The Complete Yes Minister (22 page)

I arrived at the office in a rather good mood today. I’d done all my boxes. I was feeling thoroughly on top of the job. I’d handled all my PQs [
Parliamentary Questions – Ed
.] rather well yesterday, given a good speech last night at a dinner, and was looking forward to a broadcast that I’m due to make tomorrow. All splendid publicity. I find that people are at last beginning to know who I am, as a result of the high profile I’ve been managing recently.

I asked Bernard what the broadcast discussion would be about. NATO, I thought. Bernard said that, in fact, it would be about co-partnership in industry.

I knew it was something like that. Some sort of partnership, at any rate.

The discussion would contain the usual compulsory BBC ingredients – one politician, one employer and one trades unionist.

I noticed that the trades unionist in question was Joe Morgan, who had been the TUC representative on the Solihull project. I remarked that this was good, because it meant we could talk about the project on the air.

To my surprise, this rather non-controversial remark was greeted with much anxiety by Sir Humphrey.

‘Minister, you’re not proposing to refer to the Solihull project on the air?’

‘I certainly am,’ I said. ‘It’s a shining example of a successful collaboration between government and private industry.’

‘Why do you say that?’ he asked.

For a moment, I couldn’t think why. Then I remembered. ‘Because you said it was,’ I pointed out. ‘Why? Have you changed your mind?’

‘No,’ he said carefully, ‘but . . . I would be much happier if you omitted such references from the broadcast.’

‘Why?’ I asked.

He said it was premature. I pointed out that work started on the project six months ago, so it could not possibly be described as premature.

‘Precisely,’ he said, ‘rather out of date in fact.’

Remarkable! Premature
and
out of date?

Humphrey amended this foolishness instantly. He simply meant ‘untimely’, he claimed. So again, I asked him
why
?

‘What I mean is, don’t you think it will be rather uninteresting to the general public?’ he whined.

I couldn’t see why. It’s an example of partnership in industry that is really happening. Now.
Extremely
interesting. I said so.

Humphrey seemed to be getting desperate. ‘Quite so, Minister,’ he said. ‘It is
so
interesting, in fact, that there is a danger that it will obscure the main point that you wanted to make on the broadcast.’

‘What is my main point?’ I asked, suddenly unable to remember.

Humphrey also seemed to go blank. ‘Bernard, what is the Minister’s main point?’

Bernard reminded us. ‘That private projects are more socially responsible with government money, and government projects are more efficient with private investment.’

This was precisely my main point. And reference to the Solihull project will obviously underline it. Humphrey really is a wet blanket. He just goes around stirring up apathy.

But he was still not satisfied. ‘Minister,’ he persisted. ‘I must advise you very seriously with all the earnestness at my command that you do not refer to the Solihull project on the air tomorrow.’

Again I asked why? Again he dodged. But, by now, I had guessed. ‘Could it be,’ I enquired coldly, ‘that you are planning to take all the credit for this scheme at next month’s European Convention of Government Administration?’

Humphrey said, ‘I beg your pardon?’ – in other words, he didn’t deny it! So I knew I was right. And I really tore him off a strip.

‘Your keynote speech will be well reported, won’t it? Well, let me explain some facts of life, Humphrey. Politicians are the ones who are ultimately responsible to the people, and it is we who get the credit. Not civil servants.’

Humphrey intervened. He assured me that he would be only too happy for me to take the credit for this project, as long as it wasn’t tomorrow. Liar!

I brushed this procrastination aside. ‘Humphrey,’ I told him firmly, ‘I am not going to fall for it. I am going to make all the political capital I can out of this Solihull project – I know a good thing when I see one.’

[
Hacker was completely mistaken. Sir Humphrey Appleby was trying to hush up all references to the Solihull project, with very good reason. Later that day Bernard Woolley, who had realised that there was more to this situation than met Hacker’s eye, sought an interview with Sir Humphrey – Ed
.]

SIR BERNARD WOOLLEY RECALLS:
¹

It was clear to me that Sir Humphrey Appleby was engaged in a cover-up of one sort or another. However, I was adamant that I needed to be fully informed about this matter, as it did not seem possible for a £74 million building project on a nine-acre site in the middle of one of our largest cities to be swept under the carpet. Even if the brush were to be wielded by Sir Humphrey Appleby.

Sir Humphrey told me that he intended to try to use the Official Secrets Act. I remarked that I couldn’t see how the project could be kept secret, as it was so big.

‘It’s a big secret,’ replied Sir Humphrey.

I could also see no way to invoke the Official Secrets Act, when everybody knew about the project. I was young and green and had not yet fully realised that the Official Secrets Act is not to protect secrets but to protect officials.

Sir Humphrey attempted to explain his evasiveness by saying that, as the Minister had not enquired into the background of the Solihull project, he didn’t wish to know. And it was, of course, standard Civil Service practice not to bother a Minister with information about which he had not enquired.

I took my courage in both hands, and indicated that I might hint to the Minister that I believed that there was a scandal connected with the Solihull project. Naturally, I made it clear to Sir Humphrey that I might
not
do so were I myself to be put more fully in the picture.

Sir Humphrey then came clean, rather reluctantly. I learned that the Solihull project had been set up by Sir Humphrey, acting for the DAA in partnership with Michael Bradley of Sloane Enterprises. This had happened long before my promotion to the Private Office.

