The Fall of Carthage (40 page)
Capua was the most important city to defect to Hannibal in the aftermath of Cannae. Its population held Roman citizenship, but without the right to vote or stand for office in Rome, and the aristocrats of the city had close connections with many senatorial families, marriage alliances being relatively common. Hannibal guaranteed that Capua should be self-governing and retain its own laws, which would be enforced by its own magistrates. No Carthaginian officer or magistrate was to have jurisdiction over the city, and neither could they compel Campanian citizens to serve in the army or perform any other duty against their will. Arrangements were also made to provide the city with 300 Roman prisoners who could be exchanged for a similarly sized detachment of Campanian horse serving with the Romans in Sicily. In fact these cavalrymen chose, or felt compelled, to remain loyal and were later rewarded by the Romans. It was clear that the city did not envisage a close, subordinate relationship with Carthage. Perhaps the leaders at Capua hoped that after the Punic victory in the war, their city would replace Rome as the dominant power in Italy. It is difficult to know to what extent the Capuans were motivated by discontent with their relationship with Rome or despair over their ally's prospects after the string of defeats culminating in Cannae. Livy claims that a deputation had been sent to Varro after the battle and that his sense of despair persuaded them that Rome's defeat was inevitable, but this may simply be another piece of propaganda intended to blacken the consul's name. Romans in Capua were arrested and imprisoned in a bath house, where they were suffocated by the extreme heat of the furnace. It is unclear whether or not this act was deliberate and, if so, who ordered it, but it is clear that feelings against Rome ran high after Capua had rebelled.
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Most of the cities which defected to Hannibal did so only on the approach of his army. When a city did not act in this way, Hannibal immediately resorted to force or the threat of force in an attempt to overawe them with his might and prompt their surrender. Twice in late 216 the Punic army swept down on Naples, hoping to force it into submission. Some Neapolitan cavalry were heavily defeated in a skirmish outside the walls, but the magistrates and senate held the population loyal to Rome and no faction willing to seize power or betray the city to the enemy appeared. Hannibal withdrew as soon as this became clear and moved off to try his luck elsewhere, starving Nuceria into submission and making the first of his unsuccessful threats to Nola. Only very small communities were ever subjected to direct assault, for an attack on a well-fortified city had little prospect of success and risked heavy casualties and the diminution of his reputation for invincibility. As in the First War in Sicily, the principal ways of taking a city were by stealth or blockade. Stealth relied on gaining knowledge of a weakness in the defences or an offer of betrayal from inside and was therefore only viable in some places. Blockade required the army to stay in one place for months or even years and the willingness of Hannibal to employ his main army in this way was usually a sign of the importance of the place under siege.
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After the fall of Capua, Hannibal began the siege of Casilinum late in 216 and reinforced the blockading force with much of his army early in the next spring. The city lay on the River Volturnus, commanding the routes north out of the Campanian plain along the
via Appia
and the
via Latina.
It was heroically defended by a garrison of allied soldiers, a cohort of about 500 Latins from Praeneste commanded by Marcus Anicius and another of 460 Perusians with a few mixed stragglers from Roman field armies. Short of food the defenders foraged for roots and grass outside the walls, planting turnips when Hannibal ordered the ground ploughed up. A Roman army under the
Magister Equitum
Gracchus hovered in the area but was unwilling to close with the Carthaginian army. To aid the defenders, at night the Romans floated large jars full of grain down the river. For several nights the plan succeeded until Hannibal's men noticed the pots caught in the reeds near the river bank and established a firmer guard, sealing off this means of supply. Eventually the garrison ran out of food and surrendered after Hannibal had promised to ransom them at the rate of seven tenths of a pound of gold per man. This was duly paid - presumably by their communities although our sources are not explicit - and the men released. Livy tells us that Anicius later erected a statue of himself at Praeneste to fulfil a vow made during the siege. About half of the garrison had perished before the capitulation. The Praenestians were offered Roman citizenship by the Senate and interestingly refused the honour, a sign of the strong loyalty of many Latins and Italians to their own communities. Hannibal left Casilinum to the Campanians, bolstering their new garrison with 700 of his own men, for the Romans would need to regain control of this place if they were to threaten Capua itself.
