The President considered the ambassador's response for some minutes, then looked over at the Admiral.
âWhen we go in, I don't want any American soldiers on the ground anywhere near this goddamn gas.' He was troubled by the reports that Saddam had amassed stockpiles of the lethal VX nerve gas.
Once the Israelis had discovered the existence of the deadly gas, they had threatened their own pre-emptive strike against Iraq without waiting for any U.N. debate on the matter. Although
âOperation Desert Storm'
had successfully destroyed most of Iraq's armaments, the country had maintained its belligerent course, rebuilding its shattered defenses. Saddam Hussein's refusal to permit U.N. inspectors access to what U.S. satellite intelligence identified as suspected armories for the storage of weapons of mass destruction, only supported the West's gravest fears. The Chinese ICBM's were to be used to deliver the VX as part of their payload.
Admiral Brown affirmed that there would be no ground troops deployed in the action, having already decided to maximize air-strikes to destroy the targeted depots and suspected missile storage sites, including the Presidential Palaces.
The conference concluded and those no longer required departed leaving the President to discuss other matters with National Security Adviser Alex Hastings, the Defense Secretary, Steven Cohen, and John W. Peterson, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Chief of Staff hesitated at the door expecting to be included in these discussions.
âThanks, Dean.' It was a clear signal that the President would not require his presence and, although miffed with the polite dismissal, he smiled and closed the door gently behind as he exited, curious as to what might transpire in his absence.
* * * *
The concerns which were to be discussed had arisen out of growing evidence that there had been a substantial shift in Indonesian politics, one which had been discussed over a number of months, and one which had the potential of destabilizing not only South East Asia, but America's efforts to consolidate its position in China. Less than three weeks had passed since these men had last been required to brief their chief. Now, with confirmation that the American President would visit China within the following months, it was essential that events in the Indonesian archipelago in no way influenced negotiations which would take place in Beijing.
âWell?' The President asked, standing to restore circulation. He rubbed the back of his thighs, stretched, then returned to his seat. Director Peterson carried no files, for what he had to impart would not be recorded, not even for future Presidential libraries.
âIt's not good news. It appears that our earlier speculations were on track. No matter which way we interpret the intelligence, it would appear that Suhapto is, indeed, considering the acquisition of nuclear-capable missile technology from Iran,' he relayed, his voice devoid of any emotion.
âThe general consensus is that he also intends giving the Indonesian Moslem parties a major say in the country's administration.'
âI don't know, John,' the President argued, âseems like a radical flip to me. Suhapto is a cunning old codger, are you sure we're not misreading what's going on here?'
âEverything we've gathered points to the same conclusion.'
âAre we certain that our judgment is not being influenced because he's been courting the Chinese?'
âThat's certainly part of the bigger picture, but for now our prime concern relates to what is happening within Indonesia. A sudden swing towards Moslem militancy would destabilize the region. Considering current economic trends in South East Asia, we believe that the mood amongst lower income communities would support a resurgence of Moslem extremist policies.'
âAnd these links with the PLO and..,' the President hesitated, looking for assistance.'
âOsama bin Ladam,' Peterson offered.
âYes, bin Ladam. How does this tie in with Suhapto?'
âAt first, we missed what was happening because we had no reason to monitor the external flow of funds from Jakarta to Switzerland. As it turns out, even had we been aware of the transactions, it's possible that these would have been ignored. The amounts were not excessive, and could have been easily overlooked. It's not as if the Suhaptos have never had payments made into their Swiss accounts before. Had it not been for the Israelis, in all probability, we might never have picked up on what was going on.'
âBut hasn't this bin Ladam sufficient resources of his own? Why is it necessary for the Indonesians to pump funds into his organization?'
âWe're not entirely sure. What it does though, is signal that there are those in Jakarta who are prepared to finance radical elements known for their anti-American sentiments. Perhaps the funds were sent simply as a gesture. The jury's still out on this.'
âWhat are we up against with bin Ladam?'
âIt's highly likely that he already possesses at least one nuclear warhead that could be used on a missile, most probably from the Iranians. Our sources have reported an increase in the frequency of his visits to Teheran.'
âWhat's in it for the Iranians, or even the Iraqis for that matter?' the President asked.
âThat's the China link.'
âLet's go over that again. I don't see how the Indonesian situation is affected by Iran's relationship with Beijing.'
The Director exhaled heavily. âWe all know how events of the bloody Sixties were attributed to Beijing's interference in Jakarta's affairs. After the Indonesians broke off diplomatic relations with the Chinese, relationships continued to sour through the years. Even the Indonesian military promoted the belief that the Chinese were responsible for the so-called communist coup attempt. This unexpected rapprochement caught us all by surprise, particularly as it so obviously had military implications.'
Peterson looked over at the National Security Council Adviser Hastings for support, who accepted his cue.
âMr. President,' he commenced, âit makes sense. Indonesia is the world's largest Moslem nation. All of China's imported oil passes through the archipelago. This oil originates from Iran and Iraq, both basically fundamentalist Moslem nations. China provides missiles and associated technology to them, and has consolidated its position with yet another Moslem nation, Pakistan. The intelligence points to an ambitious move by the Chinese to identify regionally with those Moslem powers.
We believe that Beijing has been wooing the Pakistanis with the promise of additional nuclear weaponry, for the past two years. Tel Aviv's intelligence claims that Pakistan may even be considering nuclear testing, although we have had no evidence of such developments. It could be that our feisty allies may have some explaining to do themselves with respect to India's growing nuclear potential. In short, we believe that Indonesia is next on China's list and, unless we move to destabilize this relationship, it is conceivable that Chinese manufactured weaponry, particularly ICBMÂ missile technology, could end up in Indonesian hands.'
