The Bletchley Park Codebreakers (63 page)

All references, except where otherwise stated, are to documents held at the Public Record Office.

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1
‘extreme elements’: WO 208/2014, Enclosure 22A.

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2
pigeons: HW 19/53, ISOS 58952 and HW 19/137, ISK 60438.

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3
‘decrypted about so little’: HW 11/10, 10.

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4
start time: HW 5/11, CX/JQ/822.

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5
monitoring station: Noel Currer-Briggs describes the operation in ‘Army Ultra’s Poor Relations’ in F. H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp (eds),
Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park
(OUP, Oxford, 1993), p. 209.

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6
somewhat smugly: HW 13/14.

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7
Brig. E. T. Williams: ‘The Use of Ultra’, WO 208/3575.

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8
identical to BP decrypts: e.g. an
Abwehr
decrypt of 17 August 1943, HW 19/60, ISOS 66091 is virtually the same as a decrypt of a Comintern message to Tito on 16 September, HW 17/51, ISCOT 1038.

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9
regular oral briefings: Davidson wrote notes for the Cabinet Office Historical Section in 1972. He referred to frequent telephone briefings to Churchill as well as visits to No. 10 and Chequers. Davidson papers, Liddell Hart Centre, King’s College London, Document F.

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10
Zwei Fischer
: HW 19/51, ISOS 56939.

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11
attacks on railway lines: HW 19/11, ISOS 8537.

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12
Italian aircraft: HW 5/24, CX/MSS/79.

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13
law and order: HW 16/6, ZIP/MSGP/27.

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14
bodies mutilated: HW 19/12, ISOS 9699.

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15
pacification of Bosnia: HW 19/12, ISOS 9841.

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16
‘to crush the rebellion’: HW 5/26, CX/MSS/265 and HW 1/82, C/7641.

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17
Italian divisions: HW 5/35, CX/MSS/364.

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18
German divisions: HW 5/37, CX/MSS/406.

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19
‘clashes’: HW 5/38, CX/MSS/437 and HW 1/218, C/8072.

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20
‘Russia would win’: HW 19/18, ISOS 148591.

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21
‘caps over the fence’: WO 208/4604, CAB 79/15-COS(41)354.

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22
revolt could be maintained: WO 208/4604, Minute 31.

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23
‘in human power’: quoted in F. W. D. Deakin,
The Embattled Mountain
(OUP, London, 1971), p. 144.

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24
situation reports: including HW 5/71, CX/MSS/784 and HW 1/402, C/8923.

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25
‘only ones to be reckoned with’: HW 19/89, ISK 3514.

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26
becoming steadily worse: HW 5/76, CX/MSS/823.

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27
time was right: WO 208/2014, Minute 11.

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28
all-out offensive: WO 208/2014, Enclosure D to Minute 11.

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29
movement of trains: HW 5/95, CX/MSS/1021.

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30
‘smash the resistance’: HW 5/90, CX/MSS/976.

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31
Churchill commented: WO 208/2014, Minute 22.

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32
Italians wished to withdraw: HW 5/126, CX/MSS/1333.

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33
had seized control: HW 5/130, CX/MSS/1390.

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34
‘really ticklish situation’: HW 5/132, CX/MSS/1394.

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35
‘to do their part’: WO 208/2014, Minute 30.

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36
vigorous action: HW 5/138, CX/MSS/1458.

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37
under German command: HW 5/138, CX/MSS/1455.

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38
‘needlessly sacrificing’: HW 5/139, CX/MSS/1468.

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39
clean up the Livno area: HW 5/148, CX/MSS/1559.

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40
antimony mine: HW 5/149, CX/MSS/1562.

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41
during the winter: HW 5/171, CX/MSS/1781.

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42
Operation
Weiss
and Operation
Schwarz
: HW5/182, CX/MSS/1891 and HW 5/191, CX/MSS/1986.

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43
surround the Partisans: HW 5/194, CX/MSS/2015 and HW 1/1332; HW 5/194, CX/MSS/2011; HW 5/196, CX/MSS/2031.

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44
operation in mid-winter: WO 208/2019, Minute 7.

