The Fall of Carthage (39 page)
The Senate refused even to see Carthalo and sent messengers ordering him not to enter the city. Both the Punic emissary and his master were shocked by this outright rejection. Similarly Pyrrhus had been equally surprised when after defeating the Romans in battle he had naturally attempted to begin negotiations to conclude a peace, only to have the Senate declare that they would never treat with an enemy still on Roman or allied soil. In 216 the Romans reinforced this refusal to concede defeat by a public demonstration of their continued determination. A vote was narrowly carried in the Senate that the State would not pay the ransoms for the prisoners taken at Cannae, nor would it permit private citizens to redeem family or friends. Tradition held that some of the ten delegates from the captives tried to remain in Rome, having attempted to circumvent their oath by returning to the Punic camp on some pretext before resuming their journey, but that the Senate had them sent back to Hannibal. In an alternative version of the story they were allowed to remain, but publicly humiliated and ostracized by the rest of the population. Hannibal had some of the 8,000 captives executed and sold the rest into slavery. Soon afterwards the survivors of Cannae were formed into two legions which were sent to Sicily and not allowed discharge or to return to Italy until the end of the war. Some were in fact still serving twenty years later.
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The determination of the Roman people under the leadership of the Senate to continue the war in spite of the catastrophe at Cannae was a source of immense pride to later generations of Romans. The Roman aristocracy justified its right to rule by the obligation of its members to lead in war. In the first two years of the war they had paid the price of this duty, suffering disproportionately high losses. Thus Livy's dramatic portrayal of a city stunned by the scale of the disaster probably is not far from the reality. As after Trasimene, news of another disaster soon arrived to add to the despair. Postumius, the praetor sent to Cisalpine Gaul to restrain the Gallic tribes whose aggressive raiding had gone unchecked since Hannibal's arrival, had been ambushed and the bulk of his two legions and allies massacred. The praetor had been beheaded, his skull cleaned and gilded to be used as a vessel in tribal rituals. Yet still the Romans refused to compromise and come to terms with Hannibal. That a few men panicked and despaired should not surprise us; what is truly remarkable is that the majority remained so determined to fight on. Roman victory was still over a decade away and there were other disasters still to come before this was achieved, but with hindsight this was the most serious crisis the Romans faced during the war and the nearest they came to defeat. Whether or not the immediate advance of Hannibal's army on the city after Cannae would have been just enough to tip the balance and shatter Rome's will to resist must remain one of the great unanswered questions of history.
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Rome's refusal to negotiate can only have surprised and perhaps discouraged Hannibal, but on balance his situation in late August 216 seemed very good. His army had fully established itself in Italy and displayed its superiority over the best that Rome had sent against it. Soon most of southern Italy would defect to him, and the Gallic tribes of the Po valley remained in open revolt. There was no reason to think that continued pressure on Rome would not eventually force her to acknowledge defeat.
Within a short time the Romans started to recover from the shock and take practical measures to rebuild their strength. A levy was carried out to form new legions, enrolling many 17-year-olds and even younger soldiers. It may have been around this time that the minimum property qualification for military service was lowered to include poorer citizens. Soon there were at least four legions at Rome, although Livy suggests that these were slightly under strength in cavalry, an indication of the severe losses suffered by the equestrian order. An appeal was made to the slave households of citizens, promising freedom and the franchise on discharge for those willing to fight Hannibal; in response 8,000 volunteers
(volones)
came forward and made up two legions, their owners receiving compensation from the State. Another 6,000 men were provided from criminals awaiting punishment and debtors, all of whom were promised amnesty if they were willing to fight. Equipment was in short supply, so the Romans went to the temples of the city and stripped them of the many trophies of foreign armour and weapons from past triumphs, giving the newly raised troops a motiey appearance. The released criminals were issued with Gallic weapons and armour captured by Flaminius in 223.
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(volones)
came forward and made up two legions, their owners receiving compensation from the State. Another 6,000 men were provided from criminals awaiting punishment and debtors, all of whom were promised amnesty if they were willing to fight. Equipment was in short supply, so the Romans went to the temples of the city and stripped them of the many trophies of foreign armour and weapons from past triumphs, giving the newly raised troops a motiey appearance. The released criminals were issued with Gallic weapons and armour captured by Flaminius in 223.
