Read The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order Online
Authors: Samuel P. Huntington
Tags: #Current Affairs, #History, #Modern Civilization, #Non-fiction, #Political Science, #Scholarly/Educational, #World Politics
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (60 page)
F08
Raspail’s
Le Camp des Saints
was first published in 1973 (Paris, Editions Robert Laffront) and was issued in a new edition in 1985 as concern over immigration intensified in France. The novel was dramatically called to the attention of Americans as concern intensified in the United States in 1994 by Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy, “Must It Be the Rest Against the West?”
Atlantic Monthly,
v. 274 (Dec. 1994), pp. 61ff., and Raspail’s preface to the 1985 French edition was published in English in
The Social Contract,
v. 4 (Winter 1993-94), pp. 115-117.
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It should be noted that, at least in the United States, terminological confusion exists with respect to relations between countries. “Good” relations are thought to be friendly, cooperative relations; “bad” relations are hostile, antagonistic relations. This usage conflates two very different dimensions: friendliness vs. hostility and desirability vs. undesirability. It reflects the peculiarly American assumption that harmony in international relations is always good and conflict always bad. The identification of good relations with friendly relations, however, is valid only if conflict is never desirable. Most Americans think it was “good” that the Bush administration made U.S. relations with Iraq “bad” by going to war over Kuwait. To avoid the confusion over whether “good” means desirable or harmonious and “bad” undesirable or hostile, I will use “good” and “bad” only to mean desirable and undesirable. Interestingly if perplexingly, Americans endorse competition in American society between opinions, groups, parties, branches of government, businesses. Why Americans believe that conflict is good within their own society and yet bad between societies is a fascinating question which, to the best of my knowledge, no one has seriously studied.
F10
No single statement in my
Foreign Affairs
article attracted more critical comment than: “Islam has bloody borders.” I made that judgment on the basis of a casual survey of intercivilizational conflicts. Quantitative evidence from every disinterested source conclusively demonstrates its validity.
F11
In a prediction which may be right but is not really supported by his theoretical and empirical analysis, Quigley concludes: “Western civilization did not exist about
A.D.
500; it did exist in full flower about
A.D.
1500, and it will surely pass out of existence at some time in the future, perhaps before
A.D.
2500.” New civilizations in China and India, replacing those destroyed by the West, he says, will then move into their stages of expansion and threaten both Western and Orthodox civilizations. Carroll Quigley,
The Evolution of Civilizations: An Introduction to Historical Analysis
(Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979; first published by Macmillan in 1961), pp. 127, 164-66.
Chapter 1
p. 323
1
. Henry A. Kissinger,
Diplomacy
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 23-24.
2
. H. D. S. Greenway’s phrase,
Boston Globe,
3 December 1992, p. 19.
3
. Vaclav Havel, “The New Measure of Man,”
New
York Times,
8 July 1994, p. A27; Jacques Delors, “Questions Concerning European Security,” Address, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Brussels, 10 September 1993, p. 2.
4
. Thomas S. Kuhn,
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 17-18.
5
. John Lewis Gaddis, “Toward the Post-Cold War World.”
Foreign Affairs,
70 (Spring 1991), 101; Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in Goldstein and Keohane, eds.,
Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 8-17.
6
. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,”
The National Interest,
16 (Summer 1989), 4, 18.
7
. “Address to the Congress Reporting on the Yalta Conference,” 1 March 1945, in Samuel I. Rosenman, ed.,
Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt
(New York: Russell and Russell, 1969), XIII, 586.
8
. See Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky,
The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil
(Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Introduction: The End of the Cold War in Europe,” in Keohane, Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds.,
After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 6; and James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, “A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era,” International Organization, 46 (Spring 1992), 467-491.
9
. See F. S. C. Northrop,
The Meeting of East and West: An Inquiry Concerning World Understanding
(New York: Macmillan, 1946).
10
. Edward W. Said,
Orientalism
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), pp. 43-44.
11
. See Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,”
International Security,
18 (Fall 1993), 44-79; John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,”
International Security,
15 (Summer 1990), 5-56.
12
. Stephen D. Krasner questions the importance of Westphalia as a dividing point. See his “Westphalia and All That,” in Goldstein and Keohane, eds.,
Ideas and Foreign Policy,
pp. 235-264.
13
. Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-first Century
(New York: Scribner, 1993); Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
Pandaemonium:
p. 324
Ethnicity in International Politics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); see also Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,”
Atlantic Monthly,
273 (Feb. 1994), 44-76.
14
. See
New
York Times,
7 February 1993, pp. 1, 14; and Gabriel Schoenfeld, “Outer Limits,”
Post-Soviet Prospects,
17 (Jan. 1993), 3, citing figures from the Russian Ministry of Defense.
