The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics (11 page)
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appeasement
A policy of acceding to hostile demands in order to gain peace. The term is today normally used in a pejorative sense by most politicians and communicators. Its alleged practitioners are usually held to be willing, in an ignoble or cowardly fashion, to sacrifice other people's territories or rights in an attempt to buy off an aggressor or wrong-doer. Moreover ‘appeasement’ is supposed never to succeed for long: the aggressor always returns demanding further concessions. And the implication is usually that refusal to ‘appease’ would, by contrast, have a happy ending as in any morality play.
‘Appeasement’ has often been seen in these terms ever since the outbreak of the European war over Poland in 1939. But the word had no such connotations when it first became fashionable during the 1920s and early 1930s. For example, as late as 1936 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden , later widely thought of as an ‘anti-appeaser’, stated in the House of Commons that ‘it is the appeasement of Europe as a whole that we have continually before us’. A consensus had developed in most countries, and in Great Britain in particular, that the Peace Settlement of 1919, based on questionable assumptions about war guilt, had been too severe to the First World War's defeated powers. Hence it was thought that the way to avoid a second such war was for the victors to try to meet the reasonably justified grievances of the losers. This meant working by negotiation to end reparations, to address German grievances with respect to permitted levels of armaments, to evacuate those parts of Germany that were occupied by the victors, and to meet claims for frontier adjustments in cases involving a denial of the principle of self-determination. At first, France, supported by some of her East European allies, was hesitant about accepting this approach. But gradually Great Britain, supported by most other countries, broke down French resistance.
The rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany in 1933 did not at first make much difference to this pursuit of ‘appeasement’ by the victors of 1918. It was widely hoped that he would become more moderate as he gained experience in office and as Germany's reasonable grievances were met. Thus Great Britain and France did nothing to prevent Hitler's proclamation that ‘illegal’ German rearmament was taking place, his remilitarization of the Rhineland and the
Anschluss
(annexation) with Austria. Nor would public opinion in Great Britain or France, still less in the United States, have favoured war over these issues. A war against Mussolini's Italy for attacking Abyssinia would have been more popular, but the British and French governments were too afraid of the growing strength of Germany and Japan to take any serious risk of joining in a conflict that did not directly affect their interests.
The public mood in Great Britain and France changed only in 1938–9—largely as a result of Hitler's treatment of Czechoslovakia. Hitler seemed at first to have a reasonable case when he drew attention to the discontent of the German-speaking minority of Czechoslovak citizens living in the Sudetenland area that was contiguous to Germany. And British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was generally applauded when he masterminded the transfer of this territory to Germany at the Munich Conference held in September 1938. But Winston Churchill led a vociferous minority who claimed that Hitler had behaved in such a threatening manner that he had effectively humiliated Great Britain and France and that he was really aiming at European mastery if not world conquest.
In March 1939 Churchill appeared to have been vindicated when Germany invaded the remainder of Czechoslovakia without serious justification. It seems probable that Chamberlain's initial inclination was nevertheless to continue with the policy of ‘appeasement’ as long as Hitler continued to move east. For he recognized that Great Britain had never seen Eastern Europe as an area of vital interest and he was aware that in any case the military balance of forces was not such as to make it easy to check Hitler in that region. And he had no desire to ally with the Soviet Union whose communist system he detested even more than fascism. But the majority in the British Cabinet, responding to public opinion, decided to abandon ‘appeasement’. Accordingly a ‘security guarantee’ was given to Poland and this was honoured with an Anglo-French declaration of war in September 1939 when Germany invaded. The policy of ‘appeasement’ was thus discredited and has remained so among ordinary people ever since.
Some historians have attempted to launch ‘revisionist’ accounts that support Chamberlain's broad approach. They point out that Great Britain and France were unable to defeat Germany in 1939–40—with the result that Poland was to be subjugated for half a century. As A. J. P. Taylor , an early ‘revisionist’, wrote: ‘Less than one hundred thousand Czechs died during the war. Six and a half million Poles were killed. Which was better—to be a betrayed Czech or a saved Pole?’
