The Fall of Carthage (35 page)
The year ended with the Roman army maintaining a respectful distance from the enemy, but sporadic skirmishing occurring between patrols and foraging parties. Around December 217, the six-month term of the dictatorship expired and Fabius and Minucius returned to Rome, leaving the army under the command of Geminus, the surviving consul, and Marcus Atilius Regulus (the son of the consul of256), who had been elected as suf-fect or replacement consul and had held the magistracy itself ten years earlier.
Quintus Fabius Maximus was gready revered by his own and later generations as the man who had saved Rome by avoiding battle. He earned the nickname 'Cunctator' ('the delayer'), which was clearly a considerable improvement on 'Verrucosus'. His dictatorship gave the Romans a breathing space to recover from the defeats at Trebia and Trasimene, in which they could rebuild their strength. In our sources he is depicted as an isolated figure, who alone realized that the Romans could not defeat Hannibal in battle and refused to be swayed by persuasion or mockery from his decision not to fight.
CHAPTER 8
Cannae and the Crisis for Rome
ON 2 AUGUST 216,
Hannibal won his greatest victory in the plain (north of the small, hilltop town of Cannae in southern Italy. By the end of the day his outnumbered mercenaries had enveloped and massacred the greater part of the largest army Rome had ever fielded, turning this into one of the bloodiest battles ever fought, rivalling even the industrialized slaughter of the twentieth century. For the Romans Cannae became the yardstick by which other defeats were measured, never surpassed and only once or twice equalled in the next six centuries. Cannae remains one of the most famous battles ever fought, frequentiy alluded to in modern military writing, and Hannibal's tactics are still taught in the military academies where today's officers are trained. The UN commander in the Gulf War, General Norman Schwartzkopf, claimed to have employed principles based on study of Hannibal's campaigns and Cannae in particular in the planning and control of his own brief and devastatingly effective campaign. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the disciplines of Ancient History and Archaeology were overwhelmingly dominated by German scholarship, and it was perhaps a reflection of this that the study of ancient warfare was taken very seriously by the Prussian and German military. Von Schlieffen, the architect of the plan for the invasion of France in
AD
1914, was obsessed with Cannae, studying it in incredible detail throughout his life, and attempting in his war plan to achieve just such a total victory. Cannae became the shorthand term for a complete success for many German generals. In
AD
1941, as Rommel drove the British army back towards Tobruk, he wrote in his diary that 'a new Cannae is being prepared', and a year or so later in December 1942 during the Stalingrad campaign, the commander of the 6th Panzer Division produced a boastful report of a successful day's fighting around the obscure village of Pakhlebin, calling the engagement 'the Cannae of Pakhlebin'.
1
Yet in spite of having fought 'the perfect battle' Hannibal ultimately lost the war and, having achieved no other victories as great as this, but still undefeated in battle, was forced to evacuate Italy twelve years later. How and why the Romans were able to survive this disaster is the theme of this chapter.
Hannibal won his greatest victory in the plain (north of the small, hilltop town of Cannae in southern Italy. By the end of the day his outnumbered mercenaries had enveloped and massacred the greater part of the largest army Rome had ever fielded, turning this into one of the bloodiest battles ever fought, rivalling even the industrialized slaughter of the twentieth century. For the Romans Cannae became the yardstick by which other defeats were measured, never surpassed and only once or twice equalled in the next six centuries. Cannae remains one of the most famous battles ever fought, frequentiy alluded to in modern military writing, and Hannibal's tactics are still taught in the military academies where today's officers are trained. The UN commander in the Gulf War, General Norman Schwartzkopf, claimed to have employed principles based on study of Hannibal's campaigns and Cannae in particular in the planning and control of his own brief and devastatingly effective campaign. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the disciplines of Ancient History and Archaeology were overwhelmingly dominated by German scholarship, and it was perhaps a reflection of this that the study of ancient warfare was taken very seriously by the Prussian and German military. Von Schlieffen, the architect of the plan for the invasion of France in
AD
1914, was obsessed with Cannae, studying it in incredible detail throughout his life, and attempting in his war plan to achieve just such a total victory. Cannae became the shorthand term for a complete success for many German generals. In
AD
1941, as Rommel drove the British army back towards Tobruk, he wrote in his diary that 'a new Cannae is being prepared', and a year or so later in December 1942 during the Stalingrad campaign, the commander of the 6th Panzer Division produced a boastful report of a successful day's fighting around the obscure village of Pakhlebin, calling the engagement 'the Cannae of Pakhlebin'.
1
Yet in spite of having fought 'the perfect battle' Hannibal ultimately lost the war and, having achieved no other victories as great as this, but still undefeated in battle, was forced to evacuate Italy twelve years later. How and why the Romans were able to survive this disaster is the theme of this chapter.