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via Appia
and the
via Latina.
It was heroically defended by a garrison of allied soldiers, a cohort of about 500 Latins from Praeneste commanded by Marcus Anicius and another of 460 Perusians with a few mixed stragglers from Roman field armies. Short of food the defenders foraged for roots and grass outside the walls, planting turnips when Hannibal ordered the ground ploughed up. A Roman army under the
Magister Equitum
Gracchus hovered in the area but was unwilling to close with the Carthaginian army. To aid the defenders, at night the Romans floated large jars full of grain down the river. For several nights the plan succeeded until Hannibal's men noticed the pots caught in the reeds near the river bank and established a firmer guard, sealing off this means of supply. Eventually the garrison ran out of food and surrendered after Hannibal had promised to ransom them at the rate of seven tenths of a pound of gold per man. This was duly paid - presumably by their communities although our sources are not explicit - and the men released. Livy tells us that Anicius later erected a statue of himself at Praeneste to fulfil a vow made during the siege. About half of the garrison had perished before the capitulation. The Praenestians were offered Roman citizenship by the Senate and interestingly refused the honour, a sign of the strong loyalty of many Latins and Italians to their own communities. Hannibal left Casilinum to the Campanians, bolstering their new garrison with 700 of his own men, for the Romans would need to regain control of this place if they were to threaten Capua itself.
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After 216 Hannibal was faced with the permanent problem of protecting his new allies and their territory. Defections to him did not greatly increase the number of soldiers at his disposal. At various times predominantly Italian forces were formed, sometimes bolstered by detachments of mercenaries from the main army and commanded by a Carthaginian officer. The army defeated at the River Calor in 214 consisted of 17,000 Bruttian and Lucanian foot supported by 1,200 Numidian and Moorish light horse under the leadership of Hanno. This army had earlier enjoyed some success in persuading the Greek cities of the south-west to submit. In 212 it was again heavily defeated near Beneventum, when the Romans surprised Hanno whilst the bulk of his men were out foraging. At this action, a cohort from Praeneste once more played a distinguished role, being the first to break into the Punic camp. Most of Hannibal's Italian allies were unwilling to commit large numbers of their troops to campaigning outside their own territory, another sign of the lack of common cause between these communities as well as the fear of Roman reprisals. It was rare for there to be more than one sizeable force available to operate in support of Hannibal's main army and, as Hanno's defeats showed, their performance was poor. The Romans fought with great determination against their former allies and were certainly not in awe of them, as they still were of Hannibal and his army. Few Italians had ever exercised high command, since such posts were the preserves of Roman citizens, and Carthaginian officers could only gradually create a bond with Italian soldiers and develop some sort of command structure to control these new armies. As at the River Calor, most of these predominantly Italian armies were weak in cavalry, denying them one of the greatest advantages Hannibal himself had always enjoyed over the Romans. This meant that the only force which could consistentiy face and defeat Roman armies in battle was Hannibal's own main army. Some Italians were incorporated into this and performed well, but its heart remained the Libyan, Numidian, Spanish and Gallic contingents. Its numbers were steadily cfiminished by casualties, disease, and the need to detach groups to bolster allied resistance. Only once, in 214, did Hannibal receive a significant reinforcement when Bomilcar and a Punic fleet managed to land troops, elephants and supplies at Locri.
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The Roman situation was utterly different. We have already seen how quickly they had mustered new legions in the months after Cannae, making use of slaves and criminals. There is some suggestion that during these years the minimum property qualification for service in the legions was significantly reduced, adding to the already large pool of citizen manpower which was to prove Rome's great advantage in these years. Record numbers of legions were enrolled for the remaining years of the conflict. Livy is our main source for the number of legions fielded in each year, although there are some problems and apparent contradictions in these passages, for instance the inconsistency with which he includes the armies in Spain in his figures, so that certain scholars have modified his total. There were at least twelve and probably fourteen legions in service in the spring of 215 and eighteen in 214. The number continued to rise until there were twenty-five legions at the peak of Roman mobilization in 212-211, representing a theoretical strength of at least 100,000 infantry and 7,500 cavalry, supported as always by a similar number of allied soldiers. The bulk of these troops were invariably deployed in Italy. However, they were not concentrated into one or two great armies intended to confront and defeat Hannibal in open battle. In the decade after Cannae there were between four and seven consular-sized, two-legion armies operating in the Italian Peninsula, supported by several single-legion forces as well as smaller garrisons and detachments. The increase in the number of active field armies made it relatively easy for the Romans to threaten defecting Italian states.