DC
‘Appeasement’ has often been seen in these terms ever since the outbreak of the European war over Poland in 1939. But the word had no such connotations when it first became fashionable during the 1920s and early 1930s. For example, as late as 1936 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden , later widely thought of as an ‘anti-appeaser’, stated in the House of Commons that ‘it is the appeasement of Europe as a whole that we have continually before us’. A consensus had developed in most countries, and in Great Britain in particular, that the Peace Settlement of 1919, based on questionable assumptions about war guilt, had been too severe to the First World War's defeated powers. Hence it was thought that the way to avoid a second such war was for the victors to try to meet the reasonably justified grievances of the losers. This meant working by negotiation to end reparations, to address German grievances with respect to permitted levels of armaments, to evacuate those parts of Germany that were occupied by the victors, and to meet claims for frontier adjustments in cases involving a denial of the principle of self-determination. At first, France, supported by some of her East European allies, was hesitant about accepting this approach. But gradually Great Britain, supported by most other countries, broke down French resistance.
The rise to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany in 1933 did not at first make much difference to this pursuit of ‘appeasement’ by the victors of 1918. It was widely hoped that he would become more moderate as he gained experience in office and as Germany's reasonable grievances were met. Thus Great Britain and France did nothing to prevent Hitler's proclamation that ‘illegal’ German rearmament was taking place, his remilitarization of the Rhineland and the
Anschluss
(annexation) with Austria. Nor would public opinion in Great Britain or France, still less in the United States, have favoured war over these issues. A war against Mussolini's Italy for attacking Abyssinia would have been more popular, but the British and French governments were too afraid of the growing strength of Germany and Japan to take any serious risk of joining in a conflict that did not directly affect their interests.
The public mood in Great Britain and France changed only in 1938–9—largely as a result of Hitler's treatment of Czechoslovakia. Hitler seemed at first to have a reasonable case when he drew attention to the discontent of the German-speaking minority of Czechoslovak citizens living in the Sudetenland area that was contiguous to Germany. And British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was generally applauded when he masterminded the transfer of this territory to Germany at the Munich Conference held in September 1938. But Winston Churchill led a vociferous minority who claimed that Hitler had behaved in such a threatening manner that he had effectively humiliated Great Britain and France and that he was really aiming at European mastery if not world conquest.
In March 1939 Churchill appeared to have been vindicated when Germany invaded the remainder of Czechoslovakia without serious justification. It seems probable that Chamberlain's initial inclination was nevertheless to continue with the policy of ‘appeasement’ as long as Hitler continued to move east. For he recognized that Great Britain had never seen Eastern Europe as an area of vital interest and he was aware that in any case the military balance of forces was not such as to make it easy to check Hitler in that region. And he had no desire to ally with the Soviet Union whose communist system he detested even more than fascism. But the majority in the British Cabinet, responding to public opinion, decided to abandon ‘appeasement’. Accordingly a ‘security guarantee’ was given to Poland and this was honoured with an Anglo-French declaration of war in September 1939 when Germany invaded. The policy of ‘appeasement’ was thus discredited and has remained so among ordinary people ever since.
Some historians have attempted to launch ‘revisionist’ accounts that support Chamberlain's broad approach. They point out that Great Britain and France were unable to defeat Germany in 1939–40—with the result that Poland was to be subjugated for half a century. As A. J. P. Taylor , an early ‘revisionist’, wrote: ‘Less than one hundred thousand Czechs died during the war. Six and a half million Poles were killed. Which was better—to be a betrayed Czech or a saved Pole?’
DC
appellate jurisdiction
The authority of a court of appeal to review decisions made by a lower court.
apportionment
The allocation of a whole number of seats to each of a number of units into which a state is divided. The units may be territorial. For instance, the US Constitution requires seats in the House of Representatives to be divided among the states once every ten years after each census, with no seat crossing a state line. The UK Boundary Commissions redistribute parliamentary seats every twelve to fifteen years, and normally no parliamentary seat crosses county boundaries. Alternatively, the units may be parties, in the case of list
proportional representation
. The two applications of apportionment have a common mathematical structure (and hence face common
impossibility theorems
) but this has not generally been realized by reformers who periodically reinvent systems of apportionment that are already in use under another name somewhere else. See
Jefferson
;
d'Hondt
.
proportional representation
. The two applications of apportionment have a common mathematical structure (and hence face common
impossibility theorems
) but this has not generally been realized by reformers who periodically reinvent systems of apportionment that are already in use under another name somewhere else. See
Jefferson
;
d'Hondt
.
appropriation
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