The essential writings of Machiavelli (24 page)

CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR
O
N HOW THE POWER OF THE DICTATORS DID NOT HARM THE
R
OMAN
R
EPUBLIC BUT BENEFITED IT, AND ON HOW THE POWER A CITIZEN SEIZES FOR HIMSELF, UNLIKE THAT ACCORDED TO HIM BY FREE ELECTION, IS DESTRUCTIVE TO CIVIC LIFE

Some historians condemn those Romans who created the institution of dictator, maintaining that it was this that eventually brought about tyranny in Rome. They allege that the first tyrant ruled the city under the title of dictator, and that had this title not existed, Caesar would not have been able to disguise his tyranny beneath an official designation. Those holding this opinion, however, have not examined it carefully It has been believed without good reason, because it was not the title or rank of dictator that enslaved Rome, but the power that the dictator seized from the citizens for the duration of his office. If the title of dictator had not existed in Rome, another would have been chosen, because power easily acquires a title, while titles do not easily acquire power. It is clear that the office of dictator, when it was bestowed in keeping with the public institutions and not seized by one man’s authority, always benefited the city. Republics are harmed when magistrates are created and granted power by exceptional and not ordinary means as was the case in Rome, when over such a long period of time no dictator did anything but good for the republic.

There are very clear reasons for this. First, for a citizen to do harm and seize illegal power for himself, he must have many faculties which he could not have developed in an uncorrupted state. He would have to be extremely rich and have many adherents and followers, which he could not have in a state where the laws are observed, and even if he did have followers and adherents, such a man would have been so dreaded that free votes would not have been given to him. Moreover, a dictator was elected for a brief period of time, not forever, and only to handle the emergency for which he was elected.
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He had the authority to decide on his own what measures needed to be taken to counter urgent danger, and he could do this without consultation, punishing any individual without right of appeal. But the dictator could not take any action that would diminish the power of the state, such as removing authority from the Senate and the people, or eliminating old institutions and establishing new ones. Hence, if one takes into account a dictator’s brief term of office and the limits on his power, and that the populace of Rome was not corrupted, it was impossible for the dictator to transcend the limits of his office and harm the city. And history has shown that the dictatorship was always useful.

In fact, among all Roman institutions, that of dictator deserves to be esteemed and numbered among those that led to the greatness and power of Rome. Without such an institution, a state has difficulty emerging from extraordinary circumstances. The usual institutions of a state move slowly, since no council or magistrate can run everything but will need to confer with others. This takes time, which makes this course of action perilous when it is a matter that cannot wait. Therefore states need to create an institution similar to that of the Venetian Republic, which is an excellent republic of our times. It has given authority to a few chosen citizens to deliberate on urgent matters without the need to consult others if they are all in agreement.
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If such a system is lacking in a state, it will either come to ruin as it clings to its laws or, in order to escape ruin, breaks them. And in a state it is bad for anything to take place that forces it to be governed by exceptional means, because even if the exceptional means are beneficial for a time, the example nevertheless causes harm. It sets a precedent for contravening the state’s laws for a good purpose, and later, under the same pretext, the laws might be contravened for bad. Thus there never was a perfect state that did not make provisions for everything in its laws, and set up remedies for every circumstance. In conclusion, I suggest that those states that have no recourse to a dictator or a similar authority when in urgent danger inevitably come to ruin.

It is to be noted with what foresight the Romans set up the method of electing a dictator. The creation of a dictator brought some shame on the consuls: They were the heads of state but, after the election of a dictator, would have to obey him like everyone else. The founders of the dictatorship, foreseeing that this would cause the citizens to disdain the consuls, decided that the power to elect a dictator should remain with the consuls, the idea being that when a dire circumstance beset Rome and a monarchical authority was necessary, the consuls would willingly appoint a dictator. If they made the appointment, their own loss of authority would pain them less, because any harm that man does to himself voluntarily and by his own choice ultimately hurts less than harm done to him by others. In later years, however, the Romans gave dictatorial authority to the consul and not to a dictator with the words: “Let the consul see to it that no harm befalls the Republic.”
¹¹¹

But to return to our subject, I conclude that Rome’s neighbors, by trying to suppress Rome, forced the city to create institutions that would not only be suited to its defense, but also give it the ability to counterattack with greater cohesion, force, and power.

109.
Roman dictators were elected for a maximum period of six months.

110.
The Council of Ten, established in 1310, watched over the security of the Venetian state.

111.
Machiavelli quotes from Livy (Book III, chapter 4) in Latin:
Videat consul, ne respublica quid detrimenti capiat
.

CHAPTER THIRTY-EIGHT
O
N HOW WEAK STATES ARE INDECISIVE AND CANNOT REACH DECISIONS, AND HOW WHEN THEY DO IT IS USUALLY BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN FORCED TO, NOT BECAUSE THEY HAVE CHOSEN TO DO SO

There was a severe outbreak of pestilence in Rome, and the Volsci and the Aequi took the opportunity to mount an attack.
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They assembled a large army and assailed Rome’s Latin and Hernici provinces, ravaging their lands and forcing them to call the Romans to their defense. Rome was afflicted by the plague, and so replied that it would allow these provinces to defend themselves with their own forces, as it was unable to defend them.

