The Downing Street Years (77 page)

It is all but impossible to keep anything secret in Washington, which was now awash with rumours of US preparations for military action against Libya. This did not make it any easier to maintain a discreet silence about our own attitude. At one point on Friday it seemed that the US was not intending to use the F
1 — 11S
based in Britain, which would of course have substantially eased our predicament. But later in the evening it appeared that they would indeed wish to do so. Later still I received a message from President Reagan thanking me for our offer of co-operation and confirming that the targets would be closely defined under three categories: those which were directly terrorist related; those having to do with command, control and logistics which were indirectly related; and those relating to defence suppression — that is radar and other equipment which would endanger the incoming American aircraft.

On Saturday morning General Vernon Walters came to see me to explain American intentions in more detail. I began by saying how appalled I was that the gist of my exchanges with President Reagan was by now openly reported in the US press. This meant, of course, that the propaganda battle was even more important. I eagerly welcomed General Walters’s offer to show us in advance the statement
from the President which would announce and explain the Libyan raid. He and I also discussed how much intelligence information could be used in public to justify the action. I was always more reluctant to reveal intelligence than were the Americans. But on this occasion it was obviously vital to do so if the general public were to be convinced of the truth of the allegations we were making against Gaddafi. In fact, although I do not believe that anyone’s life was endangered as a result of these revelations, it is certainly true that a fair amount of intelligence dried up. I also discussed with General Walters the President’s latest list of targets which I found reasonably reassuring. I suspect that the General knew precisely which targets the US would hit by the time he came to see me. If so, it was very wise of him not to say what they were. I hoped that he would be even more discreet in the rest of his trip to Paris, Rome, Bonn and Madrid where he was to explain the intelligence on which the US was acting and ask for European support.

Now that America was actually asking the Europeans for assistance which involved a political price they showed themselves in a less than glorious light. Chancellor Kohl apparently told the Americans that the US should not expect the wholehearted support of its European allies and said that everything would turn on whether the action succeeded. The French who just recently had indulged in at least private sabre rattling refused to allow the F1 — 11s to cross French airspace. The Spanish said that the American aircraft could fly over Spain, but only if it was done in a way which would not be noticed. Since this condition could not be met, they had to fly through the Straits of Gibraltar.

Speculation was now rife. We could not confirm or deny our exchanges with the Americans. The Labour and Liberal Parties insisted that we should rule out the use of American bases in the UK for the action which everyone now seemed to expect. It was important to ensure that senior members of the Cabinet backed my decision. At midday on Monday (14 April) I told the Cabinet’s Overseas and Defence Committee what had been happening in recent days. I said that it was clear that the US was justified in acting in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Treaty. Finally, I stressed that we had to stand by the Americans as they had stood by us over the Falklands.

That afternoon it was confirmed by telephone from Washington that American aircraft would soon take off from their British bases. I received the news shortly before attending a long-standing engagement at the
Economist:
this was a reception to celebrate either the great Victorian constitutionalist Walter Bagehot or Norman St John Stevas,
his contemporary editor, depending on your point of view. As I entered the
Economist
building off St James’s, Andrew Knight, the magazine’s editor, remarked with some concern how pale I looked. Since my complexion is never ruddy, I must have appeared like Banquo’s ghost. But I wondered how Andrew Knight would have looked if he knew about those American F1 — 11s heading secretly and circuitously towards Tripoli. Nevertheless I praised Bagehot, kissed Norman and returned to No. 10.

Late that night I received a message from President Reagan saying that the US aircraft would shortly strike at five named terrorist-associated targets in Libya. The President confirmed that the text of his televised statement to the American people took into account our advice to stress the element of self-defence to get the legal position right. My own statement to the House of Commons on the raid for the following day was already being drafted.

The American attack was, as we had foreseen, carried out principally by sixteen
F1-11
s based in the UK, though a number of other aircraft were also used. The attack lasted forty minutes. Libyan missiles and guns were fired but their air defence radars were successfully jammed. The raid was undoubtedly a success, though sadly there were civilian casualties and one aircraft was lost. Television reports, however, concentrated all but exclusively not on the strategic importance of the targets but on weeping mothers and children.

The initial impact on public opinion in Britain, as elsewhere, was even worse than I had feared. Public sympathy for Libyan civilians was mixed with fear of terrorist retaliation by Libya. Conservative Central Office received large numbers of telephoned protests, as did the No. 10 switchboard. Worries were expressed about the fate of British nationals there and the potential for hostage taking. Opposition critics, Conservative back-benchers and Tory newspapers alike were bitterly critical of the fact that I had given permission for the use of the bases. I was depicted as cringing towards the US but callous towards their victims. I reported fully on what had happened to the Cabinet, some of whose members I subsequently learnt thought that they ought to have known about the raid beforehand. Later that afternoon I made my statement to a largely sceptical or hostile House of Commons. President Reagan telephoned me afterwards to fill me in on what had been happening and to wish me well in fighting off the criticism he knew I faced. He said that when in his speech on television the previous night he had referred to the co-operation of European allies, he had had only one country in mind — the United Kingdom.