Subsequently the Solihull Report came in, containing a paragraph casting doubt on the financial soundness of Sloane Enterprises and Mr Bradley. [
‘Casting doubt on the financial soundness’ means that Bradley was probably about to go bankrupt’ – Ed
.]

However, by the time the Report came out, Sir Humphrey was so committed to Bradley that it seemed a better risk to him to see the project through.

Now that I knew the full facts I was in an invidious position. Naturally I could not tell the Minister something that I had learned in confidence from the Perm. Sec. Equally, I had a duty to prevent my Minister involving himself in this matter if I could. It seemed that all I could do was to remonstrate with Sir Humphrey.

I explained that if the Minister knew the full facts he would certainly not be so foolish as to broadcast them. But Sir Humphrey insisted that as a matter of principle, Ministers should never know more than they need to know. Like secret agents. Because they may be captured and tortured.

‘By terrorists?’ I asked.

‘By the BBC,’ he replied. He also explained that the situation was not lost. The bank was dithering about whether or not to foreclose – a potential disaster. He was to have lunch that week with the Bank’s Chairman, Sir Desmond Glazebrook. So, meanwhile, there must be no mention of the Solihull project on the air or to the press.

I was getting exceedingly worried about my part in what appeared to be a cover-up. I explained this to the Perm. Sec., who insisted that this was not a cover-up, it was responsible discretion exercised in the national interest to prevent unnecessary disclosure of eminently justifiable procedures in which untimely revelation would severely impair public confidence.

This sounded even worse than I thought – like Watergate! However, Sir Humphrey explained to me that Watergate was quite different. Watergate happened in America.

Today I did the broadcast on the Solihull project, about which I am beginning to feel a little uneasy.

I drove with BW [
Bernard Woolley – Ed
.] to BH [
Broadcasting House – Ed
.]. I asked Bernard if I had correctly diagnosed Sir Humphrey’s reasons for not wanting me to mention the Solihull project on the air. This question seemed to cause Bernard considerable anguish, but he merely shook his head slowly and sadly.

So I said to him: ‘What is Humphrey’s real reason for not wanting me to mention it?’

Bernard opted for answering my question with a question, i.e. not answering – ‘Did you not think he gave six or seven very convincing reasons, Minister?’

‘No,’ I said. ‘Did you think that?’

He ducked that question too. ‘I’m sure,’ he said evasively, ‘that Sir Humphrey knows what he’s doing.’

I’m sure he does. I only wish that
I
knew what Sir Humphrey is doing!

I decided to approach it another way. I feel, and I don’t think I’m mistaken, that Bernard has a certain sense of loyalty towards me. So I asked him what he advised me to do.

This put him into a frightful state. ‘Well,’ he said, panicking, ‘it’s not for
me
to advise, Minister, but if it were, I would be obliged to advise you that you would be well advised to follow Sir Humphrey’s advice.’

‘Why?’ I asked.

‘Well,’ he dithered. ‘It’s just that, well, um, certain projects have certain aspects which, with sensitive handling, given reasonable discretion, when events permit, there is no prima facie reason why, with appropriate give and take, if all goes well, in the fullness of time, um, when the moment is ripe, um, um . . .’

‘Bernard!’ I interrupted him. ‘You’re blathering, Bernard.’

‘Yes Minister,’ he agreed wretchedly.

‘Why are you blathering, Bernard?’ I enquired.

‘It’s my job, Minister,’ he replied, and hung his head.

Clearly he is keeping something from me. But what? Foolishly, perhaps out of spite, I resolved to talk about the project on the air and get the matter – whatever it is – out in the open.

But I now wonder if this was a mistake.

Anyway, we recorded the broadcast and I talked, at some length, with some enthusiasm, about the Solihull project.

[
We have obtained the transcript of the broadcast discussion, and reproduce below the relevant pages. Those taking part were Hacker, Joe Morgan – General Secretary of the Commercial and Administrative Workers Union – and Sir George Conway, Chairman of International Construction Ltd – Ed
.]

I didn’t have time to go for a drink in the Hostility Room afterwards, but as I was leaving Joe Morgan buttonholed me.

‘Oh,’ he said, as if spontaneously, ‘I hope you don’t mind me mentioning this, Mr Hacker, but I wonder if you’d be able to put in a word for my members’ claim for a special Birmingham allowance?’

I naturally pointed out to him that I cannot conduct trades union negotiations in a BBC studio. Furthermore, it is a matter for the Department of Employment.

Then he made a curious remark. ‘I was thinking, see,’ he said, ‘that after this broadcast people might start asking questions about the Solihull project, wanting to know more about it, you understand?’

‘I hope they do,’ I said, stubbornly. Well, I do!

Then he said. ‘But, as we know . . .’ and he winked, ‘. . . there are some things . . .’ he winked again ‘. . . better not found out.’ Then he tapped the side of his nose with his forefinger and winked again. ‘I’m sure we understand each other.’

He grinned and winked again. I began to suspect that he was trying to tell me something. But what? Or – and the more probable explanation suddenly flashed into my mind – he knows something and
he thinks I know too
. But whatever it is,
I don’t
!