The Channel Islands At War (11 page)

His thinking on what this action might involve was highly confused. At one point he spoke of small raids on moonless nights in periods of bad weather; at another of larger raids when tide and weather conditions were favourable. Even allowing for full scale attack his preparations were excessive, and a mixture of other reasons was put forward. The British could raid German submarine bases from the Islands if they captured them and, once there, the Islands would become another Malta for them. Strong German control would protect a large part of the French coast, and provide a forward base for Channel communications. In fact, the strategic arguments were all weak; the real reason for the excessive fortification was that as an OKW document said on 10 June 1941, ·consideration must be taken that after the conclusion of peace the Channel Islands will remain German territory and must be unassailable'.

Through the summer months and early autumn of 1941 reinforcement went ahead and 319 Division settled in. Mrs Tremayne noticed large guns and small French tanks arriving on Sark, as well as stocks of timber to build huts for the troops. The garrison there rose to 300. On 5 October, General Schmundt, Hitler's adjutant, came to
the Islands and von Schme
ttow told him he lacked almost every basic requirement for completing their defences. On 8 October and ten days later two OKW meetings considered the Channel Islands and reinforcement and fortification policies were linked together. On 20 October the directive for
eine unangriefbare Festung
in the Islands was issued. Organization Todt, based at St Malo, and, from February 1943 on Cherbourg was ordered to carry out the work, and Dr Fritz Todt himself visited the Islands in November 1942 to organize Operations Jakob (Jersey), Gustav (Guernsey), and Adolf (Alderney). At the meeting. Hitler had demanded not only heavier artillery of every kind but up to 250 strong points. Detailed maps with line illustrations were prepared for each Island (those for Guernsey still survive), and on one occasion the man in charge of them was dismissed for not updating them. Von
Schmettow
was delighted with the increased importance of his command, and as a Christmas present he sent the F
ü
hrer a specially commissioned account of the Islands which Schmundt had the pleasure of reading in part to Hitler on Christmas Eve 1941. There was a chorus of opposition from OKH and Army Group D saying the Islands would only duplicate existing defences on the mainland, and offer a hostage to fortune since German prestige would require they should not be surrendered. Hitler simply pressed ahead.

Year by year the fortifications proceeded and were still being built when D-Day slowed them down with the departure of most Todt workers in July 1944. By January 1944,484,000 cubic metres of concrete fortifications adorned the Islands. In February, the three Islands were declared fortresses and three fortress governors appointed; von Schmettow, Heine, and Schwalm. Next month the Feldkommandantur or civilian military organization was reduced in status to prepare the way for fortress life. There is little doubt that von Schmettow thought the policy mistaken, and more f
ervent Nazis in the Kriegsmarine
began a campaign against him. This was led
by Vice-Admiral Friedrich
Hüffmeier
who, Donitz told Hitler in November 1944, believed the Islands could hold out to the end of

1945 provided the civilian population was sacrificed. When he eventually became fortress commander in February 1945 H
ü
ffmeier's first order of the day stated, i have only one aim: to hold out until final victory', and Mrs Tremayne heard he had said his men would eat grass before he surrendered.

The fortifications constructed were almost bewildering in their number and complexity. Because of the threat of air attack, underground works played an important part involving massive movement of earth and concrete tunnelling. On the main Islands, sixteen tunnels were planned, although only three were fully completed with air-conditioning, central heating, hot and cold water, power, drainage and emergency escape shafts. In Jersey, one at St Lawrence involving the removal of 14.000 tons of earth and absorbed 4,000 tons of concrete. Nine workers were killed
by a rock fall and left unburie
d behind it. On Guernsey there were two tunnels. One by St Sampson's Church was used for munitions; the other at La Vassalerie with one-and-a-half miles of tunnel was used as a hospital. There were 900 medical corps and nurses on the Islands, and the hospitals were able to treat hundreds of wounded from St Malo. During the building of this tunnel. 22 workers were killed,
and buried later at Les Vauxbele
ts.

