The Burden of Power: Countdown to Iraq - The Alastair Campbell Diaries (92 page)

We saw the press on the plane, and we were making clear the French had to come back and say whether there were any circumstances at all in which they might support military action. I lost it with the staff when I learned the texts and documents had not been issued at the right time. TB was seeing David Margolick [
Vanity Fair
].
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TB was still saying it was the right thing to do. I had lost count of how many times I had heard those same words. We started work on his speech for Tuesday, which was going to have to be one hundred per cent.

The summit came out not too bad, Bush’s ‘moment of truth’ the best top line, the overall sense that the diplomatic process was going nowhere and now we had to gear up on the military side. There was the not insignificant matter of our vote, mapping out in my head a note to send to Dan with an overnight press summary, schedule for the day and stressing how important it was that Bush’s 1am speech did not create problems for us. I said GWB was unlikely to pull any of our people back, but he could push them the other way. I leavened it a bit by telling him the
Guardian
had said Bush was better than Blair yesterday. He called later, said they had built up the ultimatum as I suggested and also injected a lot of conditional material so that it was not simply seen as a declaration of war.

Then to a meeting of TB, JP, GB, JS, JR, HA plus the usual lot to go through the day. Jack was irritating TB a bit by going on about process the whole time and irritating JP who was trying to get a
straight answer to the question of whether RC should do a statement tomorrow or today. Jack and I both felt today was better, on a day of massive events, then GWB in the morning, rather than before TB’s speech. We agreed Greenstock would put down the SCR at 10.15 New York time, that we would say at the 11 there would be a Cabinet at 4, Jack’s statement later and also that the Attorney General would publish his view that there was a solid legal base for action. Jack would go through the motions of talking to his opposite numbers but basically the game was up. De Villepin had rejected it again. GB said we needed to get up the Blix unanswered questions as well. TB was fairly quiet, worrying about his speech and about rebels. We agreed Margaret B should do media so I spoke to her to brief her, then sent over the AG’s opinion and our various texts from yesterday.

I was working on a draft exchange of letters with Clare in case she went. JP went off to see her and reported back that she was probably going. It was all playing totally to her attention-seeking. Jonathan emailed me about the draft exchange of letters, saying ‘Probably better not to have them drafted by someone who so clearly despises her.’ Probably true. Robin called re my draft. I had mentioned the various military situations we had been involved in – Operation Desert Fox, Kosovo, Sierra Leone. He was very funny about it, said ‘I can see why in these circumstances you want to present me as a heroic war leader, but I wonder if you couldn’t put in one or two of my humanitarian triumphs as well.’ He was keen that we make mention of Lockerbie and the International Criminal Court, and also wanted to make clear that he wanted TB to stay on as leader. It was so different dealing with him rather than Clare. He felt she was in a totally ridiculous position. TB was working to keep her in, even suggesting we get Kofi to call her. RC came to see TB and they agreed there was no point in him staying for Cabinet. So Robin and I went round to my office to agree the process. We agreed we wouldn’t put the letters out until 4.15, once Cabinet was in.

We joked about the fact that it was the first resignation letter I had not written. ‘I’ll race you to see whose memoirs that appears in first,’ he said. He was very friendly, seemed liberated, also clear that he had a strong if very different political future ahead of him. He was also very nice to me personally, said we had been through some very difficult times together and he always valued my advice and support. He said there was something oddly fitting about the fact that we had worked so closely at the end of his marriage and were working so closely again at the end of his ministerial career. He wanted to leave by the side door so I walked down with him, we shook hands, he
said ‘I really hope it doesn’t all end horribly for you all,’ and headed off to Birdcage Walk.

TB started Cabinet, introduced Goldsmith, then Clare came in and asked Sally where Robin was. ‘He’s gone,’ said Sal. ‘Oh my God.’ TB’s only reference to Robin was to say that he had resigned. He said French intransigence had made it impossible to get a resolution. We were at an end of the diplomatic process. We intended to issue an ultimatum and seek an endorsement for action if it was necessary. He said we had tried everything to avoid this course. The other big issue was MEPP, and the US had undertaken to publish the road map. He also emphasised the planning that was going on on the humanitarian front. He said Jack and the FCO team had done a brilliant job but an impasse is an impasse and the French block is not conditional but absolute. Jack said nobody could have done more than TB did to keep things within the UN.

