The Channel Islands At War (21 page)

The last three chapters have considered three form
s of collaboration. Frank Falla,
one of the most hostile writers about the war years, estimated a very small percentage of Islanders were involved. As far as working for the Germans for wages or helping them to benefit from the black market this was untrue. Exact details of informers are unknown, but it seems that they were numbered only in hundreds. Fraternizing between Island women and Germans was widespread, even though the number of illegitimate children was less than contemporary opinion believed. The difficulty in assessing collaboration is that it was never defined in law. No collaborators ever stood trial, and details of accusations made in 1945 still remain secret.

Part 4

The Dangerous and Lonely Decision: Resistance

Espionage and Undercover Information

Immediately after the war a flood of books came out dealing with resistance in occupied Europe and Britain's role in supporting it. The work of the Commandos, Small Sca
le Raiding Forces, MI9 helping escape
rs and evaders, SOE arming, and financing foreign resistance and particularly the courage of individual agents who had taken
off from airfields like Tangmere
and Tempsford for Nazi-occupied Europe were all admired.

Britain's role, described by the distinguished French historian Henri Michel as decisive in every aspect of resistance, seemed beyond reproach as did the conduct of those who organized and took part in resistance. In Europe resistance was given the highest possible profile since it indicated that basic human rights and self-respect had been maintained in a world where European civilization had turned into a charnel house.

Claims of all kinds were made about the value of this resistance. It had helped rescue
and protect evaders and POW e
scapers. It had carried out sabotage of the Nazi economy, and of particular sites vital to German war effort. It had provided intelligence vital to D-Day. By raising armed forces, it had tied down large numbers of German divisions in Western Europe which could have gone east if the population had been completely cowed. In 1944 and 1945 it played a vital military role in disrupting communications. It paved the way for the return to political normality, and helped to discourage collaboration and purge the body politic of Fascism. Besides these practical contributions there was the simple fact that resistance killed Nazis while others were doing their bidding.

Henri Michel wrote, 'there was not a single occupied country which did not give birth to its clandestine resistance', but this was untrue. The Channel Islands produced no organized resistance either by the British government, so keen to foster and praise it elsewhere, or by the Island governments. Writing in 1971 Norman Longmate commented that, 'it is hardly a matter of pride that the Channel Islands should have been the only enslaved country without a resistance movement, though one can feel grateful that as a result they were spared the murders, massacres and atrocities which marked German rule elsewhere'.

During the 1970s, attitudes towards the success or even the wisdom of resistance began to change. As memories of Nazi rule faded, and wartime

heroism and patriotism became less immediate emotions, historians probed the case for resistance. They said that by creaming off many of the best men and women, and in the process killing a high percentage of them, secret armies and resistance forces deprived the regular forces of much valuable talent: the Channel Islands raids, for example, produced little tangible success, and led to the death of some of those involved. It began to be stressed that bravery was not an individual matter: it involved others because the Germans took reprisals against the i
nnocent. In Sark, Julia Tremayne
said the second raid brought them more misery, and on occas
ions, such as evasion by Nicolle
and Symes or the cutting of cables, the Germans acted harshly on the Islands as a foretaste of what might happen if resistance got going in a substantial way. In France at Romainville prison, where a number of Channel Islanders were to end up, a supply of hostages was kept to be drawn on every time a German or Vichy official was killed.

The Germans were skilful operators of the police state, and employed informers and native Fascists anxious to betray fellow countrymen. They were equally skilled in refinements of execution and torture, and resistance enabled them to put these ideas into practice. Historians suggest the Gestapo and the SS were nourished by resistance, and lives were sacrificed for little purpose other than individual protest.

Close study of resistance showed, too, a mixture of motives. There were the brave, disinterested, and patriotic; there were also time-serving politicians, criminals who enjoyed breaking the law, and sadists who enjoyed killing people. Some were there, as M.R.D. Foot wrote, 'for the tobacco and the rumours of easy women'.

On the Channel Islands, Ambrose Sherwill's plea in August 1940 to refrain from provocative behaviour, adhere to the 'strictest conformity' with German orders, and make the occupation 'a model to the world' was heeded to the end by the overwhelming majority of Islanders. In a sense the of
ficial line adopted by Coutanche
, Carey, and Leale seems to have anticipated the shift in historians' views because they argued resistance was futile, dangerous, and counter-productive. Their view is strongly endorsed by Charles Cruickshank who wrote, it is manifestly impossible that there should have been in the Channel Islands anything like the resistance movements which developed in the larger countries occupied by the Germans." He described the action of discouraging resista
nce as 'simply plain commonsense’
,
and agreed that such people as e
scapers placed innocent lives at risk by their actions. Just as the Island governments hushed up what resistance there was and ill-rewarded the resisters, so Cruickshank largely ignores the courage and significance of unofficial resistance which did lead Islanders to take the lonely decision to oppose the Germans.

