The Fall of Carthage (13 page)
Syracuse was the main target for the Roman offensive and clearly perceived as the prime enemy. Faced with the overwhelming force of both consuls, Hiero decided to make peace. His approach was readily accepted by the Romans, whose large army was already facing major supply problems. In part this was a result of the continued Carthaginian blockade of the Straits, their only active participation in this phase of the campaign, but also a product of the Romans' unpreparedness for fighting a campaign so far away. A direct assault on a large and well-defended city was always dangerous and the army could not have fed itself for the duration of a long siege, even if they could have preserved a blockade and prevented supplies from reaching the city, which was probably impossible without a Roman fleet to seal off the harbour. By the terms of the subsequent treaty Hiero became a friend and ally of Rome, returned without ransom all the Roman prisoners in his hands, presumably taken in the skirmishes with Claudius, and paid them 100 talents. The alliance, confirmed in perpetuity in 248, allowed Hiero to control an independent Syracuse and extensive territories, ruling in a way that earned praise from Polybius which, he claims, was reflected by Hiero's Greek subjects. Hiero's loyalty to Rome was to remain staunch even at the lowest ebb of their fortunes and without his aid, in particular in ensuring the supply of provisions to the Roman armies, the campaigns in Sicily would not have been possible.
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Syracuse was the weakest of the three states, which explains Hiero's easy shift in alliance from Carthage to Rome. In this way he achieved his original objective of removing the threat of raiding by the Mamertines, even if he could not conquer the city. The short-lived alliance between Syracuse and Carthage had always been a strange one, given the fact that they were natural rivals and the recent Carthaginian insertion of a garrison into Messana. It is interesting to speculate, but impossible to know, what they expected to happen if they had taken Messana together. The Carthaginians' actions were merely a continuation of their long-term attempt to dominate Sicily. They disliked the prospect of a reinvigorated Syracuse capturing Messana, but were even less willing to see the Romans establish themselves on the island. In the past the Carthaginians had endured the onslaught of various foreign armies which had come to Sicily to fight them on behalf of the Greek cities, the most recent example being Pyrrhus. Though such leaders had achieved notable successes the Carthaginians had always weathered the storm and eventually repulsed them. Whatever the details of earlier treaties, the Roman landing in Sicily was a direct challenge to Carthaginian power in an area where they had long had a presence. The contrast between Carthage's great naval power and Rome's lack of a fleet can only have encouraged them in their belief that the Romans would have extreme difficulty in maintaining a presence in Sicily. There seemed no reason for them to admit the Romans to the island in the first place, or to believe that the initial reverse was anything other than temporary.
Syracuse, Carthage and Rome all acted out of self-interest, but it is important not to judge their actions by modern standards. It was considered proper in the Graeco-Roman world for states to seek to increase their hegemony over others, a view which did not conflict with the importance of freedom as a political ideal. Yet Rome had no tradition of a presence in Sicily to mitigate their opportunistic actions and the Mamertines were clearly undeserving allies. Both Rome and Carthage were supremely self-confident, probably rather naively inclined to assume that their strength was great enough to overawe any opposition, or swiftly overcome it if force proved necessary. It was in this light mood that they were to enter upon twenty-three years of war.
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The Land War
T
HE OPERATIONS OF
armies and fleets were intimately related in the ancient world, especially in a conflict like the First Punic War when much of the righting occurred on or around islands or near coastlines. However, it is easier to understand the events of the war if we deal separately with the actions of the navies and armies involved, and concentrate in turn on the activity in each theatre of operations. This chapter will describe the campaigns fought on land.
HE OPERATIONS OF
armies and fleets were intimately related in the ancient world, especially in a conflict like the First Punic War when much of the righting occurred on or around islands or near coastlines. However, it is easier to understand the events of the war if we deal separately with the actions of the navies and armies involved, and concentrate in turn on the activity in each theatre of operations. This chapter will describe the campaigns fought on land.
Sicily, 262-258
BC
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Syracuse provided the Roman armies with a secure base for their operations, where grain, fodder and other supplies could be massed. Messana was now secure and the ostensible objectives for Rome's going to war had been achieved, but our sources do not suggest that either side attempted to begin peace negotiations. The Carthaginians saw no reason why their initial reverses should force them to accept a permanent Roman presence in Sicily and began to build up a powerful army for use there. Large numbers of mercenaries were enlisted in Spain, whilst other contingents were provided by the Gauls and Ligurians. For the Romans, hostilities could not end until the Carthaginians admitted defeat and were willing to come to terms favourable to Rome, as Hiero had done. The prospects of glory and plunder from the rich Sicilian cities which had first attracted the Romans to the area provided a further incentive for continuing the struggle. Polybius claims that after the capitulation of Hiero the Romans had reduced their forces from four to two legions, trusting to the king's aid to ease their supply problems. Subsequently, in reaction to the Carthaginians' preparations, both consuls and four legions were dispatched to Sicily in 262.
