The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (46 page)

We had a dreadful TB/GB plus key people strategy meeting in which we were trying to sign him up to the six-month strategy paper. Every time we put forward a specific idea or thought, GB would say something slightly different. When he read Philip’s analysis, which was not new to him and with which he basically agreed, he feigned shock and said he would now have to rethink the CSR strategy. His basic line was that going on about crime had been short-termist and we needed long-termism. If TB said responsibility was a key theme, GB would say what about opportunity? If TB had said opportunity, he would have said what about responsibility? This was hopeless. Thankfully I was called out to take a call and afterwards went back to my office. Douglas called me afterwards and said he couldn’t believe how bad that had been. The truth was GB was winning the ghastly war of attrition.

Earlier, even before that meeting, TB had called in Jonathan, Sally M and me and asked if we thought it was possible for him to announce publicly that he wouldn’t fight the next election and tell Cabinet that if ministers wanted to fight a leadership election, they would have to do it outside. Sally feared it would make him a lame duck straight away, though Aznar had seemed to survive a second fixed term pretty well. I said he had to decide whether it was the right thing to do, and that if it wasn’t, he was simply caving in to psychological warfare. Did he really want to go? And was it really the right thing? He said that’s exactly what Cherie would say. What he’d like to do was win an election, win a referendum, then go after getting the new leader in place or, if a referendum were possible this side of the election, win that, stay to the election and get a new leader in place.

He said all GB ever asked him these days was when was he going. There was a real sense around that GB was at it the whole time. Sally said disgruntled former ministers and disappointed backbenchers
were being given strong hints of jobs. He was courting JP the whole time. He was going more and more sceptic in his dealings with Murdoch and his papers. TB had devolved too much power in the areas he really cared about like public services and the euro. Godric felt that on the press front, the new level of nastiness was a direct response to the changes to the lobby. They really did believe we were trying to do them in the whole time. There was no doubt that now with Byers gone, and with TB still pretty impregnable, I was the next best target. Charles Clarke did a piece for
The Times
attacking parts of the press, which would fly a bit.

The
Mail
and
Telegraph
absolutely vile about me, the others a bit more balanced. Charles’ attack was going big and I admired his guts in doing it but GB and Co. were straight out saying it was a mistake to attack the press. TB was still in an absolute fury about Black Rod. We had agreed to try to close it down but it was clear we would not have long to wait before more Black Rod-ery came pouring out. I was managing just about to hang in there but I was going through a mega down phase, worried I wasn’t being terribly effective, worried about being strung out by sustained attacks. Even Fiona was adamant I couldn’t leave now because it would so weaken TB. Peter M said if I went GB would be home and dry and the Tories would be jubilant, so I just had to hang in there. He said TB relied on me as a brute force able to drive the machine. He said he too was worried about the extent to which they wanted to go for me, but still felt I had no choice but to stay.

At PMQs, TB thought IDS might do the PCC business. In the end, nobody raised it. IDS did Pam Warren then welfare but didn’t land a blow. TB had a good tone. Our side better. Weekly meeting with Peter M, PH [Peter Hyman] and PG. On the euro, we went over the various scenarios. Don’t go for it, and TB is weakened. Go for it and win, and TB could successfully bow out, though GB would be likely to think TB would use it as an excuse to stay longer and so might block. So option three, do a deal, but GB is unlikely to trust. Option four, do the euro and lose, then GB is home and dry. PH felt that just going for it would show courage and conviction, but I was sure it would be the end of him, if he went for it and lost. Peter M was a real strength at these meetings, seemed to worry less about status or how he was perceived by us, and was most of the time giving very clear and concise strategic advice.

Starting to get calls from journalists who were picking up on Black
Rod’s evidence. TB said if Black Rod had had a genuine complaint, why had he not come straight to him or RW? He said he was totally satisfied civil servants did nothing wrong. He said things were going to get very tough and we had to be strong. Tessa [Jowell] called, asked if I was thinking of going, said I mustn’t.

