The Bletchley Park Codebreakers (65 page)

Page
60
‘number of different computing projects …’: Turing, ‘Report on visit to U.S.A., January 1st – 20th, 1947’.

Page
61
contract with the US Army Ordnance Department: Goldstine, op. cit., 150.

Page
62
consultant to the Eckert-Mauchly project: John Mauchly recalled that 7 September 1944 ‘was the first day that von Neumann had security clearance to see the ENIAC and talk with Eckert and me’ (J. Mauchly, ‘Amending the ENIAC Story’,
Datamation,
25(11) (1979), 217). Goldstine (op. cit., 185) suggests that the date of von Neumann’s first visit may have been a month earlier: ‘I probably took von Neumann for a first visit to the ENIAC on or about 7 August’.

Page
63
circulated bearing only: N. Stern, ‘John von Neumann’s Influence on Electronic Digital Computing, 1944–1946’,
Annals of the History of Computing
, 2 (1980), 354.

Page
64
gave his engineers Turing’s ‘On Computable Numbers’: private communication from Julian Bigelow to William Aspray, reported in W. Aspray,
John von Neumann and the Origins of Modern Computing
(MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 313.

Page
65
was working by the summer of 1951: J. Bigelow, ‘Computer Development at the Institute for Advanced Study’, in Metropolis, Hewlett and Rota, op. cit.

Page
66
‘the great positive contribution of Turing’: letter from von Neumann to Wiener, 29 November 1946 (Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Washington DC).

Page
67
‘The importance of Turing’s research is just this’: the text of von Neumann’s lecture ‘Rigorous Theories of Control and Information’ is printed
in J. von Neumann,
Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata
, A.W. Burks (ed.) (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1966), 50.

Page
68
‘I know that in or about 1943 or ‘44’: letter from Frankel to Randell, 1972, printed in Randell, ‘On Alan Turing and the Origins of Digital Computers’, p. 10.

Ralph Erskine would like to thank Philip Marks for his comments on aspects of Chapter 20.

Page
1
Army’s Signal Security Agency exploited: ‘Report on the Work Carried Out at S.S.A. on GEE’ (NACP HCC Box 202, Nr. 970); Cecil Phillips, ‘The American Solution of a German One-Time-Pad Cryptographic System’,
Cryptologia
, 24 (2000), 324. Despite claims to the contrary by a former member of GC&CS, GEE was not solved by GC&CS.

Page
2
set out the
Grundstellungen: Der Schlüssel M Allgemeine Bestimmungen
(M. Dv. Nr. 32/3 – NHB), paras 23, 90.

Page
3
a second ‘Greek’ rotor (gamma): see p. 173.

Page
4
should replace Enigma by a codebook: ‘German Naval Communications Intelligence’ (NACP HCC Box 625, Nr. 1695), 256.

Page
5
carried out many inquiries: see R. A. Ratcliff,
Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, Ultra, and the End of Secure Ciphers
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006); R. A. Ratcliff, ‘Searching for Security: The German Investigations into Enigma’s Security’,
Intelligence and National Security
, 14(1) (1999), 146.

Page
6
capture of
Schiff 26
: see p. 168.

Page
7
special
Stichwort: ‘Verlust Schiff 26 und 37 und Schlüsselsicherheit
’, 3 May 1940, OKM KTB 2/SKL (NHB, microfilm); on U-13, ibid., 11 June 1940.

Page
8
‘Either our ciphers have been compromised’: BdU, KTB, 28 September 1941 (NACP microfilm T1022, reel 4063) – translation from Ministry of Defence (Navy) [Günter Hessler],
The U-Boat War in the Atlantic
(HMSO, London, 1989), 1: 163.

Page
9
‘The more important ciphers’: Skl, Chef MND 2557/41, 24 October 1940 cited in ibid.

Page
10
–2 BdU recorded that: BdU, KTB, 25 March 1943, as cited in Lt.-Cdr.K. W. McMahan, ‘The German Navy’s Use of Special Intelligence and Reactions to Allied Use’, 211.

Page
11
disturbing report: ‘
Entzifferung deutschen Marinecodes
’, OKM/A Ausl/Abw IM/T B.Nr. 1663/43, 18 August 1943; cf. ‘
Operative Geheimhaltung Allgemeines SKL Chef MND 1a 1O-OKM
’ (NACP HCC Box 192, Nr. 908), 5; BdU, KTB, 13 August 1943 (copy held by author – this page was excised from
the copy filmed for NACP T1022, reel 4063).

Page
12
‘… out of the question’: BdU, KTB, 13 August 1943.

Page
13
‘At present no possible way …’: ‘
Operative Geheimhaltung Allgemeines
’, 2.

