The First Clash (36 page)

10.
Some historians make the case that the humbling of Argos is what brought Corinth, Sicyon, Megara, and Aegina into the Peloponnesian League and that
they had not been members prior to this war. See Terry Buckley,
Aspects of Greek History 750–323 BC: A Source-Based Approach
(New York: Routledge, 1996), 83.

11.
For a good general description of the
agoge
system, see W. G. Forrest,
History of Sparta 950 BC–192 BC
(London: Hutchinson, 1968). An argument has been made that what we know about the
agoge
is a result of Hellenistic and Roman myth making and that Sparta’s education of its youth was little different from that in any other Greek city. I remain unconvinced by these arguments, but for those who wish to pursue them, see: Nigel M. Kennell,
The Gymnasium of Virtue: Education and Culture in Ancient Sparta
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).

12.
Paul Cartledge says a more accurate term is a “similar,” as there were levels of society within Sparta and men were not peers, except when they took their place in the battle line.

13.
Willis West,
Ancient World: From the Earliest Times to 800 A.D
. (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1905), 109.

14.
If a hoplite ran away from battle, the first thing he would discard would be his heavy shield. Also, a dead hoplite would be carried home or to his burial place on his shield.

15.
Jean-Pierre Vernant, ed.,
The Greeks
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 93.

16.
Herodotus, 5.39.

17.
Ibid., 5.42.

18.
Five ephors were elected annually. They could advise and influence the king and summon the assembly and the more powerful
gerousia
(selected only from Sparta’s noble families). They also acted as judges and punitive powers and could bring other officials to trial. Sparta was ruled by two kings, who to some degree were overseen by five ephors elected annually. The institution may have arisen as a result of a need for leadership while the kings were leading armies in battle.

19.
Sparta had two kings descending from two royal houses, the Agiad and the Eurypontid. Of the two, the Agiad was considered superior.

1.
There is some evidence that the Alcmaeonidae exile from Athens was not as clean a break as Herodotus reports, and even that during the rule of Hippias, Cleisthenes himself may have served as an archon. For a discussion of this possibility, see Wesley E. Thompson, “The Archonship of Cleisthenes,”
Classical Journal
55, no. 5 (February 1960): 217–220; and James W. Alexander, “Was Cleisthenes an Athenian Archon?”
Classical Journal
54, no. 7 (April 1959): 307–314.

2.
Herodotus, 6.108.

3.
J. A.O. Larsen, “A New Interpretation of the Thessalian Confederacy,”
Classical Philology
55, no. 4 (October 1960): 229–248.

4.
Herodotus, 5.62.

5.
This is a pretty strong indication that the mass of people in Attica had not yet turned on Hippias, and he might even have still drawn considerable support from the countryside. This would mean that his more murderous tendencies were restricted largely to the noble classes and were of little interest to the mass of farmers, who still felt a lingering loyalty to the Pisistratidae for the rights to their land.

6.
A policy they happily put aside during the Peloponnesian War, when they accepted substantial Persian support in order to defeat Athens.

7.
Herodotus, 5.69.

8.
For an excellent discussion of the political maneuvering leading up to Cleisthenes’ assumption of power in Athens, see George Willis Botsford, “The Trial of the Alcmeonidae and the Cleisthenean Constitutional Reforms,”
Harvard Studies in Classical Philology
8 (1897): 1–22.

9.
It is unclear if Isagoras was aware of his wife’s affair or even if Herodotus was just passing on malicious (but possibly untrue) gossip.

10.
The date for these reforms is still a matter of great debate. A straight reading of Herodotus seems to indicate that they were made while Isagoras was still in power. But how they could have been enacted during a time when Cleisthenes held no political power is a mystery. My belief is that the promise of reform was made to the people during Isagoras’s rule and later delivered on. For an excellent discussion of this dating problem, see Charles W. Fornara and Loren J. Samons,
Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 169–171.

11.
For an excellent review of Athenian politics during this period, see C. A. Robinson Jr., “Athenian Politics,”
American Journal of Philology
66, no. 3 (1945): 243–254.

12.
For an excellent discussion of these reforms and changing Athenian politics, see A. Andrews, “Kleisthenes’ Reform Bill,”
Classical Quarterly
, new ser. 27, no. 2 (1977): 241–248.

13.
There is some debate as to whether Cleisthenes was the first to enact laws on ostracism, as it may have been done during the time of Pisistratus. As it is not central to the theme of this book, we will not delve into the topic. For those with an interest in this unique legal development, see Antony E. Raubitschek, “The Origin of Ostracism,”
American Journal of Archaeology
55, no. 3 (July 1951): 221–229.

14.
Historians have long disputed whether Cleisthenes actually enfranchised aliens and slaves. I have accepted the conclusions of Donald Kagan on the matter. See Donald Kagan, “The Enfranchisement of Aliens by Cleisthenes,”
Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte
12, no. 1 (January 1963): 41–46.