15
. See Gaddis, “Toward the Post-Cold War World”; Benjamin R. Barber, “Jihad vs. McWorld,”
Atlantic Monthly,
269 (March 1992), 53-63, and
Jihad
vs. McWorld
(New York: Times Books, 1995); Hans Mark, “After Victory in the Cold War: The Global Village or Tribal Warfare,” in J. J. Lee and Walter Korter, eds.,
Europe in Transition: Political, Economic, and Security Prospects for the 1990s
(LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, March 1990), pp. 19-27.
16
. John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Nuclear Deterrent,”
Foreign Affairs,
72 (Summer 1993), 54.
17
. Lester B. Pearson,
Democracy in World Politics
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 82-83.
18
. Quite independently Johan Galtung developed an analysis that closely parallels mine on the salience to world politics of the seven or eight major civilizations and their core states. See his “The Emerging Conflict Formations,” in Katharine and Majid Tehranian, eds.,
Restructuring for World Peace: On the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century
(Cresskill NJ: Hampton Press, 1992), pp. 23-24. Galtung sees seven regional-cultural groupings emerging dominated by hegemons: the United States, European Community, Japan, China, Russia, India, and an “Islamic core.” Other authors who in the early 1990s advanced similar arguments concerning civilizations include: Michael Lind, “American as an Ordinary Country,”
American Enterprise,
1 (Sept./Oct. 1990), 19-23; Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century,”
International Affairs,
67 (1991), 441, 448-449; Robert Gilpin, “The Cycle of Great Powers: Has It Finally Been Broken?” (Princeton University, unpublished paper, 19 May 1993), pp. 6ff; William S. Lind, “North-South Relations: Returning to a World of Cultures in Conflict,”
Current World Leaders,
35 (Dec. 1992), 1073-1080, and “Defending Western Culture,”
Foreign Policy,
84 (Fall 1994), 40-50; “Looking Back from 2992: A World History, chap. 13: The Disastrous 21st Century,”
Economist,
26 December 1992-8 January 1993, pp. 17-19; “The New World Order: Back to the Future,”
Economist,
8 January 1994, pp. 21-23; “A Survey of Defence and the Democracies,”
Economist,
1 September 1990; Zsolt Rostovanyi, “Clash of Civilizations and Cultures: Unity and Disunity of World Order,” (unpublished paper, 29 March 1993); Michael Vlahos, “Culture and Foreign Policy,”
Foreign Policy,
82 (Spring 1991), 59-78; Donald J. Puchala, “The History of the Future of International Relations,”
Ethics and International Affairs,
8 (1994), 177-202; Mahdi Elmandjra, “Cultural Diversity: Key to Survival in the Future,” (Paper presented to First Mexican Congress on Future Studies, Mexico City, September 1994). In 1991 Elmandjra published in Arabic a book which appeared in French the following year entitled
Premiere Guerre Civilisationnelle
(Casablanca: Ed. Toubkal, 1982, 1994).
19
. Fernand Braudel,
On History
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 210-211.
Chapter 2
1
. “World history is the history of large cultures.” Oswald Spengler,
Decline of the West
(New York: A. A. Knopf, 1926-1928), II, 170. The major works by these scholars analyzing the nature and dynamics of civilizations include: Max Weber,
The Sociology
p. 325
of Religion
(Boston: Beacon Press, trans. Ephraim Fischoff, 1968); Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, “Note on the Notion of Civilization,”
Social Research,
38 (1971), 808-813; Oswald Spengler,
Decline of the West;
Pitirim Sorokin,
Social and Cultural Dynamics
(New York: American Book Co., 4 vols., 1937-1985); Arnold Toynbee,
A Study of History
(London: Oxford University Press, 12 vols., 1934-1961); Alfred Weber,
Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie
(Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff ‘s Uitgerversmaatschappij N.V., 1935); A. L. Kroeber,
Configurations of Culture Growth
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944), and
Style and Civilizations
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973); Philip Bagby,
Culture and History: Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of Civilizations
(London: Longmans, Green, 1958); Carroll Quigley,
The Evolution of Civilizations: An Introduction to Historical Analysis
(New York: Macmillan, 1961); Rushton Coulborn,
The Origin of Civilized Societies
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); S. N. Eisenstadt, “Cultural Traditions and Political Dynamics: The Origins and Modes of Ideological Politics,”
British Journal of Sociology,
32 (June 1981), 155-181; Fernand Braudel,
History of Civilizations
(New York: Allen Lane – Penguin Press, 1994) and
On History
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); William H. McNeill,
The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); Adda B. Bozeman, “Civilizations Under Stress,”
Virginia Quarterly Review,
51 (Winter 1975), 1-18,
Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft
(Washington: Brassey’s (US), 1992), and
Politics and Culture in International History: From the Ancient Near East to the Opening of the Modern Age
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994); Christopher Dawson,
Dynamics of World History
(LaSalle, IL: Sherwood Sugden Co., 1978), and
The Movement of World Revolution
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959); Immanuel Wallerstein,
Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-system
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Felipe Fernández-Armesto,
Millennium: A History of the Last Thousand Years
(New York: Scribners, 1995). To these works could be added the last, tragically marked work of Louis Hartz, A
Synthesis of World History
(Zurich: Humanity Press, 1983), which “with remarkable prescience,” as Samuel Beer commented, “foresees a division of mankind very much like the present pattern of the post-Cold War world” into five great “culture areas”: Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Confucian, and African. Memorial Minute, Louis Hartz,
Harvard University Gazette,
89 (May 27, 1994). An indispensable summary overview and introduction to the analysis of civilizations is Matthew Melko,
The Nature of Civilizations
(Boston: Porter Sargent, 1969). I am also indebted for useful suggestions to the critical paper on my
Foreign Affairs
article by Hayward W. Alker, Jr., “If Not Huntington’s ‘Civilizations,’ Then Whose?” (unpublished paper, Massachusetts Insitute of Technology, 25 March 1994).
