32, and David Wise,
The Spy Who Got Away
(New York: Random House, 1988), 22–31.

3.
On Howard’s dream of Switzerland, see
Safe House
, 38; on drinking, Wise,
Spy Who Got Away
, 31.

4.
Wise,
Spy Who Got Away
, 54.

5.
Howard,
Safe House
, 39.

6.
The dates of Howard’s service are from a briefing by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to President Reagan and White House officials on October 2, 1986. See “USSR” folder, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, box 7, Donald T. Regan files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.

7.
On training regimen for
ckelbow
, two confidential sources; FBI report, 273; also on overall training, see Wise,
Spy Who Got Away
, 58–63.

8.
Howard,
Safe House
, 40–42; Wise,
Spy Who Got Away
, 64–75.

9.
Mary told the FBI that Howard attempted to “beat the second polygraph by keeping his muscles tense,” and when he admitted that to the examiner during the third test, the examiner got so upset he demanded the fourth test. FBI report, 353. For Howard’s account of the polygraphs, see
Safe House
, 43–50; Wise,
Spy Who Got Away
, 76–86. David Forden, interview with author, Feb. 6, 2013.

10.
Wise,
Spy Who Got Away
, 85, quoting Howard. Howard’s version of the events is in
Safe House
, 46–47.

11.
FBI report, 306, reporting on an Oct. 28, 1985, interview of Mary C. Howard; although her name is redacted, the context indicates it is Howard’s wife.

12.
Wise,
Spy Who Got Away
, 87; Howard,
Safe House
, 51.

13.
“Edward L. Howard,” résumé, in FBI report, 201.

14.
Wise,
Spy Who Got Away
, 85; Howard,
Safe House
, 51.

15.
FBI report, sec. 5, 1316, and FBI interviews with Legislative Finance Committee personnel in sec. 4.

16.
FBI report, 285.

17.
The CIA’s insular approach was described to the author by CIA officials. It was also the focus of the later investigation by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and is discussed in Wise,
Spy Who Got Away
, 87–93. A former CIA official told the author there wasn’t enough hard evidence at this point to compel the FBI to do anything.

18.
FBI report, 306.

19.
Ibid., 286, quoting Mary. Howard,
Safe House
, 54, says he pondered, “What would happen if I walked through that door and told them everything I know?” He says he did not but omits any mention of his letter.

20.
Victor Cherkashin,
Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer
, with Gregory Feifer (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 146.

21.
FBI report, 307.

22.
Howard,
Safe House
, 49.

23.
FBI report, 285–86.

24.
Ibid., 2, 23; also see Wise,
Spy Who Got Away
, 108–17; Howard,
Safe House
, 55.

25.
FBI report, 285.

26.
On the meeting in Santa Fe, Mills told the author he could not recall the trip. Other sources include Gerber, interview with author; FBI report, 401; Wise,
Spy Who Got Away
, 137–40; Howard,
Safe House
, 56–57.

27.
FBI report, 308.

28.
Ibid., 11, 287.

29.
Ibid., 10, 286.

30.
Cherkashin,
Spy Handler
, 148.