The Birth of Korean Cool (26 page)

The success of some recent Korean start-ups suggests that Korean culture is becoming increasingly more tolerant of Korean Americans. Daniel Shin, a Korean American from McLean, Virginia, with a
Wharton Business degree, moved to Korea in 2010 to found Ticketmonster, a website that offers discounts on various products, similar to Groupon. Just twenty months after its founding, according to
Inc.
magazine, Ticketmonster had seven hundred employees and $25 million per month in revenue.
⁵
In 2011, Shin sold Ticketmonster to the Internet
coupon site LivingSocial for a reported $380 million.
⁶
At the time, Shin was twenty-six years old.

Shin had the foresight to see an industry gap in Korea and jump in with Ticketmonster. But he did butt heads with more conservative Korean business types. Shin told
Inc
. magazine that
an executive from a large Korean conglomerate had said he would disown a son of his who dropped a successful corporate life to embark on a start-up.
⁷

In short, the creative economy may have its fits and starts, but anyone wagering against Korea’s ultimate success would be foolhardy. Despite difficulties with what continues to be a
conservative and patriarchal culture, drastic changes are already afoot—not just on the business landscape, but in the very fabric of Korean society.

THE KOREA KIT

Is there something about the Korean success model that can be bottled and sold, just like its K-pop albums and melon bars? Well, Korea is certainly banking on this.
Beginning in 2009, the country has stepped up its efforts in “knowledge sharing”—passing on the secrets of its affluence to some thirty-odd developing nations from four
continents, from Algeria to Turkey to Bolivia to the Philippines. In other words, Korea is peddling a wealth kit, something like a combination of a self-help book and the Marshall Plan. Korea is
offering these countries a neat little package containing funding, nation-building experts, and strategies—the centerpiece of which is the advice that all countries build government-funded
research and policy institutes whose sole purpose is to carry the country from third-world to first-world status.

What rewards does Korea reap from this seeming beneficence? Most likely, a great deal. For one thing, the knowledge-sharing initiative guarantees that Korea gets in on the ground floor with
emerging markets. By the time these countries get on their feet, they will already have established partnerships with both the Korean government and Korean industry. In other words, these countries
will already have been sold on Korea the Brand and will be more likely to buy Korean products. Korea’s outreach, coupled with Hallyu—opiate of the masses—is a full-on amphibious
attack with a very high probability for success. The Marshall Plan aid strategy worked for the United States after World War II, which is a major reason the twentieth century belonged to America.
After the Korean War, American aid took on so many forms—monetary, military, cultural—that my mother’s family named their dog Betty after the character from the
Archie
comic strip. None of this seemed weird at the time; most of the world worshiped the United States. And there is no reason to doubt that Korea’s plan will have a similar effect on the
developing nations it is currently aiding.

But there are a few lessons of Korean success that can, in fact, be replicated. One of these is the need for a government that is unafraid to interfere with private business and its
citizens’ private lives. A somewhat alarming example of this is the Korean government’s decision, under the presidency of Park Chung-hee, to limit the expansion of universities so as to
ensure that there would be enough blue-collar workers to populate the nation’s factories and keep the boilers running, so to speak. It was draconian and seemingly uncivilized, and no doubt
many suffered for it, but it is hard to argue against its efficacy. Even those workers who might have been cheated out of a university education still have a much higher standard of living than
they would have with university degrees if the nation continued as a barely inhabitable backwater unable to recover from the Korean War. In fact, their sacrifice was not in the name of some
long-term, abstract hope: those workers were able to see the benefits of living in a rapidly growing nation within their own lifetimes. Their salaries and standard of living  rose visibly in
five-year increments.

In most capitalist countries, private industries would find this level of government intervention intolerable. Not in Korea, though: the Korean government has always run itself like the board of
directors of a giant corporation with 50 million employees. Decisions made at the national level, like making Hallyu a top priority and throwing billions of dollars at it, were arrived at after
exhaustive market research and with the close, willing cooperation of its private enterprise sector.