[Roy] Hattersley and [Trevor] Kavanagh were both saying I had to go, Kavanagh in quite a friendly way. Piers [Morgan] had actually been pretty good about me on Channel 4 last night so I dropped him a friendly line. Alex F called, said it must be serious because he even had people phoning him to say how hard I was getting it at the moment. He said don’t let other people think for you, because they’ll all have their own motives. If there is doubt, he said, then there is no doubt. He said it was an old Irish saying. I thought about it through the day. When it came to it, I didn’t just want to run away. I still had a job to do. It was pretty heavy though, evidenced by the kind of people sending in letters of support. Not just people I’d expect to like Bruce [Grocott], but also Alice Mahon, Ann Clwyd, David Clark [Labour MPs]. I even had Gwyneth Dunwoody defending me on the radio. Jonathan at his weekly meeting tried to be chirpy as ever, said it was a ‘Save AC Campaign’ meeting. People looked a bit shot, particularly Sally.

David Manning was genuinely shocked by Black Rod’s behaviour. The
Spectator
cover had me and TB getting spanked by the little fucker. We were of course building up to the
Mail on Sunday
who would no doubt publish the memo from Black Rod to the PCC so we had to decide whether to put our version out, with our own dossier of evidence. I felt we had to because Sunday was in danger of being a massive event with only one side of the story there. Tom had forty-five minutes of it with the lobby. This thing took up hours through the day. Meanwhile, perhaps the most dramatic Cabinet yet. TB meandered through the Grid in the usual way, bit of chat, bit of Middle East and Afghanistan, then GB came in about the Tories doing an opposition day debate on world poverty. He said it was strategically important because they were trying to become New Conservatives, position themselves in the centre through mood music but we should be wary because in policy they would be very right wing. He said their weakest point is health. The unspoken message was that TB does Grid, spin and foreign whereas GB does substance and strategy.

But then JP came in with a virtual declaration of war on TB. He said he knew we had to do the press stuff and he wasn’t knocking
that but it was interesting that the Tories were trying to echo New Labour and avoid substance. But he said we have a very good compromise between Old and New. He said we all have to be involved in future policymaking but ‘I’m bound to say if we’re going to have weekend retreats for some at Hartwell House [Buckinghamshire hotel, venue of Peter Mandelson’s Third Way event], and Mandelson giving interviews saying we’re all Thatcherites now, then we’re going to have some very serious discussions in here.’ He said the compromise between Old and New means we’re Labour again and there will be real division if we try to replace policy structures.

TB was looking at him with a mix of steel and humour whereas others in the room clearly sensed it was quite a moment. GB had the beginnings of a smile on his face which was as broad as I’ve seen it in years by the time he left. JP said the Labour Party has always been lousy on the back foot. There needs to be more forward strategy and it has to be discussed right here. TB hit back pretty hard, said it was time for a little reality check, time to stop believing everything people read in newspapers. He said we are on our sixth year in government and sometimes government gets difficult. The way not to deal with it is to wet our knickers every time it gets difficult. We are in a strong position. The economy is good, we have the right agenda on public services, the right approach on social exclusion. The Tories were coming at us on character because they had nothing else to go on. They had lost on policy. We have to stick on policy, not get distracted or irritated. He said we had been uniquely blessed as a government, to a large extent free of many of the problems other Labour governments had faced. Our mettle was being tested and it’s at times like these that we had to hang together, not fall apart.

The history of Labour governments, he said, is that they make themselves fail rather than others make them fail. We are winning all the arguments, so let’s get a sense of perspective. He then looked around, smiled, said ‘I’ve got the Indonesian president coming in now, so that’s the end of that.’ JP put on his real sour look and walked straight out. GB smiled. The rest were blank. It was Paul Boateng’s first Cabinet and Bruce’s [Grocott] first actually at the Cabinet table. Paul looked really shocked. RW came to see me later. He said that was a big, bad moment. TB was pretty calm afterwards, convinced it needed saying. He had had a pretty heavy session with JP earlier, who was going on about the Hartwell business. It was now an open thing around the world that GB was doing in TB. Yesterday he had spoken to Chrétien, who referred to having a Brown problem, namely that his Treasury minister was after his job and he had told him to
fight for it from the outside. But the message out of Cabinet had been pretty clear – from JP, I’ve had enough and I’m going to throw my weight around, and from GB, I’m moving in. From TB, I’m staying. From the Cabinet, confusion and concern.

