The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (93 page)

De Villepin called JS to say that Chirac was ‘pained and shocked’ at the way we had misrepresented what he had said, that this was not what was expected of an ally and it showed TB lacked courage. Chirac was clearly going up the wall and we were getting a lot of signs that he had basically been hoping TB would fall on the issue. Bush said that the Iraqis would now be ‘shredding documents like crazy’. When he heard about the prisoners who had had their tongues cut out, it ‘made me vomit’. He said the road map would be published today when Abu Mazen was confirmed. He would call and congratulate him.

I went to see David Manning then chatted to C and John Scarlett. Desertions were beginning in Iraq. The Republican Guard was moving to Baghdad. Nobody seemed to have a clue where Saddam was hiding. It was possible to feel the planned operation moving through the gears. First we had the ad hoc ministerial meeting where John S went through the intelligence, and CDS was clearly reluctant to go over the military plans in detail. I also found myself holding back with Clare there. TB saw her afterwards to tell her not to worry about the savaging she was getting in the papers at the moment. I felt her credibility was now totally shot but he still wanted to keep her on board and she was off to New York.

Fiona came to see me, said she couldn’t stay in the job any longer and started crying. She said it wasn’t the war per se, but it had been the last straw. She felt it was a waste of time her being here, that she wasn’t happy doing what she did. I said she should go if she wanted to, and if she didn’t support what we were doing, to try not to do it in a way that makes us an issue. She said but you are a big issue, which meant that there was never a right time to go, but she really didn’t want to stay. She went to see Sally, got very upset. Sally said she felt it was as much about Cherie/Carole as being about me. It was about not being valued. I didn’t quite know how to deal with it. It’s true there was never a right time, but this was about as unright
as it could be, in terms of us being made an issue. It didn’t exactly help that the message from the security people was that patrols around the house would be stepped up while the conflict was going on.

I wrote letters of complaint to the BBC, first from me to [Richard] Sambrook [director of news] on various issues re [John] Humphrys, [Andrew] Gilligan and Rageh Omaar [BBC journalists] on the nature of their coverage. Then drafted a letter from TB to Gavyn Davies [BBC chairman] and Greg Dyke [BBC director general], attaching articles from David Aaronovitch [journalist] and [John] Simpson [BBC]. PMQs was low-key after all the drama of yesterday but TB did fine, pushed the general vision stuff, also explicit about regime change for the first time. TB called me in later to discuss France, what to do at the summit with Chirac. He was clear we shouldn’t go running after them, that they should come to us. But there was no chance of that at all.

I told TB about Fiona. He reacted, as I knew he would, by saying he couldn’t understand why people got so emotional about this. I said well, it’s going to happen so I have to work out how to handle it. I said it’s true she wasn’t happy with the war, but there were other issues too, chief among them that she now had a bad relationship with CB, despite having successfully helped build a very positive image for her. She felt we had next to no life outside work, and that I gave too much for too little in return. He went into ‘this is ridiculous’ mode. I said Tony, you are talking about Fiona and I won’t have it. He said for God’s sake, I was always saying things about his wife, but this stuff was very difficult, when big political issues were swirling around and they got mixed up with relationships. But if she went and said it was about Iraq, that would look very odd for me because people would think that was my position too.

I said it’s probably a consequence of a build-up of neglect, some of it mine, some of it Cherie’s. He said it was a bit much to have all the things he had to deal with and be expected to keep everyone happy all the time. I had the weekly meeting with Peter M, PG, PH. Peter M was interesting on GB. He felt GB had come back to us a bit because he was worried about Clare, in that if she went it was his last out-and-out support in Cabinet. Whatever the reasons, he was a bit more back on board. TB called me out for another chat on his way up to the flat and we went into the Number 11 study. He said he felt Fiona was probably fed up with being in my shadow and needed a role independent of me. He asked me what I wanted to do. I said if he was going before the election, I may as well go sooner rather than later because I couldn’t imagine working in the same way for a different leader or prime minister. He said in the big moments, like
now, I gave real added value, and I shouldn’t underestimate how important that was to him. So all he asked was that if I did go, I helped find someone who could replace me.