âWhy would China want to give them weapons which, in time, could be turned against them?'
âWell, although Chinese in origin, we believe that the technology and equipment will come from Iran, perhaps even Iraq. By giving Indonesia the weapons directly, they'll ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil to China. In turn, Iran and Iraq continue to receive missile technology from Beijing.'
âAnd China won't object?'
âChina would still maintain control over the technology. It's unlikely they'd permit anything too serious to pass into Indonesian hands. It's most likely we'd see short-range missiles popping up around the country, but nothing which could threaten China directly. Our guess is that Beijing would see this development as another positive step towards loosening American-Indonesian ties. Any diminishment of American influence in Asia would receive a positive response from them. They know we'll do whatever necessary to prevent Jakarta from acquiring such technology and, in their minds, any rift between our countries could only benefit China's influence over the region, in the long term.'
âBut why would Jakarta need missiles? They're not under threat.'
âOur concern lies with the possibility of a major shift towards Moslem fundamentalism in Indonesia. This would open the door for the extremists there, whom we all know, are less than pro-American. With President Suhapto's support, we could see a polarized Moslem government in Jakarta espousing anti-American propaganda, providing a forum for Filipino and Malay Muslims to follow.
In Malaysia, this could be a particularly nasty scenario, considering the last ethnic and religious upheaval which pitched indigenous groups against Chinese-Malays. Possessing missile technology would undoubtedly be a major boost to national pride and, as Jakarta has obviously fallen under the influence of the mullahs, we can be reasonably certain that an Indonesian Muslim government wouldn't hesitate to improve its status amongst the world's Islamic community.'
The President recalled how his fellow Americans had once been totally consumed by their anti-Communist zealousness. Subsequent to the collapse of the Soviet Empire, attention had become focused on Islam as the Free World's new threat, the memory of gasoline rationing when the Arabs had held the West to ransom, still fresh in American minds.
âWouldn't the Indonesians be concerned with China's motives?' the President asked. They had discussed the emerging problem on several occasions over past weeks, and he just did not want to believe that their old ally, Suhapto, was even considering forming an axis with Beijing, particularly one which would undoubtedly result in the reduction of an American presence in Asia.
He was most disturbed with these developments, and experienced a feeling of
deja vu
, recalling that Indonesia's first President, Soekarno, had formed such an unholy alliance with Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse Tung.
This, he knew, was the basis for the American Government's constant but futile attempts to have the man known lovingly by his people as
Bung
Karno
overthrown, succeeding finally, when the then General Suhapto came to acceptable arrangements with the United States.
In the weeks that followed his taking office, the American President was moved when reading his predecessor's most secret accounts of the bloodletting which had then ensued, resulting in the loss of more than half a million lives amongst which, were many innocent Chinese.
âLet's not forget that it's been the Chinese who have supported Suhapto thoughout his career Mr. President. There is no doubt that he has delivered the Indonesian economy to them. Banks, flour mills, steel mills, textiles, shipping, timber, property. My god, the list goes on forever!'Â the exasperated adviser complained. âThese days, the Indonesian-Chinese investment houses can be found anywhere one cares to look; Singapore, London, Sydney, Germany, and in most cities here in the States. Inadvertently, even we've played a major role in their rapid growth, by permitting their powerful investment houses to penetrate the Chinese market via our own banking system.'
Alex Hastings then hesitated, not knowing just how far he should go considering the sensitive issues which had emerged over the President's past relationships with the Jakarta-based Chinese who, it had been discovered, had donated huge amounts to his earlier election campaigns.
He looked directly at his Chief to determine if he had overstepped the mark. Detecting that he hadn't, Hastings continued.
âSuhapto's overtures towards Beijing caught everyone by surprise, including his senior military officers who agree that this sudden shift in Indonesian politics can only benefit the Chinese. Although China has committed itself to expenditures exceeding fifty billion dollars over the next fifteen years to rebuild and expand its nuclear power facilities, their oil dependency is alarmingly high.
China's economy is growing at an amazing rate, and we can be certain that they would have considered precisely how vulnerable they would be in the event of any interruption to their oil supplies. Indonesia has archipelago status over its shipping lanes. It makes sense that China would be delighted to mend fences with them and even offer to cooperate in other areas, even if this translates into providing their neighbors with limited missile technology to boost Moslem morale.
Should this eventuate, Mr. President, the Japanese people would most probably wake up one morning to discover that China had displaced them as the major trading partner with Indonesia and, subsequently, all ten of the ASEAN member nations. This would represent the world's largest trading bloc, one which would continue to grow at the expense of both the European Union and our own NAFTA treaties.' This was followed by silence as those present considered the ramifications of such an alliance, and the threat of having the doors closed to a potential consumer base which approached three billion people.
âAnd Suhapto's sudden infatuation with these militant Moslem groups, how does this fit in?' the President left the question hanging for either of the two senior officers to respond.
âWe have a man inside the
Mufti Muharam
hierarchy who has confirmed that the Palace has agreed to the proposed shift in policy, one which will provide both the major Islamic groups with a substantial voice in future government. Our source is emphatic that the Palace has agreed to support radical changes in its position relating to minority religious groups, preventing the further spread of non-Moslem teachings. It seems that the aging President senses his end might be near, and is influenced by his approaching demise.
In short, we might be witnessing the beginnings of an Indonesian sectarian state. Ever since Madame Suhapto passed away, the old man has turned much of his attention to studying the Koran, and has spent considerable time with senior members of the Islamic community, both in Indonesia, and the Arab states during recent Haj journeys to Mecca.'