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45
prestige and influence: WO 208/2026, Minute 3.

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46
‘active and vigorous Partisans’: WO 208/3102. Minute 1.

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47
advancing on bauxite area: HW 5/208, CX/MSS/2156.

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48
left flank was exposed: HW 5/208, CX/MSS/2136.

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49
towns had fallen: HW 19/48, ISOS 53156.

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50
Löhr said he did not have: HW 5/207, CX/MSS/2141, 2144.

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51
to relieve: HW 5/210, CX/MSS/2174.

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52
thirteen and sixty: HW 19/49, ISOS 54524.

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53
Italian-officered Chetnik units: HW 5/216, CX/MSS/2236.

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54
German fire: HW 5/215, CX/MSS/2228.

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55
transporting them: HW 19/50, ISOS 55961.

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56
negotiation with the Partisans: HW 19/51, ISOS 56608, 56699.

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57
‘current policy of supporting’: WO 208/2019, Minute 3.

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Partisans should be contacted: CAB 80/68: COS(43) 142(0).

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59
yet to play a decisive part: HW 1/1474, C/2604.

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Chetnik reinforcements: HW 19/50, ISOS 55961.

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61
Mihailović barely escaped: HW 19/51, ISOS 56734.

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62
said to have joined the Partisans: HW 19/52, ISOS 57654.

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63
captured large quantities: HW 19/52, ISOS 55915, 58191, 58888.

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64
organizing in the towns and villages: HW 17/51, ISCOT 1040.

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65
headquarters near Foca: HW 19/53, ISOS 59368.

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Mihailović and his Chetniks: WO 208/2026, Minute 8.

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Hitler’s instructions: HW 5/255, CX/MSS/2627.

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Djurisić had fallen out with Mihailović: HW 19/54, ISOS 59683, 59969.

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providing transport: HW 19/54, ISOS 60020.

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70
protect as many of the Chetniks: HW 5/250, CX/MSS/2574.

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near Jajce: HW 19/127, ISK 51991.

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72
Partisan and Chetnik losses: HW 5/271, CX/MSS/2782 and HW 1/1765, C/3654.

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73
Churchill argued in a note circulated: Winston S. Churchill,
The Second World War, Closing the Ring
, vol. V (Cassell, London, 1952), pp. 736–7.

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74
report from the intelligence services: PREM 3/510/7 124298.

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75
‘satisfied from information’: CAB 121/674.

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British efforts to unify the resistance: CAB 121/674.

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‘of the highest importance’: PREM 3/510/7 124298.

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could be sent to the Partisans: ibid.

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‘hunting in the next field’: CCAC, CHR/20/131.

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80
‘the great disorder’: HW 1/1820 Personal Minute Serial No. 122/3.

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81
the marvellous resistance: CCAC, CHR/20/131.

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82
conserve his forces: HW 17/51, ISCOT 1048.

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83
‘main object of an Allied attack’: HW 19/134, ISK 57401.

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84
‘the first to be invaded’: HW 36/1, GERDI 0460.

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85
their attention on the Balkans: HW 19/136, ISK 59589.

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86
‘must strengthen her defences’: HW 11/10, BJ 120793.

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87
Italians were withdrawing: HW 19/60, ISOS 65953.

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88
‘a planned evacuation’: HW 5/229, CX/MSS/3126.

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89
Italians were offering arms: HW 19/135, ISK 59221.

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to seize Italian naval installations: HW 5/340, CX/MSS/3180.

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91
5,000–6,000 Chetniks: HW 19/61, ISOS 67118.

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92
Mihailović would act only: HW 19/237, ISOSICLE 5863.

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93
German troops were marching: HW 11/10, BJ 122406.

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94
‘firmly in our hands’: HW 5/343, CX/MSS/3196.

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95
28,000 Italians: HW 19/62, ISOS 68601.

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‘extremely bad effect’: HW 19/88, ISOS 64286.

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97
‘major operations’: HW 5/363, CX/MSS/3299.

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actions of the Partisans: HW 19/141, ISK 66865.

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removed from Yugoslavia: HW 5/359, CX/MSS/3276.