I asked what his plans were. ‘I really don’t know. I’ve never really wanted to fight a third election, but I don’t know, I might.’ I asked if he had done a deal with GB. Not at all, he said, but he didn’t rule it out. He said it was interesting that GB had been more co-operative recently and said JP had been the key to that. JP had basically told him that if TB didn’t want him to get the job, and JP was agin it, it would not happen. In the end, he said, I think it’s wrong for me to think I can pick the next leader, or control what he does. But I do worry about him. I worry about the party and do want it to be well led. Things were definitely in flux again, and it was odd how often it was the really big moments that brought out these situations.

It was a friendly enough chat and although inevitably he was thinking about his own interests too, he did seem to be applying his mind to a decent way out for Fiona. As for me, I said I wasn’t that excited about the euro, which might be the next big thing, and I wasn’t sure I could face doing another election in exactly the same job. Maybe I could leave and come back for that. I told Godric about the Fiona situation. He felt it was potentially bigger than Cook going, because it played into so many different parts of the soap opera, which in the end is what the press love most.

After going to bed late last night, then another row with Fiona over my leaving, and her demanding a departure date NOW, I was woken at 3am by Godric. Did I know action had begun? Then media calls started. GWB had gone on TV to say that preparatory action had begun, taking the MoD totally by surprise, and most of us in Number 10. It transpired that Condi had indeed told David [Manning], who had passed it on to TB, but neither thought to pass it on. It meant we were not ready in the way we should have been. We put together a line that said TB was told just after midnight, and when there were operations with substantial UK involvement, we would say so. GWB later apologised to TB who said all he really cared about was that we now got on with it and won. It turned out the US had some late, sudden intelligence re Saddam’s whereabouts and took the decision to go straight away. They reckoned later he may have been injured, and certainly there was real angst and turmoil being reported from his inner circle. I was up most of the night, got a couple of hours’ sleep and then in for a 7.30 meeting.

TB had a meeting of his inner team (Jonathan, DM, SM, AC) with C, CDS, John Scarlett to get a military and intelligence briefing before being joined by JP, JR, GB, DB etc. John said there were reports of growing internal strife, e.g. pilots being ordered to carry out suicide missions; one-fifth of the Republican Guard deserting. We discussed whether TB should do a broadcast. With our Marines due for action taking a peninsula towards Basra tonight, it was madness to think we could wait another day before TB did a broadcast, so we went ahead with setting it up. Peter H had done a draft but TB was keen to do his own, into which I wrote a couple of clips, but it was basically very much his own voice.

We got hold of the Speaker and GH offered a statement. We were clear we would not be giving a running commentary but statements in the House were going to be an important part of the overall communications. Cabinet was fairly sombre and subdued, and so much better without Clare’s constant muttering and interruptions. Sally and I were chatting about what I should do re Fiona. TB, JS and GH all did a fairly basic reporting job on what was happening. Lots of praise for Hilary A on the whips’ operation. There was a pretty united mood and a lot of understanding for the enormity of the decision, and the pressure on TB now. He still hadn’t decided on RC’s replacement. I was feeling the stress today, just a bit wired, and burdened. When these big moments were on, everyone seemed to want to call, or pop in, and it all just added to the sense of pressure.

We recorded the broadcast at 3pm. TB did fine, though he was blinking a lot. We did it in two takes, and I was watching the camera crew to get a sense of their response. They were definitely following the argument, and I sensed the effect was positive. Then straight to the Bush call. GWB reported on the strike, said they very nearly struck lucky. They were still hopeful. They had another discussion re France and Russia, and Bush signalled he really wanted to go over all that in detail at Camp David. He felt it would be a vital discussion for the future of the world, because these relations were central to the direction the world took. He wanted to get back on decent terms with Putin in particular. Then, apropos of nothing, he said ‘And tell Alastair I am NOT going to kiss his ass, even though you won the vote.’ TB laughed, and said ‘I think he’ll be relieved. He was not exactly looking forward to it.’

