The Circle (70 page)

“At this time, Captain Packer had given his first rudder order, left standard, with no indication of alarm or urgency. During this period, Lenson was on and off the port wing. The receiver was at least twenty feet from him, with a doorway intervening. Thus it is not surprising that he did not hear the transmission. Lieutenant Evlin, the OOD, apparently was on the port side, by the chart table, checking the solution that he had been ordered to work out by the captain.

“Where was Packer?

“The evidence shows that he was either on the centerline of the bridge, using the alidade, or more likely standing by his chair on the starboard side. In the first instance, he would be fifteen feet from the receiver; in the second, he would have been beside it. In either case, he was the closest man to it.

“Conclusion: The commanding officer was the most likely person to have heard
Kennedy
's signal changing her course, and probably, considering the low volume and the locations of the other officers, he was the only one who did.

“Let's go on to something that I only learned this morning, with the receipt of a message from USS
Garcia.
Her captain informs me that from 0100 to 0330 on the 25th, his primary receiver was inoperative. He was operating with his secondary, which had lower sensitivity.
Garcia
states that although he received the formation turn signal, which went out with the carrier's antennas basically pointing at him, he did not receive or hear the ‘mike corpen' signal. Yet Captain Javits stated that he received an acknowledgment from
Garcia.

“At the time, it seemed unimportant.
Garcia
wasn't involved in the collision. But now we see that the testimony on this point was inaccurate. The signal went out to five ships; it was acknowledged by four. We thought the missing ship was
Ryan.
It now appears that it was
Garcia.

“Conclusion: It is probable that the ‘mike corpen' two-five-zero signal was not only received but acknowledged by
Ryan
's captain.

“Now, at one minute and forty-five seconds before the collision, we see from Exhibit E that the bearing and range of
Kennedy
from
Ryan
was zero-six-zero true, two thousand yards. Yardner and Pettus testified that it was then Captain Packer abruptly ordered his helm left full and shortly thereafter left hard. What were his other choices? A centered rudder would have resulted in a head-on collision. He could have slowed; could have brightened his lights; he could have sounded his whistle. But all of these would have taken time, the one thing he did not have.

“In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, Commander Packer must be presumed to have acted as a reasonable and prudent officer would have
in that circumstance.

“And, in fact, it is likely that if
Kennedy
had really been on a course of two-five-zero—
as she had just told
Ryan
she was
—rather than five or ten degrees away, and swinging toward it, Packer's actions would have resulted in
Ryan
passing clear, this court would not be sitting, and one hundred and seventy-eight men would still be alive.

“Conclusion: It was the misleading signal that led to his last-minute increase in left rudder and the subsequent collision.

“With these facts in mind, it is easy to reconstruct the chain of events that led to the accident.

“My narrative begins with the conversation between Evlin and Commander Packer. The captain had formulated a maneuver he would make if
Kennedy
came to recovery course and he was instructed to take plane guard again. He indicated the intention to come right to one-three-zero true until
Kennedy
bore about zero-one-zero true, then turn left and slide into position behind her.

“Mr. Evlin objected, but Packer overruled him in view of the hortatory but ill-advised message from Rear Admiral Hoelscher. This ended the discussion, and he left the bridge.

“No one will ever know what effect Evlin's recommendation had on him. It seems logical to conclude that it had some effect. In the time between this discussion and the commencement of the maneuver, while he was getting his pipe, it is reasonable to think that Commander Packer reexamined this decision in the privacy of his cabin. As he did, he probably realized that Evlin's suggestion had some merit, though not in the way the lieutenant meant it.

“That is, Packer must have belatedly realized that one-three-zero would take him wide of the carrier and that he would conclude the maneuver aft of her and somewhat wide of station. During the turn that would then be necessary to reach it, he would be falling astern every moment. If he did so, he would never regain position. Why? Because
Ryan
had boiler power available for only about 29 or 30 knots, and the recovery speed was twenty-seven. Losing speed in the turn, and accelerating only gradually, he would lag behind the carrier, and would take long minutes—perhaps as long as half an hour—to regain station, if indeed he ever did.

“This, if anything, would constitute ‘sluggish maneuvering' in Admiral Hoelscher's book.

“I believe he then formulated a different maneuver in his mind. When he felt
Ryan
heel, he went to the bridge and found Evlin on a course of one-three-zero, as directed. He took the conn from him and ordered a course change to zero-nine-zero. Then, waiting as
Kennedy
closed, watching her intently, he ordered a left rudder. What was in his mind?

“I believe that he intended to fulfill his orders to maneuver smartly by steaming down
Kennedy
's port side at close range, then executing a Williamson turn. As the Court knows, this is a high-speed course reversal used to pick up men overboard. Its effect is to bring the ship rapidly around in a loop so that she has swapped ends and is steaming back along her original wake.

“At the moment of maximum danger, however, Packer hears the carrier announce she is not on two-six-zero but on two-five-zero. Taken aback, he acknowledges the signal, simultaneously considering how to react. Looking at
Kennedy,
he may very well have concluded that he was actually on her starboard bow, as he would have been if she had swung a little past two-five-zero in coming to it—certainly not unlikely. Remember, as Captain Javits has said, destroyermen are taught to regard a carrier with ‘caution and to some degree even suspicion.'”

“Now Packer had to act. The range was closing rapidly. His rudder was already left. He did not have time to reverse it, and if he believed he was on her starboard bow, such an order would have been fatal, anyway. His decision was to increase his rudder to left full.

“A few seconds later, with horror, he must have noted that
Kennedy
's bearing was nearly constant. He immediately increased rudder and ordered emergency flank speed. Unfortunately, as Lieutenant Talliaferro has testified, he was disappointed in this because of the slow response of the engines due to water remaining in the fuel tanks from ballasting in the Arctic—a decision he made reluctantly, and events bore him out.