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When Varro was recalled to the city he received a rapturous reception, Senate and People praising him for 'not having despaired of the Republic'. Whether or not he caused the defeat at Cannae and whatever the circumstances of his flight during the battle, in its aftermath he had behaved as a Roman commander should, regrouping his soldiers to renew the struggle, and refusing to admit defeat or negotiate with the enemy. Varro assisted in the organization of Rome's renewed war effort, and continued to hold commands for the remainder of the war, although he never again led an army in a major battle. The surviving praetors were also heavily involved in the raising and equipping of the new legions and the contingents of allies to support them, but overall command was once again invested in a military dictator. This was Marcus Junius Pera, who had been consul in 230 and censor in 225, with the able Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus as his Master of Horse. Near the end of the campaigning season of 216, Pera was able to lead a field army of 25,000 men out of the city.
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As after Trasimene, the Romans paid great attention to their religious duties. Mourning was officially limited to thirty days by the Senate, but even so they allowed the annual festival to the goddess Ceres to lapse, since this could only be performed by married women who were not in mourning. Two Vestal Virgins were accused of breaking their vows of chastity and in the tense atmosphere were condemned to the traditional punishment of being buried alive, although one girl managed to commit suicide before the sentence was imposed. One of their lovers was scourged so severely that he died as a result. The Sibylline Books were consulted to discover how this offence to the goddess could be propitiated and as a result the Romans made one of their rare recourses to human sacrifice, burying alive a Greek and Gallic man and woman in the Forum Boarium. Fabius Pictor, the later historian, was sent to the famous oracle of Apollo at Delphi in Greece to seek guidance on how the Romans could best restore the favour of the gods and whether as a People they would survive the recent disasters. Polybius found the Romans' obsessive adherence to obscure religious rites at times of crisis rather odd, and certainly un-Greek, but we should never doubt its importance to the Romans themselves.
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By the end of the campaigning season of 216 the war in Italy had irrevocably changed. Throughout southern Italy many states defected to Hannibal, including parts of Apulia, nearly all of Samnium and Bruttium, and, most disturbing of all, Campania. The Carthaginian army now had bases from which it could draw supplies and was no longer forced to keep moving simply to feed itself. It also had allies to protect from Roman retribution, a pressing need if other communities were to be persuaded to rebel against Rome. Like the land operations in Sicily during the First War, the Italian campaigns now became dominated by fortified towns and strongholds. The Romans strove to protect their remaining outposts in enemy-held territory whilst steadily attacking their rebellious allies, as Hannibal attempted to overcome these last bastions of Roman authority in the south and defend his new allies. Pitched battles were less common in these years, and invariably fought to protect or threaten a city or town, not with the primary object of destroying the enemy's field army. Skirmishes, blockades and sudden raids were the most common activities for both sides. Much of the campaigning took place in the rugged country of central Italy, near the Apennines, terrain which made it exceptionally difficult to force a battle on an unwilling opponent. The Romans' massive resources of manpower came into play in these years more than ever before, as they fielded unprecedentedly large numbers of legions. Yet unlike 216, these were not massed into one great army, but dispersed into several forces, each not much bigger than a conventional consular army, which operated simultaneously in several theatres. The odds were against Hannibal in this type of warfare, despite his continuing ability to outwit and surprise his opponents. Ultimately he could not match the enemy's numbers and one by one the armies formed by his Italian allies were cornered and defeated, although the Romans were never able to inflict more than minor reverses on Hannibal himself and his mercenaries. In 211, in an effort to lure the Romans away from his beleaguered allies in Capua, Hannibal once again surprised the enemy and made a rapid march to Rome, camping outside the walls of the city. In contrast to 216 the city was well defended, with more troops hurrying to its aid. Later tradition claimed that an auction was held to sell the piece of land on which Hannibal's army had actually camped and that the plot went for the normal market price. Hannibal's response was to hold his own auction and sell off the major banks based around the Roman Forum. Having achieved nothing, for the blockade of Capua had not been interrupted, Hannibal was forced to march away as his food was beginning to run short and sizeable Roman forces were approaching. Whatever threat he had posed to Rome itself was at last laid to rest, but the war was far from over.