I was in and out agreeing final changes to the article Bill Clinton was doing for us for the
Guardian
. I got back in as Peter Goldsmith went through the answer on legal authority to use force. Clare asked if he had had any doubts. He said lawyers all over the world have doubts but he was confident in the position. One by one, a succession of colleagues expressed support, then Clare said she owed them ‘a short statement’, that she intended to reflect overnight. She said publication of the road map was significant but we shouldn’t kid ourselves that it means it is going to happen. She said she admired the effort and energy that had gone into getting a second resolution but there had been errors of presentation. ‘I’m going to have my little agonising overnight. I owe it to you.’ JP, John Reid and one or two others looked physically sick.

JR spoke next, said never underestimate the instincts for unity and understand that we will be judged by the Iraq that replaces Saddam’s Iraq, and by the Middle East. Derry said he felt we would have got a second resolution if the French hadn’t been determined to scupper it, and said we had made so much effort to get a second resolution that it had led to people thinking we actually needed one. Paul Murphy was just back from America and said what an amazing feeling there was towards us there. ‘It’s not quite the same here,’ said TB. JP pointed out we were on the eighteenth SCR dealing with Saddam and it was about time we moved to uphold the UN’s integrity. He said the only reason the Americans went down the UN route at all was because of TB and now he is getting them down the road of the Middle East peace process and deserves all the support we can give.

We had agreed JP would speak in the street post Cabinet. I had drafted a script and he went through it with me and Jack. He went
and did well. TB felt Cabinet had gone well. JP had been terrific. Only Clare was ridiculous. Fittingly, when she spoke, huge gusts of wind had blown through the open window. TB had another call with Bush, fairly inconsequential, mainly about the vote. TB said at the moment we had 190 backbenchers against us and we wanted to bring it down to 150. Bush seemed genuinely surprised when TB said his comments on the Middle East had helped. They both felt the French had mishandled things. He was in very folksy mode, said that TB had ‘heart in your voice and a spring in your step, so that’s fine by me’. He asked TB if he had to be in there in Parliament for ten hours of debate. TB said you get the odd comfort break. GWB laughed. TB said it was tough and would be tight and that French intransigence, plus the Middle East moves, had helped, but also we had to keep the UN in play. He said a lot of our backbenchers were mildly obsessive about the UN and the post-war issues. Robin did his resignation statement, did it very well, a really powerful Commons moment and got a fairly widespread standing ovation. Margaret [Beckett], who was about to do
The World Tonight
[BBC Radio 4], was unimpressed. She called me, felt it was typical Robin, said he would support TB and then call directly on people to vote against action, which, if carried, would defeat the PM and the government. She wanted to go for him but I said it was better simply to say that TB would also be going to the House and would make a case that was logical and powerful and strong. I was surprised at how angry she was with Robin. She said she hoped she could hold her tongue. TB was working on his speech for a good part of the day and it was in good shape. Neil [Kinnock] called and said Robin was one of a very small number of people who could bring catastrophe to the government and even though it was difficult, we should try to keep a bridge out to him. It was pretty clear by now that Clare would be on her way too, if with a lot less impact.

Debate day dominant. GWB’s statement overnight had come out fine. They had taken in all our changes, the ultimatum was calm and strong, the tone towards Iraqi people compassionate, the commitment to the Middle East peace process was in there strong, and all the bellicose stuff either taken out or conditional. So to be fair, they had delivered big time for us. The Robin resignation speech, and the standing ovation in parts of the House, was still getting a lot of play but I sensed that was the high point of the rebellion. I ran in, then up to see TB in the flat. He was on the phone to Blunkett who was
warning him that John Denham [Home Office minister] would resign. Also Philip Hunt [Lord Hunt, junior health minister] went on the radio to resign. That seemed to be about it at the moment. TB was in a pretty calm mood. He felt we were winning some people over on the arguments, but we had a problem in that there were a lot of our MPs who had promised their local parties that they wouldn’t support without a second resolution. This was the unintended effect of the point Derry made yesterday, that we fought so hard to get one that people assumed we needed one before action.