There are arguments on both sides in the Islands as elsewhere in Europe. Something on a similar scale to European resistance was impossible: the weight of the German presence, and the difficulty of escape were strong arguments. The Channel Islands were not a country, but only part of one, and neither their local government nor Whitehall had given any indication that resistance was to be encouraged or

favoured. Without direct help by MI9 for escapers, or SOE with sabotage, resistance was hamstrung by British government action, and could only be amateur and piecemeal. Officially the Islands were in a war zone subject to military law, and it seemed likely that the death penalty, so often alluded to in notices, would be enforced. It was certainly passed on a number of occasions and, with the disappearance of Islanders to prisons in Nazi Europe, resistance was unwise. If the relative moderation of the Germans and their good relations with the Island rulers were taken into account, it seemed wisest not to disturb this balance by acts which at best could be pinpricks to German power. Larger measures would only provoke savage reprisals and the deaths of innocent Islanders. It was official policy not to resist. It was illegal under the Hague Convention for occupied people to take reprisals. The last Royal Order had told the authorities to carry on the government to the best of their ability. Other arguments pointed in a different direction. Small acts of resistance were not trivial. A myriad of such acts added up to a substantial burden on the nerves and resources of the occupiers, diverted resources, and prevented propaganda from further reducing the will to resist. In an atmosphere where Mrs Tremayne setting out one afte
rnoon to chalk up V-for-Victory
signs lost her nerve, every little act had some significance. As Mrs Cortvriend pointed out, however estimable individual Germans were, collectively they were cogs in the German war machine, and "to oil a cog was to increase the machine's efficiency'.

A price had to be paid for lack of Island resistance: the suffering inflicted went unchecked and unpunished, and the German war machine functioned without interruption at the expense of the Allies.

Obtaining intelligence was a major risk for resisters, and in the case of the Channel Islands was of two kinds: until the summer of 1944, details of the garrison were needed; thereafter details of the food situation had to be smuggled out. Brave men did this at great risk to themselves. Major Crawford-Morrison, organized the most important of the groups concerned with military intelligence. In his official position as ARP Controller he had a car, and was able to hold meetings without arousing suspicion at the Picquet House (later National Westminster Bank) in Royal Square, St Helier on Saturday afternoons when crowds assembled to hear the German band outside. William Crawford-Morrison, and his main helper
s the two brothers. Majors Manley
and Major L'Amy, worked away for years until they had acquired a schedule of military fortifications on Jersey. Some of the information was gathered personally by such simple expedients as asking the Germans to notify him of their times of artillery practice so he could warn people of possible damage or noise, or on another occasion memorizing a map of German defences on the wall of von Schmettow's office. Crawford-Morrison also operated a network of agents, some of whom worked as drivers or servants for the Germans. One was the gardener at Knackfuss' residence at Linden Court, Frederick Cook. As states surveyor, L'Amy was able to move freely about the Island and spy on German positions. Their information was filmed by Stanley Green, the local cinema projector operator.

Getting information off the Islands proved difficult, but some was entrusted to escapers, and when Crawford-Morrison and his wife were deported to Biberach he decided to take a copy of the information with him. Although the Germans searched his coat and shoes thoroughly, they did not look in the lining of his flat cap where the plans were hidden. When some of the internees were repatriated to England Crawford-Morrison entrusted the material to one of them, and it reached the British secret service. After he had gone the Germans curbed ARP activity and clearly had their suspicions, but Major L'Amy continued the work helped by Monsieur Lambert, the French consul on Guernsey, who was involved in a number of resistance activities which he would not discuss after the war because he had violated his diplomatic privilege. Information had been obtained about naval defences on Guernsey from a Frenchman, Xavier Golivet, who was an electrician worked for the Germans. Lambert agreed to help him escape if he would take the information, but a boat had to be found.

Lambert approached two brothers, John and Thomas Le Page. They had no near relatives, so there was no risk of immediate repri
sals. They agreed to take Golive
t and his dangerous cargo out. Lambert made a waterproof container for the documents which could be dropped overboard if the boat was searched. The Pages knew the French Consul because when their own fishing boat had been damaged in a collision with a German patrol vessel he had given them the
Et
oile de Marin
which the brothers had improved by inserting
a 6/8 horsepower engine. Golive
t began to go out with them on fishing trips so that suspicion would not be aroused. Night after night in January 1945, Lambert, Golivet and the Page brothers waited for the coincidence of fog and tide they needed for a successful evasion of the tight German fishing regulations. Eight nights passed, but on the morning of 23 January conditions were perfect. It was neap tide, and mist had reduced visibility to about two miles. Shortly before eleven that morning Golivet and the Pages arrived at Albert Pier. While discussions were taking place with the Marine Guards Golivet slipped into the public toilet where Lambert handed over more documents.

As usual, the Pages were required to give details of their intended trip, and said they were going east to pick up lobster pots, and would then turn southwards. They left harbour and sailed towards the Great Russel
l
where they turned north between Herm and Sark to avoid the German patrol boat. At two o'clock the mist lifted, but by then they were ten miles off Sark and were undetected. Darkness fell as they passed Cape de Flamanville, close inshore, and shots rang out. The boat came in on a sandy beach where they were surrounded by American troops who took them to Cherbourg. Their boat was brought in, and a plane sent off to circle the Island to let Lambert know they had succeeded. The Pages were then sent to London where they presented their
documents and an up-to-the-date
report on the food situation.

L'Amy continued to smuggle information out of Jersey, and in February 1945 five boys, two brothers called Le Gallais, C.A. Luxon, and two others, possibly called Foster and Avard or Havard, were entrusted with this. A boat was obtained from one of L'Amy's informants, William Gladden, a boat-builder living at St Martins, and petrol for it was found by one of the Island doctors. An old furniture van was used to move the boat to Fauvic Beach, and, as there was no horse available, the boys pulled the van themselves past unsuspecting Germans. They left Fauvic Beach on the evening of 22 February, and arrived in France next day. The firing of a gun at a prearranged time from the mainland informed L'Amy they had arrived safely.