On Alderney, apart from an escape tunnel for the commandant of Sylt concentration camp, and a few other small tunnels, the main ones were east of the upper Braye Road leading out of St Anne. On Sark, 'the whole Island is burrowed and tunnelled'. A tunnel linking Stocks Hotel with the headquarters at Le Manoir was still being completed and furnished in August 1944.

Inland there were field fortifications, but the main defences were naturally built on the coast or near to it as a second line of resistance. Older military buildings were frequently utilized. On Alderney. Fort Albert; on Guernsey, Castle Cornet and Fort George: and on Jersey. Elizabeth Castle and Fort Henry were among the medieval and Victorian castles that echoed to German commands. Fort George was used for court martials, interrogation, and military or Todt executions while Elizabeth Castle was the Todt punishment laager. Old martello towers and mills were utilized or pulled down if they interrupted the artillery's range. Where there were no such towers, communications required them, and seven
marinepeilstande
unique to the Islands were built like those at Chouet in Guernsey or Les Landes in Jersey.

There was a network of smaller works including fortified posts, machine-gun nests, and machine-gun turrets. Along beaches and bays were the usual barbed-wire, mined stakes, and searchlights, and where beaches provided easy access for landing-craft or vehicles, anti-tank walls six metres high and two metres thick were built.
'Huge concrete walls', said Sine
l, 'disfigure many of our lovely bays', although they later proved so durable as to become part of Island sea defences. Above all, there was intensive mining of the Islands. By the end there were no less than 177.925 mines distributed in 305 locations, if half the mines they have laid go off, this little Island will go up in smoke', wrote Julia Tremayne.

The only victims of the mines, apart from British commandos in 1943, were accidental ones. On Sark, th
e Commandant, Major Johann Hinke
l was killed by a mine in March 1943 and only a few months later two German soldiers were killed by suspended mines while looking for gulls eggs on the cliffs. Those who suffered most were fishermen whose lives were made a misery
by restrictions, and military w
ar games, as well as by the deadly mines. In June 1943, 'Four poor Guernsey fishermen were caught in a minefield last week. Two were kil
led outright, and the other two,
who were good swimmers, were saved, but their boat was blown to bits.'

Mounted in the fortifications was a formidable array of anti-aircraft and other artillery. In Jersey alone there were 15 heavy batteries, containing 59 guns, and 137 anti-aircraft positions including 37 with the renowned 88mm 'flak' guns. Practices were frequent, with shells roaring over the Islands, and many gun positions brought disruption and misery to families that lived near them. Molly Finigan wrote that, 'Although our curfew hours were 9 p.m. or sometimes 10 p.m. - some early mornings Germans would knock on our doors and tell us to get out and leave the house -usually this order came at approximately 4 or 5 a.m.
"Achtu
ng, achtung",
would be
the cry. All along the top of Le
s Cotils were several gun emplacements with very big guns and we would all have to leave the house while the practicising of these great guns was carried out. All doors and windows had to be left open and off we had to go.'

Besides the daily misery inflicted there was a more permanent result -the systematic damage to historical sites, property, and attractive views. Mrs Cortvriend summarized the effect of the fortifications on the environment as, 'Famous beauty spots became vistas of incredible ugliness covered with huge excavations, massive concrete blockhouses and gun emplacements. Houses, cottages, gardens, trees, or anything that was in the way were ruthlessly swept aside before the encroaching tide of steel and concrete.

Part 2

Ruled
by
the Third Reich

The German Rulers and their Organizations

Hitler's new Order in Europe, of which the Channel Islands formed a tiny fragment, was not based on any rational theory of government or long considered plan for European unity. He knew how to force conquered territories to pay the cost of their own occupation. Up to March 1944. the Channel Islands paid over two million marks in occupation costs although later the Germans bore the brunt of the fortification costs. Hitler's government knew, too, how to imprison, enslave, execute and torture the virtually endless enemies of an Aryan-dominated Europe. "Shoot everyone who gives you a black look', he once remarked, and his personal responsibility for such decrees as the Final Solution, hostage-taking, and commando extermination is well known. All F
ü
hrer orders increased and never decreased suffering. Gradually the powers of the Gestapo and SS prevailed until much of Europe, in Michel's famous phrase, 'became a prison until such time as it became a graveyard".