TB had been up early and had rewritten the speech so it was much more his voice. The only ongoing discussion was about whether to keep in the passage about the 1930s [appeasement], or whether really direct comparisons might backfire. It was not yet clear what Clare intended to do. Then we heard a rumour that she was planning to make a statement, which we assumed was a resignation but then learned was to be an announcement she was staying. We had a meeting to organise a pretty much all-day blitz of the airwaves including getting GB live on some of the bulletins. We had Margaret out and about all day doing well. Whether in the House or out, we were at least making the arguments but Hilary said it was still too difficult to judge the outcome. I worked on the Queen’s message to the troops, and spoke to Dan [Bartlett] a couple of times to go over the exact timings of military action. There were going to be a lot of special forces operations around the oilfields, then wait till Friday for a proper announcement. Clare was making a complete fool of herself. TB had done very well keeping her there, but she was now viewed as humiliated. She was pretty much finished. [William] Hague was on to it, had an absolutely brilliant line in the debate, how TB had ‘taken his revenge and kept her’.

TB’s speech in the House was one of his best.
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Very serious, full of real argument, confronting the points of difficulty and we felt it moving our way. He did a brilliant put-down to the Lib Dems [’unified, as ever, in opportunism and error’] which helped the mood behind him. I did another secure call with Dan. It looked like Wednesday late, special forces. Thursday, preparations underway. Friday, ‘A’ day, first Bush, then TB, recall Parliament. By the time I got back in, Sally said there were definitely some people turning
back to us. I got GB out on the media again. He called me into his office for the first time in ages to discuss the line to take on Clare. Stay nice to and about her and not put the boot in. TB’s speech had gone fine and the reaction was good. It was one of those days when people out in the country were actually following what was going on. IDS and Charles Kennedy had both been poor. There had been some excellent back-bench speeches but the interventions didn’t really zing, TB had definitely come out on top.

There were a lot of protesters outside, so I faced a bit of abuse going in, then up to JP’s office to agree the line that we push from the moment the vote was over, that we won the vote, because we won the argument, and now the country should unite. JP asked me to stay back and asked if I had a problem with him. I said no, why? He said he felt I was angry because he screwed up this morning in going for Robin and Hunt and I had kept him off through the day. I said not at all, but it was one of those days when GB seemed up for it and I wanted him out and about as much as possible. We had also used Peter Hain a lot as well. We ended up having a very friendly chat, then going down to wait for the vote, which for the government motion was 412 for and 149 against, and for the rebel motion 396 voting against and 217 for. 139 Labour MPs rebelled. I called Dan B with the result as it came through.

I was in the front office of TB’s Commons office, MPs coming and going, the staff all pretty relieved. TB came back and called everyone in to say thanks. He said we had pulled out the stops and we had to. His own performance today had been superb. All of us, I think, had had pretty severe moments of doubt but he hadn’t really, or if he had he had hidden them even from us. Now there was no going back at all. He had to give authority for our forces to go in and by tomorrow night it would be underway. Everyone was assuming the Americans would start a massive bombing whereas in fact the first action would be some of our forces acting to prevent an ecological disaster. I got to bed by 1am.

TB got the best press he had had for ages, because of the quality of the speech and the fact that he had seen it through. As Bush said on their call later, other leaders would look at what he did, and the power with which he did it, and really learn lessons from it. ‘Landslide,’ he said, referring to the road-map publication as ‘genius’. He referred back to what he called ‘the
cojones
conference’ at Camp David. ‘You showed
cojones
, you never blinked. A leader who leads will win, and
you are a real leader.’ He said the object is regime change and once Saddam is in hiding, that is the beginning of the change. TB felt the next stage after winning the war would be to work out the geopolitical fallout and repair some of the divisions. Bush said Condi had this line that we should ‘punish the French, ignore the Germans and forgive the Russians’, which was pretty glib. TB didn’t comment at the time but later said he didn’t agree. We should try to build bridges with all of them. We finally got Bush to agree that there was no point TB going to the US at the moment, that we should wait until the fighting starts. ‘You’re one of the few leaders they let me see,’ said Bush.