Page
14
‘… could not have taken place’: ibid., 7.

Page
15
report on
Kriegsmarine
cipher security: ‘Naval Cyphers and WT Procedures’, 10 July 1944, 4/SKL, 2339/44 (PG 17626 – ADM 223/505).

Page
16
Stichwort procedure: this is set out in
Der Schlüssel M - Allgemeine Bestimmungen
, as amended, paras 100 ff., and described in Ralph Erskine, ‘Ultra and Some U. S. Navy Carrier Operations’,
Cryptologia
, 19 (1988), 93. The procedure was made much more complicated as the war progressed, but to no avail.

Page
17
protecting captured key-lists: ‘
Operative Geheimhaltung Allgemeines
’, 2.

Page
18
‘infallible confirmation’: ‘Naval Cyphers and WT Procedures’, 5.

Page
19
‘no trace or even hint …’: ibid., 5–6.

Page
20
the contents of Allied signals: see e.g. ZTPGU 751 of 4 December 1942 (orders to RN submarine), ZTPGU 14736 of 27 May 1943 (destination of US Navy submarine).

Page
21
true HF-DF: signals 0142Z/10 April 1943 (true HF-DF) and 0959B/11 April 1943 (HF-DF as Ultra cover) (PRO ADM 199/575, 370).

Page
22
As Tranow observed: TICOM I-38 (Lt. Frowein), para. 33.

Page
23
made little real progress: ‘German Naval Communications Intelligence’, 259.

Page
24
also convinced: Wladyslaw Kozaczuk,
Geheim-Operation WICHER: Polnische Mathematiker Knackenden den deutschen Funkschlüssel ‘Enigma’
(Bernard & Graefe, Koblenz, 1989), p. 340.

Page
25
MND’s major report: ‘Naval Cyphers and WT Procedures’.

Page
26
the dropping of double encipherment: see Appendix II.

Page
27
‘change in the system’: TICOM I-92 (Wachtmeister Otto Buggisch), 5 (PRO, HW 40/167).

Page
28
remained a dead letter: TICOM I-96 (Oberstlt Mettig), cited in ‘German Naval Communications Intelligence’, 256.

Page
29
‘secure when used according to regulations’: TICOM I-45 (OKW/Chi Cryptanalytic Research on Enigma, Hagelin and Cipher Teleprinter Machines - by Dr Erich Hüttenhain and Dr Fricke), 4.

Page
30
were well aware: Buggisch as quoted in ‘European Axis Signal Intelligence in World War II as Revealed by “TICOM” Investigations’, vol. 2 (EASI, 2), 12, ‘Notes on German High Level Cryptography and Cryptanalysis’. My thanks to David Alvarez for supplying this document, which is now available at-

http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/european_axis_sigint.shtml (accessed 5
November 2010).

Page
31
‘given extraordinary mechanical outlay …’: ‘Naval Cyphers and WT Procedures’, 21; cf. TICOM I-45, 5; cf. EASI, 2: 10.

Page
32
catalogues of the enciphered letter ‘e’: TICOM I-45, 4.

Page
33
whether a practical solution: ibid., 5. A manuscript note on this file adds ‘the army did according to [TICOM] DF 190’.

Page
34
rewired Enigma used by the Swiss: ‘Analysis of the Cipher Machine “Enigma,” Type K’ (NACP HCC Box 1112, Nr. 3448), cited in David H. Hamer, Geoff Sullivan and Frode Weierud, ‘Enigma Variations: An Extended Family of Machines’,
Cryptologia
, 22 (1998), 222.

Page
35
re-enciphered at a different setting: TICOM I-92 (Wachtmeister Otto Buggisch), cited in EASI, 2: 9.

Page
36
to solve Railway Enigma traffic so successfully: see p. 61.

Page
37
cribs of only ten letters: TICOM I-77 (Dr Hüttenhain, Dr Fricke on
Zählwerk
(counter) Enigma).

Page
38
started to use a new reflector: Ultra/Zip CCR 38, 22 December 1944, ‘German Signals Security Improvements During 1944’, para. 1 (RIP 403, NACP RG 38, Radio Intelligence Publications, Box 169).

Page
39
beta rotor/thin reflector Bruno combination: see p. 171.

Page
40
Umkehrwalze
D: for an outstanding study of UKD, see Philip Marks, ‘Umkehrwalze D: Enigma’s Rewirable Reflector, Part I’,
Cryptologia
, 25 (2001), 101.

Page
41
3.2×1011 different possible wirings: ibid., 112. The letters J and Y could not be rewired.

