The Devil Soldier (31 page)

In England, Colonel William H. Sykes—a former Indian army officer and now member of Parliament for Aberdeen who was one of the last Taiping partisans in the House of Commons—condemned Admiral Hope’s support of Ward and the participation of British troops in anti-Taiping
actions: “A Christian’s blood runs cold,” said Sykes, “at the contemplation of such slaughter of human beings, who earnestly ask to be considered our friends.” But the public mood in Britain had shifted irreversibly, and the London
Times
’s assessment of Sykes was indicative: “[T]hat assiduous member [is] a standing warning against a superstition which has long existed in the House of Commons, that because a man has been in India thirty years ago, he must necessarily know something about China in the present day.”

The day after Kao-ch’iao, Admiral Hope scouted the territory around the town and found it largely deserted by the Taipings. Presumably, he made this excursion in Ward’s company; at any rate, the two held important talks following the battle concerning their future strategy. On returning to Shanghai, Hope revealed the essence of their conclusions in a letter to Frederick Bruce. Telling the British minister that he had “considered it necessary” to lend “certain moral support” to the Ward Corps, Hope went on to

strongly recommend that the French and English commanders should be required by yourself and M. Bourboulon [the French minister] to free the country from rebels within a line commencing at Chia-ting on the Yangtze above Wu-sung, through Ch’ing-p’u to Sung-chiang on the [Huang-pu] River, and thence across to a walled town opposite on the Yangtze, by which means a district of country amply sufficient for the support of Shanghai would be protected, and the town secured from the present state of chronic panic so detrimental to trade.

In the months to come, this idea would gain notoriety as “the thirty-mile radius,” and Hope’s concluding remarks to Bruce clearly revealed the plan’s author: “Colonel Ward, upon whose experience of the Chinese I am disposed to place very considerable reliance, assures me that if Imperialist garrisons were placed in the towns I have named, with the troops under his command employed as a flying column, he could effectually prevent the return of the rebels within the limits I have named, even if they were disposed to attempt it—an event very unlikely to occur.”

Once again, Hope underestimated the Taipings; they were indeed “disposed to attempt” the clearance of the thirty-mile radius. And both he and Ward overestimated the ability of imperial Chinese army units in the region to garrison captured towns. None of this, however, detracted from the soundness of Ward’s idea or from the noteworthy fact that he was now in a position to advise his former antagonists. The turnaround in his fortunes was, however, just beginning.

On February 27 General John
Michel, who was in the process of resigning his command of British army units in China, accompanied Admiral Hope on a visit to Sung-chiang. Michel was preparing a list of recommendations for the British government and for his successor, Sir Charles Staveley, regarding the Taipings and future British military policy. His purpose in visiting Sung-chiang was to determine whether the Ward Corps should play a role during the coming months of what now appeared unavoidable conflict with the rebels. Ward obligingly brought his men out to parade before the British commanders, and, as Michel reported to Frederick Bruce the following day:

I saw one regiment of 700 or 800 men in line, and some 300 or 400 others at drill. I examined them with some minuteness, and can judge pretty well what they are worth. Their arms are good percussion firelocks, in very good order. The regiment in line stood for some time on parade as steady as an indifferent European regiment. They know some company and some battalion drill, and also our manual and platoon exercises; they charged in line very fairly. They were all clothed in a good serviceable uniform, with turbans, and I understand are paid regularly 8 1/2 dollars per month.… I am of [the] opinion that 1,000 men of this description and thus drilled, are quite competent to deal with many thousands of rebels, and that an augmentation of this force would enable Colonel Ward to clear the country by degrees. I consider this force, if duly supported, the military nucleus of better things.… I believe that no better means could be found than the Chinese Government handing over to this officer, or aiding him to enlist some 8,000 or 10,000 men, and perhaps more eventually—in fact, such a number as he may be able to officer and drill; that funds be placed at his disposal to pay for such troops regularly; and that he be aided in procuring arms, ammunition and guns.

