The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (11 page)

I was out playing football with Calum [AC’s younger son] when TB called, really worried about Pickett’s Lock
¹⁴
and what it said about Britain and our potential for sport. I agreed with him, but it was an odd thing to be obsessing about given what else he had on his mind. Karen Hughes called and said my note had really got them thinking about how to do the media in what was obviously going to be a cross-national media operation. I went in for Geoff Hoon’s PINDAR [Ministry of Defence crisis management centre] meeting in the bunker. I chatted to CDS about exactly how to pitch our involvement. We had three Tomahawks let off and support staff not yet being used. I set out the timing of the Bush and TB statements. Then news came through that they were going early so we had to cobble together the final drafts taking in a few of Condi’s changes, including them not wanting to say that action would be proportionate. I was up and down to the
flat to get the final changes in and signed off and then downstairs to do the statement to the media.

JP, Jack and Geoff were there to flank him and it was going to be important to get away from some of this presidential stuff that was surrounding him. He looked absolutely fine, but just minutes earlier, as Bush was starting his speech, TB was not even dressed, his hair was wet. He was pretty nervous about the whole thing, was sweating and later beating himself up over not having prepared properly for the statement. At least it suggested there was still humility in there. I was sure he had made the right decisions though but as ever, nobody could accurately predict exactly what would happen when the shooting started.

Several of the papers ran TB’s words alongside GWB’s and noted the similarity of language and message. The coverage was wall to wall of course. I was in early and the first meeting was with the intelligence and defence people. I was beginning to feel a bit sorry for Lander at the way TB asked him whether there was any sign of an attack on the UK, as though Lander was expected to know the answer in yes or no terms. He had a mischievous little face, a bit of a cross between Ian Hislop [editor of satirical magazine
Private Eye
] and Richard Stott [former tabloid editor turned irreverent
Sunday Mirror
columnist]. He said there were a large number of people ‘who worry us’, that sixty had been interviewed in the past three weeks, that the ones they were really worried about were under permanent surveillance. [Admiral] Boyce went over some of the thirty-two attacks launched in the immediate wave, and some of the planned targets tonight. These were likely to go on for three to five days in the first instance. Scarlett said all planes came back safely.

There was a pretty clear impression the operation had not been as effective as being hoped. [Sir John] Kerr said the Israelis were not being helpful. There were also real concerns about what reactions there might be against some of our [diplomatic] posts, especially in Indonesia. There were legal difficulties being raised re targeting some of the Afghan TV output. Both Harriet [Harman, Solicitor General] and the Attorney General [Lord Peter Goldsmith] had seemingly raised concerns. TB was clear post Kosovo that their media machine was a part of their military machine and a legitimate target. Afterwards, Richard W, Jonathan and I persuaded TB that there should be regular meetings of a War Cabinet – TB, JP, GB, JS, GH, Clare, RC, CDS and the main agencies. TB was reluctant at first, probably because of his
ongoing arguments with GB. RW said he was worried about the ‘presidential’ tag, and he was right, though his concerns – that his strictures were not always being followed – were maybe not the same as mine, though they were linked – namely that we needed a cadre of ministers bound in to the decision-making and able to go out and explain properly to MPs and public.

I got TB to agree to do Al Jazeera [Arabic news network] whose coverage was causing a lot of concern. What with that, Church leaders coming in, Cabinet and a statement in the House, there was plenty going on to brief the media and keep them busy. The Al Jazeera interview was difficult, as expected, and with a lot of focus on the Palestine question. It pretty much went to the heart of every question and managed to create the sense TB was on the defensive, though he did get over some of the key messages for the Arab world. In the pre-briefing, a couple of ultra-Arabists from the FCO had been urging him to use the interview to dump on Israel, or at least distance ourselves as much as possible. I spent a fair bit of time working on the statement for the House, in which he was able to announce the second wave had started. He did fine, though it was all a little bit flat.