Page
42
did not enter service until November: OP-20-GY-A-1 war diary, 4 and 13 November 1944 (NACP RG 38, Crane Library, 5750/159).

Page
43
‘a pathetically meagre result’: S. Milner-Barr, memorandum, 25 July 1944, ‘Operation Dora’, 2 (PRO HW 14/108).

Page
44
much less than anticipated: S. Milner-Barry, memorandum, 7 August 1944, ‘Uncle D’, in Fried Report #73 of 8 August 1944 (NACP HCC Box 880, Nr. 2612).

Page
45
The Autoscritcher: the Autoscritcher, Superscritcher and Duenna are fully described in Philip Marks, ‘Umkehrwalze D: Enigma’s Rewirable Reflector, Part II’,
Cryptologia
, 25 (2001), 177.

Page
46
four successful solutions: ‘Signal Security Agency General Cryptanalytic Branch – Annual Report FY 1945’, 20 (NACP HCC Box 1380, Nr. 4360).

Page
47
solved only eleven keys: ‘Summary of Duenna Operations to June 1945’, Exhibit 1, RIP 608, E6 – 147 (NACP RG 38, Radio Intelligence Publications, Box 171).

Page
48
without any warning: ‘German Signals Security Improvements During
1944’, 2, 6.

Page
49
Uhr
: the
Uhr
is referred to, but not by name, in Gordon Welchman,
The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes
(Allen Lane, London, 1982), pp. 136–7. It is fully described in Heinz Ulbricht, ‘The Enigma Uhr’,
Cryptologia
, 23 (1999), 193.

Page
50
embodying a rewirable reflector: TICOM I-53 (Construction of ‘Schlüsselgerat 39’); EASI, 2: 16.

Page
51
Allies could not have broken: EASI, 2: 14.

Page
52
Plans were made in December: minutes of conferences held by OKW/Chi on 13 December 1943, as quoted in EASI, 2: 14.

Page
53
SG 41: for a description, see TICOM I-72 (Buggisch on SG 41).

Page
54
A post-war United States Army study concluded: EASI, 2: 13.

Page
1
displayed a greater flair: Alan Judd,
The Quest for C: Mansfield Cumming and the Founding of the Secret Service
(HarperCollins, London, 1999).

Page
2
intelligence … a departmental concern: Philip H. J. Davies, ‘Organisational Politics and Britain’s Intelligence Producer/Consumer Interface’,
Intelligence and National Security
, 10(4) (1985), 114; Philip H. J. Davies, ‘MI6’s Requirements Directorate: Integrating Intelligence into the Machinery of British Central Government’,
Public Administration
78(1) (2000), 29.

Page
3
‘50 per cent … drawn from overt published sources’: Reginald Hibbert, ‘Intelligence and Policy’,
Intelligence and National Security 5
(1) (1990), 112.

Page
4
Hence, during the Napoleonic Wars: on military intelligence in the Peninsular Wars, see for example, Jock Hasswell,
The First Respectable Spy: The Life and Times of Colquhoun Grant, Wellington’s Head of Intelligence
(Hamish Hamilton, London, 1969) and Julia Page,
Intelligence Officer in the Peninsula: the Letters and Diaries of Major the Hon. Edward Charles Coles 1786–1812
(Hippocrene, New York, 1986).

Page
5
Just as the Indian government… the Great Game: see, for example, Peter Hopkirk,
The Great Game
(John Murray, London, 1990).

Page
6
Secret Department of the Post Office: on the Post Office see, variously, P. Aubrey,
Mr. Secretary Thurloe
(Athlone, London, 1990), K. Ellis,
The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century
(OUP, Oxford, 1958).

Page
7
the Boer war: for the Boer War influence on pre-war thinking in MI6 and MI5’s predecessor MO 5, see ‘Secret Service in the Event of a European War’, cover letter dated 17 October 1905 (PRO HD 3/124).

Page
8
Admiralty and War Office before the Haldane Committee: ‘Report and Proceedings of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence Appointed by the Prime Minister to Consider the Question of Foreign Espionage in the United Kingdom’ (PRO CAB 61/8).

Page
9
MacDonough Scheme: Judd,
The Quest for C
, pp. 391–3.

Page
10
‘independent sections … known as the SIS’: Vivian to Menzies, appendix to Robert Cecil, ‘C’s War’,
Intelligence and National Security
, 1(2) (1986), 186.

Page
11
led to a postwar scheme: H. A. R. ‘Kim’ Philby,
My Silent War
(Ballantine, New York, 1983), p. 124; Davies, ‘MI6 Requirements Directorate’.