But in day to day administration Hitler's empire was an administrative jungle. Rival individuals and organizations jockeyed for power, and systems created for one purpose were soon overturned by some new F
ü
hre
r order, or Reich authority responsible only to himself. Each Western country had a different regime. The Channel Isles were in the war zone, and could not have a civilian government, or even the presence and help of Switzerland, the British protecting power during the war. The Islands therefore had a military government, and eventually became four fortresses with a resident civilian population.

Those who arrived in charge of the occupying forces in June 1940 were temporary commanders, and their rule lasted eleven weeks. Major Albrecht Lanz on Guernsey and Captain Erich Gussek on Jersey were, however, responsible for issuing on 2 and 8 July the ordinances regulating the German government, stating the Germans had 'taken over the military power of the Islands', leaving the existing civilian government and law courts intact, but subject to veto by the commandant. Sark was to be automatically included in any Guernsey orders, while Alderney had no government until February 1941, and no formal commander until July that year. The ease with which the Germans accomplished their task, and their belief that they were going on to
the mainland before long, meant
that the early months of occupation as far as the administrators on the Islands were concerned were a period of surprisingly good relations. Ambrose Sherwill, in his Radio Bremen broadcast on 8 August 1940, said 'The Lieutenant-Governor and Bailiff, Mr Victor Carey, and every other Island official has been, and is being treated, with every consideration and with the greatest courtesy by the German military authorities ..."

Speaking to the states later he said 'May this occupation be a model to the world - on one hand tolerance on the part of the military authority and courtesy and correctness on the part of the occupying forces, and on the other, dignity and courtesy and exemplary behaviour on the part of the civilian population; perfect obedience to law and order, conformity - the strictest conformity - with blackout regulations and with orders and regulations issued by the German commandant and the civil authorities.'

The Germans stated that if good relations continued, 'the life and property of the population will be respected and guaranteed'. They broke their side of the bargain, but the Island governments kept theirs.

On 9 August 1940 the military government of the Channel Islands was established. It consisted of two parts: a military organization for civilian affairs, and an occupation garrison under military command. The administration came under the military government of France run from St Germain by Otto and, from January 1942, Heinrich-Karl von Stulpnagel. The Islands were part of District A, Departement de La Ma
nche, headed by General Schreibe
r, and were run by Feldkommandantur 515, formed in Munich, which had seen service in Luxemburg, before transferring to the Channel Islands. Their headquarters were in Victoria College House on Jersey while day-to-day business on the Island was handled from offices in the town hall in York Street, St Helier. On Guernsey their headquarters were at Grange Lodge Hotel, and their St Peter Port office was in the Islands Hotel (now the Savoy). Although there were arguments about jurisdiction, and an external enquiry, the structure remained unchanged until 19 May 1944 when the administration's status was reduced to that of Platzkommandantur (PKI), and the final appeal in the courts was transferred to the military.

The first Feldkommandant was Major Friedrich Schumacher, an elderly, portly man, who was in the Islands for a year before he was replaced in October 1941 by Major Fricdrich Knackfuss. He left in February 1944, and was replaced by Major I.V. Hcider who became Platzkommandant and remained in that position until February 1945 when a shake-up took place in the personnel of the occupation government. The branch or
nebenstelle
in Guernsey was run by Major Kratzer, and two Sonderfuhrer (a title with no precise equivalent in English) were responsible for Alderney and an outpost at Granville handling economic and shipping matters. Alderney was brought into the administrative structure in 1941, wit
h the appointment of SF Heinz He
rzog who established his headquarters in Lloyd's Bank in Victoria Street, St Anne.

There is general agreement that in spite of harsh orders and violations of the Hague Convention which FK515 administrators were required to issue, their conduct of affairs was often intelligent and sympathetic. The