Cannae, August 216
BC
BC
If we are to understand the Cannae campaign and the battle itself, we must constantly remind ourselves that at the time no one could have guessed at its outcome and that, even during the battle itself, there were several stages when things might have turned against Hannibal for all the brilliance of his tactics. Livy's account of the preliminaries to the battle is dominated by a sense of impending disaster, as once again an impulsive Roman commander recklessly led the army to defeat, ignoring the advice of his more experienced colleague. The sense of inevitable catastrophe pervading the narrative is utterly false.
The Roman Senate had resolved on mounting a major effort for the campaigning season in 216. The magistrates for the year were a distinguished group, with one of the consuls and three out of four praetors all having held the consulship before, whilst the other consul and all the praetors had held the praetorship in an earlier year. For the first time ever each consul was given a double-sized army of four legions which were expected to fight together. In 225 the consuls had also each commanded four legions, but the participation of both armies in the battle of Telamon had been coincidental. The legions themselves were each to be larger than normal, expanding to the size the Romans felt appropriate for the current crisis, so that each mustered 5,000 infantry as well as the usual complement of 300 horsemen. We do not know the size of the allied
alae
attached to each army, but can safely assume that their infantry were roughly equal in number to the Roman foot, whilst their cavalry was more numerous. Sometimes the unprecedentedly large size of this army has been doubted, especially since Livy mentions that there were a variety of traditions about the number of troops enrolled in this year. However, Polybius clearly believed that there were eight legions in the united army of the two consuls and there is no good reason to doubt him. This was not the only Roman army to be fielded in this year. In addition to the forces in Spain and Sicily, an army of two legions was sent north to face the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul which remained in open rebellion. This expedition was commanded by Lucius Postumius Albinus, who had been twice consul in 234 and 229 and was now probably nearly 60 years old.
2
alae
attached to each army, but can safely assume that their infantry were roughly equal in number to the Roman foot, whilst their cavalry was more numerous. Sometimes the unprecedentedly large size of this army has been doubted, especially since Livy mentions that there were a variety of traditions about the number of troops enrolled in this year. However, Polybius clearly believed that there were eight legions in the united army of the two consuls and there is no good reason to doubt him. This was not the only Roman army to be fielded in this year. In addition to the forces in Spain and Sicily, an army of two legions was sent north to face the tribes of Cisalpine Gaul which remained in open rebellion. This expedition was commanded by Lucius Postumius Albinus, who had been twice consul in 234 and 229 and was now probably nearly 60 years old.
2
The incoming consuls given command of this, the largest army Rome had ever put into the field, were Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus. The latter was the grandfather of Scipio Aemilianus and therefore receives a very favourable treatment from Polybius and all subsequent historians. This was his second consulship, as in 219 he had fought successfully against the Illyrians and celebrated a triumph, although he seems to have been involved in the scandal associated with the campaign which had led to the retirement from politics of his colleague, Marcus Livius Salinator. Paullus was to fall in battle, but, unlike Flaminius, he was a member of a wealthy and well-established aristocratic family, who were more than capable of defending his reputation in later years. A convenient scapegoat was found in the person of his colleague, who survived the fighting, but was a new man and vulnerable to the propaganda of such powerful families. Varro's descendants continued to gain membership of the Senate, but none had distinguished careers and the family never gained admittance to the core of senatorial families who dominated the senior magistracies till the end of the Republic.
Livy portrays Varro as a demagogue much like Flaminius. This conforms with his theme that it was the radical, popular politicians who caused most of the disasters to befall the state, when the mob ignored the wise leadership of the experienced aristocrats in the Senate. He tells us that Varro's family was undistinguished, that it was said his father was a butcher. Such an accusation is typical of the exaggerated invective that was a normal feature of Roman political debate and should not be taken seriously. Varro is supposed to have been one of the main supporters of Metilius' bill to grant Minucius equal power to Fabius Maximus the year before, but otherwise, even by Livy's account, his career had not been a radical one. As with Flaminius, he must have had considerable support from the wealthier classes in the
Comitia Centuriata
to have won election to the consulship. Livy even claims that he was the sole choice of the Assembly at the election, which strongly attests to his popularity, and that he actually presided over the vote to appoint his colleague. His success also makes it certain that he possessed considerable support amongst his fellow senators and, given that the presiding magistrate could do much to influence the outcome of an election, it is unlikely that he and his fellow consul were hostile to each other. There is no good reason to accept Livy's depiction of Aemilius Paullus as an adherent of Fabius' strategy of avoiding battle. It is not even certain that Fabius himself believed this to be the right way to proceed in the spring of 216, and that he continued this strategy in the years after Cannae does not necessarily mean that he advocated it before this disaster.