2
. Braudel,
On History,
pp. 177-181, 212-214, and
History of Civilizations,
pp. 4-5; Gerrit W. Gong,
The Standard of
“
Civilization
”
in International Society
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 81ff., 97-100; Wallerstein,
Geopolitics and Geoculture,
pp. 160ff. and 215ff.; Arnold J. Toynbee,
Study of History,
X, 274-275, and
Civilization on Trial
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 24.
3
. Braudel,
On History,
p. 205. For an extended review of definitions of culture and civilization, especially the German distinction, see A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn,
Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions
(Cambridge: Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, 1952), passim but esp. pp. 15-29.
4
. Bozeman, “Civilizations Under Stress,” p. 1.
5
. Durkheim and Mauss, “Notion of Civilization,” p. 811; Braudel,
On History,
p. 326
pp. 177, 202; Melko,
Nature of Civilizations,
p. 8; Wallerstein,
Geopolitics and Geocul
ture,
p. 215; Dawson,
Dynamics of World History,
pp. 51, 402; Spengler,
Decline of the West,
I, p. 31. Interestingly, the
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
(New York: Macmillan and Free Press, ed. David L. Sills, 17 vols., 1968) contains no primary article on “civilization” or “civilizations.” The “concept of civilization” (singular) is treated in a subsection of the article called “Urban Revolution,” while civilizations (plural) receive passing mention in an article called “Culture.”
6
. Herodotus,
The Persian Wars
(Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 543-544.
7
. Edward A. Tiryakian, “Reflections on the Sociology of Civilizations, “
Sociological Analysis,
35 (Summer 1974), 125.
8
. Toynbee,
Study of History,
I, 455, quoted in Melko,
Nature of Civilizations,
pp. 8-9; and Braudel,
On History,
p. 202.
9
. Braudel,
History of Civilizations,
p. 35, and
On History,
pp. 209-210.
10
. Bozeman,
Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft,
p. 26.
11
. Quigley,
Evolution of Civilizations,
pp. 146ff.; Melko,
Nature of Civilizations,
pp. 101ff. See D. C. Somervell, “Argument” in his abridgment of Arnold ]. Toynbee, A
Study of History,
vols. I-VI (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 569ff.
12
. Lucian W. Pye, “China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society,”
Foreign Affairs,
69 (Fall 1990), 58.
13
. See Quigley,
Evolution of Civilizations,
chap. 3, esp. pp. 77, 84; Max Weber, “The Social Psychology of the World Religions,” in
From
Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
(London: Routledge, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 1991), p. 267; Bagby,
Culture and History,
pp. 165-174; Spengler,
Decline of the West,
II, 31ff; Toynbee,
Study of History,
I, 133; XII, 546-547; Braudel,
History of Civilizations,
passim; McNeill,
The Rise of the West,
passim; and Rostovanyi, “Clash of Civilizations,” pp. 8-9.
14
. Melko,
Nature of Civilizations,
p. 133.
15
. Braudel,
On History,
p. 226.
16
. For a major 1990s addition to this literature by one who knows both cultures well, see Claudio Veliz,
The New World of the Gothic Fox
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
17
. See Charles A. and Mary R. Beard,
The Rise of American Civilization
(New York: Macmillan, 2 vols., 1927) and Max Lerner,
America as a Civilization
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1957). With patriotic boosterism, Lerner argues that “For good or ill, America is what it is—a culture in its own right, with many characteristic lines of power and meaning of its own, ranking with Greece and Rome as one of the great distinctive civilizations of history.” Yet he also admits, “Almost without exception the great theories of history find no room for any concept of America as a civilization in its own right” (pp. 58-59).