On the flight to Brussels [EU summit], Jack S and I were chatting re the French. His basic view of Chirac was really negative. At the meeting, Chirac seemed to be avoiding TB, and wanting it to be
noticed that he was avoiding him. Later, with Chirac sitting at his desk in the meeting room making a call on a mobile, TB went over and shook him by the hand. But it didn’t exactly warm things. When we left the building at the end of the session, we had to walk by Chirac and his entourage to get to the cars, and on seeing TB, he just turned away. De Villepin did likewise. The atmosphere generally was dire. The meeting room was being kept pretty tight so I was relying on Jack’s notes to follow what was going on. Jack came out to tell us that Chirac was trying to remove any reference to Iraq being responsible for the crisis, and [Costas] Simitis [current EU President] was letting him. TB did not say much, and on the occasions I popped in, they seemed to be splitting into groups rather than getting things sorted round the table. It was not a nice atmosphere at all. But in terms of outcome, it was OK for us, and the French did not have as much support as they had hoped for. I had a chat with Schroeder’s team who thought TB’s speech had been ‘brilliant’.

Nick Matthews [senior duty clerk] called me early to say that eight UK Marines and four US servicemen had been killed in a helicopter crash inside Kuwait. Worst possible start to the day. I went out for a run, then back to see TB in his bedroom. He was getting dressed, and reflecting on the news we’d just had. We agreed he should not say anything about it till the press conference. He said that people will be saddened but they understand that these things are going to happen. I sensed he was hiding how he actually felt. He said what mattered now was that we saw through the military campaign. At the summit centre, Schroeder was the first to come over and offer condolences, followed by others. Chirac wrote TB a little note, which was nice of him, and his words were totally devoid of any side or politics. It was interesting how many of the smaller countries were just not prepared to take the Franco-German line on things, and Chirac was definitely weakened around the place.

TB and I discussed euro/GB. GB had definitely been more co-operative recently, and that was largely down to JP. But GB was now keen to include the euro assessment in the Budget, and TB felt he was going to be in a ‘yes but’ position, that there were a number of changes that had to be made, e.g. to the housing market, before we could consider it. We were in the middle of this conversation, just outside the main meeting room, when Chirac came out to have a pee. He walked past us, went to the Gents, and when he came out he and TB both smiled warmly at each other. Chirac went back into the
meeting room, but then came straight back out and walked over to us. ‘
Tony, est-ce qu’on peut avoir un mot?
’ [Could I have a word?] I stepped back a little, Chirac put his hand on TB’s back and steered him a little way down the corridor, where there were fewer people. But most were looking on, whilst trying to look like they weren’t. They chatted for ten minutes or so, and the body language of both was tense.

Chirac said it was time to calm the atmosphere, lower the temperature, that there was nothing to be gained from the kind of mutual aggression we had been showing. He said he could not understand why we had been so aggressive towards him and it was time to call off the press attacks. TB said he could not understand why they had been so aggressive diplomatically. They agreed it was time to make up. But Schroeder’s people were clear with me that Chirac had been hoping to destroy TB on the back of this, and failed. TB had been down at one point but bounced back quickly and won a surprisingly high number of plaudits from fellow leaders here. On the way out to the airport, he said ‘God, it is awful, this war business.’ ‘Yes, that’s why it is usually best to avoid it.’

Then to the Bush call. He said he was sorry about the deaths, then added ‘It’s called sacrificing for peace and freedom.’ He said he thought they had secured the southern oilfield. Rumsfeld reckoned eighty-five per cent of Iraqi oil was secure, so the danger of a self-inflicted environmental attack, or a huge impact on the markets, was limited. We occupy thirty-five per cent of the country. The Scud baskets are under our control. The ground campaign started early. 45,000 troops, US, UK and Australian forces marking the way. Basra should be surrounded today. The Iraqi Army in the north has surrendered. Inside Baghdad there is chaos. There are defections. Saddam’s circle is fracturing. It all sounded a bit too good to be true.