I was to speak in the emergency debate on the Libyan raid in the
House on Wednesday afternoon. It was intellectually and technically the most difficult speech to prepare because it depended heavily on describing the intelligence on Libya’s terrorist activities and we had to marshal the arguments for self-defence in such circumstances. Every word of the speech had to be checked by the relevant intelligence services to see that it was accurate and that it did not place sources at risk. The debate was rank with anti-American prejudice. Neil Kinnock misquoted President Reagan’s televised broadcast; but he did so once too often. I had heard him do this earlier in the day and I had the full text of what the President had actually said given to Cranley Onslow, the Chairman of the ‘22 Committee Executive. Mr Kinnock said:

Cranley Onslow interrupted to point out that the President had said precisely the opposite:

As the Victorians used to say: ‘collapse of stout party’.

My speech steadied the Party and the debate was a success. But there was still a large measure of incomprehension even among our supporters. I went that Friday to Cranley Onslow’s constituency. I felt that people were looking at me strangely, as if I had done something terrible, which given the sensational and biased media coverage you could understand. When I explained to party workers at a reception that our action had been taken to protect the victims of future terrorism, they understood: but the accusation of heartlessness stuck — and it hurt. Yet the Libyan raid was also a turning point; and three direct benefits flowed from it.

First, it turned out to be a more decisive blow against Libyan-sponsored terrorism than I could ever have imagined. We are all too inclined to forget that tyrants rule by force and fear and are kept in check in the same way. There were revenge killings of British hostages
organized by Libya, which I bitterly regretted. But the much vaunted Libyan counter-attack did not and could not take place. Gaddafi had not been destroyed but he had been humbled. There was a marked decline in Libyan-sponsored terrorism in succeeding years.

Second, there was a wave of gratitude from the United States for what we had done which is still serving this country well. The
Wall Street Journal
flatteringly described me as ‘magnificent’. Senators wrote to thank me. In marked contrast to feelings in Britain, our Washington embassy’s switchboard was jammed with congratulatory telephone calls. It was made quite clear by the Administration that Britain’s voice would be accorded special weight in arms control negotiations. The Extradition Treaty, which we regarded as vital in bringing IRA terrorists back from America, was to receive stronger Administration support against filibustering opposition. The fact that so few had stuck by America in her time of trial strengthened the ‘special relationship’, which will always be special because of the cultural and historical links between our two countries, but which had a particular closeness for as long as President Reagan was in the White House.

The third benefit, oddly enough, was domestic, though it was by no means immediate. However unpopular, no one could doubt that our action had been strong and decisive. I had set my course and stuck to it. Ministers and disaffected MPs might mutter; but they were muttering now about leadership they did not like, rather than a failure of leadership. I had faced down the anti-Americanism which threatened to poison our relations with our closest and most powerful ally, and not only survived but emerged with greater authority and influence on the world stage: this the critics could not ignore. And such are the paradoxes of politics that within the year this wave of anti-Americanism had come to the Government’s aid. Labour was emboldened foolishly to stress an anti-American defence policy — which provoked strong reactions from Cap Weinberger and Richard Perle. When the British people were told that ‘if you want us to go, we will go’ they woke up to reality. Labour’s anti-Americanism, in vogue the year before, steadily became more of an albatross and when the election came it helped to sink them.

As the spring of 1986 moved into summer the political climate began slowly, but unmistakeably, to improve.

CHAPTER XVI

As 1983 drew on, the Soviets must have begun to realize that their game of manipulation and intimidation would soon be up. European governments were not prepared to fall into the trap opened by the Soviet proposal of a ‘nuclear-free zone’ for Europe. Preparations for the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles went ahead. In March President Reagan announced American plans for a Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) whose technological and financial implications for the USSR were devastating. Then, at the beginning of September the Soviets shot down a South Korean civilian airliner, killing 269 passengers. Not just the callousness but the incompetence of the Soviet regime, which could not even bring itself to apologize, was exposed. The foolish talk, based on a combination of western wishful thinking and Soviet disinformation, about the cosmopolitan, open-minded, cultured Mr Andropov as a Soviet leader who would make the world a safer place was silenced. Perhaps for the first time since the Second World War, the Soviet Union started to be described, even in liberal western circles, as sick and on the defensive.

There was a new chill in East-West relations. We had entered a dangerous phase. Both Ronald Reagan and I were aware of it. We knew that the strategy of matching the Soviets in military strength and beating them on the battlefield of ideas was succeeding and that it must go on. But we had to win the Cold War without running unnecessary risks in the meantime.