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to seize Jews and others: HW 19/62, ISOS 69043.

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Partisan leader’s complaints: HW 17/51, ISCOT 1063, 1192.

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a shopping list: HW 17/51, ISCOT 1092, 1303.

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sole recipient: WO 208/2026, Minute 22.

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sent to the resistance: HW 5/366, CX/MSS/3313/3328, HW 1/2078, C/4555, HW 1/2085, C/4574.

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could soon be sent: John Ehrman,
Grand Strategy Vol. V, August 1943 September 1944
(HMSO, London, 1956).

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106
provision of supplies: HW 1/2108, C/4643.

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107
threat to the major towns: ZIP/MSGP/50, GPD/1688–1905 and HW 5366/367.

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death of 3,200 Partisans: HW 5/381, CX/MSS/3431.

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109
‘unsatisfactory’: HW 5/411, CX/MSS (Series 2) R11.

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‘the more active body’: WO 208/4628, Appn/710/43/MI3b.

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111
Lukacevic treaty: HW 19/146, ISK 73795 and HW 1/2259, C/5058.

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112
should be intensified: Ehrman,
Grand Strategy
, p. 111.

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113
‘to overcome certain difficulties’: HW 17/51, ISCOT 304/1459 (a signal of 28 September 1943, decrypted on 28 December 1945).

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114
alleged by a number of commentators: e.g. Michael Lees,
The Rape of Serbia
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1990); David Martin,
Web of Disinformation: Churchill’s Yugoslav Blunder
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
New York, 1990).

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115
‘agent of influence’: Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin,
The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West
(Allen Lane, London, 1999), p. 167.

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116
Ralph Bennett … and others: Ralph Bennett et al., ‘Mihailović or Tito’,
Intelligence and National Security
, 10(3) (1995), 526.

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117
addressed the House of Commons: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Fifth Series, 397, House of Commons, 22 February 1944, 692–7.

The author was given access to ‘The Sixta History’. This unpublished source is retained by GCHQ under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act 1958.

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1
‘My Y Service exists to produce intelligence …’: Michael Smith,
Station X: The Codebreakers of Bletchley Park
(Channel 4 Books, London, 1998), p. 24.

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‘a difficult and dangerous art’ etc.: J. E. Cooper, memorandum, 24 June 1941, ‘Relationship of Cryptography and W.TL’ (PRO WO 208/5125).

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inference ‘solely based upon radio studies …’: W. F. Friedman, ‘Report on E Operations of the GC&CS at Bletchley Park’, 30 (NACP HCC, Box 1126, Nr. 3620).

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1
Jones said: Eric Jones, Memo to All Hut 3 Personnel, 6 June 1944 (PRO HW3/125); Brig. E. T Williams, The Use of Ultra, 6 June 1944 (PRO WO 208/3575).

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2
Jellyfish information: Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence,
3(2): 777–80; Michael Smith,
Station X: The Codebreakers of Bletchley Park
(Channel 4 Books, London, 1998), pp. 157–8.

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3
Allied assessments of German defences fairly good: F. H. Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations
(HMSO, London, 1988), 3(2): 771–6.

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4
Codebreaker’s memories of Oshima message: Carl Boyd,
Hitler’s Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and Magic Intelligence, 1941–1945
(University Press of Kansas, Kansas, 1993), p. 106.

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5
Japanese military attaché’s message: Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 3(2): 18.

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6
Japanese naval attaché report: see Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 3(2): 787–92.

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7
Bennett on location of German divisions: Peter Bate interview with Ralph Bennett, for the Channel 4 television series
Station X
(Darlow Smithson Productions, 1999).

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8
White proposal: Tom Bower,
The Perfect Englishman
(Heinemann, London, 1995), pp. 37–8.

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9
Details of Snow: Summary of the Snow Case (PRO KV 2/452), 1–3; Transcript of shorthand notes taken at Scotland House, London SWl, on 24 September 1938 at the interrogation of [Arthur Owens] by Col. Hinchley Cooke (KV 2/452), 6, 21–2.

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Details of code sent to GC&CS: Robertson to Vivian, 19 September 1939 (PRO KV 2/453).