Nearly every Korean triumph discussed in this book is attributable to this highly paternalistic, mostly benevolent system of what one might call “voluntary coercion.” Korea’s
recent boom in manufacturing, Samsung’s success switching from food to semiconductors, the nation’s massive Internet infrastructure, and widespread export of pop culture—all of
these aspects of success came about because of the Korean attitude that what’s good for the country is good for business and what’s good for business is what’s good for the
individual. Koreans don’t see profit as a zero-sum game, to use an economics term—that is, no one party has to profit at the expense of the other; everyone can win.

Ultimately what it boils down to is that even if Koreans disagree with the government, or are resentful of corporate greed, they think of themselves as citizens of a republic in the sense that
Plato intended, wherein citizens believe that the well-being of those around you contributes to your own well-being. This idea is very much alive in Korea. That’s why every school in the
nation follows the same curriculum; that’s why school is so difficult. Even the most elitist of Koreans believe that everyone has the right to a quality education. Call it enlightened
self-interest, if you like. Koreans know from experience that everyone must rise together, or not at all.

Another important lesson from Korea’s success is this apparent paradox: Being number one matters, but being first does not. Almost every area in which Korea achieved dominance occurred in
territory that was well covered by other nations. Korea did not invent the semiconductor, the plasma TV, the mobile phone, or refrigerators, and most definitely not pop music. As appealing as it is
to have many patents and innovations to one’s credit, history is full of inventions that failed because they came to the market too early. Video phoning was technologically possible decades
ago, but people weren’t yet comfortable with having to change clothes or put on makeup just to make a phone call—that required a little social evolution and change in attitudes about
appearing on camera. Apple released the Newton—an early precursor of the iPad—in 1993. But wi-fi didn’t really exist yet, nor did 3G networks, and without those, it was difficult
to transmit information to and from the device, so the fact that you could carry it around didn’t offer much appeal. Only after it became possible to read e-mail and download information
instantly on a tablet did the technology start to take off.

It defies common sense, but Korea was able to get ahead in so many areas because it wasn’t concerned about being first. It didn’t have the means, for one thing. So by default it
adopted a strategy similar to that used by Tour de France cyclists, called drafting. In a long race, cyclists may intentionally fall behind the lead riders so as to be shielded from wind re
sistance by those in front. Cyclists can draft only up to a point—eventually they have to decide when to pull ahead of the others. Korea has always been good at the last-minute photo
finish.

At the end of the day, the most important factor in Korea’s success is its work ethic. Surpassing a certain threshold of effort is necessary to push a person or a country from being merely
very good to being great.

So how does Korea manage the work ethic and maniacal drive to be number one? The underlying national psychology that motivates the country is not a salutary one. I remain convinced that
han
, that culturally specific, millennia-old rage against fate, is a huge motivating force in Koreans’ stamina and persistence. But
han
by definition cannot be experienced
by non-Koreans. Another motivator is shame: deep, profound shame and self-flagellation for any and all failings, including allowing themselves to be colonized by Japan in 1910, for
post–Korean War poverty, for having to take bailout money during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, and for being second-best at anything. These two traits,
han
and shame,
are deeply embedded in the collective Korean unconscious. If Korea were a person, it would be diagnosed as a neurotic, with both an inferiority and a superiority complex. It would be difficult for
other nations to mimic this kind of complicated spiritual constitution. Nor should anyone want to, really. For one thing, it took five thousand years for Korea to evolve into what it is now, a
superachieving, frighteningly ambitious nation with a mighty axe to grind. Frankly, a great deal of Korea’s drive comes from trying to outpace its demons of past and present. If Korea manages
to stay ahead of demons yet to come, it could mean that it is in fact always going to be occupying some future space—a vanishing point off in the distance. Korea is the future. Welcome to the
future.

INTRODUCTION

1
.  Andrew Woodman, “South Korea VC: State Subsidies,”
Asian Venture Captial Journal
, Oct. 31, 2012,
http://www.avcj.com.avcj/analysis/2221157/south-korea-vc-state-subsidies.