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The Roman situation was utterly different. We have already seen how quickly they had mustered new legions in the months after Cannae, making use of slaves and criminals. There is some suggestion that during these years the minimum property qualification for service in the legions was significantly reduced, adding to the already large pool of citizen manpower which was to prove Rome's great advantage in these years. Record numbers of legions were enrolled for the remaining years of the conflict. Livy is our main source for the number of legions fielded in each year, although there are some problems and apparent contradictions in these passages, for instance the inconsistency with which he includes the armies in Spain in his figures, so that certain scholars have modified his total. There were at least twelve and probably fourteen legions in service in the spring of 215 and eighteen in 214. The number continued to rise until there were twenty-five legions at the peak of Roman mobilization in 212-211, representing a theoretical strength of at least 100,000 infantry and 7,500 cavalry, supported as always by a similar number of allied soldiers. The bulk of these troops were invariably deployed in Italy. However, they were not concentrated into one or two great armies intended to confront and defeat Hannibal in open battle. In the decade after Cannae there were between four and seven consular-sized, two-legion armies operating in the Italian Peninsula, supported by several single-legion forces as well as smaller garrisons and detachments. The increase in the number of active field armies made it relatively easy for the Romans to threaten defecting Italian states.
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There was also far more continuity in the Roman command. Fabius Maximus held his third consulship in 215 with Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the dictator Pera's
Mag
ister Equitum,
as his colleague. In 214 he was again consul, this time with Marcus Claudius Marcellus, who had held the office in 222. The next year Fabius' son, also called Quintus Fabius Maximus, was elected consul in what was seen as a gesture of favour for his father, and Gracchus won his second term of office. Marcellus held the consulship again in 210 and 208, and the elder Fabius once more in 209. In 212 and 209 Quintus Fulvius Flaccus held his third and fourth consulships, over twenty years after he had first held the post in 237. All of these men also held pro-magisterial commands during the years between their office, so that Marcellus served without a break from 216 until his death in 208. The electorate's preference for experienced men to hold the senior posts indicated a realization that the current crisis required able commanders, but was also a result of the appalling casualties suffered by the major senatorial families in the first years of the war. The Senate's ranks had been replenished by men with distinguished records, but these were invariably too young or too poor to stand for the highest magistracy with any chance of success. Marcellus, Fabius and Fulvius Flaccus were all in their late fifties or sixties, members of the generation which had grown up and fought during the First Punic War. Serving with the same legions for several years in succession gready increased the bond between commander and soldiers. The legions of
volones,
the slaves recruited after Cannae, showed particular affection for Gracchus, dispersing and having to be reformed after he was ambushed and killed in 212.
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Mag
ister Equitum,
as his colleague. In 214 he was again consul, this time with Marcus Claudius Marcellus, who had held the office in 222. The next year Fabius' son, also called Quintus Fabius Maximus, was elected consul in what was seen as a gesture of favour for his father, and Gracchus won his second term of office. Marcellus held the consulship again in 210 and 208, and the elder Fabius once more in 209. In 212 and 209 Quintus Fulvius Flaccus held his third and fourth consulships, over twenty years after he had first held the post in 237. All of these men also held pro-magisterial commands during the years between their office, so that Marcellus served without a break from 216 until his death in 208. The electorate's preference for experienced men to hold the senior posts indicated a realization that the current crisis required able commanders, but was also a result of the appalling casualties suffered by the major senatorial families in the first years of the war. The Senate's ranks had been replenished by men with distinguished records, but these were invariably too young or too poor to stand for the highest magistracy with any chance of success. Marcellus, Fabius and Fulvius Flaccus were all in their late fifties or sixties, members of the generation which had grown up and fought during the First Punic War. Serving with the same legions for several years in succession gready increased the bond between commander and soldiers. The legions of
volones,
the slaves recruited after Cannae, showed particular affection for Gracchus, dispersing and having to be reformed after he was ambushed and killed in 212.