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11
Alert operator and GC&CS scepticism: [John Curry],
The Security Service 1908–1945: The Official History
(PRO, London, 1989), pp. 206–7.

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12
Broken by Gill and Trevor-Roper: ibid., pp. 178–9, 206–7.

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13
Setting up of GC&CS
Abwehr
section: ibid., pp. 178–9.

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14
Use of Pear codename: Report entitled ‘ISOS’, 25 September 1945 (PRO ADM 223/793), 1.

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15
Astor on MI5 and MI6 responsibilities: author’s interview with Hugh Astor, 23 January 1998.

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16
Twenty Committee set up: J. C. Masterman,
The Double Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945
(Pimlico, London, 1995), pp. 10–11.

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17
Astor on Robertson, Masterman and White: author’s interview with Hugh Astor.

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18
Workings of the Double Cross system: Masterman,
The Double Cross System
, pp. 1–35; Michael Howard,
British Intelligence in the Second World War: Volume 5 – Strategic Deception
, HMSO, London, 1990), 5: 8–9; Report entitled ‘ISOS’.

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19
Astor on consultations with the Twenty Committee: author’s interview with Hugh Astor.

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20
Montagu quotes: Ewen Montagu, The XX System (PRO ADM 223/794).

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21
Knox solution of
Abwehr
Enigma: Denniston to Menzies, minute, 10 December 1941 (PRO HW14). Lever solution of GGG machine: private information.

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22
Robertson quotes: Howard,
British Intelligence
, 5: 20–1.

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23
Philby quotes: West and Tsarev,
The Crown Jewels
, p. 309.

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24
Montagu quotes: Report entitled ‘ISOS’, 25 September 1945, 2–3.

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25
–61 Garbo and ISBA reports bring situation to a head:
The Security Service 1908–1945
, pp. 207–11; F. H. Hinsley and C. A. G. Simkins,
British Intelligence in the Second World War: Volume 4 Security and Counter-Intelligence
(HMSO, London, 1990), 4: 125–7; Howard,
British Intelligence
, 5: 19.

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26
A few weeks later:
The Security Service 1908–1945
, pp. 206–9.

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27
Petrie takeover bid for Section V and Menzies compromise: Michael Smith,
Foley: The Spy Who Saved 10,000 Jews
(Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1999), pp. 242–3.

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28
Masterman quotes: Masterman,
The Double Cross System
, p. 65,

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29
Problems of accepting that German perception different from that of the British: PRO DEFE 28/49.

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30
Quotes on improvements in MI5–MI6 liaison following Foley appointment: Smith,
Foley
, pp. 243–4.

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31
–63 Details of Mincemeat: PRO ADM 223/794; Currer-Briggs quotes: Smith,
Station X
, pp. 121–2.

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32
Astor on ‘impression of tremendous rivalry’: author’s interview with Hugh Astor.

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33
Radio Security Intelligence Conference: Report entitled ‘ISOS’, 6.

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34
Astor on relations between MI5 and MI6 and use of Ultra: author’s interview with Hugh Astor.

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35
Bodyguard: Roger Hesketh,
Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign
(St Ermin’s Press, London, 1999), pp. 17–19.

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36
Number of double agents: ibid., p. 46.

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37
Evolution of Fortitude: ibid., pp. 25–7.

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38
Main agents: ibid., pp. 46–56.

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39
Treasure comes close to giving away Fortitude: Summary of Treasure Case (PRO KV 2/464).

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40
Treasure ‘saves Bletchley’s bacon’: Page to Masterman and Masterman memo, both 29 November 1944, Summary of Treasure Case (ibid.).

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41
Garbo networks: Howard,
British Intelligence
, 5: 231–3.

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42
mobile wireless vehicles: Operation Neptune Radio Deception (PRO WO 208/5050), 2; Notes on Army Wireless Deception for Operation Overlord (ibid.), 2.

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43
Garbo message and shown to Hitler: Howard,
British Intelligence
, 5:188.

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44
Garbo reports and German acceptance of them: ibid., pp. 188–9.

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45
Interrogation of relieved German: Hesketh,
Fortitude
, pp. 489–90.