15.
This is the number of demes in the third century BC (according to Strabo), and the number during Cleisthenes’ time was likely the same or very close to it. Others give the number of demes at 139.

16.
For an in-depth look at the
trittys
concept, see Donald W. Bradeen, “The Trittyes in Cleisthenes’ Reforms,”
Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association
86 (1955): 22–30.

17.
For a thorough analysis of these reforms, see James H. Oliver, “Reforms of
Clisthenes,”
Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte
9, no. 4 (October 1960): 503–507.

18.
Athens had developed a system of three concurrent archons: the archon eponymous, the chief magistrate; the archon basileus, for civic religious arrangements; and the polemarch, who commanded the army.

19.
Herodotus, 5.73.

20.
For an interesting analysis of the pro-Persian faction in Athens, see C. A. Robinson Jr., “Medizing Athenian Aristocrats,”
Classical Weekly
35, no. 4 (October 27, 1941): 39–40; and James Holladay, “Medism in Athens 508–480 B.C.,”
Greece & Rome
, 2nd ser., 25, no. 2 (October 1978): 174–191.

21.
It is also likely that if one Spartan king did not wish to attack, there were a large number of Spartan hoplites present who also thought it was inadvisable.

22.
Athens was burned by the Persians in the 480 BC invasion, and apparently there was still significant scarring when Herodotus was writing.

23.
Colonies, once established, were politically independent entities, while settlers in cleruchies kept their Athenian citizenship, rights, and duties, which included serving as hoplites when needed.

24.
Pausanias,
Description of Greece
, 1.29.1,
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/pausanius-bk.html

25.
Elizabeth A. Myer, “Epitaphs and Citizenship in Classical Athens,”
Journal of Hellenic Studies
113 (1993): 106.

26.
That Herodotus may have ignored his noble or even heroic death in combat (no mean undertaking for a man of his years) could be just one more example of the historian saying as little positive of the Alcmaeonidae as possible.

1.
Herodotus, 4.97.

2.
Ibid., 4.142.

3.
See George Beardoe Grundy,
The Great Persian War and Its Preliminaries
(London: 1901) for an excellent analysis of how Herodotus came to believe so much of a story that was so obviously incorrect (pp. 55–70).

4.
The chronology of Miltiades’ adventures is open to argument. Apparently, at some unknown point he was forced to flee the Chersonese because of a Scythian incursion. Some important historians have stated that he was forced to flee not by the Scythians, but by Megabazos, who had learned of his disloyalty at the Danube bridgehead. The truth seems to be that this Scythian invasion took place well before Darius’s march through Thrace and that Miltiades soon returned to defeat the Scythians (or wild Thracians). The spoils of this victory were dedicated to Zeus at Olympia, and archaeologists have discovered his helmet there. Miltiades was definitely in the Chersonese when the Ionian revolt broke out in 499 BC, as coins he issued and dated to that period have been discovered. Some historians have argued that the Scythian invasion took place after Darius had returned to Sardis in 512 or 511 BC and that Megabazos, knowing of Miltiades’ supposed treachery at the bridge, refused to come to his assistance. There are two major problems with this thesis.
First, letting a Scythian force large enough to menace walled cities penetrate that deep into Thrace uncontested would have risked everything Darius had gained in his expedition. There is no reason to believe Megabazos was that militarily incompetent. Next, this reasoning fails to explain why the Persians allowed Miltiades to return and remain in power for over a decade. For a defense of this position, see J. A. S. Evans, “Histiaeus and Aristagoras: Notes on the Ionian Revolt,”
American Journal of Philology
84, no. 2 (April 1963): 113–128.

5.
Herodotus tells a story that the future Macedonian king Alexandros had Megabazos’s Persian envoys murdered because of their rude treatment of Macedonian women. He later covers up this crime by bribing Megabazos and giving his sister in marriage to the Persian envoy sent to discover what happened to his predecessors. This is almost certainly a fabrication that Alexandros sold to the other Greeks after the Persians had finally been defeated. That he had submitted and married off his sister to a Persian could not be denied or hidden. But it could be explained away as necessary after the slaughter of important Persian envoys. That the murders could have taken place and been left unavenged by Persia must be judged as unlikely.

6.
That Darius rewarded loyal Greeks was just good policy. It by no means discounts the hypothesis that there was a Persian force at the bridge to make loyalty the easiest option to take.

1.
For the story of the tattooed messenger, see Herodotus, 5.35.

2.
See Evans, “Histiaeus and Aristagoras,” who is in general agreement with this position but goes further by stating that Histiaeus never revolted but ran afoul of Artaphrenes, who had him impaled because he was determined to crush the revolt with force and did not want his plans hindered by prolonged negotiations. (Histiaeus is Histiaios.)

3.
Denied plunder, the fleet and army would have been glad to get paid; Aristagoras paid them out of his own pocket.

4.
Bury, ed.,
Cambridge Ancient History
, vol. 4,
The Persian Empire and the West
, pp. 218.

5.
That the Persians reassessed and lowered the tax burden at the cessation of hostilities is a strong indication the taxes were both ruinous and an underlying cause of the conflict. That the Persians were willing to lower the taxes demonstrates they were doing everything possible to avoid a recurrence of hostilities.