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The Carthaginians intended to use Agrigentum (also known by the Greek name Acragas), roughly midway along the coast of Sicily nearest to Africa, as their main base. However, by the summer of 262 when the Romans moved against the city few, if any, of the newly raised troops had arrived. The consuls, Lucius Postumius Megellus and Quintus Mamilius Vitulus, marched together, their combined armies theoretically giving them around 40,000 men, and arrived outside the city at harvest time (probably in about June). Hannibal, son of Gisgo, the commander at Agrigentum, had gathered many people from the surrounding area within the city walls, so that Polybius tells us that its population had swollen to 50,000, but his garrison appears to have been relatively small. His refusal to contest the area outside the city walls may well have been interpreted by the Roman consuls as weakness, for, at least in the western Mediterranean, it was normal for a confident defender to fight for some time outside his fortifications even against a numerically superior attacking force. Once the Romans had built their camp about a mile from the city, a large proportion of the army dispersed to harvest the ripened crops in the surrounding fields. For an army recruited mainly from small farmers and agricultural labourers, the task must have been a familiar one. Nevertheless it is striking that once again the logistical arrangements of a Roman army seem to have been inadequate. Roth, in his excellent study of the army's logistics, argues that the army at this time was simply unprepared to feed large forces campaigning so far afield for long periods of time.
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It had been very rare for four legions to take the field together in the past. Only the small picket placed outside the camp, following a practice which was to remain standard in the Roman army for several centuries to come, was composed of formed and equipped troops. These men were oath-bound not to leave their position and the Roman army's harsh discipline punished with death any man who did so.
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It had been very rare for four legions to take the field together in the past. Only the small picket placed outside the camp, following a practice which was to remain standard in the Roman army for several centuries to come, was composed of formed and equipped troops. These men were oath-bound not to leave their position and the Roman army's harsh discipline punished with death any man who did so.
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Hannibal seized the opportunity and launched a vigorous sally. The foragers, scattered and probably largely unarmed, could offer no effective resistance and fled. A major Roman disaster appeared likely as Carthaginian troops advanced on the Roman camp. The only resistance came from the picket guarding the Roman camp and these men, despite being heavily outnumbered, put up a fierce fight. The Roman losses were heavy, but in the end they routed the attacking troops, defeated another group which had begun to penetrate the camp and pursued them all back to the city. Both sides were chastened by this experience, and their behaviour was subsequently more circumspect. Hannibal could not risk further losses to his garrison and became reluctant to risk further attacks, whilst the Romans ceased to underestimate their enemy and in future took care to forage in a more organized way, posting larger numbers to troops as a covering force.
The easiest way to take a city in this period was by surprise or stealth, attacking at night or from an unexpected direction. Such sudden attacks were most likely to succeed if aided by treachery amongst the defenders. The frequently bitter internal politics of the city state often provided disaffected elements willing to open a gate and admit an enemy force, which could then seize key points before the defenders were aware of their presence. Almost as many cities fell to treachery as to conventional means during the Punic Wars, but it was difficult for an attacker to plan for this, and he could merely act on the opportunity if it was offered. Treachery was even harder for the defender to guard against, although considerable efforts were made to do so and this was the main theme of the fourth century
BC
Manual on Siegecraft written by Aeneas Tacticus. No opportunity occurred at Agrigentum for the Romans to take the city through treachery or surprise, which left them with a choice between the other two options for a besieging force, assault or blockade.
BC
Manual on Siegecraft written by Aeneas Tacticus. No opportunity occurred at Agrigentum for the Romans to take the city through treachery or surprise, which left them with a choice between the other two options for a besieging force, assault or blockade.
Assault was the one aspect of ancient warfare most affected by technological advances. It involved the attacker finding a way over, through or under the defender's fortifications. The simplest method was escalade, when the attacking infantry carried ladders up to the walls and attempted to scale them, but this invariably involved heavy casualties and was rarely successful unless the walls were denuded of defenders. Mobile siege towers which dropped a drawbridge onto a rampart and allowed men to cross, whilst providing covering fire from archers or artillery on top, were essentially an extension of this same basic idea. The main alternative was to create a breach in the walls by battering ram or tunnelling underneath to undermine them. This required extensive preparation, scientific knowledge and labour to create siegeworks allowing engines such as a battering ram to pass over any defensive ditches and reach the wall. All the time the defender would be employing artillery to hinder this activity, countermining to thwart the attacker's tunnelling, and launching sallies to burn his engines. The ingenuity of both sides was severely tested as they struggled to find measures to counter the moves of the enemy. Once the defences had been breached then ingenuity and technical skill counted for little as the assaulting infantry had to storm their way inside. Casualties might still be heavy, and failure was a real possibility. Such was the massive effort and the uncertainty of the outcome that assaults on major cities were not contemplated lightly. Convention decreed that a defender would normally only be permitted to surrender on terms if he did so before the first battering ram touched the wall, otherwise the city would be subject to a sack. At this period the Roman army lacked the technical skill to undertake such a project on a city as large as Agrigentum with any real prospect of success.