2
.  Jeff Yang, “Future Pop,”
Upstart Business Journal,
Mar. 27, 2008,
http://upstart.bizjournals.com/executives/features/2008/03/27/Music-Impresario-Jin-Young-Park.html?page=all.

1: BEFORE COOL

1
. The results are drastic: between the years 1983 and 2005—a span of just twenty-two years—Korean life expectancy increased 60
percent for males and 48 percent for females. S. Yang et al., “Understanding the Rapid Increase in Life Expectancy in South Korea,”
American Journal of Public Health
, May 2010,
cited at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20299661.

3: THE DYING ART OF SCHOOL THRASHINGS

1
.
Republic of Korea: Country Report
, Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children, Mar. 2013, http://www.endcor
poralpunishment.org/pages/progress/reports/rep-korea.html.

2
. Kim Hae-noon, “Students Cite Slip in Respect for Teachers,”
Korea JoongAng Daily
, May 14, 2003,
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid-1979181.

3
.  The
kwako
exam originated in the Koryo Dynasty, in the ninth and tenth centuries ad.

4
.
Public Spending on Education, Total (% of GDP)
, World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS.

5
.
The Learning Curve: Lessons in Country Performance in Education
, 2012 Report, Pearson,
http://www.into.ie/ROI/NewsEvents/LatestNews/Downloads/LearningCurve.pdf.

6
. Kevin Chien-Chang Wu, Ying-Yeh Chen, and Paul S. F. Yip, “Suicide Methods in Asia: Implications in Suicide Prevention,”
International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health
, Mar. 28, 2012, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3366604/.

7
. Jessica Shepherd, “World Education Rankings: Which Country Does Best at Reading, Maths and Science?”
Guardian,
Dec. 7,
2010, http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/dec/07/world-education-rankings-maths-science-reading.

8
. Michael Trucano, “Broadband for Schools?”
EduTech
, Feb. 5, 2013, http://blogs.worldbank.org/edutech/broadband.

4: CHARACTER IS DESTINY

1
. TH Lee, president, GSA Public Relations. The number cited is a largely anecdotal and illustrative character.

2
.  Official website of Dokdo. The English version can be found at http://en.dokdo.go.kr/korean_dokdo_people_of_dokdo.do.

3
.  Jack Kim, “North and South Koreans Find Cause for Unity: Japan,” Reuters, Nov. 9, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/11/19/us-korea-north-japan-idU.S.TRE4AI12120081119.

4
. Lee Moon-yol, “Let’s Have North Korea Put a Missile Base on Dokdo,”
Dailian
, July 24, 2008,
http://www.dailian.co.kr/news/view/119486#reple.

5
. The correct literal translation is actually “body and soil are not two,” but that doesn’t make sense in English.

6
. Hyunah Yang, “Vision of Postcolonial Feminist Jurisprudence in Korea: Seen from the ‘Family-Head System’ in Family
Law,”
Journal of Korean Law
5(2), 2006: 17–18, http://www.snujkl.org/?module=file&act=procFileDownload&file_srl=129&sid=fdd361a9fd3e5565868b15241af3dd20.

5: KIMCHI AND THE CABBAGE INFERIORITY COMPLEX

1
. “South Korea: SARS Boosts Kimchi Exports to Record Levels,” Just-food.com, Jan. 13, 2004,
http://www.just-food.com/news/sars-boosts-kimchi-exports-to-record-levels_id79989. aspx; “Kimchi Sales Jump Attributed to SARS,”
Asia Times
/Yonhap News Agency, June 19,
2003,  http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/EF19Dg03.html.

2
.
Global Status Report on Alcohol and Health: 2011
, World Health Organization,
http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/global_alcohol_report/msbgsruprofiles.pdf.

3
.  Millionaires’ Club, “The Definitive Ranking of the World’s Million-Case Spirits Brands,” Drinks International,
2013, http://www.drinksint.com/files/CombinednewPDF.pdf.

6: WHY POP CULTURE?

1
. “Koreans Give Up Their Gold to Help Their Country,”
BBC News
, Jan. 14, 1998,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/analysis/47496.stm.