6.
According to Herodotus, Koes was a Greek who advised Darius not to dismantle the bridge over the Danube before plunging deep into the Scythian hinterland. For this good advice, Darius had granted him Mytilene to rule. If the bridge had been dismantled, there was a strong possibility that Darius and his army would have been lost.

7.
The term
anabasis
(a large military expedition) comes from the title of a book by Xenophon describing a Greek military expedition into the heart of the Persian Empire in 401 BC.

8.
Herodotus, 5.51.

9.
Ibid., 5.96.

10.
Plutarch, in a story impossible to evaluate, relates that Eretrian ships had defeated a Phoenician fleet off Cyprus that had been ordered to move against the Ionians.

11.
See
The Malice of Herodotus (De Malignitate Herodoti)
, p. 24. This book is considered by many to be the first scathing literary review, and it does catch Herodotus in some errors; but mostly it’s a rhetorical exercise conducted by a writer who appears viscerally upset that Herodotus often makes negative comments of the Greek cities Plutarch worshiped.

12.
Grundy claims that it must have taken some weeks for the Persians to raise a force of this size. However, it is unlikely the Ionians would have remained in a ruined city where they did not control the citadel, while the Persians mobilized an army to fight them (Grundy,
Great Persian War
, p. 98).

13.
Various reasons were given for the Athenian desertion, including the very good one that war had just erupted with their close neighbor Aegina. Also, there was already a substantial peace party in Athens, and it would probably not have taken much to turn volatile public opinion against a war on far-off shores, when there were so many pressing threats nearer home.

14.
It seems obvious that Artaphrenes had been mobilizing his army at Sardis. Logistically, a force of any formidable size would have been difficult to maintain in one location. Prudence dictated that this army be dispersed throughout the region, making it easier to draw supplies off the land. After all, the army that defeated the Greeks at Ephesus did not spring up by magic and could not have force marched from Miletus in time to have affected the course of events.

15.
Herodotus, 5.105. There is no way to determine the veracity of this passage, but it is unlikely that the Zoroastrian Darius would have prayed to Zeus. (Of course, it’s possible Herodotus may have just inserted the name of a god that would be familiar to his Greek audience.)

16.
Grundy and others say that the defeat at Ephesus could not have been as terrible as Herodotus relates, or the revolt would not have spread as rapidly as it did in 497 BC (Grundy,
Great Persian War
, p. 101).

17.
Herodotus reports that Hymees became ill and died during these operations.

18.
Grundy,
Great Persian War
, p. 111.

19.
Herodotus, 5.121.

20.
Ibid., 6.1.

21.
Some historians, such as A. R. Burn, have a radically different take on the story Herodotus presents. They make the case that Histiaios’s squadron was actually there to prevent the Persians, who now controlled the southern coast, from interfering with shipments of grain heading for Ionia. (See Burn,
Persia and the Greeks
, p. 208). However, as there is no evidence to support this position, it remains purely speculative.

22.
Most historians tend to doubt the number Herodotus presents when he gives the size of Persian fleets, as three hundred and six hundred come up often. However, it is just as likely that the Persians may have considered these numbers
to be somewhat standard. In any case, there is no doubt that Persia was capable of making a naval effort of this size, and since this fleet had been three years in the making, it must have been substantial. Sir John Myers, on evidence I have not been able to uncover, claims that of the 600 ships, only 353 ships were war vessels. See John Myers, “The Battle of Lade, 494 BC,”
Greece & Rome
, 2nd ser., 1, no. 2 (June 1954): 50–55.

23.
Assuming an average of 150 men on each ship (crews and marines).

24.
The great square sails used by the Greeks were bulky and would have been either stored securely or more likely left ashore so as not to get in the way. That the Lesbians appear to have had their sails at the ready is a strong indication that thoughts of desertion were probably on their minds before the Samians showed them the way.

25.
After the fall of Miletus, the dramatist Phrynichus composed a play,
The Taking of Miletus
, that brought his Athenian audience to tears. For reminding Athens of its desertion of the Ionian cause, he was fined one thousand drachmas.

26.
Herodotus, 6.32.

27.
This was probably not a universal policy, as tyrants are still reported in Samos, Chios, and other cities in 480 BC (and later).

28.
Mardonius was a son-in-law of Darius and the son of Gobryas (one of the seven co-conspirators who brought Darius to power). He became famous as the military commander for Xerxes’ later invasion of Greece. After Xerxes left Greece, Mardonius was killed and his army destroyed at the great Battle of Plataea.

29.
Herodotus, 6.44.

30.
Herodotus also says a number of them were devoured by sea monsters … possibly sharks?

31.
Herodotus, 6.45.

32.
Ibid., 7.133. The Athenians threw the envoys into a pit reserved for condemned prisoners. Sparta threw the envoys into a well and told them to gather earth and water from it.