Page
12
interwar and early wartime years: F. H. Hinsley and C. A. G. Simkins,
British Intelligence in the Second World War: Volume 4 Security and Counter-Intelligence
(HMSO, London, 1990), 4.

Page
13
excessively rigid bureaucracy: see, for example, criticisms of the Security Service in the Security Commission Report on the Michael Bettaney Case, Report of the Security Commission (HMSO, London, 1985), Cmd. 9514.

Page
14
rivalry and hostility existed: Christopher Andrew,
Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community
(Sceptre, London, 1986), p. 142.

Page
15
Foreign Office and SIS control of GC&CS: ibid., p. 421.

Page
16
six senior assistants …: ibid., pp. 374–5.

Page
17
‘technical success and organizational confusion’: John Ferris, ‘Whitehall’s Black Chamber: British Cryptology and the Government Code and Cypher School 1919–1929’,
Intelligence and National Security
, 2(1) (1987), 54.

Page
18
service branch complaints: Andrew,
Secret Service
, p. 421.

Page
19
naval, air and army sections formed: F. H. Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
(HMSO, London, 1979), 1: 22.

Page
20
commercial section was set up: ibid., p. 26; A. G. Denniston, ‘The Government Code and Cypher School Between the Wars’,
Intelligence and National Security
, 1(1) (1986), 63; ‘ATB and (EPG) 13 and 14, Item 2(b) Organization of an Intelligence Service, Interim Report’ with cover noted from Morton to Jones, 31 March 1938, FCI 968 (PRO BT 61/69/2).

Page
21
GPO-manned system of stations: Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 1: 26; Denniston, ‘The Government Code and Cypher School Between the Wars’, 68.

Page
22
meteorological section: Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 1: 339.

Page
23
MI6 circulating sections which tasked: Denniston, ‘The Government Code and Cypher School Between the Wars’, 57.

Page
24
acute lack of receivers: Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 1: 51.

Page
25
moved mainly to landlines: ibid., p. 52.

Page
26
increasingly crowded circumstances: ibid., p. 270.

Page
27
demanded an investigation: ibid., pp. 270–1.

Page
28
the reconvened Y Board and its conclusions: ibid., p. 271.

Page
29
traffic analysis proved a very valuable auxiliary method: see, for example, Gordon Welchman,
The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes
(Allen Lane, London, 1982).

Page
30
Y Board, the Y and cryptanalysis sub-committees: Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 1: 271.

Page
31
cryptanalysis sub-committee petered out, ADI based at the OIC: ibid., p. 272.

Page
32
GC&CS quadrupled: ibid., p. 273.

Page
33
GC&CS staff numbers in 1941, 1942: F. H. Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
(HMSO, London, 1981), 2: 25.

Page
34
exotic assortment of civilians, ‘loose collection of groups’, senior staff still performed: Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 1: 273.

Page
35
‘undisciplined’ wartime staff: ibid., p. 274.

Page
36
appeal directly to Churchill: Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 2: 25; the letter is set out at pp. x–xii in the present book; for a personal account of the events, see also S. Milner-Barry, ‘Action This Day: the Letter from Bletchley Park Cryptanalysts to the Prime Minister, 21 October 1941’,
Intelligence and National Security
, 1(1) (1986), 272.

Page
37
Double Cross, volume of work and MI5’s managerial crisis: see in particular Hinsley,
British Intelligence
, vol. 4; J. C. Masterman,
The Double Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945
(Pimlico, London, 1995); Nigel West,
MI5: British Security Service Operations 1909–1945
(Granada, London, 1983).

Page
38
‘total operational control’; fell to quarrelling: Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 2: 26.

Page
39
GC&CS subdivided and civil side moved: ibid.; for a personal account, see P. W. Filby, ‘Bletchley Park and Berkeley Street’,
Intelligence and National Security
, 3(2) (1988), 272–4.

Page
40
subsequently received replacements, etc.: Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence
, 2: 26–7, F. H. Hinsley et al.,
British Intelligence in the Second World War
(HMSO, London, 1984), 3(1): 460.

Page
41
redesignated himself Director General, etc.: ibid., p. 461.

Page
42
the Cold War GCHQ: for GCHQ’s Cold War internal management structure, see Duncan Campbell, Friends and Others,
New Statesman and Society
, 26 November 1982, 6; Michael Smith,
New Cloak, Old Dagger
(Gollancz, London, 1996), pp. 185–7.

Page
43
JIC in the Cabinet Office: For the current version of the JIC’s role in Britain’s National Intelligence Machinery, see the Open Government webpage on Central Intelligence Machinery, downloadable at http://www.archive. official-documents.co.uk/document/caboff/nim/0114301808.pdf (accessed 4 November 2010).