Alan Milburn was worried enough to wander over later, bring in some sandwiches, said TB had to face up to the fact that GB was killing him, and if he didn’t stand up to it, his supporters would get very demoralised. He said there was no way I could think about going and if anything I should go back to doing the briefings. But TB had to get back rooted in more substance and politics, cut the crap. He was very calm, clear and strong and I was grateful that he came over like he did. Meeting then with TB, Derry [Irvine], Charlie [Falconer], RW etc. to go through PCC/Black Rod again. Agreed to a strategy with TB, covering note plus evidence dossier to put out pre Sunday. Fraser [Kemp] was fantastic, organising support for me in the PLP.

I collected Fiona from Sarah Brown’s book launch [
Magic: New Stories
] and we went to a very nice Robert Thomson dinner with the Scardinos [Marjorie, chief executive of Pearson plc, and Albert, her journalist husband], James Baker III [former US Secretary of State] and his wife [Susan], Ian McEwan [author] and his wife [Annalena McAfee], who was literary editor of the
Guardian
. Baker was impressive, particularly on the Middle East. He felt that Bush was moving in the right direction but had made a huge mistake in giving DoD an equal seat at the foreign policy table. It meant Powell and Rumsfeld were at odds the whole time whilst Condi was less a full-time National Security Advisor to the president but a mediator between the two. His view was that one day there would be a land-for-peace deal but he felt it likely it would only happen under a Labor government [in Israel]. Baker had picked up on the scale of coverage and the level of nastiness around me and once we got through all the jokes was very supportive, said I should take it as a compliment. I liked Ian McEwan too once he opened up a bit, while Marjorie Scardino’s husband shared a devotion to a struggling league club [Notts County]. Marjorie said this is a good government, I was doing a great job and I had to keep at it. TB called late for a chat. He said JP would be reflecting and would come back a bit now. He hadn’t liked the mood today, which was why he had really gone for it.

Most of the papers had some sort of editorial comment about me. The
Guardian
– I should go. [Richard] Littlejohn [
Sun
columnist] snide.
Telegraph
snide.
Independent
not so bad.
Mirror
bad. TB said ‘That’s it for Piers with me.’ I wrote a short statement for TB to go on the front of the dossier. I got the staff together after the morning meeting to explain what was happening. Jeremy then called, said there was a real problem. [Lieutenant Colonel] Malcolm Ross, comptroller of the Royal Household, had told Charles Moore [
Telegraph
editor] yesterday that they too had been told TB wanted to walk [through crowds from Downing Street to the Queen Mother’s lying-in-state] and they had said it was a bad idea. If true, it was dreadful. But it was not true that Number 10 had said to the Palace that he wanted to walk. I had put in TB’s statement that nobody from Black Rod’s office had complained to TB or Richard W. RW didn’t want to be in there. He told Clare he was fed up of being a human shield, to which she had said, ‘You are supposed to be a human shield, protecting and defending me.’ She was really upset about the whole thing. But I took out the reference to RW and instead put ‘me or anyone on my behalf’.

Richard came to see me. I offered him tea but he said he wouldn’t stay. He then said ‘I just want to say two things. The first, you are probably not fully aware of how stressful and traumatic this has all been for you personally. Second, I don’t think there’s much support for you around the Cabinet table.’ I said I think I’m a better judge of those at the Cabinet table than you are and apart from GB from time to time, and Clare who doesn’t matter much, I have no real problems with any of them, and I’m one of the few people who gets on equally well with TB and JP. So what are you saying? That because the Tories and the press are after my blood, I should get out? No, no, no, he said. But just be very careful. There was a hint of menace there. He stayed for a matter of minutes and unlike previous such visits, my antennae told me the intention had been to unsettle me. If so, it didn’t work. On the contrary, I felt strengthened because I drew a contrast between those who were calling and writing to express support, and those who were going on the airwaves to say they wanted me out. What sort of people were calling? RC, Jack S, Margaret B, Brian Wilson [energy minister], Kim Howells [culture minister]. Lots of backbenchers. Family, Fiona’s family, Alex F, people at Burnley. PR people like Matthew Freud or Melanie Cantor. At one point Alison [Blackshaw] was just coming in with lists of names. My team was totally solid too. TB did a clip on the whole business from Jersey which was strong, and Godric did the briefing, followed by the honours briefing and we were in a much better position. We briefed ministers and MPs going up on it and I felt the machine starting to roll, but even better Oborne was out saying that he had never said TB did anything wrong.