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Several of the elections in these years were controversial. In 215, Gracchus and Lucius Postumius were originally elected consuls, and the Assembly voted for Marcellus to replace the latter when he was ambushed and killed in Gaul. However, on the day that Marcellus formally assumed the office, the college of augurs reported hearing thunder and his election was declared invalid on religious grounds. Another election was held and Fabius Maximus chosen. It is difficult to know what lay behind this incident, although manipulation of the State religion for political ends was not unknown at Rome. Those who understand Roman politics purely in terms of factions have had trouble reconciling Fabius' apparent desire to prevent Marcellus holding office, with his willingness to have him as a colleague the next year. Fabius himself presided over the election for 214 and is supposed to have asked the leading centuries of the
Comitia
to reconsider, when they had initially chosen two former praetors whom he considered to be unsuitable for the current situation. Livy tells us that the Senate informally stated that it was improper to have Marcellus and Gracchus as colleagues, since both were plebeians and it was traditional to reserve at least one of the consulships for a patrician. If this was in fact behind the whole business, then it would indicate the same sort of emphasis on scrupulous normality in spite of the current crisis which also characterized the regulation of the State religion at this time. The continuation of the normally fierce competition for office throughout the Hannibalic war is another indication of the strength of the Roman political system. Roman senators battled furiously to gain magistracies and senior commands against the State's most dangerous enemy. None ever dreamed of joining that enemy and seeking his aid to gain power in a defeated Rome.
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Comitia
to reconsider, when they had initially chosen two former praetors whom he considered to be unsuitable for the current situation. Livy tells us that the Senate informally stated that it was improper to have Marcellus and Gracchus as colleagues, since both were plebeians and it was traditional to reserve at least one of the consulships for a patrician. If this was in fact behind the whole business, then it would indicate the same sort of emphasis on scrupulous normality in spite of the current crisis which also characterized the regulation of the State religion at this time. The continuation of the normally fierce competition for office throughout the Hannibalic war is another indication of the strength of the Roman political system. Roman senators battled furiously to gain magistracies and senior commands against the State's most dangerous enemy. None ever dreamed of joining that enemy and seeking his aid to gain power in a defeated Rome.
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Although the Roman armies fielded in these years did not mass together, they often operated in mutual support. Campania was the main focus of Roman attention until 211. In 215 Fabius and Gracchus both went there, whilst Marcellus based himself with another two legions at Nola. Gracchus relieved Cumae on his own, but afterwards both consuls acted together against the outposts protecting the approaches to Capua. In 214 Marcellus brought his army into the area to cover Fabius whilst he besieged and eventually captured Casilinum. Later, near the end of Fabius' year of office, a nobleman from the city of Arpi in northern Apulia came to him and offered to betray the city to the Romans in return for a reward. This man, one Dasius Altinus, informed them of a weakness in the city's defences. Fabius approached as if to conduct a regular siege, but then employed a picked body of 600 men in a night attack. The weather favoured the Romans as a thunderstorm reduced visibility and forced most of the sentries to seek shelter. Setting ladders against the weak spot in the wall, the Roman force climbed into the city and moved silently to seize the gates and admit the remainder of the army into the city just before dawn. For a while the population and the Punic garrison tried to resist in the streets, but the Arpini surrendered and turned on their erstwhile allies. The Carthaginians in turn capitulated and were allowed to rejoin Hannibal's main army, but nearly 1,000 Spanish deserted to the Romans who rewarded them with double rations, perhaps an indication of one of their grievances with Carthaginian service conditions. This was the second serious desertion suffered by Hannibal's army, for 272 mixed Spanish and Numidian cavalrymen had defected to Marcellus' camp outside Nola the previous year. Such losses in the years when Hannibal's strength and fortune appeared at its greatest are striking, but this was not entirely a one-way process, for some Roman and Italian deserters proved willing to fight with the enemy. On the whole Hannibal's soldiers of all nationalities proved remarkably loyal.
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