Michel’s perception of imperial Chinese officials and commanders in the region was just as insightful:

The Viceroys of districts will of course be unwilling to hand him over any portion of their rabble (called soldiers), as probably they pocket much money which is supposed to be spent in providing troops, arms, and ammunition, besides, perhaps, from their jealousy of this new element. Colonel Ward should therefore be invested with some large powers.… I consider that soon a prestige would attach to his army, which would do as much as the fighting of his troops, and by extending the system the silk districts would be recovered, and eventually the rebel head-quarters [Nanking] would be gained.

Michel’s recommendations regarding Ward personally were perhaps the most sensitive portion of his communication, and he seems to have known it: He took care in underlining that “Colonel Ward’s interest will be so strongly enlisted in carrying out this matter energetically, that whatever he may be, and whatever feeling there may be as to trusting him to any great extent, I am convinced that no dread of that sort should deter the Chinese Government from giving him frank, energetic and real support; not that support which will be given by jealous squeezing Viceroys, but direct from Peking, supported energetically by your Excellency.”

Ward’s character and his ultimate purposes were serious concerns not only of British diplomatic officials but of Minister Burlingame of the United States as well. Burlingame already had knowledge of the Ward Corps’s second-in-command, Henry Burgevine, who had been in Washington during Burlingame’s terms in Congress. Early in March, Burlingame made arrangements to meet Ward himself and to sound him out, sending a report on these encounters to Secretary of State Seward on March 7.

Ward was, said Burlingame,

an American to whom my attention was first called by Admiral Sir James Hope who wished to introduce him to me and who commended him warmly for his courage and his skill. He is instructing the Chinese in the use of European weapons and has about two thousand of them (Chinese) trained whom he has led in a most desperate manner, successfully, in several recent battles. I know nothing of him save what I have learned from Sir James Hope[,] the Chinese and himself. He says he was born in Salem Massachusetts—went to sea when a boy—became mate of a ship and then was a Texas Ranger—California gold miner—instructor in the Mexican service—was with Walker, for which he was outlawed by his Government; at the Crimea and then joined the Chinese army where he has gradually risen to influence and power. He is now their best officer and for his recent successes has been recommended by the Chinese and the English for greater promotion. He says he is a loyal American and though a Chinese by adoption he desires above all things that his country shall have its full weight in the affairs of China.

In the weeks to come, Burlingame would be as personally won over by Ward as Admiral Hope had been. But while Burlingame’s friendship would be of enormous emotional importance to Ward, it was Hope who provided the material assistance Ward very much needed to expand his corps. On March 5 Hope wrote to the Admiralty to say that while he had once believed that the training of Chinese soldiers in modern military methods was a job for French and British regular officers, he now considered it “clear that the Force organising under Colonel Ward is very preferable for this purpose in virtue of its character being more completely Chinese and therefore more calculated to lead to that self dependence on the part of the government without which China will never be restored to peace.” Hope then took the extreme step of asking that the British government—using imperial Chinese intermediaries—make available to Ward “at cost price … such guns, Arms, Ammunition and other military stores as can be spared to him both here and in India.” In addition, Ward and his Chinese and Western business partners should be allowed to purchase arms and especially river steamers in England. Should any “legal difficulties” be encountered because of the Neutrality
Ordinance, “they should be removed by Order from the Foreign Office.”

Far as he had gone in his recommendations, Hope went one step farther: British soldiers and noncommissioned officers who wished to join the Ward Corps should be allowed to do so. The benefits of adopting all these measures would soon become apparent: “I have little doubt that at the expiration of a few months [Ward] will be in possession of Soochow, will have cleared this province including the Silk districts[,] and will have so tranquillised the Country in this vicinity as to render the occupation of Shanghai by Foreign Troops unnecessary.”

The imperial Chinese government was still trying to come to grips with the idea of using Western troops to counter the Taipings in and around the treaty ports when word of the battle of Kao-ch’iao was received in the Forbidden City. Peking had just announced that since there were inadequate imperial forces in Shanghai to meet the new advance of the Taipings, Chinese officials in that city would be permitted to make use of Western troops. And a week later Tseng Kuo-fan had reluctantly accepted the idea of permitting Anglo-French forces to operate in the treaty ports, although he continued to vigorously resist the notion of foreign troops campaigning in the interior. But on February 25
Hsüeh Huan memoralized to the throne and by introducing Frederick Townsend Ward and reviewing his career presented the imperial government with a risky but potentially very effective way out of its dilemma.