This is an example of the wisdom and generosity of the Roman Senate, how it always strove in good and bad times to be the arbiter of decisions concerning its subject provinces. Nor was it ashamed, when necessity demanded, of ruling in a way contrary to custom. I say this because on other occasions the same Senate had forbidden the Latins and the Hernici to arm and defend themselves.
¹¹³
A less prudent senate might have considered that it was jeopardizing its standing by allowing its provinces to provide their own defense, but the Roman Senate always judged things as they ought to be judged, invariably choosing the least bad alternative as the best. For reasons I have already mentioned, and for many others that are obvious, the Senate was aware how bad it was for Rome not to be able to defend its subjects, and allowing them to arm themselves on their own. But the Senate was also aware that the provinces had no choice, since the enemy was at their gates. So the Senate took the honorable course in deciding that the provinces should do what they had to do with Rome’s consent. If they now had to disobey out of necessity, they would not later disobey out of choice. Though this might appear to be a resolution any state would take, states that are weak and badly advised are not able to, nor do they know how to manage similar extraordinary circumstances. Cesare Borgia, for instance, had taken Faenza and forced Bologna to accept his terms. He then wanted to return to Rome by way of Tuscany, and sent word to Florence to request that he and his army be granted passage. The Florentines consulted on how to handle the matter, but nobody proposed that his request be granted: The Florentines did not follow the Roman practice. As Cesare Borgia was heavily armed, and the Florentines were not well armed enough to forbid him passage, it would have been a more honorable course of action for them to be perceived as allowing him passage of their own free will rather than being forced to do so. What ensued was Florence’s utter disgrace, though it would have been only a minor matter had they acted differently. The worst attribute of weak states is their irresolution, so that all the decisions they ultimately make are made by force. If they come to any good decisions it is because they are forced to, not because they do so out of their own wisdom.

I would like to give two more examples of this, concerning the government of our city of Florence, that have taken place in our times. In 1500, after King Louis XII of France had retaken Milan, he wanted to give Pisa back to Florence for the fifty thousand ducats that the Florentines had promised him for such a restitution. He sent his army to Pisa under the command of Monsignor de Beaumont, who, though a Frenchman, was a man the Florentines trusted. Commander and army marched to the area between Cascina and Pisa in order to attack the city walls, but during the few days in which they were preparing the siege, Pisan emissaries came to Beaumont and offered to hand Pisa over to the French army on condition that King Louis would pledge not to deliver the city to the Florentines before a period of four months had passed. The Florentines spurned this proposal, with the result that they marched against Pisa only to march away again in disgrace. The proposal had been rejected for no other reason than the Florentines’ distrust of the king’s word, even though they had in the first place put themselves in his hands through bad counsel. They did not trust him, but they could not see how it made more sense for the king to restore Pisa to them once he had occupied it—and that if at that point he did not restore it, he would be revealing his true nature. But as Louis XII had not yet occupied Pisa, he could only promise it to them and force them to pay for that promise. Thus it would have been far more advantageous for the Florentines to have agreed to Beaumont’s taking the city under any condition. There was a similar occurrence in 1502, when the city of Arezzo rebelled and the French king sent Monsignor Imbalt with French troops to aid the Florentines. As Monsignor Imbalt marched toward Arezzo he was approached by the Arezzans, who were prepared to give up their city for certain pledges, much as the Pisans had been. This proposal was rejected in Florence, and Monsignor Imbalt, convinced that the Florentines had little understanding of the matter, began to conduct negotiations on his own without involving the Florentine representatives. As a result, he drew up the agreement in his own manner, and under this agreement entered Arezzo with his men, giving the Florentines to understand that he considered them simpletons. If they really wanted Arezzo, they should address themselves to King Louis, who could hand them the city much more easily now that the French had occupied it than when they had been camped outside. There was much cursing and blaming of Imbalt in Florence until the Florentines finally realized that if Beaumont had acted the way Imbalt had, the Florentines would have had not only Arezzo, but Pisa too.

Hence, to return to our topic, irresolute states never make good choices except by force, because their weakness never lets them reach decisions where any doubt exists. And if this doubt is not eliminated by a violent act that presses them forward, they remain forever suspended in indecision.

112.
Livy describes the plague and Rome’s inability to help her allies in Book III, chapters 6–8.

113.
Livy in Book II, chapter 30, mentions that when the Aequi attacked Latium, the Roman Senate felt it was “safer to have unarmed Latins defended by Romans than to allow them to rearm.”

CHAPTER FORTY-ONE
O
N THE IMPRUDENCE AND INEFFECTIVENESS OF SUDDEN CHANGE FROM HUMILITY TO HAUGHTINESS AND FROM MERCY TO CRUELTY WITHOUT APPROPRIATE MEASURES

Changing too quickly from one quality to another was among Appius’s principal injudicious measures for maintaining his tyranny
¹¹⁴
His cunning on the other hand, in feigning to be a man of the people in order to deceive the plebeians, was effective.
¹¹⁵
Also effective were his methods for reappointing the Decemvirs,
¹¹⁶
as was the audacity of appointing himself against the wishes of the nobility and then putting his entourage into power. But having done all this it was injudicious, as I said above, for Appius suddenly to change his nature, turning himself from a friend of the plebeians into their enemy, from benevolent to arrogant, from generous to difficult, and all this so suddenly and without excuse that anyone could see his falsity. If a man has been perceived as good at a certain time but wants to become evil for his advantage, he must do so on an appropriate occasion and in a way that gives the impression that his actions are being forced by circumstances, so that before his changed nature deprives him of old favors, it will have secured so many new ones that his power will not be diminished. Otherwise he will find himself exposed and without friends, and so will come to ruin.

114.
Appius Claudius was the most tyrannical of the Decemvirs, a legislative commission appointed in 451 and 450
BCE
, given the task of resolving the power struggle between the patricians and the plebeians.

115.
Livy (Book III, chapter 33) writes: “By means of the plebeians’ favor, the leadership of the magistracy was granted to Appius. He feigned such a new personality that instead of being seen as a savage persecutor of the plebeians, he suddenly became their champion, ready to capture every breath of popularity.”

116.
Livy (Book III, chapter 33) writes: “The Decemvirs were elected without right of appeal.”