Cabinet was largely just TB and the other ministers involved reporting to the rest of them. By and large they were supportive. TB went through the three different planks – military, diplomatic and humanitarian. The aim was to put a ring round the Taliban regime, undermine them militarily and politically, and meanwhile show this was about the regime not the people. He went through how we were working with the Northern Alliance, but stressed any future rule had to be broad-based. On the diplomatic front, we had a lot of allies wanting to join up in some way. But we had big problems in the Arab world and there was going to have to be a major propaganda effort to reach them. We cannot say often enough that ‘This is not a war on Islam.’ He said the strong message from the Church leaders, and from many Muslims, was that now we had started it, we should finish as quickly as possible. He also emphasised that we had continually to make the link to domestic policy – that this had implications for our fight against drugs and terrorism; that it was important to restoring confidence in the economy; the sooner we act, the more likely we will be to contain a refugee crisis. Geoff made clear we were able to study all of the targets because some of the planes came out of Diego Garcia [Indian Ocean military base].

Clare reported on the humanitarian situation, said even before all this Afghanistan was heading towards famine. Five million were going
hungry, nothing like enough food was getting through and in six weeks the roads will be impassable. Air drops and leaflets were not enough. We must get back to convoys. She said the US were being ‘more generous than usual’, and money was less of a problem than logistics. GB, just back from the G7 meeting, said consumer spending was holding up, but recent company performance was not good. Tessa said the latest estimate had 120 British people killed on September 11. A lot of relatives and the process of identification and the return of remains was clearly difficult. I sent through a follow-up note to Karen Hughes on co-ordination. I saw GB re the PBR [Pre-Budget Report]. At TB’s office meeting, he was just railing at the lack of progress on the domestic agenda and worrying that because he would be forced to focus on the international, departments would be taking their feet off the accelerators again.

I was getting into a much better rhythm with Karen Hughes. If anything, the need for proper co-ordination was going to be even greater than Kosovo because there were more and different communications challenges. For Kosovo, we had a bigger alliance, and we were fighting for Muslims. We now had a lot of anti-Americanism running around, despite Sept 11, and we had a particular problem with some of the Arab media and the way they were fuelling the idea of a war on Islam. It was going to be important to get the Americans not to think they were just talking to America the whole time. We got big play home and abroad for the Al Jazeera interview, and we were going to need to do a lot more with the Arab media. TB was seeing [Gerry] Adams and [Martin] McGuinness [leading Sinn Fein politicians in Northern Ireland] at 8 and we had to choreograph the arrivals to avoid any crossover with the War Cabinet – not what we needed right now.

At the morning meeting, there were two immediate problems to address – the first was that the BBC were reporting TB was going to Oman. They just would not listen to our concerns on this. And the second was the leak of a Jo Moore [special adviser to Stephen Byers] email from September 11 saying that it was a good time to ‘bury bad news’. I didn’t allow much discussion of it at the morning meeting. It was perfectly clear someone inside had leaked it and it was a classic Civil Service move on a special adviser. It was a stupid thing to say, and knowing Jo she would be mortified, but I didn’t like the idea of her being hanged, drawn and quartered for it. I also knew it would unleash another avalanche of bollocks about spin, me, culture of blah.
I spoke to Byers and he asked if I thought she would have to go. I was worried it might end there. But after talking to TB, we agreed there should be a reprimand and an apology. TB felt Jo was basically a decent person, very committed and professional, and it was a bit much to destroy her career over one leaked email that she should never have sent. Tom [Kelly] came back from the eleven o’clock a bit taken aback by the ferocity over it. TB was clear that she had given us great service down the years, and it was not a hanging offence.

I did a conference call with her and Steve and we agreed there would be no budging from that line. My only question mark was whether she was really up to facing the shit that was coming her way. She sounded OK, and she had always struck me as pretty good under pressure, but who knows? I got SB to organise [Richard] Mottram [permanent secretary, Department of Transport, Local Government and the Regions (DTLR)] to do the official reprimand bit. I wrote to Greg Dyke [BBC director general] complaining about the BBC – Kate Adie [BBC chief press correspondent] – doing a number re TB and the forthcoming trip to Oman. The War Cabinet was OK. It was remarkable how quickly these extraordinary meetings became almost routine in their nature, TB wandering in with us lot, ministers chatting a bit, the spooks and defence guys sitting up straight and getting ready to do their stuff, Scarlett, C, Lander, CDS, all chipping in, very matter-of-fact and straightforward. Scarlett was meticulous in his presentation. It was again not exactly clear how successful the strikes had been. They almost got Mullah Omar. He was injured, might be dead.