“So, at hard left rudder and high speed,
Ryan
tried to shoot across the bow of an oncoming ship thirty-five times heavier than she was. If she had traveled another two hundred feet, she would have made it. If she had made another hundred feet,
Kennedy
would have hit her fantail, damaging her, but without much loss of life, since most of the crew were midships and forward.

“But the emergency speed was not forthcoming. There was a collision, and
Ryan
went down.

“Every fact in this narrative is in the record. The proximate cause of the collision was Admiral Hoelscher's ill-advised threat. The immediate cause was Captain Javits's mistaken course signal.

“It is true that Commander Packer did not inform
Kennedy
of his intentions, nor did he use his whistle. It can be said that his only thought at that point was to save his ship. No knowledge given to
Kennedy
could have done that. Signals could not have changed the momentum of thousands of tons of steel.

“We have now covered the major causes of the collision and found Commander Packer guiltless. Let us now go on to contributing causes.

“There is no reason why the plane guard could not have been stationed prior to turning the carrier to recovery course. Doubtless because it takes a few seconds more, it was not Hoelscher's policy.

“Next, Commander Packer was called on to perform like an expert on the first night he had been with the formation, after four months in the yard and two and a half weeks of independent steaming.

“Finally, there is the question of the adequacy of an old ship like
Ryan
to keep up with modern carriers.
Kennedy
can make upward of thirty or thirty-five knots. If we're honest, we must conclude that
Ryan
could actually manage no more than about twenty-eight or twenty-nine on the night in question. The task group commander and the commanding officer of
Kennedy
had no compunction about maneuvering at very high speeds, and there is no evidence they gave any thought to the demands this placed on their screening units.

“But we should not place the mantle of guilt solely on the shoulders of Captain Javits and Rear Admiral Hoelscher. The maneuver that ended this time in disaster has been performed many times before, and as Captain Javits has pointed out, is probably being performed at this moment somewhere on the oceans of the world. At least two ships to my knowledge have been lost to collisions with carriers since World War Two. One wonders how many near-misses there have been. Unfortunately, last Christmas Eve, all the links in the chain of circumstances were there for disaster.

“I submit that if
Ryan
had not been run down, it might have been
Bordelon, Belknap, Laffey,
or
Claude Ricketts.
If the carrier had not been
Kennedy,
it might have been
Coral Sea
or
Enterprise.
By assigning blame to one man, we set the stage for recurrence of such disasters. I respectfully ask the Court to bear that in mind when they find where the responsibility for it lies.

“I know that in so doing, they will decide that the captain of USS
Reynolds Ryan,
Commander James J. Packer, USN, performed his final duties coolly, competently, and in the best traditions of the naval service.”

*   *   *

COUNSEL for Lieutenant Evlin then made the following oral argument.

*   *   *

“PRESIDENT and members of the Court: The able counsel for the Court, together with the other counsels, parties, and witnesses, have set forth in the course of this inquiry every detail concerning a maritime disaster that resulted in the loss of a fine ship and nearly two hundred men.

“It is unnecessary for me to recount again a narrative that has been reiterated until the final moments of
Ryan
have been engraved on our memories forever. It would be presumptuous for me, as a civilian, to attempt to tell you what your findings should be. You have far more experience than I at sea and can judge both with wisdom and compassion.

“That said, I would like to make a few remarks about Lieutenant Alan Evlin.

“During this hearing, Lieutenant Evlin has been the subject of the lowest sort of gossip and character assassination, such sly and loathsome chatter as I never heard during my time in service, though I have since—in divorce cases. Now we hear dismaying hints of the motives that may have lain behind those insinuations. No, sir, you need not object; I will say no more about Commander Bryce's testimony. Far too much has been heard about it already.

“We are concerned rather in this hearing with Lieutenant Evlin's performance in the half hour or so prior to his heroic death—for his last act, fighting the flames as
Ryan
was going down, can only be described as that of a hero. He gave his life for his shipmates. Is this the act of an incompetent coward? I think you will agree it is not.

“Instead, we see from all the testimony here given that in the last moments of his career, Lieutenant Evlin acted wisely and correctly. He recommended a safe maneuver to the captain and persisted to the point of argument when he was overruled. Once given his orders, however, he carried them out punctiliously, meanwhile setting his junior partner to a continuous surveillance of the prime source of danger.

“In the last moments before collision, yielding the conn to the captain as naval law requires, he nevertheless did not turn aside. He plotted the new course and advised Packer he was standing into danger. Our account of subsequent events is spotty, but it is clear he continued to assist the captain until all hope was gone. When
Ryan
drifted broken like a child's toy, to whom did James Packer turn for an opinion? To Evlin. It is evident that the commander of
Ryan,
whether or not he was ultimately responsible for the disaster, had the highest confidence in his senior watch officer.

“Finally, when ‘abandon ship' was passed, did Evlin follow the dictates of fear? No. He went in harm's way to save his shipmates, and paid for their lives with his own.

“Members of the Court, I believe that considering these facts, you will conclude that if you had been in charge on
Ryan
's bridge in those terrible last moments, you could have wished for no better officer beside you than Alan Evlin. Quiet, deliberate, selfless, courageous, he was a man the Navy could ill afford to lose. I have been proud to represent him, and I thank you for that opportunity.”

*   *   *

THERE being no further arguments, the counsel for the Court closed as follows:

Although the widest latitude has been given to parties and counsel for argument, this Court will base its findings solely on evidence produced in Court and not on theory, conjecture, hearsay, or hypothesis.