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This meant that the only viable option available to the consuls in 262 was blockade, cutting off the city from the outside world until its food supplies ran out and starvation forced a surrender. If the enemy had had time to prepare for the siege by massing stocks of essentials, then this might well take a very long time. However, the Romans had a large enough army to blockade Agrigentum effectively, and began by throwing up a system of ditches and small forts which completely surrounded the city. Each of the consular armies constructed its own camp to support this line of circumvallation and a second line facing outwards, or line of contravallation, was built to prevent supply columns from trying to break in. Unlike many Carthaginian strongholds, Agrigentum did not have its own port and was situated on a plateau several miles inland. The Romans would have found it virtually impossible to seal off a harbour without ships of their own. The long duration of a blockade imposed severe burdens on the logistic arrangements of the besiegers, since a large army which remained stationary swiftly consumed all the food available locally. Rome's allies provided grain and cattle, which were massed at the supply dump created at an unidentified place called Herbesus a short distance away.
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After five months of siege, Hannibal began to become concerned about the city's resources of food and began to make urgent appeals for aid. The Carthaginians shipped the bulk of their recently raised forces over to Sicily, concentrating them at Heraclea Minoa, about 20 miles up the coast from Agrigentum, where they were placed under the command of Hanno. Polybius does not give a figure for the strength of this force, although he subsequently mentions that it included around fifty elephants. Diodorus, explicitly citing Philinus, gives their total as sixty elephants, 6,000 cavalry and 50,000 infantry. This gave Hanno at least parity, and possibly a slight advantage, in numbers over the two consular armies and any allies besieging Agrigentum. His first move was to mount a surprise attack on Herbesus, capturing the Roman supply dump and severing their lines of communication. The legions outside Agrigentum soon began to suffer from food shortages. In their weakened state the men became prone to disease which spread rapidly through the crowded camps. Confidently the Carthaginian advanced his main force from Heraclea Minoa, sending his Numidian light horsemen on ahead, with orders to engage the Roman cavalry and then feign retreat. The Roman cavalry took the bait and too rashly pursued the Numidians when they turned to flee. Reaching the main Carthaginian column, they rallied and turned on the blown and disorganized Roman horse, routing them and chasing them back to the Roman lines with heavy loss. It was with similar tactics that these superb light cavalry would play such a prominent role in the Second War with Rome.
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After this success, Hanno moved his army to within a mile and a quarter (10 stades) of the Romans and built a fortified camp on a hill known as Torus. Zonaras says that Hanno deployed his army and challenged the Romans to battle, but that they declined, chastened by the defeat of their cavalry. As time passed and their food shortage became more severe, the Roman consuls decided to march out and offer to fight, but their sudden apparent rise in confidence deterred Hanno from a direct encounter. The tentative nature of this manoeuvring and the reluctance of generals to risk a battle unless convinced that they held every possible advantage, as well as the difficulty of forcing an enemy to fight even when he was camped only a mile or so away, are typical of the warfare of this period. Polybius does not discuss this period in detail, merely saying that for two months the armies were camped close together without any direct conflict apart from periodic exchanges of missiles. Ultimately, it was only because of a constant flow of messages and fire-signals from Hannibal, stressing the desperate food shortages in the town and the growing rate of desertion to the enemy, that Hanno was forced to fight. The Romans, themselves close to starvation, readily accepted and deployed in the plain between the camps.
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After this success, Hanno moved his army to within a mile and a quarter (10 stades) of the Romans and built a fortified camp on a hill known as Torus. Zonaras says that Hanno deployed his army and challenged the Romans to battle, but that they declined, chastened by the defeat of their cavalry. As time passed and their food shortage became more severe, the Roman consuls decided to march out and offer to fight, but their sudden apparent rise in confidence deterred Hanno from a direct encounter. The tentative nature of this manoeuvring and the reluctance of generals to risk a battle unless convinced that they held every possible advantage, as well as the difficulty of forcing an enemy to fight even when he was camped only a mile or so away, are typical of the warfare of this period. Polybius does not discuss this period in detail, merely saying that for two months the armies were camped close together without any direct conflict apart from periodic exchanges of missiles. Ultimately, it was only because of a constant flow of messages and fire-signals from Hannibal, stressing the desperate food shortages in the town and the growing rate of desertion to the enemy, that Hanno was forced to fight. The Romans, themselves close to starvation, readily accepted and deployed in the plain between the camps.
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