Hsüeh began by acquainting the throne with the details of Ward’s arrival in China and his early successes in 1860 and went on to describe his victories in January and February 1862, including his scouting mission with Hope before Kao-ch’iao. The Kiangsu governor’s tone was uniformly respectful, and he took every opportunity to remind Peking that Ward had long ago petitioned to become a Chinese subject—a petition that had yet to be answered by the throne:

Wu Hsü attests that Ward excels in both courage and intelligence and knows military affairs well, a fact that is shown by his effective training of soldiers. It is a rule that all foreigners who are not governed by the consuls are within Chinese jurisdiction; Ward has acknowledged in a written statement that he wants to be a Chinese subject and to change to the Chinese style of clothes. [In Manchu China, the wearing of native dress and the shaving of the forehead were vital symbols of a foreigner’s acceptance of Chinese cultural superiority.] Considering the above factors, it seems we should not discourage Ward’s zeal to submit to the Chinese way of life. This is the whole story of this matter, and I hereby petition the Throne to grant Ward the fourth rank [mandarin’s] button and let him continue to train soldiers at Sung-chiang and cooperate with the government troops in fighting the rebels.

Hsüeh did not mention the fact that Ward’s “written statement” that he wished to “submit to the Chinese way of life” had been made largely in order to avoid prosecution and prolonged imprisonment by the British. Rather, Ward was portrayed as an earnest supplicant, one who richly deserved not only official recognition as a Chinese subject but elevation to the status of fourth-rank mandarin. (The “button” of which Hsüeh spoke was a small colored sphere that was worn in the crown of every mandarin’s cap. Colors denoted rank: The fourth-rank button was dark blue.) Hsüeh was well aware that both Ward and Burgevine—who soon followed Ward’s lead by applying for Chinese citizenship, and whom Hsüeh also recommended for fourth-rank status—had manifold reasons for requesting Chinese citizenship. The two men hoped that official recognition from Peking would further protect them from foreign interference as well as clear the way for a dramatic expansion of the size and operations of the Ward Corps. Their enthusiasm for “the Chinese way of life,” as they had experienced it, was limited at best. But Hsüeh, along with Wu Hsü and Yang Fang, shared Ward’s desire to make the funding and operations of the corps easier by gaining imperial sanction, and he painted his picture of the young commander in the best possible light.

The effort brought results. In a responding decree, the Emperor T’ung-chih—or rather, the Empress Dowager Tz’u-hsi and Prince Kung—declared that Ward had “turned out of admiration toward Chinese customs and with a sincere heart is helpful and obedient, surely
worthy of admiration and esteem.” Ward was granted the fourth-rank button as well as a peacock feather for his new mandarin’s cap; Burgevine soon received the dark blue button as well. The event caused much comment in the Western communities in the treaty ports, and when word of Ward’s transformation made its way back to London,
the
Times
took note of it in its “Latest Intelligence” column with the unembellished and rather bemused headline “Colonel Ward has been created a Mandarin.”

Further rewards were to come. But Ward and Burgevine had little time to concern themselves with ceremonial machinations, for the end of February brought new emergencies in the field. The severe check that the Taipings sustained north of Shanghai led them to redouble their efforts to close on the port from the west and south. Early in March, Ward turned to meet these threats. The corps—its movements now carefully followed by Western and Chinese officials not only in Shanghai but in Peking as well—met the approaching rebel armies with typical audacity and gave the Taipings additional lessons in the virtues of Western military methods.

During the week following the battle for Kao-ch’iao, Admiral Hope embarked on more trips into the districts around Shanghai, ostensibly, as the
North China Herald
put it, “for the purpose of reconnoitring on the Pootung or east bank of the [Huang-pu] river.” Yet given Hope’s character and behavior, it is difficult to dispute Augustus Lindley’s claim that the admiral “went roving about the country for a week in search of some one to fight. His warlike spirit was gratified at a place named Hsiao-t’ang, in the vicinity of Ming-hong (nearly twenty miles away from Shanghai), a fortified village occupied by several thousand Taipings.”