3
Comitia Centuriata
to have won election to the consulship. Livy even claims that he was the sole choice of the Assembly at the election, which strongly attests to his popularity, and that he actually presided over the vote to appoint his colleague. His success also makes it certain that he possessed considerable support amongst his fellow senators and, given that the presiding magistrate could do much to influence the outcome of an election, it is unlikely that he and his fellow consul were hostile to each other. There is no good reason to accept Livy's depiction of Aemilius Paullus as an adherent of Fabius' strategy of avoiding battle. It is not even certain that Fabius himself believed this to be the right way to proceed in the spring of 216, and that he continued this strategy in the years after Cannae does not necessarily mean that he advocated it before this disaster.
3
Even if Fabius still advocated his policy of delay, then the plans of the Senate for the campaigning season of 216 make it clear that he was in a minority, and that they expected a direct confrontation with Hannibal. Fabius' six-month dictatorship had given the State time to recover from the defeats at Trebia and Trasimene. His army of four legions was relatively well-trained and had won some minor successes, even if part of it had also been defeated under Minucius. To this force they added four new and less experienced legions, so that around 80,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry would face Hannibal's 40,000 foot and 10,000 horse. A continuation of Fabius' strategy did not require such a large force and concentrating so many soldiers and mounts greatly increased the problems of supply. Morale was good both in the population as a whole and amongst the soldiers, who were eager for battle. Many senators and their sons were serving either as tribunes, in the cavalry or on the commanders' staffs. One of the tribunes was the former Master of Horse, Minucius. The allied soldiers in particular were desperate to fight and avenge the devastation Hannibal's progress had wrought on Italian fields. Polybius claims that the Senate told Paullus to seek battle and attributes a speech to him in which he explained to the soldiers the reasons for Hannibal's recent victories and assured them that the enemy would not be able to stand up to the combined might of both consular armies. In Polybius' version, Varro and Paullus did not disagree over whether or not to fight a battle, but instead over when and where to do so.
4
4
At the opening of the campaigning season in 216, Hannibal was still at his winter base at Gerunium in Apulia, watched warily by the army commanded by Geminus and Regulus. Both of these men had their power extended as proconsuls for this year, but it is not clear whether Regulus remained with the army for the coming campaign. Livy claims that he gained permission to return to Roman on the grounds of age and infirmity, and certainly Polybius' statement that he was killed is untrue, since he became censor in 214. Once the crops had ripened enough to make foraging possible, Hannibal led his army south. The proconsuls followed him at a safe distance and sent repeated messages to the Senate asking for instructions, explaining that they could not close with the enemy without being forced to fight a battle. This was plausible enough, since the country the armies were marching through was open and fairly flat. Hannibal pressed on and captured the ruined stronghold of Cannae, which was still in use as a Roman supply depot.
5
5
It is not certain when the new consuls arrived and the two parts of the army were joined together. Polybius implies that this was not until after Hannibal had taken Cannae, less than a week before the battle, whereas
Livy tells of their arrival before he had left Gerunium. Polybius' account is probably to be preferred, not only because of the implausibility of much of Livy's account of Hannibal's withdrawal, but also because the difficulties of feeding such a large army make it unlikely that the Roman force remained concentrated for such a long period. Further uncertainty exists over the precise location of the battlefield, chiefly with regard to which side of the River Aufidius it was fought on. We do not know what the course of the river was in the third century, but it is clear that this differed from its present-day line. Although some authorities have placed the battle to the north - the term is used loosely, the river actually running from south-west to north-east - on what is normally referred to as the left bank, it is an easier reading of our best sources to locate the fighting on the south, or right bank, assuming that the river's course originally lay further away from the hillock of Cannae itself. Such a positioning makes the movements of both armies more intelligible and will be followed here.
6
The Romans advanced carefully in pursuit of Hannibal, having learned from Flaminius' failure to scout properly before Trasimene. They seem to have come along the coastal plain, perhaps to avoid having to pass any suitable ambush positions. On the day they came into sight of the enemy army, they stopped and camped 6 miles away. The Romans were to the east on the flat and open plain which rims down - there is a very slight gradient -to the sea. The consuls held command of the army on alternate days, the normal practice on the rare occasions both consuls operated together, but one which Fabius had refused to adopt with Minucius in the previous year. Paullus is supposed to have advised against advancing directly on the enemy in this country which favoured Hannibal's more numerous cavalry, but the next day was Varro's turn to command and he decided to press on. As the Romans marched across the plain, the column was attacked by Hannibal's cavalry and light infantry and thrown into some disorder before the Romans formed up part of their forces to drive the enemy back. The Roman
velites
and cavalry fought with formed maniples of legionaries in close support, giving them an edge over the opposition. Skirmishing lasted till nightfall, and it is doubtful that the Romans had covered many miles by the time they made camp. The next day Paullus continued the advance and brought the army up to camp by the river bank, only a couple of miles from Hannibal's position.
velites
and cavalry fought with formed maniples of legionaries in close support, giving them an edge over the opposition. Skirmishing lasted till nightfall, and it is doubtful that the Romans had covered many miles by the time they made camp. The next day Paullus continued the advance and brought the army up to camp by the river bank, only a couple of miles from Hannibal's position.
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