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CHAPTER 9
The War in Italy 216-203
BC
BC
H
ANNIBAL'S FIRST THREE
campaigns in Italy have been described in some detail. They are well documented and included three of the largest and most important battles of the entire war. They also provide a good picture of the way in which armies moved and fought during this period. Polybius' continuous narrative of the war ends with Cannae, and only a few fragments exist for the remainder of the thirteen years Hannibal spent in Italy. Livy provides a detailed account of these years, but his reliability is often suspect. Many of the battles he describes seem to be inflated accounts of small skirmishes, perhaps exaggerated by the propaganda of senatorial families who wished to add to the reputations of their ancestors, and little reliance can be placed on Livy's descriptions of these. During these years the rival armies marched and counter-marched across much of southern Italy, frequently passing again over the same areas, both sides struggling to control the important cities and towns, such as Capua, Tarentum, Nola and Beneventum. A simple chronological account of these years would be long, wearisome and confusing to those unfamiliar with the landscape of third-century Italy. Instead, this chapter will attempt to explain why the campaigns developed in this way.
campaigns in Italy have been described in some detail. They are well documented and included three of the largest and most important battles of the entire war. They also provide a good picture of the way in which armies moved and fought during this period. Polybius' continuous narrative of the war ends with Cannae, and only a few fragments exist for the remainder of the thirteen years Hannibal spent in Italy. Livy provides a detailed account of these years, but his reliability is often suspect. Many of the battles he describes seem to be inflated accounts of small skirmishes, perhaps exaggerated by the propaganda of senatorial families who wished to add to the reputations of their ancestors, and little reliance can be placed on Livy's descriptions of these. During these years the rival armies marched and counter-marched across much of southern Italy, frequently passing again over the same areas, both sides struggling to control the important cities and towns, such as Capua, Tarentum, Nola and Beneventum. A simple chronological account of these years would be long, wearisome and confusing to those unfamiliar with the landscape of third-century Italy. Instead, this chapter will attempt to explain why the campaigns developed in this way.
City states in the Graeco-Roman world were inherently unstable, hence the widespread admiration for the 'Mixed Constitutions' of Rome and Carthage which appeared to preserve them from political upheaval. In most communities there seemed always to be individuals or a faction which wished to dominate the state, or a group on the fringes of the established political class who were willing to raise a charismatic leader to the dictatorship if he promised to favour them. Livy presents a picture of fierce factionalism in most of the cities of southern Italy, claiming that in the majority of cases it was the poorer classes which favoured rebellion against Rome and the wealthier citizens who hoped to preserve the alliance,
although he does mention a few exceptions to this rule. Livy had little sympathy for politicians who relied on the masses for their support, blaming many of the ills which befell the Republic on such demagogues, and it may be that his association of popular politics with Rome's enemies was a deliberate attempt to condemn them. However, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the leaders wishing to supplant the existing elite were both the most likely to appeal for popular support, and also to favour revolution and so a new alliance with Carthage.
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The attitude to the Carthaginians of even those allies who did change sides seems to have been ambivalent at best, for they were alien in language and culture both to Italian and Greek. Rarely did all the communities of one region rebel simultaneously. Many Campanian cities remained loyal even after the defection of Capua and this was true in each area that rebelled, so that even some Samnites remained loyal. In some cases communities were held in check by Roman garrisons, but elsewhere the existing elites were content with Roman rule and themselves suppressed any elements favouring a change. The strength of the Roman network of alliances was demonstrated at this time of crisis, the Latin communities proving especially staunch. Although eventually much of southern Italy defected to, or was captured by, Hannibal, the bulk of Rome's allies remained loyal. In part this may have been due to fear. For much of the war the Romans maintained a strong army in Etruria, and the Senate responded very quickly to reports of discontent and potential rebellion at Arretium. In Sicily during the First War the cities had felt little affinity to either side and had tended to switch allegiances and join whoever they believed to be the stronger. Despite the appearance of invincibility gained by Hannibal after Cannae, this did not happen to anywhere near the same extent in Italy.
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Those communities which did join Hannibal had no sense of common identity or purpose. In 215 one of Hannibal's officers, Hanno, led an army primarily composed of Bruttians against Rhegium, Locri and other Greek cities in the south-west of Italy. The Bruttians were amazed when Locri surrendered and was granted allied status by the Carthaginians, for they had eagerly anticipated plundering the city as enemies. They promptly proceeded to besiege Croton without Punic aid to ensure that they alone enjoyed the prizes of this victory. The Roman system had always placed Rome at the centre of a network of otherwise unconnected communities. When allegiance to Rome was removed, then there was no common bond between the Italian communities, since none favoured the prospect of shifting their allegiance to Capua or any other big city. Each tended to look to its own interests and expected Hannibal to provide them with full protection from Roman reprisals. On several occasions the Campanians and Samnites complained that Hannibal was not doing enough to defend them against attacks and expected him to rush to their aid with his main army.
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