Jack S and Clare both pressed Lander on what was happening re suspects here, and he was clear that though a lot of them were covered, there could be no guarantees, because a threat might well be coming from people we do not know about. They were both worried about Pakistani opinion in the UK really becoming inflamed. Blunkett really went off on one about the cops, e.g. John Stevens wanting to surround shopping centres with machine-gun-toting officers. He really let rip, and there were a few raised eyebrows, including TB’s. David clearly didn’t take much to the cops, made a point of saying the Security Service had been terrific, but there had to be better co-operation with the Special Branch and the police more generally. There was a lack of hard-headed clarity, and it was really annoying him, he said. The US was in the lead for attack but the UK and Israel were not far behind. The US were in no doubt there were a number of al-Qaeda ‘unexpired events’ still to be completed. TB said to Lander he should give us a shopping list of anything they felt would help. He didn’t
want them to hold back for fear that things would be politically difficult. He said give us a list of what you would want in an ideal world and we can decide what is politically possible. There was a discussion of the Saudi oilfields, what would happen to the oil price and the world economy if they went up under attack. Lander and C both said it was as well to be prepared for something pretty serious, up to and including WMD.

Ed Balls [special adviser to Gordon Brown] came to see me. He was worried re where TB was on the euro, said some of the recent noise about it was ‘dangerous’. He felt TB was trying to set a political timetable for an economic union. I asked if GB was on a different track to TB. He said he didn’t want to make the same mistake as the last lot made re the ERM. GB thought we had an agreement to shut down debate on the euro and couldn’t understand why we had opened it again. I said it would help if they could discuss it without shouting at each other about every slight, real or imagined, going back years. Ed said we would get brownie points from the Hugo Youngs [
Guardian
] and the Phil Stephenses [
FT
] for opening it up again, but did we really think it was the right course to go down at this stage?

There was a review of security in the event of a major attack. Fiona and I were both in the red team that would be taken to the underground place with TB, but we agreed we should not be in there together, that one of us should be with the kids if at all possible. TB did the BBC World Service Pashto service, who were clearly thrilled to be asked. The interview was done by a young woman called Nijiba who afterwards told us some horrific stories re the kind of thing that went on inside Afghanistan. TB suggested I try to get her out on our airwaves too. I was determined that TB keep up a voice on the Arab and Muslim media.

We left for the airport at 6, and in the car TB asked me when I thought was the best time for Anji to leave. I felt soon. It just hadn’t worked out as he had hoped for the second term. There was too much baggage in all the difficult relationships and the recent trip had shown that for all she brought to the table, Anji needed a clear role to be effective and it wasn’t there at the moment. I felt he had been wrong to stop her leaving earlier when she had basically wanted to. He said how impressed he had been with David Manning. He was doing a superb job with Condi, and he was also such a nice guy to have around. TB was still worried that the Yanks were on a slightly different track, wanting to broaden this out. He was worried re the domestic agenda suffering with all of us focused elsewhere. The Jo Moore furore was really building and the hacks on the plane were trying to get us going.

We landed [in Geneva] and set off for the Intercontinental to meet Sheikh Zayed [al-Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates]. He was around eighty, surrounded by zillions of hangers-on, one or two of whom had a bit of a gangsterish feel to them. In the meeting, SZ said it was a battle of humanity and inhumanity, sanity and insanity. There was a TV screen in the background with pictures of a giant green parrot and some pretty girls. The parrot squawked regularly. After a while, one of the sheikh’s flunkeys got up and motioned for David Manning, Anna [Wechsberg, private secretary, foreign affairs] and I to leave so that they were one-on-one. Christ knows what they would talk about. TB came out with a huge grin, and said they had resolved the problems of the world. They had brought an Abu Dhabi TV reporter with them, having promised him a TB interview and when I said nobody had mentioned it to me, they started to cut up a bit rough and unpleasant. One of them said, we are aware of your reputation but I should know the sheikh would take it as a personal slight if this didn’t happen and there would be a diplomatic incident. Then another came in with a rather menacing smile and muttered something about whether the IRA really were quiet, and whether they were linked into Bin Laden and so on. In the end, partly because it allowed us to keep going with the Arab media strategy, we agreed. As it happened, it was his best interview yet and gave us live words for the travelling hacks too.